Cold War Hot: Alternate Decisions of the Cold War

by Tsouras, Peter

  The loss of all their support vessels at Kithira put the Soviets in a difficult position, as the US had intended with its response; with the naval battles heightening global tensions, NATO member Turkey refused permission for other Soviet ships to transit the Bosphorus Straits from the Black Sea. Mediterranean options closed, the Soviets turned to the only card they had to play. Their troops in East Germany went to full alert and overtly began to prepare for battle.

  The Soviets had three tank and two combined arms armies immediately available in East Germany. They massed some 370,000 men and 7,000 tanks in 20 divisions and were backed up by 16th Air Army’s 900 planes. Another 30 divisions were in various states of readiness in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The forward movement of men and materials transmitted the threat clearly to the United States and its NATO allies and they had no choice but to respond. Five American, four British, and 11 West German divisions went to full alert and began their move toward their forward defensive positions.

  While world attention was fixed on the two superpowers, Israel completed over-running Sinai and the West Bank. Egypt lost over 90 percent of the tanks it had committed to the Sinai; Israel also captured 400 artillery pieces and nearly 10,000 military vehicles. Over 5,000 Egyptians had died with twice that many captured or missing. The Jordanians had lost 200 of their 270 tanks and 75 percent of their artillery along with 6,000 troops killed or missing. Israel had lost 600 dead and 2,500 wounded.

  The battle left just one outstanding vulnerability to the country—the Golan Heights occupied by Syrian forces. On June 23, while diplomats traded accusations and NATO troops dug in to the German countryside, Israel attacked the Heights with an ugdah of nine infantry and four armored battalions. Twenty-four hours later, Syria began its own withdrawal.20 By the end of the day, Israel held the Heights and had begun to dig in.

  With Soviet tanks moving forward and NATO defenders digging in, the hot line between Moscow and Washington was used again. Neither Johnson nor Kosygin wanted the war that was brewing, so the two finally got past the finger-pointing stage, agreeing to let the United Nations investigate the events of 20–21 June. Word of the agreement spread and both sides began disengaging.

  Conclusion

  Very few changes in the world followed the close encounters of June 1967. The United Nations could not determine a clear cause or culprit for the naval clash off Suez, and both the US and USSR declared themselves the victims of aggression. Internally, both sides assessed the results and made improvements in their forces. Cruise missiles like the Shaddock had proved their power and both navies worked to gain offensive and defensive advantages from the new technology.

  Elsewhere, the Soviets quietly removed certain key officials who had started the crisis moving. They covered this housecleaning with massive overt aid to the shattered Arab militaries. The US continued to support Israel. Arab and Israeli clashes continued as did the heated rhetoric. Fighting in Vietnam grew heavier; revolutionary wars, both pro-communist and pro-Western, cropped up sporadically. In short, the Cold War grew cold again.

  Reality

  Everything up to the results of Abba Eban’s May 26 meeting with President Johnson is historically accurate. However, at that meeting, Johnson did not give Israel the assurances they wanted in lieu of a preemptive strike nor did he commit to any unilateral action. Other commitments and the current public fervor over Vietnam were too great. In addition, the Navy could not promise that the USS Intrepid’s air group could take out all of the Egyptian batteries believed to be protecting the Strait, so the carrier was allowed to continue its journey to the Far East. This decision was a tribute to the excellent bluff by Nasser, as there were in fact no batteries in place at that time. Johnson simply told Eban that he could do little without Congressional support and told Israel not to attack. However, there was no real leverage applied to the Israelis to stop them from doing so.

  With no overt US assistance and no US impediments to an attack, Israel formed its National Unity Government on June 1, 1967, the day after Jordan signed its defense pact with Egypt, making Moshe Dayan Defense Minister. On June 5, the Israeli Air Force attacked and destroyed the Egyptian Air Force in the space of a few hours, followed by a ground assault by Tal’s, Yoffe’s and Sharon’s ugdot. The rest, as they say, is history. Six days later, Israel held the Sinai, West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.

  During the crisis that it had itself created, the Soviet Union did reinforce its Mediterranean naval presence five fold, but that was the extent of its support to the Arabs. Already shocked at the uncontrolled nature of the events they had initiated, the Soviets were further stunned by the military reverses suffered by their clients. Although they succeeded in putting a major strain on US–Arab relations, they had also suffered a severe decline in their military reputation.

  US and Soviet ships played tag, but held their tempers in check, even following the attack (by the Israelis, but unknown at the time) on the intelligence gathering ship USS Liberty. The Cold War had grown intense, but not hot.

  Some final notes:

  The problems the USS America had in fighting its deck and hangar fires were taken from actual events. On July 29, 1967, off Vietnam, an inadvertent missile launch on deck of the USS Forrestal (CVA.59) caused a massive fire and the destruction of some 64 aircraft and 134 lives. The problems cited in the fictitious America inquiry were those found in the Forrestal investigation.

  The tanker Coral Sea was actually involved in a high seas incident when attacked by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. On June 11, 1971, the PFLP fired bazookas from small boats at the ship, striking it seven times, but causing no serious damage.

  The Soviet Kynda Class cruiser Varyag was available for deployment to the Mediterranean in June 1967, but the Soviets had become very nervous about Nasser’s actions and held the anti-carrier cruiser in the Black Sea in order not to make the US Sixth Fleet too nervous.

  On June 7, 1967, the USS Lawe had a “near collision” with a Soviet patrol craft, PC-160, which was maneuvering near the USS America. Admiral Martin had ordered the destroyer to clear the Soviet vessel out of the carrier’s way.

  The limitations cited for the US Navy’s electronic suites for air searches and jamming were all too real during this period.

  Bibliography

  Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov, Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East, Praeger, New York, 1987.

  Bond, Larry, and Carlson, Chris, HARPOON-4: Rules for Modern Tactical Naval Combat, Clash of Arms Games, Phoenixville, PA, 1996.

  Burdett, Winston, Encounter with the Middle East: An Intimate Report on what lies behind the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Atheneum, New York, 1969.

  Dupuy, Trevor N., Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947–1974, Harper & Row, New York, 1978.

  Gerges, Fawaz A., The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955–1967, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1994.

  Glassman, Jon D., Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1975.

  Howe, Jonathan T., Multicrises: Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missile Age, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1971.

  Laquer, Walter, The Road to Jerusalem: Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967, MacMillan, New York, 1968.

  Parker, Richard B., The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1993.

  Notes

  1. In 1967 the United States only imported 20 percent of its oil requirements, and most of that came from Venezuela. However, almost all the oil used by the US in Vietnam came from the Middle East.

  2. Nasser’s subversive activities among the Arab states were widespread: his military attachés had been kicked out of Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia at various times during his presidency.

  3. Harakat al Tahrir al Falistine (Movement for the Liberation of Palestine, or Fatah) was a Palestinian organization
formed in 1959. It would later merge with the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1968 and assume a leadership role the following year. Fatah’s military wing, Al-Asifa, carried out its first cross-border raid into Israel on January 1, 1965.

  4. In fact, the UN reacted more harshly to Israeli reprisals than the raids that provoked them. The November 1966 reprisal raid on the Jordanian village of Samu by Israeli paratroopers and tanks, for example, turned into a four-hour pitched battle with Jordan’s Arab Legion. The raid was censured by the United Nations, and Israel was warned that military reprisals “cannot be tolerated.”

  5. Herut joined forces with the Liberal Party of Israel, forming a party called Gahal. The merger gave the more radical Herut members a stronger political base to work from.

  6. Soviet Ambassador Dmitri Pojidaev passed the information to Egyptian Foreign Under-Secretary Ahmad Hassan al Feki in Cairo. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semyenov informed National Assembly President Anwar Sadat as he was leaving Moscow for home. Finally a Soviet KGB officer passed the warning to Salah Nasr, Director-General of Intelligence in Egypt.

  7. In February 1960, the Soviets had also warned Nasser of an Israeli threat to Syria that had resulted in an Egyptian build-up in Sinai on Israel’s southern border. The Egyptians had stayed in the desert for several months before pulling out with no further confrontation.

  8. Nasser had run a domestic anti-communist campaign in 1959 that resulted in the Egyptian Communist Party dissolving, much to the Soviets’ embarrassment.

  9. U Thant argued that since the UNEF positions were solely on the Egyptian side of the border, he was obliged to withdraw them if the host country requested it. Three of the UNEF contingents—India, Pakistan and Yugoslavia—agreed with him. Five contingents—Canada, Brazil, Denmark, Norway and Sweden—felt the UN General Assembly should have discussed the matter first.

  10. This was in the public Soviet announcements. One of those publicly identified “carriers” was the USS Valcour, a former seaplane tender now acting as a fleet tactical command ship in the Red Sea. Privately, they assured Nasser that no US Marines were accompanying the Sixth Fleet and that their own Fifth Eskadra in the area would neutralize any Sixth Fleet naval threat.

  11. Moshe Dayan was the Israeli Chief of Staff and the prime architect behind the stunning Israeli victory in the 1956 Suez War.

  12. In late May, Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Gretchko, had told his Egyptian counterpart, Shamseddin Badran: “Stand firm. Whatever you face, you will find us with you. Don’t let yourself be blackmailed by the Americans or anyone else.” *Later, after his arrest and interrogation for crimes against the state, Gretchko insisted he was only trying to buttress Egyptian resolve.

  13. The Super Sherman was a heavily modified version of the venerable US M4 Sherman medium tank of World War II fame. The French originally added a 75mm high velocity gun, calling it the M51HV. The Israelis further modified the design to include a larger 105mm medium velocity gun, designating it the Super Sherman.

  14. William I. Martin was a 1934 graduate of the US Naval Academy and an aircraft squadron commander from World War II, in which he won the Silver Star. After a stint as Assistant Chief of Staff of Naval Operations for Air, he was promoted and assigned as Commander Sixth Fleet in April 1967.

  15. “Tattle tail” was the derisive term the US Navy coined for the small Soviet vessels that tagged along with their carrier battle groups. The name was appropriate since, in the event of hostilities, the Soviets would know where to find the carriers. It was particularly worrisome to the US forces since they assumed the Soviets would strike without warning.

  *16. The F-4 pilot Lt. Cdr. Mike “Paper Boy” Myron (he always delivers) was awarded the Navy Cross for his actions.

  *17. While it is “common knowledge” that attack submarines accompany all US carrier battle groups, the US Navy has never publicly released this information. The identity of the submarine that took part in this battle is still classified.

  *18. For his part in the battle, Khovrin was reassigned to the Pacific Fleet. However, in 1974, he returned to the region as the commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

  *19. The formal America inquiry after the crisis cited the lack of damage control training, lack of good weapons handling procedures, poor fire protection on deck and unsafe aircraft fuel systems as contributors to the magnitude of the fire damage.

  20. Syrian officials began their withdrawal after announcing the fall of Kuneitra following a “valiant defensive effort” by Syrian troops—hours before the Israelis even approached the city.

  5

  ANOTHER SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE

  Quebec, 1968

  Sean M. Maloney

  Montreal: July 25, 1967

  “In a speech in Montreal today, French leader Charles de Gaulle publicly supported the creation of an independent Quebec nation. To a cheering crowd, President de Gaulle uttered the phrase ‘Vive Quebec! Vive Quebec Libre!’ Fifteen spectators were injured in the melee that ensued.” Associated Press, Toronto.

  Ottawa: July 26, 1967

  “Nobel Peace Prize winner Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson declared this evening on a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation broadcast that the French leader’s remarks were improper and that no part of Canada needed liberation. President de Gaulle has been declared persona non grata in the Dominion of Canada…” Canada Press, Montreal.

  Origins of the War

  It was almost five years since the first bombs had gone off in Montreal during the spring of 1963. The shadowy operatives of several disparate separatist terrorist groups, the most prominent of which was called the Front de Liberation du Quebec, or FLQ, had blown up mail boxes in the predominantly English-speaking Westmount district and had hit several Militia armouries and a Royal Canadian Air Force establishment in the south end. The capture of one FLQ cell by the police in 1965 curtailed most of these activities, but the de Gaulle speech emboldened many into emulating the “felquists.” Now the stock exchange and several corporate headquarters had been bombed, including those of Canadair, which manufactured and maintained the air force’s CF-104 Starfighter nuclear strike aircraft. More and more rhetoric emerged through alternative media outlets that included a pirate radio station operating somewhere in the Laurentians. Printed flyers were widely distributed calling for violent revolution, general strikes, and massed violence on a par with or accompanying the huge anti-Vietnam and Civil Rights demonstrations in the United States.1

  Building A-114, CFB St Hubert

  Colonel David Enfield trudged through the snow towards what appeared to be a disused building nestled in the heart of the Forces Mobile Command headquarters complex at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) St Hubert located near Montreal. As a liaison officer to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and numerous Quebec provincial and municipal police agencies, Enfield probably knew more about the problem than any one organization and that was the reason for his presence in building A-114.

  There was a special visitor today. The Minister of Justice demanded a briefing. The man did not dress like a cabinet minister, though he affected a superior attitude and tone. Pierre Elliott Trudeau wanted answers and he deflected Enfield’s pleasantries: “Let’s get on with it. I have to brief Cabinet this afternoon.”

  “You are aware, sir, that we have directed our efforts towards determining the level of international support for the FLQ.”

  “Yes, yes, of course.”

  “Our signals intelligence stations are usually used to provide us with early warning of a Soviet nuclear attack. Fortunately the Arctic station at CFS2 Alert was able to catch several French diplomatic conversations. Similarly, the station at CFS Bermuda scooped up the communications between several merchant vessels and points ashore.”

  “Where?”

  “Algeria, mostly; Cuba to a lesser extent. We believe that there are FLQ personnel aboard these ships. Our allied sources, particularly the Americans, are still sensitive about Cuba and take great pains to keep an eye on Ca
stro’s crew.”

  “It is, of course, no surprise that we have received nothing from the French about Canadians training in Algeria,” Trudeau mused, “particularly after the shit that came out of de Gaulle’s mouth.”

  Enfield continued as though he had heard nothing. “We are losing our picture of the FLQ that is already based in Canada. They have a cell structure, probably modeled on that of the FLN in Algeria. We even caught one group with a copy of the movie Battle of Algiers.”

  “Yes, I’ve seen it,” Trudeau said impatiently. “Its cinema verité tone is matched only by its usefulness as a training film for guerrilla and terrorist groups.”

  “Well, they’re getting nasty. The Montreal police have lost three informants. One was found dead with his genitals stuffed in his mouth, the other was crushed inside a cement mixer. The third just disappeared. Our information is drying up and that is our primary weapon against these people. We don’t want to resort to the same methods used by the British in Cyprus or Palestine. Our society cannot handle that level of brutality. Yet we cannot permit a home-grown FLN or Mau-Mau to destroy what we have built here. We need guidance on how to handle this one.”