The Great War at Sea: 1914-1918

by Richard Hough

  The fact that they were further delayed in their support of Beatty was due, once again, to faulty signalling. Signalling failure then accounted for(2):(3) is a more difficult charge to answer. Besides the failures of signalling, all the scouting forces, British and German, except Goodenough’s 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron and Boedicker’s 2nd Scouting Group, tended to forget their primary function when in action. The best training in the world could not have prepared these light-cruiser officers for the distractions of real shellfire and the tumult and terrors of close-fought battle. Time and again, on both sides, the primary function of communicating information on what could be seen was lost in the hurly-burly of fighting the enemy and surviving.

  As to the fourth major criticism of Beatty, it is true that by altering course to the east he cut across the battle fleet’s intended course, forcing it to reduce speed temporarily and delaying Jellicoe’s deployment. It has been suggested that Beatty made this alteration on the assumption that Jellicoe would deploy to starboard – to the west. But Beatty was much too able a tactician, and reader of his C.-in-C.’s mind, to make such a fundamental wrong assumption. It is much more likely that he wished to conceal for as long as possible from Scheer the presence of the British battle fleet, his priority intention throughout ‘the run to the north’. He had every reason to suppose that he had succeeded so far, and he would naturally aim to draw Jellicoe’s victim as deeply into the trap as possible before it was sprung upon him.

  No praise is too high for Beatty for sustaining his aggressive tactics against Hipper in spite of his own serious losses and the damage to his flagship. He was less successful in another important duty, in keeping his C.-in-C. informed of what he saw and what was happening. It is quite extraordinary, for example, that Jellicoe did not learn until the following morning of the loss of the Indefatigable and Queen Mary, and even more extraordinary that Chatfield, twenty years later, expressed surprise when someone questioned this omission on his Admiral’s part. But it is equally extraordinary that Jellicoe, knowing what a hot time Beatty had been having, never enquired about any ships he may have sunk or losses he had sustained. With the superiority the Battle Cruiser, Fleet’s commander enjoyed, it was possible that he had already sunk the greater part of Hipper’s force, but Jellicoe either had no time, or no inclination, to find out.

  It is quite clear that Beatty had taken no steps to improve his fleet’s deplorable signalling organization. The same carelessness and lack of intelligence displayed on earlier occasions was repeated, and once again signals were not repeated by searchlight, a procedure on which Jellicoe was always most insistent. Beatty must also be held responsible for the numerous failures of his Staff, especially his Chief of Staff, the inadequate Captain Rudolph Bentinck, and, of course, for his retention of Seymour after his clear failure to match up to his job. The signalling stall of the Princess Royal and Tiger especially appear to have been insufficiently trained.

  One further point has to be made before leaving the subject of reporting and signalling generally. Many of the failures, especially during the night action, can be accounted for by exhaustion. Even if most officers and men had enjoyed some sleep on the night of 30-31 May, the late-night departure and the imminence of action had not led to much rest. Then, for all those of the Battle Cruiser Fleet the action had been almost continuous for seven hours even if contact with the enemy had been broken from time to time. The strain of that second night was appalling, and many collapsed with tiredness as they had at the Battle of the Nile in 1798.

  Of the Grand Fleet’s squadron commanders, Evan-Thomas came in for the most criticism, especially by the pro-Beatty school. His failure to turn to concentrate his strength on Beatty at once can be accounted for by the fact that, due to Beatty’s poor signalling organization and especially the failure to confirm by searchlight and W/T, the signal never reached him. It can as well have been caused by Evan-Thomas’s knowledge that he had been ordered to station himself as a link between Beatty and Jellicoe and his first responsibility was to maintain that link, only breaking it when ordered to do so. When Beatty’s signal to his destroyers to take up screening positions was received in the Barham, Captain Craig did suggest that the 5th Battle Squadron should turn to the east on its own initiative, but Evan-Thomas decided to await orders – an early example, even before the battle began, of the negative initiative instilled by the GFBOs.

  A further major difficulty lay in the fact that Evan-Thomas was a newcomer to the Battle Cruiser Fleet and his 5th Battle Squadron was only on temporary assignment to Beatty. Highly as Beatty prized these super-fast super-dreadnoughts he had worked very little with them, and Evan-Thomas was unfamiliar with Beatty’s tactical style, which was far less rigid than Jellicoe’s because of his relatively smaller size, high speed, and different function. When Evan-Thomas received no signal (and when working with Jellicoe he invariably received searchlight confirmation) he presumed that ‘the Vice-Admiral wished 5th BS further to northward to prevent enemy escaping in that direction – that was the idea at the moment in my head’. It is difficult not to accept the validity of this defence, and sympathize with the gallant Rear-Admiral when he continued with the question, ‘After all, isn’t it one of the fundamental principles of naval tactics that an admiral makes sure that his orders are understood by distant parts of his Fleet before rushing into space, covered by a smoke screen?’(23)

  The earlier arrival of the 5th Battle Squadron would certainly have given Beatty the chance to cripple Hipper’s squadron, and might have saved the Queen Mary. For this Beatty must take the lion’s share of the blame, and while Evan-Thomas demonstrated a certain lack of imagination, he did not deserve the vilification he suffered from some quarters. There remains to be said that, once in action, both Beatty and Evan-Thomas performed heroic prodigies of leadership, handling their ships in a manner beyond praise. The 5th Battle Squadron’s gunnery revealed the advantage of the superior facilities for practice at Scapa Flow compared with Rosyth.

  Of the other battleship squadron commanders there is little to say. The seamanship of all of them was first class, as expected, and there was little opportunity to reveal any other qualities, least of all individual initiative, although in the last stages of the daylight action Jerram managed to get well ahead of Jellicoe in pursuit of Beatty. Hood’s performance as C.-in-C. 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron was all that might be expected of this splendid officer. He had a brilliant future at the time of Jutland, and his loss was sorely felt in the Navy. The most tragic squadron was Arbuthnot’s. Three of the four old armoured cruisers were sunk, which did not matter, but over 1,800 officers and men died, and no nation and no navy can afford that. It was particularly unfortunate that this squadron, which was so unsuited to face the High Seas Fleet at any range, should be hurled by its bold commander into the barrels of Scheer’s and Hipper’s guns, at the same time seriously impeding British gunfire.

  With few exceptions, the flotillas performed magnificently, with dash and with many examples of sharp-thinking initiative. The night actions they fought, blinded by searchlights and muzzle flash, deafened by small-calibre gunfire at sometimes point-blank range were the most nerve-testing of all. Many heroes were made that night, among them Captain Charles Wintour in the Tipperary, and so many of his officers and men of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla. The Spitfire got home with only six dead and part of the plating and anchor gear of the German dreadnought she had rammed. Other destroyers went down as a tangled riot of smashed and twisted steel after a single German salvo, and, in all, eight of these little craft failed to come home.

  Admiral Scheer was highly praised for his tactical skill and his handling of the High Seas Fleet. This praise is deserved for his conduct of the two turnabouts and for his training of the Fleet for this manoeuvre. But great commanders are not made by skilful evasions of the enemy, and an intelligent appreciation of the events following his sighting of Beatty at the end of the ‘run to the south’ would have made these turns-about unnecessary. Scheer
could and should have concluded from Beatty’s northerly heading that the High Seas Fleet was being led into a trap. If Beatty was flying for his life, why was he not steering north-west for home? Scheer’s second tactical error was to presume, without the confirming evidence of his scouting forces, that Jellicoe was far enough south at 7.10 p.m. for the High Seas Fleet to make a dash for Horns Reef behind its rear. Scheer calculated that Jellicoe would be going at full speed, probably close to 20 knots, in pursuit of him to the south when in fact Jellicoe was still attempting to sort out his line following the last German destroyer attack. To attempt this same movement a second time does not suggest original thinking on the German C.-in-C.’s part, and presupposed a great deal of luck, which again came his way. Scheer’s boasting and misrepresentation of the battle afterwards is irrelevant and is not contributory to history’s judgement on the stature of this Admiral.

  Admiral Hipper, on the other hand, after that early lapse of leaving his west flank unprotected, played the part of a maestro – a maestro of some Wagnerian epic. He manoeuvred his ships superbly, kept his nerve under the most daunting and intimidating circumstances, and extricated all his ships from the famous ‘death ride’ following his C.-in-C.’s second turn-about. He and his captains deserve the highest credit.

  And so, who really won the Battle of Jutland, and with what weapons? To deal with the matériel first, there can be no doubt that the torpedo was the weapon that dominated the tactics on both sides, and yet fell far below expectations in the damage it caused. The flotilla attacks caused convulsive movements of the fleets but little harm. The submarines, blinded by being submerged (British) or deaf (German), played virtually no part in the proceedings, although juicy targets by the score passed near or over them. German air reconnaissance came too late on the morning of 1 June, and was never allowed to prove its value on the British side. With the exception of the ‘flash’ catastrophes on the British side, heavy shell proved to be less destructive than expected. No British gunnery officer expected that a German battle-cruiser (Seydlitz) would survive twenty-four heavy shell hits, any more than a German gunnery officer expected a British battleship (Warspite) to survive the ferocious battering she received – and in fact they claimed to have sunk her. In matériel, Fisher’s theories were proved correct. The battle-cruiser fulfilled its functions satisfactorily, scouting and drawing the enemy battle fleet into a tactically disadvantageous position. Fisher as a proponent of high speed was once again vindicated. It was also Fisher who had advocated only the smallest secondary armament for his dreadnoughts and deplored the introduction of a 6-inch secondary battery Jellicoe’s fear of the overall heavier secondary armament of German dreadnoughts was not realized. The 4-inch gun was quite adequate against German flotillas, and because of the long range of the German 5.9 fitted in all dreadnoughts, gunnery officers were tempted to use them against the enemy battle line, which confused spotting.

  In simple numbers, there was no doubt who had come off worse. The British losses were three battle-cruisers, three armoured cruisers, and eight destroyers, against German losses of one battleship, one battle-cruiser, four light cruisers, and five destroyers. Of these the German battleship Pommern and the three British armoured cruisers can be discounted as of negligible value. The serious losses were the Lützow and the four modern light cruisers for Germany, representing 20 per cent and 36 per cent of these two essential classes of fighting ship; and the Queen Mary for Britain, the relatively old and slow Invincible and Indefatigable together equally perhaps the value of one modern battle-cruiser, but statistically representing 33 per cent of British battle-cruisers participating. The balance, therefore, was marginally in Germany’s favour. But damaged ships must also be taken into account, and here the balance turns to Britain’s favour. Hipper’s battle-cruiser force was hors de combat on 1 June and was quite incapable of putting to sea. In spite of frantic efforts in German dockyards, it was six months before the last of those battered battle-cruisers were fit for service. Scheer had only ten undamaged dreadnoughts after the battle while Jellicoe had twenty-four, and all the damaged British ships were repaired within eight weeks.

  In the tragic human toll, because four of Jellicoe’s ships blew up with only a handful of survivors, the British dead numbered 6,097 against the German loss of 2,511.

  Both sides exaggerated enemy losses, but only the Germans loudly proclaimed a victory, and made great propaganda capital out of doing so immediately the fleet put into harbour. The first British official communiqué reporting the heavy losses suffered by the Grand Fleet filled the nation with anxiety and disappointment, and enraged Jellicoe’s men, who thought they had done pretty well. Subsequent announcements from the Admiralty cheered everyone up, and while the regret that this had been no Trafalgar lingered, it was recognized that the German Fleet had escaped only by the skin of its teeth.

  Germany could play with figures for as long as she wished, but British control of the world’s sea lanes was unimpaired, the blockade of the enemy as tight as ever. The High Seas Fleet had come out with the intention of trapping and destroying part of the Grand Fleet, had failed to do so, and had retreated hastily back home, leaving the field of battle firmly in British hands. It is strategy that finally wins wars, and strategically there could be no doubt that Jellicoe had been the winner, whatever shortcomings he and his fleet’s performance might have revealed. Of course it would have been infinitely more satisfactory if he had been a decisive tactical winner, too, but he judged the risks of attempting to achieve that to be too great. It is quite impossible to declare responsibly whether he was right or wrong not to take those risks. And no one can say he had not made his tactical policy amply clear beforehand. The evidence of that was in the GFBOs, all 200 pages of them.

  THE DEFEAT OF THE U-BOAT, SURRENDER AND SCUTTLE

  Post-Jutland reforms – The 19 August sortie Jackson replaced by Jellicoe, Balfour by Carson, at the Admiralty – The advent of unrestricted U-boat warfare – The Navy’s countermeasures inadequate – Jellicoe’s resistance to the introduction of convoy – American entry into the war Convoy again provides the antidote to the guerre de course – Geddes replaces Carson and Jellicoe’s peremptory sacking – Harmony prevails between the RN and USN – The success of the Geddes-Wemyss administration but failure to exploit air power – The abortive Zeebrugge raid – Surrender of the High Seas Fleet

  The Great War was not yet at its halfway stage when the Battle of Jutland was fought, and grievous setbacks lay ahead on land and at sea before the final and rapid German descent towards defeat in the late summer of 1918.

  On the same day when Jellicoe declared the Grand Fleet ready for action again, the second Battle of Ypres began on the Western Front, and just a month later (1 July 1916) the gigantic and bloody Somme offensive opened. On 15 June Woodrow Wilson, the man who was to take the USA into the war in April 1917, was re-nominated Democratic presidential candidate.

  As a reaffirmation of the first lesson of Jutland, and of the new face of sea warfare, the underwater weapon struck again, on the evening of 5 June, when the armoured cruiser Hampshire with Kitchener on board and en route to Russia, was sunk by a mine laid by a U-boat off the Orkneys. The Field Marshal, a national hero who had, in the public’s view, created the new armies as Fisher had created the Grand Fleet, had lunched with Jellicoe and discussed the Battle of Jutland and before embarking in the cruiser, rejecting Jellicoe’s suggestion that he should delay his departure.

  Amidst the cries of lamentation which sounded out in the country for the loss of Kitchener, and the loss of so many fine ships and brave men at Jutland, sweeping naval reforms were swiftly put in hand. Following Beatty’s urgent message to Jellicoe on the subject of his ships’ destruction, the ‘flash’ menace was investigated by a newly formed Protection Committee. Anti-flash gear and devices were introduced throughout the Fleet. Flash-tight scuttles in the bulkheads between magazines and handling rooms were re-introduced. But the Fleet was equally concerned with what they
regarded as the inadequacy of the armour, especially on the battle-cruisers, and battle-cruisers under construction were considerably strengthened. Only the Admiralty remained satisfied that British projectiles were beyond criticism. But when Jellicoe became First Sea Ford, oblique tests confirmed Beatty’s suspicions about the reasons for the failure of British AP shell. On the other hand, no one could find fault with British director gear and for this reason the fitting of it in cruisers and for secondary armament in capital ships was accelerated.

  The failure to transmit vital information to the Fleet by the Admiralty was thoroughly investigated, hut it took another fourteen months before Oliver could be convinced that Room 40 must become an integral part of the Intelligence Division, under Hall. Room 40 grew in size and efficiency, supported in its work by yet another piece of good fortune. German intelligence had at last replaced the signal book retrieved from the Magdeburg in the first days of the war. But on 24 September 1916 the Zeppelin L-32, which had been shot clown, conveniently yielded up a copy of the new signal book, which allowed Room 40 to continue its valuable work with hardly a break.

  The GFBOs were little altered as a result of Jutland. In spite of the relative ineffectiveness of the torpedo, this weapon still dominated tactics. lass destroyer attacks, submarines, and mines remained greatly feared, and Jellicoe was still not going to risk pursuit of a fleeing enemy or approaching within torpedo range until ‘the enemy is beaten by gunfire’. Greater flexibility in the line was permitted and Jellicoe bowed to criticism of his second turn-away – which many officers thought had led to the failure to force a decision – by permitting squadron commanders greater discretionary powers.