The Framework Negotiations: This section is primarily based on interviews with Gallucci and several other members of the US negotiating team. Carlin on Kang’s failure to say “never,” Carlin interview, November 7, 1994. Carlin “game was over” quote, Carlin interview, November 26, 1995. Gallucci on “Talmudic significance,” Gallucci interview, October 8, 1996.
The Kim Jong Il Regime: Hubbard discussions in Pyongyang, Hubbard interview, January 6, 1995. DOD cable on heavy oil, Joint Staff, Washington, DC, cable, “Subject: Delivery of Heavy Residual Fuel Oil to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” January 14, 1995, unclassified.
The Struggle over the Reactors: “We opted for solidarity,” White House official, interview, October 21, 1996. Luck’s cable to Perry, Pentagon official, interview, August 31, 1995.
CHAPTER 15: NORTH KOREA IN CRISIS
Shalikashvili quote on “implode or explode,” Mary Jordan, “Speculation Grows on Demise of N. Korea,” WR, April 6, 1996. For the North Korean rainfall figures, “Pyongyang Media Report on Flood to Get Aid,” Vantage Point (Seoul, September 1995). Also, “FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to DPRK,” FAO, Rome, December 1995. Trevor Page quotes, Pierre Antoine Donnet, “Widespread Signs of Famine in North Korea: U.N. Official,” KH, December 6, 1996. Floods “made situation worse,” “FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to DPRK.”
The DPRK request to supply grain secretly, Suh Dong Kwan interview, October 28, 1993. Quotes on Kim Young Sam as the man to bring down the DPRK, a prominent South Korean, interview, November 25, 1996. Laney quote on Kim Young Sam, interview, June 27, 1996. For details of DMZ incursions, Oh Young Jin, “Heavily Armed NK Troops Enter JSA in Panmunjom,” KT, April 7, 1996.
Disbanding of Sixth KPA corps, curtailment of winter exercises, US intelligence officials, interview, November 1, 1996. On impact of DMZ incursions on election, Sun Phil Kwon, “Policy Issues in the 1996 General Election,” Korea Observer (Spring 1997). Adrian Buzo quote from his article “The DPRK and Late De-Stalinization,” Korean Journal of National Unification 4 (1995).
Political Earthquake in Seoul: The account of the inception of the scandal is from an interview with Park Kye Dong, June 25, 1996. On Roh’s postscandal unpopularity, “Roh Named as Most Hated Politician: Poll,” KH, November 19, 1995. Kukje episode, Sam Jameson, “Fall of Kukje Corporation Illustrates South Korea’s Corruption,” KT reprint of Los Angeles Times, November 19, 1995.
Chung Ju Yung’s revelation and Roh’s response are reported in Park Byeong Seog, “Political Corruption in South Korea: Concentrating on the Dynamics of Party Politics,” Asian Perspective (Spring–Summer 1995): 172.
Summit Diplomacy and the Four-Party Proposal: My account of the 1995 and 1996 diplomacy is based on interviews with four US officials who were involved. For Kim Young Sam quote to Clinton about August 15, US official, interview, August 14, 1996. “We thought we’d done enough,” US official, interview, May 8, 1996.
Chinese response to four-way-talks proposal, “Jiang Sends Letter to Kim to Support 4-Way Peace Talks,” KT, May 22, 1996. On the Kissinger proposal of peace talks and others along this line, see Kim Hak Joon, Unification Policies of South and North Korea, 1945–1991 (Seoul National University Press, 1992), 371ff. The UN special alert, “WFP Warns North Korea Food Situation Deteriorating Sharply,” press release and report of World Food Program, United Nations, May 13, 1996. Contrast in South Korea, “One in Four Koreans Is on Diet: Survey,” KH, April 9, 1996.
The Submarine Incursion: For details on the submarine incident, see “Chronology of Events Surrounding Incursion on the Territory of the ROK by North Koreans,” information office of the ROK Embassy, Washington, October 4, 1996, and reporting in KH and KT. The 1976 quote on infiltration, USFK Hist. 1976, 53, Secret (declassified 1995).
On DPRK submarines, “PRC Magazine on DPRK’s Submarine Strength,” FBIS-EAS, February 21, 1995, 36. Kim Young Sam quotes on submarine incident, Shim Jae Hoon, “Submarine Shocker,” Far Eastern Economic Review (October 3, 1996); Chon Shi Yong, “Kim Sees ‘Possibility of War,’” KH, October 8, 1996. Kevin Sullivan’s interview with Kim Young Sam, “S. Korea Demands Apology from North; Kim Suspends Nuclear Deal After Sub Incident,” WP, November 9, 1996. Initial DPRK announcement, “Statement by a Spokesman for North Korea’s Armed Forces Ministry,” September 23, 1996, Korea and World Affairs (Fall 1996): 516.
Plunk quotes from senior ROK official, “No Way to Deal with North Korea,” WP, September 29, 1996; and Plunk telephone interview, February 6, 1997. Revelation about unilateral attack plans, “ROK Ready to Hit 12 DPRK Targets in Event of Attack,” FBIS-EAS, October 16, 1996. Kristof’s article in the wake of the submarine incursion, “How a Stalled Submarine Sank North Korea’s Hopes,” NYT, November 19, 1996.
US-ROK discussions on unilateral military action, from confidential interviews in Seoul and Washington with officials involved. Tilelli on “complete” satisfaction, Tilelli interview, April 22, 1997.
North Korea’s Steep Decline: Song Young Dae on “stability within instability,” his article “Changes in North Korea and How to Respond,” Korea Focus (January–February 1997). I also interviewed Song in Seoul, April 22, 1997. The Kim Jong Il speech of December 7, 1996, was published by Monthly Chosun in March 1997. My English translation was from the BBC, March 21, 1997. I learned that Hwang Jang Yop was the source of the speech from Kim Yong Sam, the Monthly Chosun reporter who obtained it, and whom I interviewed April 16, 1997.
Tilelli quotes from Tilelli interview, April 22, 1997. China customs data for food, fuel from US Institute of Peace, Special Report on Korea, June 1998.
Kim Jong Il’s military and nonmilitary activities in 1996 are listed in Vantage Point (Seoul, December 1996 and January 1997). The Tilelli quotes are from the Tilelli interview, April 22, 1997.
The Passage of Hwang Jang Yop: This section is based largely on Hwang’s letters and other documents provided to Monthly Chosun reporter Kim Yong Sam by intermediary Lee Yon Kil and published after Hwang’s defection. It is also based on interviews with Kim Yong Sam on April 16, 1997; with Hajime Izumi on March 8, 1997; and with Songhee Stella Kim on April 23, 1997; and on Kim Yong Sam’s retrospective article in Monthly Chosun in June 1997.
The phone call to set up the defection from interview with a senior ROK official, April 21, 1997. Hwang’s letter written in the South Korean Consulate was released by the ROK Foreign Ministry, February 13, 1997.
On “Red Banner philosophy,” see “Red Banner Philosophy as Kim Jong Il’s Ruling Tool,” Vantage Point (Seoul, March 1997). Hwang’s views as expressed in the Moscow meeting of February 1996 are from the Izumi interview, March 8, 1997.
The Two Koreas in Time of Trouble: South Korean economic data from Korea Economic Institute of America. North Korea in eighth year of economic decline, Vantage Point (Seoul, July 1998), quoting the Bank of Korea (Seoul). IMF report on North Korea, confidential, prepared by Asia and Pacific Department, IMF, November 12, 1997. US Census estimates from Nicholas Eberstadt.
CHAPTER 16: TURN TOWARD ENGAGEMENT
Into the Heavens, Under the Earth: Satellite launch data from KCNA, September 4, 1998. Sanger’s article “North Korea Site an A-bomb Plant, U.S. Agencies Say,” NYT, August 17, 1998. Livingston quotes from the WP, September 1, 1998.
Toward an Aid-Eased State: The new DPRK cabinet, from Yoo Young-ku, Vantage Point (Seoul, March 1999).
Perry to the Rescue and Engaging the United States: These sections are based in part on interviews with William J. Perry, Madeleine Albright, Wendy Sherman, Charles Kartman, Robert Einhorn, and other US officials. Vice Marshal Jo’s bio is from Vantage Point (Seoul, March 1999) and ROK press reports.
Summit in Pyongyang: Translated text of Joint Declaration from ROK Embassy, Washington, March 23, 2001. Kim Dae Jung quote on one people, Financial Times, July 16, 2000.
CHAPTER 17: THE END OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK
The observations on George Bush are in John Bolton, Surrende
r Is Not an Option (Threshold Editions, 2008), 99.
A Rocky Start: For Lim’s trip to Washington in February 2001, see Lim Dong-won, Peacemaker (Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2012), 266–268.
The Rodong Sinmun article was carried by the Korean Central News Agency, “Our Principle Position Regarding Issue of DPRK-US Relations,” November 7, 2000.
A version of Secretary of State Powell’s misstep is in Karen De Young, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell (Vintage Books, 2007), 324–326. For an account of the Bush-Kim meeting, see “At White House, Kim Hears U.S. Hard Line on Pyongyang: Bush Tells Korean He Distrusts North,” www.nytimes.com/2001/03/08/news/08iht-kim.2.t.html.
The Impact of 9/11: North Korea’s terrorist acts include assassination attempts against the ROK president, blowing up a South Korean airliner, and support for groups the United States considered terrorists (others considered them “freedom fighters”). By the late 1990s, North Korea had pulled back from supporting (funding or training) such groups and was no longer seen as active on the terrorist front. Discussions started between the State Department’s Counterterrorism Office and the North Koreans to deal with lingering US concerns.
The October 6, 2000, US-DPRK joint statement on terrorism says: “As a demonstration of their cooperation in the fight against international terrorism, the US and the DPRK intend to exchange information regarding international terrorism and to resolve outstanding issues in this regard between the two sides.” The statement also states: “On the basis of their common concerns about the threat of terrorism to international peace and stability, the two sides underscored their commitment to support the international legal regime combating international terrorism and to cooperate with each other in taking effective measures to fight against terrorism. The sides shared the view that such measures included not providing material support or resources, including safehaven, to terrorists and terrorist groups, bringing terrorists to justice, and fighting terrorist acts against the safety of civil aviation and maritime navigation.” Any one of these points might have been laid before the North Koreans as a way they could demonstrate their seriousness in cooperating on an issue that had suddenly leaped to the very top of Washington’s priorities. Whether the North actually had any useful information about those responsible for the 9/11 attacks is another question.
Threads Come Together: Japan–North Korea Talks: For a detailed account of the secret Japan-DPRK talks and the resulting September 2002 summit, see Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question (Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 1–49. The operative sections of the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration issued after the summit read:
1. Both sides determined that, pursuant to the spirit and basic principles laid out in this Declaration, they would make every possible effort for an early normalization of the relations, and decided that they would resume the Japan DPRK normalization talks in October 2002.
Both sides expressed their strong determination that they would sincerely tackle outstanding problems between Japan and the DPRK based upon their mutual trust in the course of achieving the normalization.
2. The Japanese side regards, in a spirit of humility, the facts of history that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule in the past, and expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apology.
Both sides shared the recognition that, providing economic co-operation after the normalization by the Japanese side to the DPRK side, including grant aids, long-term loans with low interest rates and such assistances as humanitarian assistance through international organizations, over a period of time deemed appropriate by both sides, and providing other loans and credits by such financial institutions as the Japan Bank for International Co-operation with a view to supporting private economic activities, would be consistent with the spirit of this Declaration, and decided that they would sincerely discuss the specific scales and contents of the economic cooperation in the normalization talks.
Both sides, pursuant to the basic principle that when the bilateral relationship is normalized both Japan and the DPRK would mutually waive all their property and claims and those of their nationals that had arisen from causes which occurred before August 15, 1945, decided that they would discuss this issue of property and claims concretely in the normalization talks.
Both sides decided that they would sincerely discuss the issue of the status of Korean residents in Japan and the issue of cultural property.
3. Both sides confirmed that they would comply with international law and would not commit conducts threatening the security of the other side. With respect to the outstanding issues of concern related to the lives and security of Japanese nationals, the DPRK side confirmed that it would take appropriate measures so that these regrettable incidents, that took place under the abnormal bilateral relationship, would never happen in the future.
4. Both sides confirmed that they would co-operate with each other in order to maintain and strengthen the peace and stability of North East Asia. Both sides confirmed the importance of establishing co-operative relationships based upon mutual trust among countries concerned in this region, and shared the recognition that it is important to have a framework in place in order for these regional countries to promote confidence-building, as the relationships among these countries are normalized.
Both sides confirmed that, for an overall resolution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula, they would comply with all related international agreements. Both sides also confirmed the necessity of resolving security problems including nuclear and missile issues by promoting dialogues among countries concerned. The DPRK side expressed its intention that, pursuant to the spirit of this Declaration, it would further maintain the moratorium on missile launching in and after 2003.
Both sides decided that they would discuss issues relating to security.
An official text of the document is found on www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html.
Slouching Toward the Cliff: The North’s unusually fast apology is described in Lim, Peacemaker, 320.
The colorful expressions of the potential for ending the Agreed Framework are in Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option, 106–107.
Cheating is a loaded word, and the State Department lawyers who helped draft the Agreed Framework laugh at the thought that by developing an enrichment capability, the North was “cheating.” The 1994 agreement was silent on enrichment, except for the thin reed of a reference to the 1992 North-South joint statement, which was already at a dead end. For practical reasons, Ambassador Gallucci wanted to include only those activities in the Agreed Framework that the United States could monitor, and enrichment was not one of them. Going down the enrichment path may have been a monumental miscalculation by Kim Jong Il. It was very typical of the North Korean propensity to hedge and exploit the seams. To call it “cheating” put the situation into a legal and moral box where it became more difficult to resolve—and where the administration’s hard-liners were happy to have it.
Kim Jong Il’s Progress: A discussion of Kim Jong Il’s July 2002 measures and the debate they set off in North Korea is in Robert L. Carlin and Joel S. Wit, “North Korean Reform: Politics, Economics, and Security,” Adelphi Paper 382 (July 2006): 35–52.
An account of Chinese reaction to the Sinuiju SAR is in “Does Beijing Back North Korea SAR?,” South China Morning Post, www.scmp.com/article/392912/does-beijing-back-north-korea-sar.
The Unquiet Americans: For a discussion of the “bold approach,” see Charles L. Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy (Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 25.
For a description of the Kelly-Kang meeting, see Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, 37–39. Also see Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 120–124.
The Morning After: Seoul’s advice to Pyongyang after the Kelly visit is in Lim, Peacemaker, 341.
Bolton’s view on what to do if the Agreed Framework collapses is i
n Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option, 115.
CHAPTER 18: TROUBLE IN THE US-ROK ALLIANCE
Problems for Diplomacy: For Rumsfeld’s description of his thinking on a coup, see Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (Sentinel, 2011), 642.
The vice president’s thoughts on history are in Richard Cheney, In My Time (Threshold Editions, 2011), 493.
Sunshine, Barely: The upsurge in anti-US demonstrations and threats to individual American soldiers was a serious concern, especially so because Washington felt the ROK government was not doing enough to tamp down the emotions. For Hubbard’s views, see chapter 9 in Ambassadors’ Memoirs: U.S.-Korea Relations Through the Eyes of the Ambassadors (Korea Economic Institute, 2009).
Moon Jae-in granted a long interview for this book in March 2012, contributing to a more balanced view of Roh Moo-hyun.
The episode about the “nuclear umbrella” was clarified through interviews with several participants from both sides.
Tensions Rise: The North’s first mention of the incident with the US reconnaissance plane was in a Rodong Sinmun commentary entitled “Whom Are You Daring to Challenge?” on March 10, 2003.
The Six-Party Mirage: Rice’s recollection of her advice is in Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (Crown, 2011), 248. An informed view of the early debate in China is in John W. Lewis and Robert L. Carlin, Negotiating with North Korea, 1992–2007 (Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, January 2008).
An account of the talks with Jiang is in George Bush, Decision Points (Broadway Paperbacks, 2010), 424. Beijing has at various times over the years told Washington that North Korea was not a Chinese but a US problem to solve. Since 2002 the Americans have put most of their eggs in China’s basket. So far, nothing has hatched. It might be well to remember that the Chinese have a dish called thousand-year-old eggs.
The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History Page 76