The Triple Agent
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4. from his Taliban interviewer: Interview excerpts, as published in “An Interview with the Shaheed,” posted by al-Sahab Web site on Feb. 28, 2010; English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.
5. The two had a mutual acquaintance: Descriptions of Balawi’s relations with Mehsud and his early interactions with the Pakistan Taliban provided interviews with a Tehrik-i-Taliban member and two Pakistani intelligence officers who later investigated the Balawi affair after the Khost bombing. Additional insights are drawn from Balawi’s accounts of his meetings with the Taliban chief.
6. Qari had beheaded a kidnapped Polish geologist: For a description of the incident, see Bill Roggio, “Taliban Feud over Murder of Polish Hostage,” Long War Journal, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/taliban_feud_over_mu.php.
7. I could go to FATA: Description of Balawi’s offer of his spying services in Pakistan provided in author interviews with two Jordanian and four U.S. intelligence officials. A detailed account of Balawi’s meetings and conversations with bin Zeid about the assignment is related in Balawi’s Dec. 26, 2009, videotaped interview, op. cit.
8. the “father of smoke”: For more on the terrorist Imad Mughniyeh and the circumstances of his death, see Matthew Levitt and David Schenker, “Who Was Imad Mughniyeh?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy online, Feb. 14, 2008, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2716.
9. who had killed Abdullah Azzam: For more on the influential cleric and the circumstances of his death, see Aryn Baker, “Who Killed Abdullah Azzam?” Time (June 18, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1902809_1902810_1905173,00.html.
10. the logistics of Balawi’s journey came together: Details about the arrangements for Balawi’s insertion into Pakistan were described by two Jordanian and three U.S. intelligence officials personally knowledgeable or privy to classified briefings on the events.
11. he could make out a familiar form: Balawi describes his encounter with the guard Ahmad, a disabled Taliban fighter, while sleeping outdoors in a videotape essay titled, “O Hesitant One: It Is an Obligation!” posted by al-Qaeda’s media arm, as-Sahab, April 30, 2010; English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.
12. “We pray to God”: For a fuller description of the interview with Baitullah Mehsud, see Nick Schifrin, “More Dangerous than Osama: Militant Leader Claims He Is Fighting a ‘Defensive’ Jihad to Destroy the White House,” Brian Ross Reports, Jan. 28, 2008, ABC News online, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=4199754&page=1.
13. capturing an entire garrison: For a discussion of Baitullah Mehsud’s defiance of Pakistan’s government, see “Baitullah Mehsud,” a Times People Topic, New York Times, Aug. 25, 2009, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/baitullah_mehsud/index.html.
14. the real target would be a decoy: This controversial story was described in detail by an official of the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the main Pakistani Taliban alliance, and related separately by two other Taliban associates, suggesting that it is a widely shared story that was used to establish Balawi’s credibility. There is no independent corroboration of the event by the CIA or other U.S. sources.
15. “Every drone strike”: Quote related in interview with Taliban official close to Mehsud.
16. his every move was being recorded: Detailed description of the attack on Baitullah Mehsud provided in author interviews with three U.S. intelligence officials involved in the planning or oversight of the operation.
Chapter 8: Pressure
1. Taliban leader was “alive, safe and sound”: “Taliban Ask Gov’t to Prove Mehsud Death Rumors,” AFP/Reuters, in Nation online, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/11-Aug-2009/Taliban-ask-govt-to-prove-Mehsud-death.
2. his staff was caught up in the drafting of a proposal: Details of the CIA’s proposal for strengthening its campaign against al-Qaeda, and of the White House’s reaction to the plan, were provided in author interviews with two senior intelligence officials and one administration official involved either in the planning meetings or in the presentation.
3. helicopter gunships swept the Taliban’s valley: For a discussion of the Pakistani offensive in South Waziristan from its faltering start in June 2009 to its final phase in October, see Bill Roggio, “What Lies Ahead in Waziristan,” Long War Journal, Oct. 17, 2009, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/analysis_what_lies_a.php.
4. touched off several bloody rounds of: Wall Street Journal online, Aug. 10, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124976257139816985.html.
5. Shadow Army, a paramilitary force: Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda’s Paramilitary ‘Shadow Army,’ ” Long War Journal, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/al_qaedas_paramilita.php.
6. technology had helped turn the tide against Iraq’s insurgents: Bob Woodward, “Why Did Violence Plummet? It Wasn’t Just the Surge,” Washington Post, Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/07/AR2008090701847.html.
7. “We don’t know for a fact where Osama bin Laden is”: Defense Secretary Robert Gates interview with George Stephanopoulos on ABC News’ This Week, Dec. 5, 2009, http://blogs.abcnews.com/george/2009/12/where-is-bin-laden-secretary-gates-says-no-intel-in-years.html.
8. One of the most promising involved: Details of CIA discussions and activities during the six-year search for bin Laden’s courier were described in interviews with two current and two former intelligence officials with direct knowledge of the events.
9. The Taliban’s defeat had been engineered by a small group of CIA officers: For perhaps the most authoritative description of the CIA-led offensive, see Gary Berntsen, Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin Laden and al-Qaeda (New York: Crown Publishers, 2005).
10. “will have flies walking across their eyeballs”: Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War (New York: Anchor Books, 2009).
11. shut down for good: Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Closes Unit Focused on Capture of bin Laden,” New York Times, July 4, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/04/washington/04intel.html?_r=1.
12. She arrived in Kabul in August: Details of Hanson’s time in Afghanistan provided in author interviews with two agency colleagues and two family members.
Chapter 9: Chief
1. attempted to bury an IED: An account of the premature mine explosion is contained in International Security Assistance Force incident logs for Afghanistan’s eastern district for Sept. 19, 2009, and released publicly by the anti-secrecy Web site WikiLeaks in July 2010.
2. She would be safe at Khost: A detailed description of Matthews’s experiences and conversations during her early weeks at Khost was provided in author interviews with eight former agency colleagues as well as two relatives who were in frequent communication with her during the relevant periods.
3. “the only women in a sea of men”: A narrative of Matthews’s early years in the CIA was drawn from accounts provided in interviews with six agency colleagues who knew her professionally and socially during that period, with additional insights provided in interviews with family members.
4. The officers … drew up contingency plans for killing bin Laden: For an authoritative account of pre–September 11 failures in the pursuit of al-Qaeda, see the final report of the so-called 9/11 Commission, The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm. Report released in July 2004.
5. “We’re at war now, a different kind of war”: Former CIA counterterrorism director Cofer Black’s words as remembered by a former CIA officer, in John Kiriakou and Michael Ruby, The Reluctant Spy (New York: Random House, 2010).
6. the case became the center of a roiling c
ontroversy: See Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War, loc. cit.
7. Zubaida was never truly an al-Qaeda leader: For an assessment of Zubaida’s role in al-Qaeda, see Peter Finn and Joby Warrick, “Detainee’s Harsh Treatment Foiled No Plots; Waterboarding, Rough Interrogation of Abu Zubaida Produced False Leads, Officials Say,” Washington Post, March 29, 2009.
8. Teams of SAD officers and Special Forces commandos spearheaded the assault: See Berntsen, Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin Laden and al-Qaeda, loc. cit.
9. They arrived in Khost at 2:00 A.M.: An account of the CIA’s first days at Khost was provided in author interviews with one current and one former agency officers who were present at Khost during the events.
10. Green Beret sergeant named Nathan Chapman: For more on Chapman, see the Special Forces tribute site to him: http://www.quietpros.com/Afgan/chapman_nathan_ross_5sfg.htm.
11. Haqqani had spent years on the CIA’s payroll: For a comprehensive history of the network and its founder, see Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network,” Afghan Report No. 6, Institute for the Study of War, October 2010, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/haqqani-network.
12. “It’s just rudimentary, baseline, box-checking training”: Author interview with retired CIA instructor who led training courses and exercises for CIA officers at Camp Peary, near Williamsburg, Virginia.
13. There were three thousand of these soldiers in the eastern half of Afghanistan: For an account of the CIA-trained Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams, see Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010).
Chapter 10: The Double Agent
1. first big score as a spy: Details of Balawi’s video attachment and the reaction within the CIA were described in interviews with three current intelligence officials who participated in meetings to discuss the finding, and one former U.S. intelligence official who reviewed internal memos and notes about the events.
2. a top aide to bin Laden: For more on Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, see Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, “Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership,” Washington Post online special, accessed Jan. 7, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/world/specials/terror/rahman.html.
3. “You have lifted our heads”: bin Zeid’s reaction to Balawi’s apparent success as a spy, as described in Balawi’s Dec. 26, 2009, videotaped interview, op. cit.
4. serve up graphically detailed descriptions of the damage: Descriptions of Balawi’s assistance to CIA targeters in the fall of 2009 were provided in author interviews with three U.S. and two Jordanian intelligence officials.
5. code-named Agent Hero: For an official account of the double agent Colonel Penkovsky’s espionage achievements during the Cold War and his eventual execution in Russia at the hands of the KGB, see his official CIA profile at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/colonel-penkovsky.html.
6. Indonesian terrorist ring known as Jemaah Islamiyah: For a detailed description of the terrorist group, see the profile “Jemaah Islamiyah” at HistoryCommons.com, at http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=jemmah_islamiyah.
7. “I have to be there for Ali”: Darren LaBonte’s comments, biographical information, and friendship with bin Zeid described in author interviews with two CIA colleagues as well as with members of the bin Zeid and LaBonte families.
Chapter 11: Dangle
1. The Jordanian had made direct contact with the deputy commander of al-Qaeda: Details of Balawi’s e-mails about his reported interaction with Zawahiri, as well as the internal reaction to his messages, were described in author interviews with U.S. intelligence officials who participated in meetings convened to discuss the e-mails, and one former U.S. intelligence official who reviewed internal memos and notes about the events.
2. “we have a chance to go after Zawahiri”: CIA director Leon Panetta’s words, as recalled in author interviews with two intelligence officials and one administration official who attended the meeting.
3. the al-Qaeda version of a mad scientist: See Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).
4. “To kill Americans and their allies”: Ibid.
5. an alleged 2003 plot to attack New York City’s subway system: See Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).
6. Zawahiri was known to have visited the same province: For a description of the failed assassination attempt on Zawahiri, see analysis by Bill Roggio, “Zawahiri, and al-Qaeda’s Future Plans,” Long War Journal, Jan. 15, 2006, as posted by http://threatswatch.org/analysis/2006/01/zawahiri-and-alqaedas-future-p/.
7. “Bush, do you know where I am?”: Andrew Buncombe, “Zawahiri Taunts Bush in New Videotape,” Independent, Jan. 31, 2006.
8. a series of options for a meeting with Balawi were weighed: The CIA’s internal debate over the meeting with Balawi was described in author interviews with three CIA officers who participated.
9. “government was crying out for information”: Interview with the author.
10. Balawi became increasingly insistent: Negotiations with Balawi over the details of his meeting with the CIA and bin Zeid recounted in author interviews with two Jordanian and three U.S. intelligence officials.
11. “We need to go slow on this case”: LaBonte’s words and his bosses’ response, as described in interviews with two CIA officials briefed on the exchange.
12. “But it’s my case”: The Jordanian intelligence agency’s effort to replace bin Zeid as the case officer for Balawi was confirmed by CIA director Leon Panetta in a press briefing on Oct. 19, 2010. Additional details about the internal discussions and events preceding bin Zeid’s departure for Afghanistan were described in author interviews with two Jordanian and two U.S. intelligence officials, as well as with bin Zeid’s and LaBonte’s families.
Chapter 12: Rehearsal
1. She would join them via Skype: Details of Matthews’s experiences during Christmas week were provided in author interviews with two CIA colleagues and two family members.
2. the most important ops plan of her life: Matthews’s plan and the various reactions to it were described in author interviews with two senior U.S. intelligence officials, three CIA colleagues, and two former Special Forces officers with personal knowledge of the events.
3. no formal counterintelligence review for Balawi: The CIA’s internal review, as described by Panetta on Oct. 19, 2010, confirmed deficiencies in the agency’s counterintelligence review of the case. Additional insights provided in author interviews with two senior intelligence officials.
4. they had found Balawi’s behavior suspicious: Author interview with Pickering, op. cit. at Langley, Virginia.
5. everything seemed wrong: LaBonte’s and bin Zeid’s concerns about the Balawi case were described in author interviews with two CIA colleagues and family members with whom they discussed their feelings in the final days of December.
6. “Sometimes it’s your job to say something”: Dec. 21, 2009, e-mail from Jeremy Wise to former navy colleague, provided to author.
7. Stay far away from this: Roberson’s words, as recalled by Khost colleague and recounted in author interview with the Khost colleague.
8. “Pray for me”: Hanson’s words as recalled in author interview with family member.
Chapter 13: The Triple Agent
1. very different from the vests he usually made: For the initial account of the making of Balawi’s suicide vest, see Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Inside Al Qaeda: Nine Years After 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s Network Remains a Shadowy, Little-Understood Enemy,” Newsweek, Sept. 13, 2010. Additional details provided in interview with Pakistani Taliban official.
2. police discovered that they could often distinguish the dead bomber: For a fuller understanding of the forensics of suicide bombing inv
estigations, see Almogy et al., “Suicide Bombing Attacks: Update and Modifications to the Protocol,” Annals of Surgery, vol. 239, no. 3 (March 2004).
3. outlandish theories about how the CIA’s missiles found their targets: Specifics provided in interviews with two Taliban associates and a Pakistani law enforcement official.
4. Balawi’s days started at 5:30 A.M.: Details about Balawi’s training camp experiences, including his leg injury, as well as al-Qaeda’s internal debate over his trustworthiness, were provided in interviews with two Pakistani Taliban officials.
5. If you do not march forth, Allah will punish you with a painful torment: For an example of al-Masri’s rhetoric, see his “Message to the People of Pakistan,” on March 26, 2009. English translation provided by www.nefafoundation.org.
6. Some in the group had been interrogated in U.S. detention camps: Conclusion reached by CIA investigators of the Khost attack, as described in author interviews with two participants in the review.
7. “All praise is due to God, the bait fell in the right spot”: Balawi’s words in his Dec. 26, 2009, videotaped interview. English translation provided by SITE Intelligence Group.
8. Among the dead was Abdullah Said al-Libi: For more on this attack, see Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda Shadow Army Commander Thought Killed in Dec. 17 Strike,” Long War Journal, Jan. 8, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/01/al_qaeda_shadow_army_2.php#ixzz1AMkm70vc.
9. “what is going on in the head of a martyr”: Balawi’s words in essay titled “The Last Writing of Abu Dujana al-Khorasani,” released Feb. 26, 2010, by al-Qaeda’s online magazine Vanguards of Khorasan. English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.
10. “We will get you, CIA team”: Balawi’s words in English in a videotaped suicide message posted on Feb. 28, 2010, by al-Qaeda media arm, as-Sahab. Video provided courtesy of Ben Venzke and IntelCenter, http://www.intelcenter.com/.