The Pirates Laffite

by William C. Davis

  The United States was not going to recognize Buenos Aires or Venezuela, at least not yet. America would not send its military to Texas to support the Laffites after the treaty was signed. If there was any remaining use for the Numbers 13 or 19, it was not in Texas. They might be useful elsewhere on the Gulf, but that was a matter for Apodaca and Cienfuegos once the Laffite irritant was removed from Texas. Thus when he received another proposal from Pierre in January offering to reestablish a port at Galveston, Onís passed it on to Apodaca with little expectation. The viceroy had heard it all before, especially the demands for money. 84

  At this time privateering commissions from Buenos Aires would have been a godsend to the Laffites, and there were plenty of them about. In the fall of 1817 alone some fourteen corsairs commissioned by the insurgency had brought forty-two prizes into port. One captain took twenty-four prizes during the summer, and boarded ninety-three vessels of all nations in search of Spanish goods.85 In discussions with Buenos Aires representatives, perhaps including DeForest, Pierre told Onís that he worked out an arrangement whereby the Laffites would reestablish an admiralty court at Galveston, appoint a governor, name their friend Garros admiralty judge, and then insurgents would split with them the proceeds of all prizes, DeForest getting 1 percent as his fee for issuing the letters of marque. Pierre further said he would persuade the privateers of the insurgencies to rendezvous at Galveston in March 18x9 to begin operations, which would concentrate them for an easy conquest by a Spanish fleet. All that was needed was approval from Apodaca, and a commitment of ships, and funds, for the brothers' expenses.86 But whatever DeForest may have suggested or promised at their meetings, the Laffites would never get commissions from Buenos Aires or from Bolivar, nor apparently from any of the other insurgencies while the brothers remained at Galveston. In the end, the Laffites were not going to get what they needed to operate against Spain, and Spain was disinclined to give them agency against the rebels. The United States wanted nothing to do with them. The brothers, it seemed, were about to be cast into the universe on their own.

  Unaware of this as yet, Pierre told people he met socially that he was in the capital to negotiate with Onís for the exchange of some of his corsairs held in Cuba for Spaniards captured on prizes brought into Galveston, probably a cover since it had always been the Laffites' policy simply to release them. Ransom may have made them some money over ships, but they never ransomed people. Pierre probably met with other insurgent representatives while in Washington, men such as Don Lino de Clemente, who arrived there in December 1818 as representative of Venezuela, though without credentials or commission, which did not stop him from issuing letters of marque all the same. After his meetings in Washington, Pierre Laffite left the capital, apparently still unaware that the brothers would have to abandon Galveston. 87 Under the impression, then, that he had made good progress, he traveled to Baltimore to meet with merchants there. At Nathaniel Williams's chandlery on Bowly's Wharf he bought sails to ship to Galveston for refitting the damaged Laffite corsairs, and he probably called on Tenant and others as well.88 Baltimore was certainly a port of choice for privateers and their agents. Laporte of New Orleans, more than once involved in dealings with the Laffites, frequently sent his prize cargoes there for sale, and Pierre could expect an interested and sympathetic hearing to any business proposals.89 His business there concluded, he went on to Philadelphia to see DeForest, and then to Charleston, South Carolina, another center of privateering investors, with some of whom the brothers may have had dealings in the past.90 In all, Pierre stayed in the East almost as long as his brother had three years before, and it was not until the late spring or early summer of 1819 that he returned to New Orleans. He was in no position at all to know what lay ahead for the Laffites.91

  NINETEEN

  The Dying Dream 1819

  He knew himself a villain—but he deem'd

  The rest no better than the thing he seem'd

  And scorn'd the best as hypocrites who hid

  Those deeds the bolder spirit plainly did.

  BY MID-FEBRUARY of 1819 affairs at Galveston were quiet enough that Jean found time to return to New Orleans for a short visit, probably to purchase supplies and building materials with some of the money brought in from the slave sales. He felt flush enough to loan $4,800 to an associate in the city, and then worked with Marie Villard to repurchase the Bourbon and St. Philip house.1 He negotiated a price of $9,000 with Antoine Abat, a considerable step-up from what Marie and Pierre had paid for it a few years before. No cash changed hands, however. Instead, Jean gave Abat nine promissory notes due in six months, mid-August, himself being security for one of them.2 After mid-March he returned to Galveston to continue the rebuilding. Before leaving, he made arrangements for Lameson's the Panchita, now renamed the Two Friends, to bring back Humbert and Dominique and about thirty other men with whom the Laffites intended to get the Galveston operation going once more. It was a move that initially made Fatio fear that forces were marshaling to make another try at Tampico,3 an idea Jean may have planted if only to manufacture a crisis in which his inside information could he valuable. In fact, the "associates" had long since given up filibustering.

  Still, as he departed, Jean may have heard the first rumblings of the unrest from a different quarter that would inspire one final filibustering adventure. By 1819 Spain seemed firmly in control of Texas and Mexico with a treaty establishing the western boundary of Louisiana at the Sabine finally signed and on every front, it seemed, a frenzied decade of agitation laid to rest.

  Not for Dr. James Long of Natchez, however, or for the frontier people in the Mississippi Valley who believed that Texas had been theirs and that they had been robbed when Adams gave it away. Worse, Washington had given it away to Spaniards, whose brutality and treachery were by now accepted frontier dogma. As soon as the Adams-Onis Treaty became known in Natchez, Long and others gathered to protest. Among them were familiar names from the filibustering years, such as the Kemper brothers and Gutiérrez, along with new names like James Gaines, Warren D. C. Hall, and the Bowie brothers, James and Rezin.

  In May a group of these men gathered in Natchez to plan an invasion army to take back what Adams had given away. Perhaps because his uncle-in-law had been a general, Long was given command of the venture. Once more the merchants and investors hoping to profit pledged their financial support. Once more adventurous and avaricious young men turned out to become soldiers of "liberation." Long established his rendezvous at the old filibuster base of Natchitoches, and the first contingent of them arrived early in June. By June 21 Long had about two hundred men across the line into Texas at Nacogdoches. That day he and his officers decreed a new government, with Long as President of the Supreme Council of Twenty-one. Two days later, in a declaration of independence in which he hoped to speak to the world, Long announced that Texas was now and henceforward an independent republic.

  The enterprise was never much more than a landgrab at its root, however, and the public at large saw through the group. In Natchitoches, shortly after Long left for Texas, John Jamison likened Long's followers to puppies riding on a chariot, looking back and telling themselves "what a dust we make." He advised Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in Washington that "the whole is a ridiculos [wc] farce and will end like all bubbles."4

  The day after issuing the declaration of independence, Long sent two men, one of them James Gaines, south along the trace to Galveston to meet with Jean Laffite. When Laffite read the letter they gave him he saw that President Long was offering him an office in the new government and a commission to privateer in its name out of Galveston. In return, he asked for Laffite's fealty and assistance.5 To Laffite this was an opportunity. Spain would easily defeat Long, but the Long threat offered the Laffites a chance to infiltrate a plot and pass along information to Fatio and Apodaca. Now as before, assisting the failure of others could bring profit to the Laffites.

  Pierre had not returned from the East when Jean received Long's em
bassy, but the younger brother knew what to do. It was an old story by now. He sent a copy of Long's June 24 letter to Fatio, and meanwhile addressed a reply, sending a copy of that, too, to Havana.6 As so often before, Laffite pledged his long devotion to "the emancipation of the Mexican provinces," and assured the filibuster that the Laffites wished to advance his efforts in any way possible. However, he could not help but remind Long that the Laffites had seen Gutiérrez and Magee, Mina and Perry, and Lallemand all try and fail before him. "I have done all in my power to help them along and should not regret the sacrifices they have cost me had they happily succeeded," he said. Now might be a good time for another effort, for Spain was tired and weak in the New World. Indeed, Jean represented his Galveston enclave as a torch keeping alive the flame of freedom in the region. "The spirit of liberty budding out under my care in these fertile provinces is growing rapidly," he said, "and it is no longer necessary to stimulate the heads of those young and brave Creoles but only to lead them wisely."

  But he wanted to know the particulars of Long's intentions and immediate plans, and if he was to ally himself with the filibuster, he needed a formal agreement between them of the Laffites' roles and the benefits to accrue to them. He asked Long to tell him "exactly what your resources are, and give me a letter explaining the means you must have to commence the campaign so that I can second you," information that would go straight to Fatio. Jean went on, "Do not keep anything from me that would enable me to cooperate with you." With customary self-aggrandizement, Laffite dangled a morsel before Long and hinted that he knew accurate information on Mexican strength in the region, referring to agents he claimed to have in Bexar who kept him apprised of sentiment there, and of the support for resistance awaiting release.

  Jean also bargained for the time he would need to notify Fatio in New Orleans and perhaps strike a new deal with Spain. Jean also expected Pierre at Galveston in a few days and wanted, as always, to confer with his older brother. Meanwhile he offered some advice to Long. Galveston privateers still flew the flag of the Mexican insurgency, but Long entertained no idea of seizing Texas for an illusory independent Mexico and had raised his own banner at Natchitoches. Jean thought it blunted their efforts to be under different flags and for the Laffites to switch now would look like indecision. "It would be a bad policy to take one different from the one under which we have been fighting for the last eight years," he argued. Besides, their flag was recognized by Buenos Aires and Venezuela "and our privateers under such colors are received there in a friendly manner by the authorities of those provinces."

  He also told Long that they should establish an admiralty court at Galveston, though neither had the authorization to do so. No doubt that is something he hoped Pierre would bring back with him from one of the several meetings with revolutionary representatives in Philadelphia or Baltimore that had kept him on the East Coast. Meanwhile Jean's suggestion that Long fly the flag of the Mexican insurgency may have been an attempt at insurance. If Pierre came back empty-handed, then even a show of embracing the revolutionary cause would allow Long to justify letters of marque and an admiralty court under his rump council.

  Long asked to meet personally with Laffite, but Jean protested that he could not leave Galveston before Pierre returned. Long had also asked for some ammunition, and Jean could spare a little of that, but only a little, as he was fortifying Galveston once more in the wake of the hurricane. Once he had more, he promised to give Long all he asked.7 It was a typical Laffite response, seeming to promise much in return for a lot of information, but giving little or nothing in effect. Typical of the filibusters, however, Long had not brought adequate supplies, and in July had to disperse his men in small parties to subsist from the land until he could somehow bring in substantial provisions from Louisiana.

  Pierre had arrived back in New Orleans by mid-July if not earlier, and the necessity of conferring with him persuaded Jean to leave the island shortly after responding to Long.8 The brothers returned to Galveston during the first weeks of August,9 and were there when new emissaries from Long stepped ashore. They came to seek supplies, which they may have gotten in some measure, but also to move on to the steps Jean had suggested of establishing an admiralty court and issuing letters of marque under the authority of what Long would call the Republic of Texas. The Laffites put them off, at least on the admiralty court, for that would have required them to swear fealty to Long, and thus abrogate their ability to operate under the rotting cloak of the Mexican insurgency. Humbert had been back since April, when the Two Friends dropped anchor in the bay, and now the old warrior began issuing commissions in his role as "lieutenant general and chief of the Province of Texas" under authority from the Mexican Congress. He granted the first on August 18 to Juan Salvador de Torres for Le Brave, captained by Jean Desfarges.10

  Typically, the official governmental letter of marque was a document that had been signed in advance in blank by a member of the junta and as such, had no validity.11 Laffite's commissions to his vessels, of which he probably never issued more than a half dozen, were written in duplicate in longhand by a secretary, one copy for the vessel and the other for retention, and signed by Laffite. He authorized his captains to stop neutral vessels and take supplies as needed, paying with a warrant negotiable with Laurent Maire, who was now a merchant in New Orleans. When bringing a prize into Galveston, the corsair should fly no flag but a white one on the mizzenmast, and approach from west of the pass. Laffite would respond by showing a white flag from the signal tower atop his house, or else fly a flag on the beach. All friendly ships lying at anchor would display white flags while in port, and when a corsair entered the bay it should fire one shot and receive an answering shot from shore. His captains were prohibited from making landing with their prizes anywhere except Galveston.12

  The overriding concern with profit was evident in another document handed to captains by Laffite and Humbert, a "charter for partition" that detailed the division of spoils taken from prizes, a touchy subject since the dawn of piracy. Half of everything went to the ship owner and outfitter, together with a 5 percent commission on the balance of the cargo brought into Galveston. The captain was to hold back another 5 percent of what was due to the crew pending dispensation of everything. If the crew took a vessel better than their own and abandoned their own as a result, then the new prize became entirely the property of the owner of the original privateer in order to cover his loss. All arms also went to the owner. Thereafter, in something resembling an insurance policy, Laffite detailed the special shares of profit to be given to a man should he lose an arm or a leg. The first man to spot a prize was to get an extra share, as was the first man to board one. The captain controlled four discretionary shares to hand out to men who performed particularly well, whereas any men who deserted or were caught stealing from their mates should lose their shares. Then in descending order from the captain to the common crewmen, a division by shares by rank was detailed. 13

  Whether Humbert was doing this on the basis of his old commission, or if Pierre secured some new authorization for him in the East, is unclear, but it would not have mattered to the Laffites either way. Before long the word was out that Humbert, "an outcast and a wanderer on the face of the earth," as Patterson called him a few weeks hence, had washed ashore at Galveston yet again to issue commissions for the Laffites.14 So long as he was doing that, it did not suit the brothers' purposes to make Galveston submit itself to Long's presumed authority.

  By late September, however, the Laffites had rethought their situation. The brothers could not expect to be able to hold their island base too much longer. With their corsairs back on the Gulf making money, the brothers could consider ostensibly changing allegiances to Long, putting them in a position to be more valuable to Spain, with the hope for remuneration, or else toleration of their Galveston establishment.

  By this time, however, Apodaca had decided he wanted nothing further to do with the double-dealing Laffites. Pierre's plan proposed to On�
�s in Washington appeared pointless to the viceroy. Given the time it took for information to get from Galveston to Havana, it would be old and obsolete before it could be acted upon, and thus not worth the expense. Besides, Apodaca did not trust the Laffites, and felt convinced that they had been double-dealing with Fatio and Onís. "In spite of whatever the Minister Onís says in favor of LaFit, I do not have any confidence in him," Apodaca told Madrid. He could not forget that while supposedly helping to disrupt Lallemand's enterprise with Fatio, Jean Laffite was also feeding Lallemand's people and thus apparently prolonging their stay. The Champ d'Asile settlement would never have gotten started had Jean not saved the colonists when they first landed at Galveston, and the Laffite argument that they were lulling the colonists to make them easy prey did not carry weight in Havana. "The Lafite person is only concerned with his own affairs," Apodaca railed, "and double-dealing with us and the adventurers."

  As for Pierre's offer to sell munitions and supplies to Havana, it was pointless, for Apodaca now had means to secure all he needed from other more reliable sources. Worse, any such dealing with Pierre would be ill advised because it would enable him to provide information on Spanish strength to other filibusters or rebels. Moreover, it would entrench Galveston as a smuggling haven. "Lafit is a lost man, reduced to poverty and without the means of subsistence," said Apodaca. The Laffites would say or do anything for money, and honor no loyalty. As for Galveston, it should be destroyed and the Laffite operation dispersed. Apodaca wanted the Laffites erased from the Spanish coast throughout his viceregal domain.15 Weather and circumstances had stopped the fleet from attacking in 1818, but in February of this year Apodaca had requested ships for another assault and waited only for official approval. At the same time he sent fifteen thousand pesos to the military commander in Texas to pay for an overland expedition to Galveston, though summer floods and other problems would sap the funds before they could be used.16