The Dead Hand

by David Hoffman

  35 Reagan diary, May 24, 1982.

  36 Carl Bernstein, “The Holy Alliance,” Time magazine, Feb. 24, 1992, pp. 28–35.

  37 George Weigel, Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 441, and note 13, p. 905.

  38 Steven R. Weisman, “Reagan, in Berlin, Bids Soviet Work for a Safe Europe,” New York Times, June 12, 1982, p. 1; and Edmund Morris, Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan (New York: Random House, 1999), p. 461.

  39 George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), p. 5.

  40 This assessment was made in 1979 by Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering William J. Perry before the House Armed Services Committee. Also see Strategic Command, Control and Communications: Alternative Approaches for Modernization, Congressional Budget Office, October 1981.

  41 Reed communication with author, Nov. 21, 2006.

  42 NSDD 55. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html.

  43 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004), Ch. 9.

  44 Reagan diary, Nov. 13, 1982. Dobrynin, pp. 511–512.

  45 “Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces,” April 1983, p. 4.

  46 In December, Congress voted to reduce funding until the basing could be resolved, but did not kill the missile altogether.

  47 Donald R. Baucom, The Origins of SDI: 1944–1983 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas), p. 184. Baucom was staff historian for the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.

  48 Bob Sims, interview, Feb. 26, 1985.

  49 Skinner, pp. 430–432. The essay is dated May 7, 1931.

  50 Anderson, Hoover presentation.

  51 A handwritten annotation says the speech was “written around 1962,” but archivists think it may have been 1963. See Skinner, pp. 438–442.

  52 Among those who attended were Bendetsen and two members of the so-called kitchen cabinet, William A. Wilson, then U.S. ambassador to the Holy See, and Joseph Coors. “Daily Diary of President Ronald Reagan,” Jan. 8, 1992, RRPL. Graham was excluded. See Baucom, Ch. 7. Soon after the White House meeting, in early 1982, the group began to splinter over tactics. Bendetsen wanted to work quietly, but Graham decided to go public and published High Frontier: A New National Strategy, a 175-page study on using space platforms and existing or near-term technology. In another split, Graham envisioned non-nuclear defense, while physicist Edward Teller was pushing nuclear-pumped lasers. According to Baucom, for the rest of the year, Bendetsen continued to seek White House action on his Jan. 8 memorandum. A White House science office committee was also studying the idea. Late in the year, Bendetsen went as far as to write a proposed insert for a Reagan State of the Union speech endorsing strategic defense and sent it to the White House. Baucom, pp. 169–170. Another account of this period is contained in William J. Broad, Teller’s War: The Top Secret Story Behind the Star Wars Deception (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 114–115.

  53 Broad, p. 118, quotes Ray Pollack, a White House official at the meeting.

  54 Edward Teller with Judith Shoolery, Memoirs: A Twentieth-Century Journey in Science and Politics (Cambridge: Perseus Publishing, 2001), p. 530.

  55 Reagan diary, Sept. 14, 1982. Teller described his idea as a laser “driven by a nuclear explosion.” Later in the 1980s, Teller endorsed a non-nuclear approach. Teller, pp. 528, 535–536.

  56 Anderson, p. 97, and interview, Nov. 10, 2008. Also, “The Schedule of President Ronald Reagan,” Wednesday, Dec. 22, 1982, courtesy Annelise and Martin Anderson.

  57 The commission, chaired by Brent Scowcroft, recommended April 6, 1983, that the United States put one hundred MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos and move to build a new generation of small, single-warhead missiles for the longer term. The commission said the “window of vulnerability” wasn’t serious enough to warrant expensive schemes such as Dense Pack or setting up ABM for silos. See “Report of the President’s Commission,” p. 17. Congress eventually approved fifty MX missiles in May 1985.

  58 In addition to Baucom’s detailed account, see Cannon, pp. 327–333; Hedrick Smith, The Power Game (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 596–616; Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), Ch. 5; Morris, p. 471; Robert C. McFarlane, with Zofia Smardz, Special Trust (New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994), pp. 229–230; and Frederick H. Hartmann, Naval Renaissance: The U.S. Navy in the 1980s (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), Ch. 14.

  59 McFarlane, pp. 226–229.

  60 Reagan diary, Feb. 11, 1983.

  61 Reagan diary, Feb. 15, 1983.

  62 Jack F. Matlock Jr., Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 55. Shultz, p. 165.

  63 Gordievsky, interview, Aug. 29, 2005; Oleg Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution: The Autobiography of Oleg Gordievsky (London: Macmillan, 1995).

  64 Andrew and Gordievsky, p. 589.

  65 Reagan, An American Life, p. 570.

  66 Reagan, An American Life, p. 569.

  67 McFarlane warned Reagan twice he should consult Congress and the allies, but Reagan rejected the advice, Special Trust, pp. 230–231.

  68 “U.S. Relations with the USSR,” NSDD 75, Jan. 17, 1983. Pipes, the Harvard professor who had led Team B, was on the White House National Security Council staff and drafted the directive. In his memoir, Pipes said that inducing change in the Soviet regime was the goal. Pipes, pp. 188–208. Raymond L. Garthoff said it was a compromise and the “main thrust of the directive … was pragmatic and geopolitical.” Garthoff, The Great Transition (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 33.

  69 In a letter Feb. 19, 2004, to Shultz, McFarlane recalled that Reagan had not made strategic defense a priority “through no less than four budget cycles” since taking office. Letter courtesy McFarlane.

  70 Cannon, p. 331.

  71 Shultz doubted the technology was ready, doubted the expertise of the joint chiefs and told Reagan the proposal was a “revolution in our strategic doctrine.” Shultz, p. 250.

  72 Reagan diary, March 22, 1983.

  73 Address by the president to the nation, March 23, 1983.

  CHAPTER 2: WAR GAMES

  1 Dmitri Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire: The Seven Leaders Who Built the Soviet Regime (New York: Free Press, 1998), p. 361.

  2 On July 16, 1982, Nitze, then negotiator for the United States, tried to work out a settlement in a “walk in the woods” with his Soviet counterpart, but the Soviets did not take up the ideas. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision, A Memoir (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), pp. 376–389.

  3 Aleksander Savelyev and Nikolay Detinov, The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-making in the Soviet Union (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), p. 57. Also see Oleg Golubev et al., Rossiskaya Systema Protivoraketnoi Oboroniy [Russian System of Anti-Missile Defense] (Moscow: Tekhnokonsalt, 1994), p. 67.

  4 “Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” May 31, 1983, Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Trial, Fond 89, Opis 42, Delo 53. Hoover, 14 pp.

  5 “The Problem of Discovering Preparation for a Nuclear Missile Attack on the USSR,” reproduced in Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 76.

  6 Gordievsky, interview, Aug. 29, 2005.

  7 Markus Wolf, Man Without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (New York: PublicAffairs, 1999), pp. 246–247; Ben B. Fischer, “A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare,” Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, September 1997, pp. 14–17. The underground bunker was sealed by the West German military in 1993, but later reopened as a national historic building and tours offered. See http://www.bunker5001.com.

  8 V
olkogonov, p. 361.

  9 Yevgeny Chazov, Health and Power (Moscow: Novosti, 1992), pp. 181–184.

  10 “The History of the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) in 1982,” from Commanding officer, USS Enterprise, R. J. Kelly, to Chief of Naval Operations, March 28, 1983.

  11 Pete Earley, Family of Spies: Inside the John Walker Spy Ring(New York: Bantam Books, 1988), p. 248.

  12 John F. Lehman Jr., Command of the Seas: Building the 600 Ship Navy(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988), Ch. 4, and p. 137.

  13 Confidential source.

  14 “The History of USS Enterprise (CVN-65) in 1983,” Memorandum from J. J. Dantone to Chief of Naval Operations, April 23, 1984, and “Command History for Calendar Year 1983,” Memorandum from Commanding Officer, Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 113, T. A. Chiprany, to Chief of Naval Operations, March 1, 1984. Watkins testimony is from Seymour M. Hersh, The Target Is Destroyed: What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew About It (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 24.

  15 Hersh, pp. 25–26.

  16 Andrei Illesh, “Secret of the Korean Boeing 747,” Izvestia, January 24, 1991, p. 5. This was part of a lengthy series by the journalist.

  17 Whitworth had received $60,000 from Walker just before he sailed on the Enterprise in late 1982. Over nearly ten years, Whitworth received $332,000 for leaking secrets to the Soviets.

  18 Howard Blum, I Pledge Allegiance… : The True Story of the Walkers: An American Spy Family (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 299.

  19 Affidavit of Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, director of naval intelligence, in United States of America, Plaintiff, vs. Jerry Alfred Whitworth, Defendant, Criminal Case No. 85-0552 JPV, Aug. 25, 1986, reproduced as Appendix A in “Meeting the Espionage Challenge: A Review of United States Counterintelligence and Security Programs,” Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, 99th Congress, 2d Session, Report 99-522, Oct. 3, 1986.

  20 Affidavit of Studeman in United States of America, Plaintiff, vs. John Anthony Walker Jr., Defendant, Criminal No. H-85-0309, reproduced in Robert W. Hunter, Spy Hunter: Inside the FBI Investigation of the Walker Espionage Case (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999), Appendix C, pp. 222–234.

  21 Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency, from Washington to Bush (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 472.

  22 Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 37–38.

  23 United Press International, Aug. 30, 1983, “Presidential Fence Is Finished.”

  24 Politburo minutes, Aug. 4, 1983. Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Volkogonov Collection, Reel 17, Container 25, on file at the National Security Archive, READD Record 9965.

  25 Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade, p. 82.

  26 Gordievsky, interview, Aug. 29, 2005.

  CHAPTER 3: WAR SCARE

  1 This account is based on reports by the International Civil Aviation Organization, Dec. 2, 1983, and May 28, 1993, and on the Osipovich interview by Illesh.

  2 The 1993 report of the ICAO stated: “The proximity of the RC-135 and KE 007 resulted in 1983 in confusion and the plotting of the track of only one aircraft.” Pp. 47–48.

  3 Seymour M. Hersh, The Target Is Destroyed: What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew About It (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 78.

  4 The plane rocking is mentioned in Osipovich interview, August 1997, for The Cold War, a 24-part television documentary produced by Jeremy Isaacs Productions for CNN and broadcast on BBC2, 1989–1999. Liddell Hart Center for Military Archives, Kings College, London, file no. 28/109.

  5 Osipovich, The Cold War transcript.

  6 Nancy Reagan with William Novak, My Turn (New York: Dell, 1989), p. 271.

  7 Hersh, Ch. 8.

  8 Cable “To All Diplomatic Posts,” Sept. 5, 1983, carrying “text of the background statement delivered by Under Secretary [Lawrence] Eagleburger September 5 concerning the flight of the US RC-135.” RRPL.

  9 Douglas MacEachin, interview, July 25, 2005.

  10 On Dec. 29, 1987, the State Department released an intelligence assessment showing the United States knew after the shoot down that it was due to Soviet ineptitude. Representative Lee Hamilton released the declassified assessment January 12, 1988. J. Edward Fox, assistant secretary of state for legislative affairs, said, “We had concluded by the second day (Sept. 2, 1983) that the Soviets thought they were pursuing a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft throughout most, if not all, of the overflight.”

  11 Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 267–268. Also see George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), p. 364.

  12 Dmitri Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire: The Seven Leaders Who Built the Soviet Regime (New York: Free Press, 1998), p. 363.

  13 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 537.

  14 TASS, Sept. 1, 1983, 17:17 in English, “Soviet Air Space Violated,” FBIS, USSR International Affairs, Northeast Asia, Sept. 1, 1983, p. C2.

  15 Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union, Sept. 2, 1983, courtesy Svetlana Savranskaya, TNSA.

  16 Volkogonov, pp. 365–366.

  17 “Provocateurs Cover Traces,” TASS report in Pravda, Sept. 5, 1983, p. 5, FBIS, Sept. 6, 1983, USSR International Affairs, Northeast Asia, p. C 2-4.

  18 On Sept. 5, Reagan signed NSDD 102, which punished Aeroflot, the Soviet national airline, and caused it to close offices in Washington and New York; seeking to force the Soviets to accept responsibility through public statements and compensation for families of the victims. Reagan reaffirmed existing sanctions on Aeroflot, and nonrenewal of a transportation treaty.

  19 Gates, p. 290.

  20 Volkogonov, p. 375.

  21 Yevgeny Chazov, Health and Power (Moscow: Novosti, 1992), p. 184.

  22 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 594–595.

  23 Oleg Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution: The Autobiography of Oleg Gordievsky (London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 272.

  24 Andrew and Gordievsky, p. 594.

  25 Dobrynin, pp. 537–538.

  26 Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), pp. 349–350.

  27 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years(New York: HarperCollins, 1993), p.324.

  28 Thatcher, p. 451.

  29 Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.77–78.

  30 Elizabeth Teague, “War Scare in the USSR,” in Soviet/East European Survey: Selected Research and Analysis from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Vojtech Mastny, ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), pp. 71–76.

  31 Dusko Doder, “Soviets Prepare People for Crisis in U.S. Ties,” Washington Post, Oct. 30, 1983, p. A34.

  32 Savranskaya, interview, May 13, 2005.

  33 Reagan diary, Oct. 10, 1983.

  34 Edmund Morris, Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan (New York: Random House, 1999), pp. 498–499.

  35 “Memorandum of conversation,” Oct. 11, 1983, RRPL. Also see Jack F. Matlock Jr., Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 83.

  36 Desmond Ball, “Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983,” in Strategic Nuclear Targeting, pp. 79–83.

  37 Reagan diary, Nov. 18, 1983.

  38 Reagan, An American Life, p. 586.

  39 Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, Oct. 23, 1983, issued Dec. 20, 1983.

  40 The invasion was dubbed “Operation Urgent Fury” by the U.S. military, and it brou
ght a public relations boost to the White House, but it was a small operation against weak foes. Eighteen U.S. troops were killed and 86 wounded.

  41 Gates recalled that Casey briefed Reagan on the Soviet fears of nuclear war on December 22 based on separate information from Soviet military intelligence sources. Gates, p. 272.

  42 McFarlane, interview, April 25, 2005. Gates concluded, “A genuine belief had taken root within the leadership of the [Warsaw] Pact that a NATO preemptive strike was possible.” Gates, p. 272.

  43 Matlock, “Memorandum for Robert C. McFarlane,” Oct. 28, 1983, RRPL, Matlock Files, Box 90888.

  44 Andrew and Gordievsky, p. 600.

  45 McFarlane, interview, April 25, 2005.

  46 Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions, p. 85.

  47 Andrew and Gordievsky, p. 600.

  48 Shultz, p. 376.

  49 Draft Presidential Letter to Andropov, Dec. 19, 1983, RRPL, National Security Council files, Head of State, USSR, Andropov, Box 38.

  50 Michael Getler, “Speech Is Less Combative; Positive Tone May Be Change of Tune,” Washington Post, p. 1, Jan. 17, 1984.

  51 Fritz W. Ermarth, “Observations on the ‘War Scare’ of 1983 from an Intelligence Perch,” Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, November 6, 2003. See www.php.isn.ethz.ch.

  52 “Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities,” Special National Intelligence Estimate SNIE 11-10-84/JX, May 18, 1984.

  53 Ermarth later said that what animated Soviet behavior “was not fear of an imminent military confrontation but worry that Soviet economic and technological weaknesses and Reagan policies were turning the ‘correlation of forces’ against them on a historic scale.” See “Observations.”