The War that Ended Peace

by Margaret MacMillan

  Aehrenthal recognised that there were risks in stirring up the Balkans. The international scene, he told Austria-Hungary’s Common Ministerial Council in the autumn of 1907, was generally good but there were trouble spots, such as the Balkans themselves or Morocco, and there were turbulent forces at large in the world. ‘The stage is set, the actors are ready, only the costumes are lacking for the play to begin. The second decade of the 20th century may well witness very grave events. In view of the combustible material about, they may come sooner.’32 In 1908 Aehrenthal came close to setting that material alight but luck was with him and the world for the time being.

  At the start of the year he announced to the assembled delegates from Austria and Hungary that he intended to build a railway southwards through the Sanjak of Novi Bazar to run into Macedonia and link up with the Ottoman railways running down to the ports on the Aegean or to Constantinople. Although Aehrenthal blandly said that the proposed railway was merely economic and did not therefore contravene any of the existing agreements on the Balkans, nobody outside Austria-Hungary, including much of the foreign press, believed him. The Serbians rightly saw the railway as Austria-Hungary’s way of cementing its hold over the Sanjak and therefore preventing a union between Serbia and Montenegro as well as extending the Dual Monarchy’s influence into the Ottoman Empire. The British were convinced that Austria-Hungary was working behind the scenes to block the reforms they were proposing in partnership with the Russians for Macedonia in return for approval for the railway from the sultan.33 The British were also uneasy about Austria-Hungary’s partner in the Dual Alliance. The naval race was continuing and the Reichstag was going to pass another of Tirpitz’s naval bills in March. The proposed railway also undercut a project the Serbians and the Russians had to build a railway from the Danube across Macedonia to the Adriatic. The Russians, who had not been properly forewarned, were furious with Aehrenthal; a railway, which in that era was a sure way of spreading political influence, was going against their 1897 agreement with Austria-Hungary to respect the status quo in the Balkans.34 Izvolsky, the vain and self-important Russian Foreign Minister, took the Sanjak railway as a personal insult and complained of Aehrenthal to the German ambassador: ‘he has thrown a bomb between my legs’.35 The Austrian-Hungarian Foreign Minister was unrepentant and in any case he had little use for Izvolsky, whom he thought a dangerous liberal and too much influenced by Russia’s new friend, Great Britain.36

  Nevertheless, Izvolsky, who was realistic about Russia’s weak position after the war with Japan, was prepared to continue discussions with Aehrenthal on the other of his counterpart’s schemes – for Austria-Hungary to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina outright – because he saw that Russia might be able to bargain for what it had always wanted and that was some form of control of the Straits. The two Foreign Ministers had started their discussions in person in the autumn of 1907 when Izvolsky visited Vienna, and these continued by letter, in spite of the uproar over the Sanjak railway, into the summer of 1908. Although he did not indicate a timetable, Aehrenthal made it clear that he intended to carry out the annexation. In return he was prepared to give up the empire’s rights in the Sanjak and withdraw its garrisons. Izvolsky, who had, as he later pointed out, little to bargain with, suggested that Russia would accept the annexation if it got Austria-Hungary’s support for changing the international agreements which governed the Straits to allow Russian warships, and only Russian warships, to move freely back and forth between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

  In June Izvolsky also got, or so he believed, assurance of support from another quarter. To cement the entente between their two countries, Edward VII and Nicholas II met that month on each other’s yachts off the Russian Baltic port of Reval (today Tallinn in Estonia). The two monarchs and their advisers, a formidable array which included Charles Hardinge, the head of the Foreign Office in London, Admiral Jacky Fisher, Stolypin and Izvolsky, discussed the matters of common interest such as the dangers of the naval race between Britain and Germany, the troubled state of Macedonia, and a project to share the building of a railway from the south coast of Persia up to the Russian border on Persia’s north (which would conveniently challenge the planned German railway from Constantinople through to Baghdad).37 While Hardinge later denied that the British had given any promises to the Russians on the matter of the Straits, Izvolsky returned to St Petersburg firmly convinced that the British would stand by Russia in revising the international agreements over them in Russia’s favour.38

  The Reval meeting had other far-reaching consequences; the Kaiser saw in it yet more evidence that his uncle and the other ‘rascals’ were plotting how to encircle Germany.39 That again underscored the importance of the alliance with Austria-Hungary. ‘We, allied to Austria,’ Wilhelm boasted at the time of the Reval meeting to one of his favourite naval officers, ‘don’t need to fear an alliance of France, Russia and England. For that we are strong enough. Our army is second to none and our navy isn’t made from cardboard, even if it can’t match the English still for a while.’40 Far to the south, in the Ottoman Empire, the reformist officers in the Committee of Union and Progress concluded that the Reval meeting meant that Britain and Russia were making plans to partition Macedonia.41 In late July, the ‘Young Turks’ mutinied against the sultan and forced him to accept a constitution. That in turn put pressure on Aehrenthal to bring forward his timetable for annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the Young Turks succeeded in establishing a strong government, they would be a much more formidable opponent than the old sultan. European newspapers carried reports that the new regime in Constantinople intended to reverse the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and elsewhere. The Young Turks pointedly invited the inhabitants of the two provinces to send representatives to the new parliament in Constantinople. On the other hand, if the Ottoman Empire collapsed into chaos and civil war, which seemed equally likely, there would be a general scramble among the powers to grab its territory and Austria-Hungary needed to get in first.

  By the end of the summer, Aehrenthal had approval from his own government to carry out the annexation. He also sent a memorandum to Izvolsky on 27 August in which he expressed the hope that Russia would be ‘benevolent and friendly’ if circumstances forced Austria-Hungary to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina. In recompense, he repeated, Austria-Hungary would withdraw its troops from the Sanjak. He did not promise more beyond saying that he hoped Russia and Austria-Hungary could work together to maintain the status quo elsewhere in the Balkans. To Schoen, the amiable and ineffective German Foreign Secretary, he downplayed the possibility of Russia’s being concerned about the annexation: ‘The Bear will growl and snarl, but won’t bite or strike out with its claws.’ Izvolsky was not at all inclined to snarl; he was prepared to accept the annexation but merely wanted to see what, if anything, Russia could get in return for not opposing it.42

  On 16 September Aehrenthal and Izvolsky met quietly at the mediaeval castle of Buchlau in Moravia which belonged to Berchtold, the ambassador of Austria-Hungary in St Petersburg. Their purpose was to negotiate an agreement satisfactory to both on the annexation and opening up of the Straits issue. By this point the two Foreign Ministers did not like or trust each other; when Berchtold came into the room where they were meeting to tell them that lunch was ready, he found them both in an angry mood. Aehrenthal later said that he spent most of the morning listening to Izvolsky complaining about the Sanjak railway. Izvolsky, for his part, claimed that he was completely exhausted after hours of ‘very stormy negotiations’. By the end of the day, nevertheless, the two men apparently had an agreement; Russia would be suitably benevolent if Austria-Hungary had to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Austria-Hungary at the same time would leave the Sanjak; Austria-Hungary would support Russia’s proposals for changing the agreements on the Straits; and Montenegro and Serbia would be allowed to divide the Sanjak if the Ottoman Empire collapsed. Finally, and this was to become important, both would recognise Bulgaria if, as was likely, it
declared its full independence sometime soon. When Izvolsky cabled the news to Nicholas, the tsar was ‘extraordinarily pleased’.43 Berchtold was so delighted that his castle had witnessed such a momentous meeting that he immediately arranged for a plaque to be put up.44 Aehrenthal went back to Vienna and Izvolsky spent the evening playing bridge with his host.45 The Russian perhaps had better luck with cards than with international negotiations.

  No records were kept of the meeting and when the whole issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina blew up and became a serious international crisis, both men gave their own versions of what had taken place which, not surprisingly, varied on some key details. Did Izvolsky get a firm quid pro quo from Aehrenthal: Russian support for the annexation and Austrian-Hungarian support for Russia’s getting what it wanted at the Straits? Aehrenthal denied it. In an attempt to exonerate himself, Izvolsky was to claim that Aehrenthal had double-crossed him by carrying out the annexation too soon: Russia, he argued, had not had time to prepare international opinion for a discussion of the Straits. This is not entirely true; when Izvolsky left Buchlau he understood that the annexation was coming soon, probably right after the delegations from the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments had been together for their annual meeting at the beginning of October.46 And Izvolsky may have been planning some double-crossing himself by planning to call for an international conference of the powers to authorise the annexation. As Izvolsky wrote to St Petersburg shortly before the Buchlau meeting: ‘Austria will appear in the character of the accused, while we will appear in the role of the defenders of the Balkan Slavs and even Turkey.’ (Aehrenthal later insisted that the most that Austria-Hungary had ever agreed to or would was a conference to ratify the annexation after the fact.)47 The most that can be said is that at Buchlau the two men made a cynical deal to get what they could out of the Ottoman Empire and neither expected the huge international uproar which followed.

  After the Buchlau meeting, Izvolsky went off on a long-planned tour of Europe’s capitals while Aehrenthal let his allies, Germany and Russia, know of his intentions towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, without giving them a specific date. The annexation, however, was not the only move in the Balkans that had been speeded up by the Young Turk seizure of power. Bulgaria, which had long chafed at its status as part of the Ottoman Empire, was preparing to take the opportunity to declare its independence. Izvolsky had done his best to discourage the Bulgarians; he did not want it to look as though there was a widespread plot to destroy the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the Ottomans still had enough force left to attack Bulgaria.48 Aehrenthal had no such concerns. When Prince Ferdinand paid a visit to Budapest in late September, Aehrenthal dropped broad hints that things might be changing soon in the Balkans and suggested that Bulgaria look out for itself. He did not tell Ferdinand that Austria-Hungary was planning to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 October and Ferdinand, who was not known as Foxy for nothing, did not tell him that Bulgaria was going to announce its independence the day before.49 Bulgaria duly went ahead and Ferdinand, who now took the title tsar, appeared in robes modelled on those of a Byzantine emperor which had been made for him by a supplier of theatrical costumes.50 The Austrian-Hungarian announcement about Bosnia-Herzegovina duly came the following day and claimed that the annexation had the full support of Russia. Since the Russians never got what they had expected in return – the opening of the Straits to their warships – they felt they had been cheated. Austria-Hungary for its part felt no need to compensate them or Serbia, which also claimed Bosnia-Herzegovina. Together the Bulgarian declaration of independence and the annexation stirred up turmoil in the Balkans, pitted Austria-Hungary against Russia, and dragged the allies of each into a major international crisis with talk of war which lasted until the following spring.

  The news of the annexation did not come as a complete surprise to Europe. The ambassador of Austria-Hungary in Paris had handed over the confidential letter from Franz Joseph to the French President three days early because the latter was going away for the weekend and rumours of the move had inevitably leaked out. The ambassador himself was unrepentant, writing to Aehrenthal: ‘That I am by nature impulsive, I know only too well, but at my age it is difficult to change a basic characteristic.’51 Berchtold who carried a similar letter to the tsar, had to chase the imperial yacht around the Gulf of Finland. The Russians were annoyed both at the speed with which the annexation had taken place and that they had not been officially told until the day it occurred. (Berchtold in fact wanted to resign his post as Austria-Hungary’s ambassador there because he felt Aehrenthal had been less than completely honest with Izvolsky.52) In the Duma and the press, there was a storm of protest over the two provinces inhabited by fellow Slavs going to Austria-Hungary, and Izvolsky came under increasing attack for not safeguarding Russia’s interests in the Balkans. Within the government, his fellow ministers were already angered as well by the fact that neither Nicholas nor Izvolsky had bothered to tell them about the discussions with Austria-Hungary until after the Buchlau meeting. Stolypin, the Prime Minister, in fact threatened to resign and he and Vladimir Kokovtsov, the Finance Minister, led the attack on Izvolsky after news of the annexation reached Russia. Nicholas began to back away from his Foreign Minister, who found his position weakening as the months went by.53

  Germany was also offended by the manner of the announcement: the Kaiser felt that Aehrenthal had not played fair with Russia and complained that he learned the news from the newspapers. Austria-Hungary’s long-serving ambassador, Count Ladislaus Szögyény, was obliged to visit Wilhelm at his hunting lodge in East Prussia to try to smooth things over. After a train trip of many hours, the unfortunate Szögyény was taken off in what he described as a ‘splendid imperial motor car’ which promptly turned over.54 Wilhelm was concerned, with reason, that Germany risked losing its influence in Constantinople which it had carefully built up over the preceding years. He also felt that Aehrenthal unnecessarily alienated Russia when the Dual Alliance still had hopes of detaching it from the entente.55 In the end, however, the Germans felt they had little choice but to support their chief ally. It was a dilemma they would face again in 1914.

  In Austria-Hungary itself reactions were mixed. While the Hungarian government welcomed the increase of territory, it made it clear that it would not accept a third, South Slav, partner in the Dual Monarchy. As a result the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina was to remain, as one Hungarian politician said, ‘floating like Mahomet’s coffin in the air’ under the administration of the joint Minister of Finance in Vienna.56 The empire’s own South Slavs, who were becoming increasingly politically active, were lukewarm about the annexation. The emerging Croat–Serb coalition within the Croatian parliament openly opposed it. The governor of Croatia arrested some fifty deputies and charged them with treason. The subsequent trial was a travesty, with biased judges and flimsy or forged evidence, and the guilty verdict had to be overturned. ‘This trial was an early fruit of the annexation policy,’ wrote the leading Hungarian newspaper. ‘All and everything it in it was politics.’57 Forgery also played a part in another sensational trial in the same period. Dr Heinrich Friedjung, a leading nationalist historian and political figure, published articles claiming to have evidence that key South Slav political leaders within Austria-Hungary were in the pay of Serbia. The documents turned out to have been conveniently supplied (and forged) by the Dual Monarchy’s Foreign Ministry. Both trials shamed the government and Aehrenthal in particular and served to alienate further the empire’s South Slavs.

  Among Austria-Hungary’s ruling classes, however, there was jubilation at the news of the annexation. ‘We have showed Europe once more that we are still a great power!’ Franz Ferdinand wrote to Aehrenthal, ‘Very good!’ He advised Aehrenthal to treat the new provinces with an iron fist and to meet any attempts by Serbia to send in agitators with bullets or a salutary hanging or two. And any hostile reactions from the other powers could, the archduke was confident, be managed. ‘The anger of England is costly but the fatty Ed
dy will already have consoled himself with a few bottles of champagne and the company of a few so-called ladies.’58

  It was not going to be as easy as that. The Foreign Office by this point was dominated by suspicion of Germany and the Dual Alliance. The British were annoyed too at Austria-Hungary’s by-passing of the international agreements on the Balkans and worried about the impact on the Ottoman Empire. The Liberal government approved of the Young Turks and did not wish to see them undermined. And if the Ottoman Empire was driven to the point of collapse British interests at the eastern end of the Mediterranean would be threatened. British policy in the crisis was a balancing act between supporting the Ottoman Empire, counteracting German and Austrian-Hungarian influence there, and keeping on good terms as much as possible with Russia while not supporting the changes to the agreements on the Straits which the Russians wanted. (The British eventually suggested opening the Straits to warships of all nations, which, of course, was the last thing the Russians wanted.)59

  From the British point of view, the crisis came at a bad time. The naval scare, with its fears of German invasion, was in full swing (he knew for a fact, said a backbench Member of Parliament, that German agents had concealed 50,000 Mauser rifles and 7 million rounds of ammunition in the heart of London)60 and the government was facing demands to increase its spending on the British navy. At the end of October the Daily Telegraph published its famous interview with the Kaiser, where Wilhelm blamed the British government for the bad relations between Britain and Germany, which further aroused British opinion against Germany. As Grey remarked to the British ambassador in Berlin: ‘this is not a time when any nation can safely strike sparks’.61 To add to the tensions, there was a serious crisis between France and Germany which had started over three German deserters from the French Foreign Legion in North Africa. On 25 September, the French had recaptured the deserters, who were being helped by the German consul in Casablanca. The German government promptly demanded an apology. As happened increasingly easily in those years, there was talk of war. By that November the British government was seriously considering what it would do if hostilities broke out between France and Germany.62 Fortunately the issue was settled when the two sides agreed to refer it to arbitration.