Favorinus of Arelate (ca. 85–155 CE; chapter 15 in this volume) wrote a ten-book Pyrrhonean Tropes, and as a result is sometimes associated with that school; he might be best thought of, however, as a moderate Academic skeptic.20 Philostratus (VS 1.8) describes him as a sophist and philosopher; Gellius (20.1) also calls him a philosopher, one who uses the “arguments of the Academy” (disputationes Academicae); and Lucian (Eunuch 7) allusively refers to him “an Academic eunuch.” In his On the Best Teaching against Favorinus, Galen describes Favorinus’s position as similar to certain Academicians (that is, by arguing for and against a certain position), and groups him in with the “Newer” Academy (νεώτεροι, 1.40K). According to Gellius, in fact, Favorinus thought of himself as a follower of the Academy;21 this use of an “Academy” could again simply be similar to that of Plutarch, above. Indeed, Favorinus and Plutarch knew one another: Plutarch quotes Favorinus in his Roman Questions, made him a character in his Table Talk, and wrote him a letter on friendship (in fact, he was the dedicatee of Plutarch’s On the Principle of Cold); in turn, Favorinus gave his work On the Academic Disposition the alternative title Plutarch. Last, Favorinus’s Memorabilia is said to include discussions of Socrates (Diog. Laert. 2.5.19, 23, 38, 40), and he is also reported to have written an Alcibiades.22
The physician Galen mentioned above wrote a nine-book On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates, in part an expository work on Platonic tripartite psychology alongside a polemic against the Stoic monist alternative. This work also reflects Galen’s synthesis of this Platonic view with his physiology of brain, heart, and liver. Textual justification for these bodily locations of the parts of the soul are taken primarily from passages from Plato’s Timaeus, as well as passages from the Republic book 4 (5.336.16–358.22), as well as a few passages from the Sophist (e.g., 5.302.18–19 and 312.11–12).23 As with Maximus of Tyre and the Latin writer Apuleius, there has been much discussion about whether Galen should be considered a Platonist.24
Numenius (fl. 175) is another important figure in the history of the Platonism of this time, but unfortunately we have only fragments.25 His main work on philosophy seems to be a six-book On the Good, which, based on the extant fragments, is an inquiry into the nature of the First Principle—Being, or The Good—in dialogue form.26 He seems to have been inspired by Plato’s accounts of the Form of the Good in Republic book 6 (508e–509b), as well as the argument concerning the goodness of god in the Timaeus (29e–30b).27 We have a mention in Origen (C. Cels. 5.57) of a work in at least two books On the Indestructibility of the Soul. We know nearly nothing, unfortunately, about what the content might be of Numenius’s treatise On Plato’s Secret Doctrines (Euseb. Praep. evang. 13.4.4, fr. 23). In the sole surviving fragment (fr. 23), Numenius discusses Plato’s use of the character Euthyphro in the Euthyphro as a representative of Athenian popular religion. As quoted in a number of sources,28 Numenius (“the Pythagorean”) is known for the statement, “For what is Plato, but Moses speaking Attic Greek?” (τίγάρ ἐστιΠλάτων ἢ Μωυσῆς ἀττικίζων;). Regarding his status as a Pythagorean, we might consider the opinions of Origen in Against Celsus, who refers to “Numenius the Pythagorean” as “a surpassingly excellent expounder of Plato” (πολλῷ κρεῖττονδιηγησάμενονΠλάτωνα), and who held a foremost place as a teacher of the doctrines of Pythagoras. In addition, he writes, Numenius quotes from the writings of Moses and the prophets in many of his works, and applies to the passages in question a likely allegorical meaning, as in his work Epops, and in those titled Numbers and Place.
The combination of Plato and Pythagoras should not give us great pause. Numenius accepted both Pythagoras and Plato as the two authorities one should follow in philosophy; that said, however, Plato had been a Pythagorean, before his doctrines had been marred by his successors.29 Numenius seemed to regard Plato’s authority as slightly subordinate to that of Pythagoras, whom he considered to be the source of all true philosophy, including that of Plato.30
We might consider four final authors here. The first, Taurus, according to the tenth-century Suda, wrote a work On Corporeals and Incorporeals, about which we have no further information (see below, however, for evidence of his polemics and commentaries). Second, we might recall Albinus’s editing an Outlines of Platonic Doctrines from the Classes of Gaius, which might be an example of a commentary “from the voice” of a teacher, a type of work that may come down by the name of a lecturer or pupil. And, like Taurus, there also seems to be reference in a Syriac text of a work by Albinus called On the Incorporeal.31 Finally, we have an extract in Eusebius (Praep. evang. 13.17) of a work On the Soul by Severus, who is conjectured to have lived in the second century CE, and is one of the authors read in Plotinus’s circle. He is said to think that soul is “not a third thing put together from two elements contrary to one another, but simple and by its very nature impassible and immaterial.” This formulation is taken as being in opposition to the dualism of Plutarch and Atticus, and shows a strong Stoicizing that is closer to the Chrysippan doctrine of the unity of the soul.32
Platonic Handbooks and Summaries
The division between topical expository works and Platonic summaries or aggregates is perhaps a false one (a summary or handbook most certainly might expand on an idea in a new way, as arguably in the case of Alcinous, below), but I take the difference as one of intent (an Introduction is different from a work on the problem of creation in the Timaeus).
A short tract by Albinus (fl. ca. 150 CE) entitled Introduction to Plato’s Dialogues (εἰσαγωγὴ εἰςτοὺςΠλάτωνοςδιαλόγους) has survived. The original title of his work was also considered to be Prologos, and it has been suggested to have originally formed a section (or the initial section) of notes taken at the lectures of Gaius. In it, after explaining the definition and nature of the dialogue (which he compares with tragedy and history), Albinus divides the dialogues of Plato first into instructional and investigative types (i.e., the “highest” or “most general types”), both of which he further subdivides into seven categories: physical, logical, political, ethical, tentative, obstetrical, probative, and refutative. He gives the first tetralogy of Thrasyllus (i.e., Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo, explaining each by their subjects), and writes that that series is based on dramatic concerns but is not helpful for those who want to discover what is in accordance with wisdom (chap. 4). As a suggested order of reading for the ideal student, whom he defines, he advises: Alcibiades (as obstetrical), Phaedo (as ethical), Republic (as political), and Timaeus (physical), and explains the educational purpose of each. Later, in chapter 6, he suggests a more general five-part series, perhaps for the nonideal student, which includes the more general categories: a “purgative” dialogue, to cast out false beliefs; one that is “obstetrical,” to bring to light our natural concepts; an instructional dialogue, to receive the appropriate doctrines; one that is logical, so that these doctrines do not escape and so that we learn the method by which true things are demonstrated and false things are refuted; and finally one that is probative and refutative, so we might not be deceived by sophists. In chapter 5 (and reinforced in chapter 6) we are told about the necessity to “have knowledge of divine matters, so that one who has acquired virtue can become assimilated to them” and, as a result, “see the divine with complete clarity,” a common goal within the Platonism during this time, found in Plutarch (De sera 550d), Alcinous (28.1), and Apuleius (On Plato 2.23). We should reemphasize that Albinus ends his short work with a common Platonic as well as a Second Sophistic concern: the value probative and refutative types of dialogues have to show us how to listen to the sophists and how and by what means to address those who make false and misleading arguments (chap. 6).
Alcinous (second century CE) is the author of work called The Handbook of Platonism (Ἐπιτομὴ τῶνΠλάτωνοςδογμάτων, referred to as the Didaskalikos), another of the few fully surviving works from this period. We know nothi
ng about the author. What is important about this work is the effort he makes to put together an introductory doctrinal handbook on Platonism from relatively disparate materials. The book contains thirty-six chapters which propose to cover topics ranging from theoretical (given as theology, physics, mathematics), practical (ethics, economics, politics), and logical (division, definition, introduction, and syllogistic), though the actual ordering and depth of the topics covered is slightly different. In general, there are numerous parallels with other relatively recent Platonists (e.g., Philo and Plutarch), but, importantly, the author reflects the type of inclusion of formulae from Peripatetics and Stoics that were part of the Platonist project. Regarding the interpretations given, modern scholars have pointed out a very similar passage from the first-century BCE Stoic author Arius Didymus (in Stobaeus), as well as some general similarities with Apuleius’s On Plato, which make it tempting to imagine a common source or sources.33 At the same time, there are moments in the work that register whether Alcinous agrees or disagrees with the way of reading Plato that he is recording, which goes beyond straightforward source transcription.34 Moreover, there are moments in the work in which familiarity with Plato seems to be assumed; at these moments, a general or neophyte reader is less likely the target audience than an instructor.35
The Platonism we find in the Didaskalikos looks very familiar to that which we find during the Second Sophistic. In chapter 9, Alcinous discusses the Platonic Forms as ideas in the mind of God; in chapter 10, like Albinus and others, he discusses the influential goal for a Platonist (and early Christians): likeness to or assimilation with God. Relatedly, a further important distinction in Alcinous’s work is the division between a first and second god, and which of these this assimilation refers to: “By ‘God’ is obviously meant the god in the heavens [τῷ ἐπουρανίῳ], not, by Zeus, the God above the heavens [τῷ . . . ὑπερουρανίῳ], who does not possess virtue, but is superior to it” (28.3). Alcinous ends his work (36.1) with a statement that gives us an idea of his desire to provide an introduction to guide someone toward Plato, as well as the limits of his account:
This much is sufficient for an introduction [εἰσαγωγή] to Plato’s doctrine-building [δογματοποιΐα]. Perhaps some of it has been stated in an organized fashion, other parts as they came up and out of order; nevertheless, as a result from what has been stated they might become able to examine and discover subsequently the rest of his doctrines, too.36
It is worth noting that Tarrant (2010, 99) argues that Alcinous adds his own material of an interpretive nature (to what had been designed as a handbook of Platonic doctrines), and so his work should be looked at more as an updated handbook that is responding to issues and ideas of his time.
Platonic Polemics
During the Second Sophistic, both intra- and interpolemical works often take to task other philosophical schools. (For some of these texts, “polemical” might be too strong a word, and we might consider them inter- and intrascholastic.)
Several of Plutarch’s works are baldly polemic, most often against the Stoics and Epicureans. The central argument in Plutarch’s criticisms is that both Stoics and Epicureans contradict common notions (see, e.g., Comm. not. 1073c–1074f) and force facts about things into agreement with their tenets, instead of the other way around (Quomodo quis sentiat 75f–76a).
A list of scholastic polemics by Plutarch would include the lost works: On the Difference between the Pyrrhonians and the Academics (no. 64) and the notable On the Unity of the Academy since Plato, in which he seems to hold that the skeptical Academy should be included in the long history of Platonism. Plutarch, then, shows an interest in distinguishing the Academic position from the generally more absolute Pyrrhonic skepticism, as well as expressing his opposition to Antiochus’s view (and, we will see, that of Numenius) that there were two Academies, an Old and a New, while Philo of Larissa had maintained that there had been only one.
We have fragments of Numenius’s treatise on the points of divergence between the Academicians and Plato (On the Defection of the Academics from Plato, perhaps ca. 160–190 CE) preserved in the Preparation for the Gospel of Eusebius (14.5). (There are other sources for the fragments, e.g., Proclus’s commentary on the Timaeus.) Here Numenius criticizes the departure of the skeptical Academics from what he considers to be Plato’s doctrine, namely, the doctrine of first principles of reality that he finds expressed in the Second Letter attributed to Plato (fr. 24.51–56). Therefore, what marks the failure of the Academy for Numenius is the disagreement of the Academic skeptics with Plato’s allegedly dogmatic philosophy. There is as well a plea in that work by Numenius for a purification of Plato’s philosophy from alien elements, Aristotelian and Stoic included, to allow him to be a Pythagorean (Numenius fr. 24–28),37 quite against the position held by Antiochus. Beyond his having an interest in the history of Platonism, then, it is thought that Numenius’s reaction against a skeptical interpretation of Plato was a reaction to contemporary attempts to revive a form of Academic skepticism, such as those by the anonymous commentary on the Theaetetus (discussed below), Plutarch, and Favorinus.38
Regarding the polemical work of Taurus, Gellius tells us of a book “against the Stoics” (NA 12.5) in which Taurus sets out their differences from the Academy (perhaps similar to Numenius’s idea of purification), as well as emphasizes the Stoics’ internal contradictions; it may be that a source for his work was Plutarch’s On the Self-Contradictions of the Stoics. The Suda mentions a work of Taurus on the differences between Aristotle and Plato, perhaps again a topic akin to what we saw above in the case of Numenius.
Atticus (second half of second century CE), called “a distinguished man among the Platonic philosophers” (διαφανὴς ἀνὴρτῶνΠλατωνικῶνφιλοσόφων), is reported to have written (again from Eusebius: Praep. evang. 1.15) a polemical tract against the Peripatetics. In that work he refutes those who profess to support the doctrines of Plato with those of Aristotle. But while for Atticus “the Peripatetic will be seen to be quite far from teaching any of the doctrines of Plato” (11.15), Aristocles, a representative Peripatetic, is perhaps more sympathetic, writing that “if any man ever yet taught a genuine and complete system of philosophy, it was Plato” (11.11). We also have report in Simplicius of a work in which Atticus attacks Aristotle’s Categories, about which not much more than that is known.39 Though it should be clear by now that there was great interest in the question of whether Stoicism (and Peripatetism) should be included in the Platonism of the time, we should remember that that worry did not prevent great borrowing of terminology, if not also therefore some ideas, from both of those schools.
Last, perhaps, in the realm of polemical works, we hear about The True Word (ΛόγοςἈληθής), a lost treatise in which Celsus argued against many principal arguments of the early Christians. What we know of the work exists in the extensive quotations from it found in Origen’s Against Celsus (C. Cels.), written perhaps seventy years later. We might tentatively add this work in this section, since, as Origen himself puts it, he plans to put questions to certain Greeks, “in particular Celsus, who either holds or not the sentiments of Plato, and at any rate quotes them” (C. Cels. 1.32). That said, Origen also tells us that Celsus might be thought of as an Epicurean (C. Cels. 1.8) (perhaps in Platonic clothing?). In the work, it seems Celsus attacked Christianity in three ways: by refuting its philosophical claims (e.g., 1.3, 2.12, 3.57), by marking it as a phenomenon associated with the uneducated and lower classes (3.57 and 58, 4.36), and by cautioning his audience that it was a danger to the Roman Empire (7.17); however, as with any polemic, we should approach with care the attribution of specific views to Celsus. It is perhaps noteworthy that we find in Origen a different evaluation between Platonists: “we express our approval of Numenius, rather than of Celsus and other Greeks, because he was willing to investigate our histories from a desire to acquire knowledge” (4.51); the reason he gives is that in his On the G
ood, Numenius quotes from the writings of Moses and the prophets (4.51).
Platonic Commentaries
Finally, there are a number of commentaries from the Second Sophistic that are meant to provide exegesis for a particular Platonic dialogue. While we have many reported titles, we have only one (anonymous) less fragmentary commentary from the period, and even that might be dated earlier than the Second Sophistic.
The closest Plutarch gets to a commentary is his work on the Timaeus (On the Generation of Soul in the Timaeus), a partial commentary on Timaeus 35a1–36b5. While Plutarch looks only at a short passage of Plato’s long work, this work is important for our understanding of Plutarch, since it is not an exaggeration to say that Plutarch’s interpretation of the Timaeus shapes his entire philosophy. In the work, he discusses some of the interpretations of his predecessors, in particular two groups who followed Xenocrates and Crantor. His first few lines, before he quotes the Timaeus passage itself, show his intent to provide a unified collection of the various statements he has frequently made about that dialogue concerning what he believes to be the opinion held by Plato regarding the soul. In addition, he adds, a separate treatise ought to be devoted to that account, “as it is both difficult to deal with otherwise and in need of vindication because of its opposition to most of the Platonists” (1012b). His overall interpretation, then, is in need of aggregation, and requires explanation not only because of its density but because of its relative unorthodoxy. Below we will see the result in subsequent commentary work of Plutarch’s redirecting Platonists’ attention toward the Timaeus.
The Oxford Handbook of the Second Sophistic Page 91