Attack State Red

by Richard Kemp

  Lieutenant Colonel Carver estimated that the battle group killed forty Taliban during Operation Palk Ghar. After the operation, attacks against Sangin reduced but did not end, and the Taliban remained determined to strike at the local population, the representatives of the government and the British troops. But their ability to do so had been further degraded, and Major Biddick and his men continued to patrol aggressively throughout the town and surrounding country to further deny the enemy freedom of action. Despite A Company’s efforts, towards the end of September a suicide bomb attack against the governor’s bodyguard resulted in the death of an Afghan police officer and the wounding of another. Two days later an IED on Route 611 just outside the town killed three Afghan National Army soldiers.

  To the north, over many weeks following the most intensive phase of attacks against Inkerman in July, Major Messenger and C Company fought numerous tough battles in the desert and Green Zone near the base. One such action involved the whole Royal Anglian Sniper Platoon, brought together under a battle group operation codenamed Palk Law, after the actor Jude Law, who played a sniper in the Second World War film Enemy at the Gates.

  Not far from FOB Inkerman, the snipers took up fire positions in a vantage point overlooking the Green Zone while Major Messenger led C Company forward to flush out a Taliban IED team. As the company advanced, the enemy began to extract and were engaged by the L96 and long-range rifles of the Sniper Platoon. During the ensuing firefight, C Company and the snipers killed at least twelve Taliban fighters.

  Around Kajaki, Major Borgnis and B Company continued to battle the Taliban right up until the Royal Anglians handed over responsibility for Northern Helmand to 40 Commando, Royal Marines. During the last month of the tour there was a significant increase in the level and ferocity of enemy activity in the Kajaki area of operations. Borgnis felt the Taliban wanted to have a final hard push before the traditional fighting season came to an end and they settled in for a less active winter.

  On Saturday 6 October, after most of the battle group had begun heading home, B Company were patrolling in the area of Mazdurak, the scene of so many previous battles involving the Royal Anglians. Borgnis’s men were attacked on three sides with an astonishing weight of fire by Taliban from twenty separate positions, interconnected by tunnels and trench systems.

  The fighting was intense, and Borgnis ordered counter-strikes from the guided multiple launch rocket system, nicknamed the ‘70-kilometre sniper’. GMLRS, based 50 kilometres away in FOB Robinson, had arrived in August and could deliver a GPS-guided 200-pound high-explosive warhead to its target, at up to 70 kilometres, with pinpoint accuracy. To enable B Company’s extraction under fire, Borgnis called in a US B1 bomber, which dropped eight 2,000-pound bombs and six 500-pound bombs on the enemy. The aircraft used up its entire payload of munitions. This rarely occurs and therefore has a special name in the US Air Force: ‘Winchestering’. The name comes from the First World War, when a biplane pilot would reach for his Winchester repeating rifle after he ran out of machine-gun bullets in a dog fight. Borgnis estimated that thirteen Taliban had been killed during the battle, which was the Royal Anglians’ last major combat action in Helmand.

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  By the time Lieutenant Colonel Carver handed over to the Royal Marines’ commanding officer in early October, the Royal Anglian Battle Group had fought more than 350 violent close-quarter battles. On average, every soldier was involved in at least forty serious engagements with the Taliban. They had fired more than a million bullets and 22,000 artillery and mortar shells. They had thrown over 500 hand grenades and launched more than 7,000 rifle grenades at the enemy. And they had called in over 200,000 pounds of air-delivered munitions.

  Carver estimated that more than 1,000 Taliban fighters had been killed during the battle group’s operations. But neither he, Brigadier Lorimer nor any of the Royal Anglian commanders considered body count to be the measure of success in Helmand. Under Lorimer’s concept for Task Force Helmand, all security operations in the province were in support of the government of Afghanistan, and were executed to set the conditions for improved governance, reconstruction and economic development. Both Lorimer and Carver recognized that vital to any success in these areas was an improved sense of safety and security among the population of Helmand: key components in the ‘battle for consent’.

  When the battle group deployed, together with the rest of Lorimer’s brigade, the so-called Taliban spring offensive was due, according to intelligence reports and the Taliban’s own propaganda. There was a noticeable increase in Taliban attacks as they prepared to give the British forces a bloody nose. Lorimer and Carver had other ideas. They recognized that to stand any chance of improving security for the people they had to switch tactics and take the fight to the enemy. There were insufficient forces available to hold any significant area of ground, but, by entering and staying in the Green Zone for extended periods, the battle group denied the Taliban the freedom they needed for their own ‘spring offensive’. Having seized the upper hand in this way, the Royal Anglians – and Task Force Helmand as a whole – retained the initiative for the whole of the six-month tour, remaining on the offensive throughout.

  For the Taliban in Helmand, this was tactically devastating. Having failed to overcome the hard-fought defences of platoon bases in Helmand during 2006, and unable to counter the offensive strikes into their own strongholds in 2007, they increasingly came to realize that they could not win in face-to-face confrontation with NATO forces. The attrition the Taliban suffered during 2007 was a major factor in their shift towards greater – but not exclusive – use of mines, roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices.

  Of equal importance, Task Force Helmand’s offensive operations sought to demonstrate to the local communities that the British forces meant business, were able to protect them to a substantial extent and could provide an alternative to Taliban intimidation.

  The Royal Anglian Battle Group’s operations led to real improvements in safety and prosperity for the people in Sangin and Gereshk and the surrounding districts. Towards the beginning of the deployment, Operation Silicon and its aftermath had denied the Taliban freedom to attack, kill and intimidate the population of Gereshk. President Karzai said, ‘If we fail in Sangin we will fail in Afghanistan.’ And for most of the tour, the security and reconstruction of Sangin was the Royal Anglians’ priority. The three major battle group operations in the Helmand River valley north-east of the town, the establishment of FOB Inkerman and the extensive security activity in and around Sangin resulted in its transformation.

  Until the US-led Operation Silver, launched as the Royal Anglians deployed into Helmand, Sangin had endured almost a year under siege. When the battle group arrived it was a virtual ghost town. Six months later, many of the residents had returned, and the vitally important bazaar was flourishing once again. A range of development projects had been initiated, including irrigation, repair of electricity transformers, constructing wells, opening schools and clinics and clearing bomb damage. Following a lengthy battle with the system, a few days after Operation Palk Ghar ended, Carver succeeded in gaining the release of $104,500 of humanitarian relief cash to pay families in Sangin whose homes had been destroyed in fighting. The payments, made by Biddick, represented a milestone in the struggle to gain the consent and confidence of the community.

  Over the six-month period, there was an increasing sense of hope and optimism among the people of Sangin, and in the community across the district. But despite everything they did on reconstruction and development, Carver and Biddick felt their efforts represented only a drop in the ocean compared to what was really needed, and throughout the tour it was a cause of constant frustration that more resources and energy were not made available by Allied governments for these vital lines of operation.

  The Royal Anglian Battle Group achieved significant success at the strategically important Kajaki Dam. Relentless aggressive patrolling by first C then B Company had pushed
the Taliban front line at Kajaki further and further back, leaving the dam itself and the hydroelectricity-generating plant virtually immune to interference from the Taliban. The Royal Anglians’ example was followed by successive units, and less than a year after the battalion left Helmand, the vital third generator was brought in by road, an achievement that will enable the hydroelectricity station to supply electric power to most of Helmand and Kandahar provinces.

  Following the tour, Brigadier Lorimer said of the Royal Anglians: ‘The officers and soldiers of the Royal Anglian Battle Group were quite superb during the summer of 2007. They knew that it was going to be a tough operational deployment, and their training and preparation for the six-month tour were comprehensive and rigorous. In Helmand Province, they had a sharp focus and a desire to maintain the pressure on the enemy. They were agile, controlled and disciplined. Despite taking casualties, they cracked on in their efforts to make northern Helmand a better place. They had a terrific regimental ethos and esprit de corps which affected everyone who worked with them.

  ‘The soldiers of The 1st Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment represented the British infantry at its best, exuding all those essential qualities that have been so important over the years: courage, determination, dedication to duty, humility, patience and forbearance; and all done with a wry smile and a sense of humour. In short, the Royal Anglian Battle Group was a fantastic group of professional soldiers, who rose to the challenge in 2007 and who should be justifiably proud of what they achieved. I am exceptionally proud to have commanded them.’

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  Every Royal Anglian who was in Helmand can testify to the chaos and confusion of war. According to a well-known military adage, ‘no plan ever survives contact with the enemy’. It is difficult enough to manoeuvre large numbers of troops and vehicles across treacherous and inhospitable terrain, sometimes by night, in dust storms, rain or searing heat; in armoured vehicles with limited external vision; against near-impossible time-lines; and coordinating with neighbouring forces, ground attack aircraft, helicopters, artillery, engineers and logistic support. But the complexities and potential for confusion are hugely increased when the enemy is trying to prevent you from doing it by killing you and blowing up your vehicles and equipment.

  Piled on top of this are the limits of reconnaissance and the frequent inaccuracy or incompleteness of the intelligence picture, sometimes brought about by the enemy’s own operational security, deception and disinformation, sometimes by lack of resources or inadequacy of collection systems. For every intelligence success such as the one achieved by Captain Tom Coleman in Sangin, there are a hundred disappointments. In close combat even the most technologically sophisticated weapons, surveillance systems and communications devices can and frequently do fail. The Royal Anglians’ repeated experience of failure at the critical moment of their state-of-the-art combat radios is a case in point. Messages are sometimes not transmitted, not received, or garbled. Precision-guided munitions don’t always hit the target they are supposed to and sometimes explode when they shouldn’t or don’t explode when they should. Especially in close infantry combat, the concept of the precise, surgical strike is more often pipe dream than practical reality. The Helmand environment, especially the Green Zone, also served to diminish the advantages of technology, frequently putting the Royal Anglians and Taliban on equal terms during the close fighting.

  Then there is perceptual distortion, common in combat situations, which can lead a commander or soldier to comprehend events in a way that is different from reality. The stresses and fears of battle, tiredness and the body’s natural chemical reactions, including production of adrenalin, can lead to excluding or intensifying sounds, tunnel vision, temporary paralysis, events appearing to move faster or more slowly than they actually are, loss, reduction or distortion of memory and distracting thoughts. These affect different people in different ways and can add to the confusion and chaos of battle.

  Amid the disorientation, the smoke, the fire, the explosions, the ear-piercing rattle of bullets, the screams of the wounded, the incomplete intelligence picture and the failure of technology, commanders and soldiers must work on to achieve their mission, no matter how hard it gets. Commanders in particular must plan, decide and act in a way that will avoid unnecessary danger, risk and loss of life to their own men and to the civilian population. These calculations and decisions become doubly difficult when fighting a tough, wily, skilful enemy, one minute shooting at you or setting a landmine to blow up your vehicle, the next tilling the land while waving or smiling or chatting to you, dressed indistinguishably from the population.

  To quote Major Biddick: ‘As a commander you are surrounded by your men yet are totally alone. You have the NATO military arsenal at your disposal, but the most useful weapons are the rifle and the bayonet. You have to kill the enemy knowing that you will then need to shake hands and win the consent of the family in the compound that he is occupying. You haven’t slept for two days, you are shattered, you are wet with sweat and the chaos of battle reigns all about you. There are no computers; on your map with your pen you must compute the locations and intentions of the enemy, your flanking forces, the unpredictable ANA, their OMLT and fourteen of your own callsigns. You must do this immediately because the CO needs a SITREP, your company group need a situation brief to orient them, and your FST commander is about to bring in fast air, helicopters and mortars, and needs to know that the danger-close fire missions – which all fire missions were in the Green Zone – are not going to kill your men. You must assess the situation and give the go in seconds to secure the initiative.

  ‘The advantage for the commander of all this is that it makes you forget the eighty pounds on your back, the water in the ditch that is up to your waist, and the sweat and dirt that streams constantly into your eyes. The battle manifests itself as a wall of noise that surrounds you, interspersed with the infantryman’s most detested sound – incoming bullets cracking above, to the side and below your head.’

  In the kind of high-intensity combat faced by the Royal Anglians in Helmand, success can only be achieved, chaos can only be controlled, and dangers can only be overcome by commanders who are fearlessly aggressive and know how to seize the initiative, imposing their own brand of order on events by surprise, momentum, pace, speed and shock action. Indecision, uncertainty, delay and timidity can lower the morale of the troops and lead to disaster. This is why Major Dominic Biddick pushed to attack Habibollah Kalay during Operation Silicon, why Major Phil Messenger forced his way into the Taliban stronghold of Mazdurak, why Major Mick Aston was determined to hunt down the enemy fighters in Katowzay during Operation Ghartse Ghar, and why Major Tony Borgnis Winchestered a B1 bomber to support his company’s extraction from Mazdurak in the closing shots of the tour.

  The chaos and friction of battle frequently leads to incidents of so-called ‘friendly fire’ or ‘blue on blue’. The tragic F15 strike that accidentally killed three of B Company’s bravest men in August 2007 stands out. There were other, less catastrophic, incidents of friendly fire during the Royal Anglians’ tour, as there have been on every combat tour in Afghanistan and Iraq and every conflict, ancient and modern, including both world wars, Korea, the Falklands campaign, Northern Ireland, the Balkans and the Gulf War. The more intensive the combat, the more often friendly fire incidents will occur. When analysing the chaos, the confusion and the ebb and flow of battle, it is astonishing that more such incidents do not take place. But the effect on morale of friendly fire can be significantly greater than death or injury caused by enemy fire. Modern surveillance, target acquisition, fire control, geo-locational and communications systems help reduce the risk, but, as with other areas of combat, technology will never completely do away with friendly fire incidents, however desirable that would be.

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  While significantly lower than the blood cost to their opponents, the price of their six-month tour had also been high for the Royal Anglians. Nine killed and fifty-seven
wounded in action. The homecoming for the dead was always poignant. Hours after the emotional ramp ceremonies when the battalion said goodbye to their dead comrades at Camp Bastion, close families gathered for the arrival of their loved ones at Brize Norton. The funeral of every Royal Anglian soldier was packed; people were standing in the aisles, and crowds assembled outside. Serving soldiers, from General Sir John McColl, Colonel of the Regiment, downwards, gathered at churches and crematoriums across the country, as did retired officers and soldiers. The sense of regimental loyalty, incomprehensible to those who have not served, drew them close.

  Many a battle-hardened combat-suited infantryman, rarely given to displays of emotion, could be seen with tears running down his cheeks, alongside boys just out of their teens, some wearing football shirts or tracksuits and trainers, others in unfamiliar dark suits or ill-fitting jackets and black ties. These were the shocked school friends, who only months earlier had been messing about in the classroom, listening to loud music or boozing illegally with the occupant of the Union Flag-draped coffin.

  Corporal Daz Bonner’s funeral was one of the largest. At the wake afterwards, the British Legion hall was packed with soldiers and former soldiers from both of the battalions he had served in. Major Dave Goude, who had been regimental sergeant major of the 2nd Battalion, observed that this was the first time in living memory that large numbers of troops from the 1st and 2nd Battalions had been together with drink taken and there hadn’t been a fight.