The War that Ended Peace

by Margaret MacMillan

  At the start of December, as the armistice was being signed to end the First Balkan War, Grey attempted to calm international tensions by calling for a conference of the ambassadors of the great powers along with a separate one for representatives of the Balkan nations, both to meet in London to make peace. Speaking for the government, Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, also warned the new German ambassador in London, Prince Karl Lichnowsky, that Britain was unlikely to stand by if Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia and that, if a general war broke out, was almost certain to intervene to prevent France being crushed. Although the Kaiser was furious with the British – ‘cowardly’, ‘a nation of shopkeepers’, ‘dog-in-the-manger attitude’ – his government was prepared to co-operate with Britain to bring the crisis to a conclusion. Both Kiderlen and Bethmann hoped for Britain’s neutrality in a future European war although they had given up on gaining its friendship.79 Austria-Hungary for its part resented what it saw as lukewarm support from its ally.80

  The other powers also accepted Grey’s invitation. France did not want a war over the Balkans and Italy always jumped at the chance to be treated as a great power. Both Austria-Hungary and Russia were feeling the financial strain of their military preparations and on both sides voices, particularly from conservative circles, called for a better understanding between the two great monarchies. The Russian government had already made one decision in November to back away from the brink. Sazonov, though, faced fierce public criticism for being willing to compromise: it was, said one deputy in the Duma, ‘a diplomatic Mukden’, equivalent to one of Russia’s key land defeats in the Russo-Japanese War. On 11 December, Austria-Hungary’s top leaders met with Franz Joseph to decide between peace or war. Conrad vehemently made the case for war with Franz Ferdinand’s support. (The archduke was shortly afterwards to return to a more moderate position.) Berchtold and most of the civilian ministers opposed Conrad. The emperor, ‘unusually serious, composed and determined’, gave his decision for peace. In July 1914, he was going to decide the other way.81

  The London conference of ambassadors met in the Foreign Office under Grey’s chairmanship from late December 1912 until August 1913. Its proceedings, Grey later said, were ‘protracted and sometimes intolerably wearisome’. Paul Cambon, who was representing France, joked that the conference would continue until there were six skeletons seated around the table.82 (It was a mark of the old Europe with its interrelated aristocracy that Count Albert Mensdorff, the ambassador of Austria-Hungary, Lichnowsky from Germany, and Count Alexander Benckendorff, the Russian ambassador, were cousins.) The Italian ambassador, complained Mensdorff, talked more than the rest of them put together.83 Although the powers were now agreed on avoiding war if at all possible, they found that it was not easy to bring the Balkan states to a settlement. The Balkan League was coming apart under national rivalries and the Ottoman Empire was again in turmoil. In January, Enver Pasha of the Young Turks, who had briefly been ousted, appeared at the head of a group of armed men at a Cabinet meeting in Constantinople to accuse the government of giving way to the other powers and to demand its resignation. To underline their demand, the Young Turks shot and killed the War Minister.

  The main disagreement among the great powers was over the nature and shape of Albania. Austria-Hungary argued that the new state should be a monarchy. Cambon thought cynically that an incompetent ruler there would suit Austria-Hungary very well by getting himself killed and giving it reason to intervene and make Albania its protectorate.84 Albania’s borders also caused endless difficulties. Part of the problem was that the Albanians, who may well have been descended from the original inhabitants of the Balkans, were intermingled with South Slavs of various nationalities and religions. The Albanians were also divided by clan and by religion – those in south were mainly Muslim while the north was largely Christian – which further encouraged outside powers to meddle. In addition Austria-Hungary wanted a large Albania to balance against the Slav states and to block Serbia from the sea while Russia hoped to give as much Ottoman territory as possible to its Slav protégés.85 As a result there were endless arguments over small villages which most had never heard of. It was, Grey complained, ‘unreasonable and intolerable that the greater part of Europe should be involved in a war for a dispute about one or two towns on the Albanian frontier’.86 (Neville Chamberlain made a similar complaint when he exclaimed in a broadcast about the crisis over Czechoslovakia in 1938: ‘How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing.’)

  The fate of the small town of Scutari (today Shkodër) led to particular tensions and renewed fears of war. Austria-Hungary wanted the town included in Albania since it was a centre of Catholic and therefore Austrian-Hungarian influence. Its inclusion in either Montenegro or Serbia would be, so Berchtold among others believed, damaging to Austria-Hungary’s prestige and interests.87 Franz Ferdinand, who by now had backed away from his earlier belligerence, wrote anxiously – and presciently – to Berchtold in mid February 1913:

  Without giving up everything, we should do anything to uphold peace! If we enter a great war with Russia, it would be a catastrophe, and who knows if your right and left flanks will function; Germany has to deal with France and Rumania makes excuses due to the Bulgarian threat. Therefore now is a very disadvantageous moment. If we wage a special war with Serbia, we will quickly overcome the hurdle, but what then? And what would we have? First all of Europe would fall on us and see us as disturber of the peace and God help us, that we annex Serbia.88

  As tensions mounted again between Russia and Austria-Hungary, Franz Joseph sent a trusted emissary, Prince Gottfried von Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst, to St Petersburg to reassure the tsar that the civilians were still in control of the generals in Austria-Hungary. In yet another chilling example of how readily the top leadership in Europe was now taking the prospect of a large-scale war for granted, Hohenlohe warned that war was likely in the next six to eight weeks if the Albanian issues were not settled.89 The two powers again pulled back from war, and by March this latest European crisis was winding down as Russia and Austria-Hungary cut back their troops along their common borders and came to an agreement that Scutari would be included in Albania in return for a handful of towns going to Serbia.

  On the ground, however, the situation was far from being resolved as the Balkan states continued to play their own game. Montenegro and Serbia, who were temporarily friends, had attempted to pre-empt any peace settlement by seizing Scutari during the war itself but the Ottoman garrison had held out with remarkable determination. The Montenegrins and Serbians remained deaf to increasingly forceful demands from the great powers to end the siege. At the end of March, Austria-Hungary sent its Adriatic Fleet to blockade Montenegro’s ports. Sazonov warned of ‘the monstrous danger which this isolated act involved for the European peace’ and the Russian government contemplated increasing its armed forces again.90 Britain and Italy hastily suggested a common demonstration of naval power and dispatched ships of their own, and the Russians and French later added theirs. (Since Scutari was twelve miles inland, it was not entirely clear what the powers hoped to gain by this.) The Russians reluctantly also agreed to put pressure on Serbia, which ended its part in the siege at the start of April. Nicholas of Montenegro was not so easily swayed, however. He had bribed one of the defenders, an Albanian officer in the Ottoman army, to deliver the city to him. Essad Pasha Toptani, almost as much of a rogue as Nicholas himself, had first murdered the garrison’s commander and then set his price at £80,000 by sending out a message that he had lost a suitcase containing that amount and asking that it be returned.91

  On 23 April, Essad duly surrendered Scutari to the Montenegrins. In Montenegro’s capital, Cetinje, there were wild celebrations with drunken revellers firing their guns in all directions. Some wits sent a donkey dressed in black carrying a large sign with rude messages to the embass
y of Austria-Hungary. Across the Balkans and in St Petersburg crowds came out to show their enthusiasm for the victory of their South Slav brothers.92 In Vienna and Berlin, the mood was grim. Conrad ordered his staff to prepare plans for a campaign against Montenegro if it refused to give up Scutari and at the end of April Gottlieb von Jagow, who had replaced Kiderlen as Foreign Secretary after the latter’s sudden death, promised German support for Austria-Hungary. At the start of May, Austria-Hungary decided to issue an ultimatum to Montenegro and started military preparations, among other measures declaring emergency rule in Bosnia. Russia in turn stepped up its measures, among other things placing orders for horses for its armed forces.93 By 3 May, Nicholas of Montenegro realised that Austria-Hungary meant business and on 4 May he announced that his troops would leave Scutari and let the great powers deal with it. Austria-Hungary and Russia yet again stood down their preparations for war. Europe’s peace had been maintained, for the time being, but not everyone greeted this with pleasure. In Vienna Conrad regretted that Austria-Hungary had not acted: a victory over Montenegro would have at least bolstered its prestige. At a dinner party, a friend noticed that Conrad was very depressed. In addition Austria-Hungary now had to deal with a Serbia that had doubled in size.94

  Under the Treaty of London, which was signed at the end of May, Albania became an independent state. It was subject to an international Control Commission, which never worked effectively because of Austria-Hungary’s obstruction. The little state, which was poor and divided, duly got a king, an ineffectual and amiable German prince. William of Wied survived in his new kingdom for six months before Essad Pasha, who had his own designs on the throne, helped to drive him out. The treaty also confirmed the gains made by the Balkan League but that did not lead to peace. The Balkan League promptly fell to pieces. Both Serbia and Greece were infuriated that Bulgaria had come out by far the greatest winner, incorporating territory which they thought was rightfully theirs, and immediately pushed for a revision of the treaty. Rumania, which had stayed out of the first war, now saw an opportunity to seize part of Bulgaria while the Ottoman Empire hoped to push Bulgaria back in the south. On 29 June 1913, a month after the treaty had been signed, Bulgaria, where public opinion was strongly in favour of war, launched a pre-emptive attack on Serbia and Greece. Rumania and the Ottoman Empire joined in against Bulgaria, which then suffered a series of defeats. On 10 August 1913 the Balkan powers made the Peace of Bucharest under which Rumania, Greece, and Serbia all gained territory at the expense of Bulgaria. ‘The peace bells of Bucharest’, said Berchtold in his memoirs, ‘had a hollow ring.’95 For Austria-Hungary the two Balkan wars had delivered damaging blows to its honour and its prestige.

  Unrest in the Balkans rumbled on. Serbia, which now controlled the Ottoman province of Kosovo and a part of Macedonia, immediately had to deal with a revolt among its new large population of Albanian Muslims. Although the Serbian government crushed all resistance savagely, it stored up for Serbia a legacy of hatred and resentment among the Albanians which was still causing trouble at the end of the century. Albania’s borders were disputed by Greece in the south and Serbia in the north and the Serbians, in particular, were determined not to back down in the face of the great powers.

  Victory in both the Balkan wars had made the Serbians, both the public and their leaders, increasingly and excessively confident. ‘They listened to nothing and were capable of all sorts of follies,’ reported the Times correspondent in Belgrade.96 The military and the extreme nationalist Black Hand complained bitterly when the government showed any signs of backing down but the civilian officials were generally equally intransigent. ‘If Serbia is defeated on the battlefield’, Pašić had exclaimed in early 1913 to his ambassador in St Petersburg, ‘then at least it will not be despised by the world, for the world will esteem highly a people who would not living enter the servitude of Austria.’ Serbia’s appetites had also grown with its successes on the battlefields. In early 1914 Pašić had a meeting in St Petersburg with the tsar. Serbia’s hopes of uniting all Serbs (something Pašić defined generously to include Croatians) now seemed closer to reality. There were some 6 million restless ‘Serbocroats’ inside Austria-Hungary, he told Nicholas, not including the Slovenes who were starting to wake up to the fact that they belonged with their South Slav kindred.97

  Austria-Hungary remained the chief obstacle to this dream. In the autumn of 1913, it demanded that Serbia pull its troops out of the pieces of northern Albania which they had occupied. The Serbian government not only refused; it sent more troops in order, so it claimed, to protect fellow Serbs against the Albanians. At the start of October, Pašić, with his long grey beard looking like a benevolent Balkan sage, visited Vienna for discussions with the government. ‘He is humble in person, anxious,’ wrote Berchtold in his diary. ‘Through his amiability he made us forget our fundamental differences that divide us, and also made us overlook his devious nature.’ Pašić was full of goodwill but he refused to make any concrete agreements.98 Although he did not know it, the Common Ministerial Council was meeting at the same time to discuss what steps to take against his country. Conrad, who, unusually, was attending this civilian meeting, urged that Austria-Hungary simply go ahead and annex its troublesome neighbour. The civilians were not yet ready to go so far but they had clearly come to accept that war was likely at some point in the future and, for some, it was even to be desired. Even Berchtold, who was usually a force for moderation, was now prepared to support an increase in armaments.99

  Among the ministers attending was the Prime Minister of Hungary, István Tisza, who took a hard line and who, in the crisis of 1914, was going to play a crucial part in Austria-Hungary’s decision to go to war with Serbia. His compatriots, even those who were his political enemies, regarded Tisza with awe for his courage, his determination, and his wilfulness. ‘He is the smartest man in Hungary,’ said a leading political opponent, ‘smarter than all of us put together. He is like a Maria Theresa commode with many drawers. Each drawer is filled with knowledge up to the top. However, what is not in those drawers does not exist, as far as Tisza is concerned. This smart, headstrong, and proud man is a threat to our country. Mark my words, this Tisza is as dangerous as an uncovered razor blade.’100 Franz Joseph liked him because he was able to deal firmly and effectively with the Hungarian extremists who thought only of Hungary’s independence and who had been blocking all attempts in the Hungarian parliament to get increases in the military budget.

  Tisza, who had been Prime Minister once before, was at once a strong Hungarian patriot and a supporter of the Habsburg monarchy. Hungary had an advantageous position, in his view, inside Austria-Hungary which protected it from its enemies such as Rumania and allowed the survival of the old Hungarian kingdom with its large territories. Deeply conservative, he was determined to maintain both the commanding position of his own landed class and the dominance of Hungarians over their non-Hungarian subjects including Croatians, Slovaks, and Rumanians. Universal suffrage, which would have given the minorities a say in Hungary’s politics, would, he said, amount to ‘castrating the nation’.101

  In foreign policy, Tisza supported the alliance with Germany and regarded the Balkan states with suspicion. He would have preferred peace with them but was prepared for war, especially if any of them became too strong.102 In the Common Ministerial Council he supported an ultimatum to Serbia to withdraw its forces from Albania. He wrote privately to Berchtold: ‘Events on the Albanian-Serbian border make us confront the question whether we will remain a viable power or if we will give up and sink into laughable decadence. With every day of indecision we lose esteem and the chances of an advantageous and peaceful solution become more and more compromised.’ If Austria-Hungary missed this chance to assert itself, Tisza went on, it would rightly lose its place among the great powers.103

  On 18 October Austria-Hungary issued its ultimatum to Serbia and gave it eight days to comply. Among the great powers, only Italy and Germany had been informed a
head of time, yet another indication that the Concert of Europe was ceasing to exist and in the next months the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance increasingly worked separately when it came to Balkan issues.104 Neither of its allies opposed Austria-Hungary’s move and Germany went further and gave its firm support. The Kaiser was especially vehement: ‘Now or never!’ he wrote on a letter of thanks from Berchtold. ‘Some time or other peace and order must be established down there!’105 On 25 October, Serbia capitulated and moved its troops out of Albania. The following day the Kaiser, who was on a visit to Vienna, had tea with Berchtold and told him that Austria-Hungary must continue to be firm: ‘When His Majesty Emperor Francis Joseph demands something, the Serbian government must give way, and if it does not then Belgrade will be bombarded and occupied until the will of His Majesty is fulfilled.’ And gesturing towards his sabre, Wilhelm promised that Germany was always ready to support its ally.106

  The year of crises in the Balkans ended peacefully but it left behind a fresh crop of resentments and dangerous lessons. Serbia was a clear winner and on 7 November it gained yet more territory when it signed an agreement with Montenegro to divide the Sanjak of Novi Bazar. Serbia’s national project was still, however, unfinished. There was now talk of union with Montenegro or the formation of a new Balkan League.107 The Serbian government was incapable and largely unwilling to rein in the various nationalist organisations within Serbia which were agitating among the South Slavs within Austria-Hungary. In the spring of 1914 during the celebration of Easter, always a major festival in the Orthodox Church, the Serbian press was filled with references to Serbia’s own resurrection. Their fellow Serbs, said a leading newspaper, were languishing within Austria-Hungary, longing for the freedom that only the bayonets of Serbia could bring them. ‘Let us therefore stand closer together and hasten to the assistance of those who cannot feel with us the joy of this year’s feast of resurrection.’108 Russia’s leaders were concerned about their headstrong small ally but showed little inclination to rein it in.