B00BY4HXME EBOK

by Lankov, Andrei

  If anything, the recent events in Libya confirmed these assumptions. On March 22, 2011, the KCNA—a North Korean official news agency—quoted a spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry as saying:

  The present Libyan crisis teaches the international community a serious lesson. It was fully exposed before the world that “Libya’s nuclear dismantlement” much touted by the US in the past turned out to be a mode of aggression whereby the latter coaxed the former with such sweet words as “guarantee of security” and “improvement of relations” to disarm itself and then swallowed it up by force. It proved once again the truth of history that peace can be preserved only when one builds up one’s own strength as long as high-handed and arbitrary practices go on in the world.

  For a change, the present author believes that this particular KCNA statement makes perfect sense.

  Indeed, in 2003 Colonel Gaddafidid exactly what the North Korean rulers had stubbornly refused to consider—surrender his country’s nuclear materials in exchange for better relations with the United States and other Western nations. As we have seen, the compromise did not work. When his own people decided to get rid of him, the rebels found willing military support from the West and the eccentric dictator had nothing to deter the mighty West from intervening in the domestic politics of his country. The North Korean leadership must have thought that had Gaddafi not been persuaded to surrender his nuclear program in 2003, the West would never have seriously considered intervening in Libya.

  The North Korean regime is thus not going to respond to either pressure or rewards, and this is increasingly obvious to the interested parties. There is therefore a great—and growing—temptation to say that North Korea is better to be forgotten and safely left alone. This is the essence of the “strategic patience” strategy, which has quietly become the mainstream thinking of the US foreign policy establishment after 2009. In essence it says that the United States is willing to talk to North Korea, and maybe even “reward” it with some monetary and political concessions, as long as North Korea does what the United States wants it to do—that is, starts dismantling its nuclear program. If it doesn’t do so, the United States should, as strategic patience promoters insist, ignore North Korea’s antics, since North Korea isn’t going to be all that harmful anyway. A somewhat similar attitude seems to be dominant among the South Korean Right. These people believe that aid and political concessions make sense only if North Korean leaders agree to policies that are seen as “rational” by Seoul.

  This reasoning might be attractive, but it seems to be unrealistic. North Korea has not the slightest desire to be left alone. Indeed, they cannot afford to be left alone. In order to compensate for the innate inefficiency of their economy, they need outside help, delivered on their specific conditions. So far, the best way to squeeze this aid has been to appear dangerous, unpredictable, and irrational. Therefore, they will continue to appear thus, attempting to cause more trouble for those countries and international forces from whom they hope to squeeze some resources. The alternative is not really attractive—either to survive on meager and perhaps diminishing returns of their nonfunctioning economy or to become excessively dependent on just one sponsor (China).

  The supporters of strategic patience (aka, benign neglect) should understand that whilst being benignly neglected, North Korean leaders will work hard to improve their nuclear and missile arsenal, at the same time trying to proliferate (both as a way to pressurize by being troublesome and as a way to earn extra cash). South Koreans are in an even less enviable situation, as we have argued above, since the refusal to deal with the North Korean regime means that South Korea will face an almost endless chain of provocations. This is bad news for Seoul, since an outbreak of inter-Korean tensions is much more costly for the South than for the North.

  Like it or not, the strategic patience of both Washington and Seoul is limited. Sooner or later, they are likely to give in and rejoin the game that is initiated and stage-managed by Pyongyang. The price of not doing so is too costly. It therefore makes sense to be prepared to rejoin the game on the conditions that are—in the long run, at least—more favorable for Seoul, Washington, and, in the final count, the majority of the North Korean population. The North Korean problem has no quick fixes, but this does not mean that it has no solution whatsoever.

  THINKING LONG TERM

  When we discuss the North Korean problem, it is important to keep in mind that it has three different, if interconnected, dimensions.

  For the United States, the major problem is North Korea’s willingness to develop and maintain (perhaps, even proliferate) nuclear weapons and other WMD, as well as Pyongyang’s inclination to engage in seemingly reckless provocative behavior.

  For South Korea, the major issue is North Korea’s refusal to initiate any kind of reforms that would bring about economic growth and a political transformation, thus creating better conditions for a manageable unification. The ceaseless brinkmanship of Pyongyang also constitutes a serious problem for Seoul (actually, a significantly greater problem than for the United States, which is lucky to be located thousands of miles away).

  There is also another, often unmentioned, dimension of the problem: that of average North Koreans. For them, the continuing existence of the system in its present ossified form means that they are doomed to live lives that are both materially and spiritually impoverished (and full of fear, too). Unable to enjoy the fruits of economic growth that the luckier people in all neighboring countries have experienced, their lives are, essentially, struggles for physical survival. They are deprived of even the theoretical opportunity to become acquainted with more refined forms of culture. Last but not least, they always remember that harsh punishment waits for everybody who deviates from the state’s rigidly prescribed forms of behavior. On balance, this waste of human lives and energy might be the greatest consequence of the Kim family’s dictatorial rule.

  As we have seen above, all of Pyongyang’s policies—the nuclear and WMD programs, the unwillingness to reform, the determined efforts to maintain a police state, the penchant for creating regional tensions—are closely connected to the nature of the North Korean regime. Without these strategies, the regime and the ruling elite will be in serious trouble and so they persist with these policies, no matter what the cost to their own population, to outsiders, and even to the long-term future of their country. The only way to alter North Korea’s behavior is to change the nature of North Korea’s regime. But how?

  To answer this question, it makes sense to have a closer look at the not-so-distant history. What brought about the end of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? In the end, it was the ingrained inefficiency of the centrally planned economy, its inability to provide the population with the level of consumption that prevails in the developed West. This is not to deny that the desire for national independence among the ethnic minorities as well as a longing for democracy and political freedoms among the better educated sections of the population also played a significant role in the demise of Communism. However, on balance, the fate of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was sealed by their economic inefficiency, not their political repressiveness. The author himself was witness to this transformation and hence can assure readers that the decisive impact on the Soviet imagination in the final decades of Communism was produced by the sight of shelves at an American supermarket rather than by the sight of vote counting at an American polling station.

  Paradoxically, the less dramatic transformation of China was also a result of similar changes: by the 1970s, the Beijing leaders were aware that China, in spite of the mad experiments of Chairman Mao, was increasingly lagging behind its neighbors, and that its state-planned economy failed to deliver. They concluded that reform was necessary.

  However, in order to become a political factor, this economic inefficiency had to first become known to and acknowledged by the majority of the population. Had the Soviet leadership been willing and able to ma
intain a North Korean level of isolation and repressiveness, the Soviet Union might still be in existence today. But the regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were soft on their population (in the post-Stalin era, that is) and did not maintain the level of isolation required. Consequently, the average Soviet and Eastern European citizen gradually became aware that peoples of the developed West were living lives that were both more affluent and less controlled by the authorities. The same is applicable to the Chinese decision makers of the 1970s: they knew that China was lagging behind, and this knowledge prompted them to act.

  If anything, North Korea is even more vulnerable to outside information than the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries used to be. After all, in Korea the tremendous economic success is enjoyed by the other half of the same nation, not by some distant countries whose cultures are different and whose languages are incomprehensible. For a long time, Soviet agitprop tried to cushion the impact of the news about Western prosperity by insisting that it was the cruelty of historic fate, and not the ingrained problems of the system, that prevented the Soviet people from enjoying the same consumption levels as Americans. In the 1960s and 1970s the Soviet media argued that the Soviet people should not compare themselves with the lucky inhabitants of North America who had never suffered a foreign invasion and could exploit the entire world for their selfish purposes (references to the slave trade and genocide of American Indians came easily). The argument was not bought by the majority of the Soviet population, but for a while it helped to some extent.

  North Korean propagandists face an unenviable situation: they have to explain the stunning prosperity of the area that at the time of the division was an agricultural backwater and is populated by members of the same ethnic group who share the same language and culture as the destitute inhabitants of North Korea. Now, when the information blockade has become more difficult to maintain, North Korean propaganda does its best to explain South Korean success as the fruits of shamelessly selling out to US imperialism. The ruse might work to some degree, but this explanation has less chance of succeeding than the elaborate but plausible constructs of 1960s Soviet propaganda.

  There is another peculiarity that makes the North Korean regime vulnerable to the spread of information about the outside world. The personality cult of the Kims has some similarities with a religious cult, but on balance the North Korean ideology is secular, with roots going back to Marxism and further back to the European Enlightenment. Unlike fundamentalist ideologues in some other parts of the world, North Korean propagandists do not promise that the faithful would enjoy eternal happiness in the afterlife in the company of 72 virgins. Instead, they claim that North Korean official ideology knows how to best arrange the economic and political life in this world, how to provide economic growth and general well-being. Unfortunately for the North Korean elite, their system has failed to deliver the promised goods and this failure is made remarkably clear in light of the extraordinary success of South Korea.

  The existence of the rich and free South is the major challenge for North Korean leaders, so the spread of knowledge about South Korea is bound to make the status quo untenable.

  In order to initiate changes in North Korea, it is necessary to put North Korea’s rulers under pressure from its people and the lower echelons of the elite. Only North Koreans themselves can change North Korea. They are the major victims of the current unfortunate situation, and they also will become major potential beneficiaries of the coming change.

  The only long-term solution, therefore, is to increase internal pressure for a regime transformation, and the major way to achieve this is to increase North Koreans’ awareness of the outside world. If North Koreans learn about the existence of attractive and available alternatives to their regimented and impoverished existence, the almost unavoidable result will be the growth of dissatisfaction toward the current administration. This will create domestic pressure for change, and the North Korean government will discover that its legitimacy is waning even among a considerable part of the elite (largely among those who don’t have vested interests in keeping the system unchanged).

  This might end in a regime collapse, but it is also possible that facing such pressure, the leadership might attempt some reforms it would not otherwise even contemplate. Reforms might theoretically end in success—that is, in the emergence of a developmental dictatorship, North Korean—style. However, due to the reasons outlined above, it seems to be far more probable that attempts at reforms will simply hasten the collapse of the regime. Either way (a regime collapse or regime transformation), it will be an improvement of the situation for both a majority of the North Korean people as well as for outsiders.

  Admittedly, one of the above-mentioned scenarios is almost certain to happen eventually. Due to its innate inability to deliver economic growth, the North Korean government has become the major obstacle to North Korea’s economic development. As history has shown countless times, in the modern era an economically inept regime always falls sooner or later. Information about the outside world is spreading anyway, whatever the government does—largely thanks to new technologies (like DVD players), but also due to the slow-motion disintegration of domestic surveillance and control. The measures discussed below will not change the course of history, but will merely speed events up to a certain (perhaps quite small) extent—and will also make the coming crisis more manageable.

  This outside support for information dissemination will also serve another important purpose that is not well understood. The half-century rule of the Kim dynasty was a social and economic disaster, but its eventual (and, like it or not, unavoidable) collapse might initially mean a disaster of comparable proportions. It is already time to start thinking about a post-Kim future, to undertake measures that will make the future transformation of North Korea less painful.

  This policy is unlikely to succeed in a short span of time, so we indeed need serious strategic patience in dealing with North Korea—as long as strategic patience does not mean being idle and doing nothing. Conversely, this policy—or rather set of policies—can be implemented by a number of actors. Efforts aimed at changing North Korea can be carried out by the bureaucracies of the different states who have a stake in the issue. But there is also a great deal of space for NGOs, private foundations, and even individuals. All efforts that increase North Korea’s exposure to the outside world should be welcomed. All interpersonal exchanges should work toward the same goal.

  Currently, there are three channels that can provide the North Korean populace with unauthorized information about the outside world. First, officially approved academic, cultural, and other interpersonal exchanges, endorsed by the North Korean authorities, will unavoidably bring such potentially dangerous knowledge inside the country. Second, radio broadcasts and digital media might deliver news that is beyond the control of the North Korean regime. Third, the small but growing community of North Korean refugees—currently residing in South Korea but maintaining relations with families and friends in the North—might play a major and important role in disseminating this type of communication.

  THE HIDDEN BENEFITS OF ENGAGEMENT

  Of all the three channels mentioned above, official exchanges between North Korea and the outside world are especially significant. Since such exchanges will have to be approved by the North Korean authorities, nearly all participants will necessarily come from the country’s current elite.

  One can expect that conservatives in Washington, Seoul, and elsewhere will question the value of these exchanges. They may say that such exchanges in effect reward the North Korean leadership and its cronies. There is a kernel of truth (actually a rather large kernel) in this point of view. There is no doubt that the top functionaries in Pyongyang and the spoiled brats of the Pyongyang government quarters will be the first to take advantage of international student exchanges or overseas study trips. However, to be frank, they are exactly the type of people who matter most. Changes to North Korea might
start from below, but it is more likely that transformation will be initiated by well-informed and disillusioned members of the elite.

  There is a historic example that shows the potential power of seemingly controlled and limited exchanges. In 1958 an academic exchange agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the United States, the diehard conservatives insisted that the agreement would merely provide the Soviets with another opportunity to send spies or educate propaganda-mongers. In addition, the critics continued, this would be done on American taxpayers’ money.

  The first group of exchange students included exactly the people the conservatives were not eager to welcome onto US soil. There were merely four Soviet students selected by Moscow to enter Columbia University for one year of study. One of them, as we know now, was a rising KGB operative whose job was indeed to spy on the Americans. He was good at his job and eventually made a brilliant career in Soviet foreign intelligence. His fellow student was a young but promising veteran of the then-still-recent World War II. After studies in the United States, he moved to the Communist Party central bureaucracy, where in a decade he became the first deputy head of the propaganda department—in essence, a second-in-command among Soviet professional ideologues.

  Skeptics seemed to have been proven right—until the 1980s, that is. The KGB operative’s name was Oleg Kalugin, and he was to become the first KGB officer to openly challenge the organization from within. He was the first person to criticize the KGB’s role as a party watchdog, and initiated a campaign aimed at its transformation into a regular intelligence and counterintelligence service.