Seize the Moment

by Richard Nixon

  If adopted, this view would eventually consign NATO to the historical scrap heap. No alliance has ever survived for long after security ceased to be its core function. No political substitute exists for the bonds of collective defense. Moreover, in the hardheaded world of power politics, no diplomatic or political initiative can succeed unless backed by credible military capabilities. This does not mean that NATO cannot add new political missions. But it does mean that we must not confuse NATO’s raison d’être—forging a transatlantic security link—with other important but secondary goals. A political function for NATO is useful and even essential. But it cannot replace mutual security as the glue that keeps the alliance together. In this new setting, the key task for the United States is not to disengage from NATO gracefully but for NATO to adapt skillfully.

  In the fog of public debate, two options have begun to emerge. The first—the NATO option—centers around a continuing U.S. commitment to a major force presence in Europe. While the numbers of U.S. troops in Europe would substantially decrease, the centrality of our role in the alliance and its integrated military command would remain unchanged. The second—the European Community option—seeks to develop a principally European security structure, though with continued U.S. participation. Ultimately, our allies will coalesce around the latter. While they understand the need for our nuclear guarantee—and accept the voice that gives America in Europe’s security decisions—they will object to a U.S. policy that supports European political unity but demands a security relationship in which Washington retains its dominant leadership role.

  Our approach should welcome increased West European self-reliance. When we brought our forces to a peak deployment of over four hundred thousand troops in the mid-1950s, I vividly recall a meeting of the National Security Council when President Eisenhower said that he intended this to be only a temporary measure needed until our allies in Europe recovered from the war. We should not allow it to become a permanent crutch. If the Europeans develop the capability of speaking with one voice on political and security matters—which is possible but not inevitable—we should embrace the European Community option.

  This does not mean that we should withdraw all of our ground forces from Europe. But it does mean that our function should involve a conventional and nuclear deployment much smaller than today but still large enough to create the essential link of mutual security and to preserve the military infrastructure for any U.S. intervention that might become necessary in a crisis. Forces in Europe are also indispensable for contingencies elsewhere, including the Persian Gulf War. NATO should not cut back on its joint exercises, though their nature and location should take into account sensitivities about disrupting civilian life. Exercises not only iron out glitches in contingency plans but also enhance our ability to work together in areas outside of Europe, such as the Persian Gulf.

  NATO must also reevaluate the role of nuclear weapons in its defense plans. Since nuclear artillery and short-range missiles were deployed principally to neutralize massed Soviet armor concentrations in East Germany, we can safely phase them out as President Bush has chosen to do. But as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO needs a nuclear option based in Europe, though air-based and sea-based missiles should be sufficient to cover all required missions. As a result, we should reject out of hand any proposal to eliminate these systems—a proposal designed to achieve Moscow’s traditional objective of a denuclearized and vulnerable Europe.

  As NATO finds its footing in the new Europe, it should also expand its mission. In Europe, it should focus not just on common defense but also on pressing for just solutions to such conflicts as the Yugoslav civil war. It must also look beyond Europe. Its creators did not envision that by specifying that the NATO commitment applied to Europe and North America, the alliance would operate only within a strict boundary. Instead, they simply sought to exclude Europe’s colonies from security guarantees requiring an automatic response from other members. Today, as demonstrated in the Persian Gulf, challenges to Western interests can arise half a world away. If NATO adheres mindlessly to artificial geographical restrictions, we will simply be shooting ourselves in the foot, compromising our interests to legalism. For example, an effort to cut the oil lifeline of Western Europe is as great a threat to the security of NATO nations as a military attack against a NATO member. While European defense must remain NATO’s core mission, so-called “out of area” security cooperation must become its cutting edge. Unless we adopt such a policy, the American people—whose commitment to NATO has depended on the perception of a Soviet threat—will inevitably seek to disengage from Europe as the alliance increasingly speaks of Moscow not as an adversary but as a “partner in security.”

  While we already cooperate in distant crises, our solutions tend to be ad hoc. To improve NATO’s capabilities to cope with out-of-area conflicts, we need to move forward in three areas. First, the European members of NATO should develop a joint rapid deployment force that would function, depending on circumstances, independently or under an integrated command with similar U.S. forces. Second, the United States should welcome European activism in parts of the underdeveloped world where their historical experience exceeds our own. For too long, Americans have assumed that our superior military power gave us superior political wisdom. In addition, because the next crisis will likely take place in the underdeveloped world, the United States should open its overseas bases outside Europe to our NATO allies. Our current policy restricts foreign military powers from using our bases, but we should be more flexible in order to facilitate greater European activism in critical parts of the underdeveloped world. Third, NATO should develop better mechanisms for more coordinated crisis management. Working together, the members of the Atlantic alliance—which control over half of the world economy—wield power that no potential adversary can afford to ignore. In addition, if the Western allies back a common course of action in the U.N. Security Council, potential aggressors will have to take notice.

  NATO must loosen, not tighten, its structure. To grow, it needs greater flexibility to be able to respond not only to military but also to political contingencies. This does not mean that either the United States or Western Europe should have a strict veto over the other’s actions. Each will have interests that the other will not share. But they must develop ways to arrive at common policies to out-of-area conflicts when possible, as well as equipping the alliance with the needed military, economic, and political instruments to carry them out. Unlike other alliances, which have dissolved as the threat of a common enemy wanes, a renewed NATO can survive the test of victory.

  • • •

  These five pillars provide a framework for a common transatlantic home. The new Europe is not a problem-free Europe, and these objectives cannot be achieved without commitment and resources on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet if we succeed, we will advance Europe’s unification, ensure its external security, buttress its internal stability, and protect its key interests around the world.

  Europeans need an active U.S. presence. Eurocommunism has been replaced by Eurocriticism of America’s role, but our allies inevitably turn to the United States in any crisis and even count on us to mediate disputes among themselves. The United States has been—and continues to be—the indispensable catalyst for cooperation among Europeans, who often trust us more than they trust each other.

  The critical issue for Europe is whether economic unity will produce a parochial or an open Europe. Critics wrongly scorned former prime minister Margaret Thatcher’s position on European unification. Her warnings about a unified but inward-looking and protectionist Europe were misinterpreted as opposition to any unity at all. She understood that the rush to create the mechanisms of unity had clouded the need to craft the meaning of unity. In her vision, European economic unification should serve as the necessary precursor to Atlantic economic unification. On the eve of post-1992 Europe, its leaders must understand that unity will serve European interests only if it represents the fir
st step toward moving out into the world and not toward retreating behind the cloistered walls of a fortress Europe.

  History’s most devastating wars have been fought in Europe. For the past forty-five years, the cold war has ironically kept the peace in Europe. Our challenge is to see that the end of the cold war does not open the door for future hot wars. Beyond that goal, the nations in the common transatlantic home can lead the way to unprecedented economic progress and the victory of freedom throughout the world.

  As we build the transatlantic home, the reach of our vision should not stop at the former Soviet border. Instead, the doors of a common transatlantic home should be open to newly independent republics of the Soviet Union that meet the economic and political requirements for membership. The former Soviet government—established on Leninist, not democratic, principles—did not measure up to those criteria. But if free-market and democratic reforms continue under the noncommunist governments in the newly independent Soviet republics, we should seek their participation in building a common transatlantic home from California to Kamchatka.

  4

  THE PACIFIC TRIANGLE

  MANY OBSERVERS HAVE proclaimed that the world will soon enter “the Pacific century.” In their view, Europe dominated the nineteenth century, the United States became preeminent in the twentieth century, and the Pacific rim region will take center stage in the twenty-first century. They foresee this westward shift in history’s focal point as the dynamic economies of East Asia become the engine of world economic growth. But a perilous paradox—explosive prosperity combined with political instability—has clouded the region’s great potential. Whether the Pacific rim’s historical contribution will be greater wealth or greater conflict depends largely on how the United States manages its relations with the countries of the Pacific triangle: Japan, China, and Russia.

  Enormous geographically, critical strategically, and dynamic economically, the nations of the Pacific rim—with a total population of almost 2 billion—have astonished the world with their recent achievements. Most of the world’s successful developing countries are in East Asia. Of the region’s twenty-three countries, eight have had average annual economic growth rates of at least 5 percent during the last decade, some of them averaging almost 10 percent. No Western European country experienced such explosive growth. With a total GNP of $4,410 billion, the Pacific rim commands 20 percent of the world economy. In 1989, trade between the United States and East Asia topped $300 billion, outstripping by far the $200 billion in U.S. trade with Western Europe.

  Stability, however, has not accompanied prosperity in the Pacific rim. Since 1945, twelve major wars and armed conflicts have taken place in the region. The United States, whose involvement in World War II started and ended in the Pacific, fought two of its three major wars in the postwar period in Korea and Vietnam. Today, 1.5 million troops line both sides of the Korean armistice line, and Indochina remains mired in bloody guerrilla conflicts, while political turbulence plagues the Philippines, Thailand, New Guinea, and others. In addition, deep-rooted suspicions, recriminations, and rivalries pit many East Asian nations against each other.

  Because of the lack of a formal security framework like NATO, the balance among the great powers becomes critical in determining the Pacific rim’s future. Only the United States possesses sufficient leverage with each of the corners of the Pacific triangle to balance and stabilize the region as each major power seeks to advance its interests:

  —Japan, an economic heavyweight but a political and military lightweight, has stumbled as its leaders search for a new role in the world commensurate with its great resources.

  —China, a potential economic superpower and a major political player, stands at a crossroads—its people seeking to break with the Communist past but its current leaders unwilling to relinquish their totalitarian control.

  —Russia, a declining economic power but a towering military power in the Pacific, has the potential to convert its armed might into a greater presence politically and greater access to the region’s capital and technology.

  The United States interacts with each of the corners of the Pacific triangle—balancing them off each other, stabilizing them as they compete with each other, and at the same time maintaining a distance of peace between them. As a result, the United States has played the major role in securing peace and stability in the Pacific since 1945, thereby creating the indispensable political foundation for its economic prosperity. But traditional ambitions, geopolitical maneuvering, and colliding interests have created a potentially explosive mix. If the United States remains engaged, it will increase the likelihood that a Pacific century will be a pacific century. Without a major U.S. role, it could become a century of conflict.

  • • •

  Japan has arrived as a world power, but it is still searching for its proper role. Because of the memories of its aggression and brutal occupation policies during World War II, the key to a wider role remains its links with the United States. Yet at a time when our political cooperation could ease Japan’s emergence on the world scene, our economic disagreements threaten to break the relationship apart.

  In 1990, a headline in a major U.S. newspaper trumpeted, “Japan Takes Lead Role on World Stage.” The growth of the Japanese economic powerhouse—whose share of world industrial output increased from 2.5 percent in 1913 to 5 percent in 1938 to 10 percent in 1990—fueled the belief that while Japan lost World War II militarily, it would now prevail over its former foes economically. From 1950 to 1973, Japan’s real annual growth rate averaged 10 percent, while the size of its GNP rose from one-twentieth of the U.S. economy in 1950 to over one-half in 1991. Japan has become the second-largest economy in the world, the largest creditor, and the second-largest exporter of manufactured goods. Its per capita income of $25,000 in 1991 was highest among major industrial countries. It has the ten largest banks in the world and spends more on capital investment than America. After the United States, it is the second-largest contributor to the IMF and the U.N. budget. In 1991, Japanese capital financed one-third of the U.S. federal budget deficit. According to some estimates, Japan could exceed the United States in absolute economic output early in the next century.

  As the only major country with a stable democratic system along the Pacific rim and as our only major regional ally since the signing of the original U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in 1951, Japan’s importance to the United States extends far beyond simple economic cooperation. The potential achievements of a cooperative relationship are enormous. Together we can use our influence to stem the global tide of protectionism and to keep world markets open. We can also manage refugee flows, curb illegal drug trafficking, and develop programs to address global environmental problems. There is, however, no guarantee of success. Because of our economic tensions, we must renew our relationship or risk losing it.

  Since 1945, the United States has dominated its relationship with Japan. Defeated in World War II, occupied until 1952, and dependent on America for security even today, Tokyo played a subordinate role. U.S. officials drafted Japan’s constitution, including the clause stipulating that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation.” The war-renunciation clause became the keystone of Japanese strategic planning and forced Tokyo to depend on the United States for its security.

  As the Soviet economy and empire collapsed, the foundation of the U.S.-Japanese relationship began to weaken. Many Americans argued that the United States should no longer foot the bill for Japan’s defense, especially because this in effect subsidized Tokyo economically. At the same time, many Japanese believed that their need for the U.S. security guarantee had diminished and therefore they no longer needed to exercise restraint in the economic competition between the two countries. Before the waning of the cold war, security concerns tempered this competition. Now, with those restraints weakened, economic concerns have supplanted security issues.

  Some U.S. analysts now look at security
problems through an economic lens. They argue that the 1 percent of Japan’s GNP spent on defense has been totally inadequate and that the United States should lean on Japan to increase sharply its military budget and to assume more of the burden for its own security. They fail to realize, however, that to insist that the Japanese develop military forces beyond those necessary to meet the limited goals of territorial self-defense and sealane security is counterproductive strategically and unrealistic politically.

  A resurgent Japanese military would cause great regional apprehensions. Historical memories from World War II have not vanished. Despite forty-five years of peaceful policies, the fear in Asia of Japan as a major military power dwarfs European concerns about a united Germany. Any plan for Japan to develop offensive capabilities would meet with strong opposition from Koreans, Chinese, Taiwanese, Malaysians, Filipinos, and Indonesians, all of whom suffered under Japanese occupation during World War II. Instead of enhancing regional security, a Japanese arms buildup would complicate defense cooperation and trigger higher military spending throughout the region.

  Internal as well as external fears of Japanese militarism inhibit Japan’s defense role. Many Japanese are afraid that the same tendencies that drove Imperial Japan into World War II now lie dormant but could easily be awakened. They fear a replay of the 1930s, when Japan followed up its economic penetration of the region with its military invasion. While they do not believe the Japanese people are innately militaristic, they do fear that a strong military establishment could come to dominate their foreign policy. And they know that their hard-won working relationships with their Asian neighbors would be jeopardized the moment Japan assumed a higher military profile.