Practical Ethics and Profound Emptiness

by Jampa Tegchok

  Thus all happiness in cyclic existence is not actual happiness because it is dependent on and designated in dependence on the decrease of pain. Pain, discomfort, and suffering, however, don’t arise based on the decrease of happiness. Unpleasant feelings arise naturally; if we just leave our body alone and do nothing, we will become hungry, thirsty, or tired. Our muscles will begin to ache or an insect will bite us. Only when unpleasant feelings decrease does what we call “pleasure” arise. This is our situation because our body and mind are under the influence of afflictions and karma. For that reason, they are considered polluted and in the nature of duhkha; they are not something worth clinging to.

  The feeling of mental happiness has the nature of an attitude and is merely created by conception. Conceptuality considers a feeling happiness and calls it happiness. Mental pleasure — by nature an attitude indicates that there is the appearance of pleasure arising in the mind that the mind then conceives to be actual happiness.

  348.Since it is just comparatively less pain

  or merely conceptually created,

  all the pleasure in the world

  is ultimately not really [pleasure].

  All feelings of happiness and pleasure that we experience in cyclic existence — both physical and mental — are merely imputed by conception as happiness based on the decrease of painful or unpleasant feelings. Happy feelings in cyclic existence are not real happiness.

  This does not mean that we are without conventional pleasure or happiness. We understand what people mean when they say, “I’m happy.” However, this happiness isn’t true happiness because it is actually just the diminishment of discomfort. In addition, it will not last. The object, person, or activity that appears to be the cause of that happiness cannot bring us happiness indefinitely. In fact, our contact with the person, situation, or thing will become uncomfortable at a certain point and we will long to do something else, be with someone else, or have something else. We can easily see this in our own experience. If those people were actually the cause of happiness and if the happiness were genuine happiness, this would not happen and our happiness would only increase.

  349.The continents, countries, places, houses,

  conveyances, seats, clothing, beds,

  food, drink, elephants, horses, and women

  are all enjoyed at distinct [points in time].

  350.One has pleasure through

  whichever of these the mind attends to,

  but one does not attend to the rest.

  Hence, they are not ultimately [causes of pleasure].

  Refuting that Mental Pleasure Is Real

  Someone says, “There is real mental pleasure because it has a cause that produces it. That cause is Ishvara.” Those who state this believe Ishvara is the creator of the world as well as of all happiness and suffering. We reply that Ishvara doesn’t produce happiness because Ishvara and happiness don’t have a cause-and-effect relationship. We do not accept the existence of an independent creator.

  These non-Buddhists believe that Ishvara is a permanent, functioning thing. However, if he were permanent he could not create experiences of happiness. A permanent cause cannot produce a result, because it is necessary for the cause to cease in order for the result to arise.

  Thirteen sources of pleasure are listed here, including countries or different kingdoms; places, such as our birthplace; conveyances, which are various means of transport; seats, which could include other furniture; and people you’re romantically or sexually attracted to. Contact with any of these brings pleasure. However, at the moment we experience pleasure from one of them, we do not derive pleasure from the rest because we are not experiencing them at that time. Since we can’t experience all of them at once, when we are enjoying one of them the thought “pleasure” cannot arise with respect to the others. That shows that those things and people are not inherent sources of happiness. If they were, then even when we were not in contact with them the thought “happiness” would still arise.

  Happiness depends on using or contacting an object, and thus does not arise independently. If it were inherently existent, happiness would exist independent of everything else — we wouldn’t have to be in contact with that particular object in order to feel happiness from it. Furthermore, since inherently existent happiness would not depend on causes and conditions, it should continue forever without ceasing. Also, if an object brought inherently existent happiness, every time and in every situation we had contact with it we would experience happiness. However, we all know that an extra piece of pie when we are full brings misery, not happiness, and that a recent quarrel with a close friend makes being with her unpleasant. In short, those thirteen objects are causes for experiencing happiness, but they are not causes for experiencing either genuine happiness or inherently existent happiness.

  351.When [all] five senses [or faculties] — the eye and so forth —

  [simultaneously] apprehend their objects,

  a thought [of pleasure] does not refer [to all of them];

  therefore, at that time they do not all give pleasure.

  352.Whenever any of the [five] objects is known

  [as pleasurable] by one of the [five] senses,

  then the remaining [objects] are not so known by the remaining [senses],

  since they are not [ascertained as] objects at that time.

  353.The mind apprehends an image of a past object,

  which has been apprehended by the senses

  and conceptualizes

  and believes it to be pleasurable.

  Refuting the Collection of the Five Objects as Inherently Existent Physical Pleasure

  Someone says, “Truly existent pleasure exists because its cause exists. That cause is the simultaneous experience of the five sense objects — sights, sounds, odors, tastes, and tactile sensations. Because we can experience the five objects simultaneously, we can experience truly existent physical pleasure from all of them simultaneously. In addition, when these five objects are known simultaneously by five conceptual consciousnesses, we experience five feelings of mental pleasure, one that accompanies each conceptual consciousness.”

  This person gives an example of experiencing all five sense objects at the same time, “At a dance performance, we can see the visual form of a dancer, smell the perfume on their body, hear the sound of the music, taste some honey, and also have the tactile sensation of soft clothing on our body. In this way the five senses can perceive the five objects at once, and due to this, the five sense consciousnesses can experience five truly existent pleasurable feelings at the same time.”

  To understand this argument, it is important to understand how sense and conceptual consciousnesses are generated. Nagarjuna explains that these five pleasurable feelings do not occur at once, because the five sense consciousnesses do not simultaneously ascertain the five sense objects. Without them simultaneously ascertaining the five objects, five conceptions that apprehend the five objects cannot subsequently arise simultaneously. Without a conception that apprehends the object, we cannot experience mental happiness from that object. Since five conceptions, each one apprehending a different sense object, cannot arise at the same time, there cannot be five pleasurable mental feelings simultaneously.

  To explain Nagarjuna’s argument more extensively: Only one sense consciousness can ascertain its object at any particular moment. At that time, the other sense consciousnesses are inattentive awarenesses. That is, their objects appear to them but they do not ascertain those objects. Because the other four sense consciousnesses don’t ascertain their objects, they do not feel pleasure from them; instead a neutral feeling accompanies them.

  For example, when you see a beautiful flower and are engrossed in looking at it, even though someone is playing music nearby, you aren’t aware of it. The visual consciousness ascertains the beautiful flower while the auditory consciousness is inattentive and does not ascertain the music at that time. After a minute or so, you may become aware of the music b
ecause your attention shifts to the music and the auditory consciousness now ascertains it. At that time, your visual consciousness becomes inattentive regarding the beautiful flower. If there are two prominent objects — let’s say a sight and a sound — the visual consciousness may ascertain its object for a few moments while the auditory consciousness is inattentive, and then the auditory consciousness may ascertain its object while the visual consciousness is inattentive. This may create the sensation that we’re experiencing both at the same time when we aren’t.

  To examine the process of cognition further, when the visual consciousness apprehends blue, for example, that blue is the cause of the visual consciousness apprehending blue. The blue (the cause) has ceased at the time the visual consciousness (its result) is generated. In that case, does blue appear to the visual consciousness? Cause and result cannot exist simultaneously, so the blue that is the cause of the visual consciousness doesn’t appear to the visual consciousness that is its result. Rather, the visual consciousness apprehends blue by means of generating an aspect of it. It is said that blue casts an aspect to the visual consciousness, and the visual consciousness is generated in the aspect of blue. Similarly, scientists say that the visual consciousness apprehends an object by means of an aspect of the object appearing on the retina.

  After the visual consciousness ascertains a beautiful blue color and experiences pleasure, a conception of blue arises. Conception is thought and is a function of the mental consciousness. An image or conceptual appearance of blue appears to that conceptual consciousness, and that mind thinks “pleasure.” At that time a feeling of mental pleasure accompanies that conceptual consciousness. It arises simply because the mind thinks “pleasure.”

  So while all the five objects can exist at the same time, a person’s five sense consciousnesses cannot ascertain or realize all of them simultaneously. Only one sense consciousness at a time can realize its object. Therefore, there are not five simultaneous conceptual consciousnesses following five sense consciousnesses that realize those five objects. Thus, there are not five simultaneous feelings of mental pleasure accompanying five conceptual consciousnesses. Only one conceptual consciousness exists at a time. This refutes the assertion that we can experience five pleasurable feelings from the five sense objects simultaneously. These five cannot be experienced simultaneously by either the five sense consciousnesses or by five conceptual consciousnesses.

  354.A single sense faculty knows a single [kind of] object.

  But without that [object], it is not really [a sense faculty],

  and without that sense [faculty],

  the object is not really an object.

  The Actual Refutation

  Each of the five sense faculties — eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body — is the dominant condition that causes its own respective sense consciousness — the visual consciousness and so forth — to know its respective object — visual forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tactile objects. Regarding each sense, the sense faculty, object, and sense consciousness are posited in relation to each other. For example, we couldn’t speak about sound if there were no ear faculty or auditory consciousness. Since the faculty, object, and consciousness are mutually dependent, they do not exist inherently. Because none of these three exist inherently, an inherently existent pleasurable feeling accompanying a sense consciousness cannot arise.

  355.Just as a child comes into existence

  in dependence upon his or her parents,

  so too visual awareness is said to arise

  in dependence upon the eye and a visible form.

  Refuting Inherently Existent Consciousness

  Someone says, “The object and the sense faculty exist inherently because their result, the sense consciousness, arises.”

  The sense consciousness is indeed produced by the object and the sense faculty, in the same way that a child is produced by his or her father and mother. This shows that they do not exist inherently. Anything that exists dependent on other factors cannot exist independently. What this person says only strengthens our position, it doesn’t harm it.

  356.Past and future objects are unreal,

  and so are past and future faculties.

  [Present ones] are not distinct from these two [past and future ones].

  Hence, the present ones are also unreal.

  357.The eye erroneously apprehends the circle

  formed by a torch whirling around.

  Likewise, the sense faculties apprehend objects

  as if they were in the present.

  Refuting an Inherently Existent Object

  We then say, “The present consciousness exists dependent on the past and future. Being dependent, it cannot exist inherently. Given that an object is not apprehended by an inherently existent past, present, or future consciousness, it, too, does not exist inherently. If it existed inherently, it would have to be posited without depending on anything else — not the past or the future, not the sense faculty or sense consciousness. In fact, the present color blue depends on all of these.” In brief, the refutation is that consciousness does not inherently exist because it is a dependent arising.

  He then says, “Yes, but doesn’t the object of that present consciousness appear to it as inherently existent?” We reply, “Although it appears to be inherently existent, this is a mistaken appearance and the mind to which it appears is a mistaken consciousness. For example, when someone swirls a torch, it appears to the visual consciousness as a circle of fire, although it is not. Similarly, the object of the visual consciousness appears to it to be inherently existent, but it is not. Although the object appears to the visual consciousness as inherently existent, the visual consciousness does not apprehend it as inherently existent. Only erroneous mental consciousnesses grasp objects as inherently existent.”

  358.The sense faculties and the sense objects

  are thought to be composed of the five elements.

  But since each of the elements is unreal,

  they also are ultimately unreal.

  Refuting the Inherent Existence of the Sense Faculties and Objects by Refuting Their Cause, the Elements

  Someone says, “Sense objects and sense faculties exist inherently because their causes, the elements, exist inherently.”

  Sense objects and sense faculties are produced from the elements. They are literally called the “transformations of the elements,” meaning that the elements are their cause. However, as we saw in chapter 4, whether the elements are considered individually or as a collection, they don’t have any inherently existent reality. Taken one by one, none of the elements exists independent of all other factors, and the collection of the elements likewise is unreal — in other words, empty of inherent existence. This in turn means that the sense faculties and objects composed of the elements also lack inherent existence.

  359.If the elements were distinct from each other, then fire could occur without fuel.

  But if they [form a single] composite,

  then they have no [distinct] defining characteristics.

  This analysis applies to the remaining [four elements].

  Refuting Inherently Existent Elements

  If the four elements were inherently existent, they would have to be either totally distinct from each other or identical to each other. If they were completely separate, each of them would exist independently, without relying on the others. In that case, it would absurdly follow that fire, which is caused by fuel, could exist even when there is no fuel. Fuel is composed of all four elements, especially earth, so fire is dependent on the other elements and cannot exist on its own.

  If the elements formed a single composite, they couldn’t be individually discerned. In that case, too, because they lost their individual identity and had no defining characteristics, they couldn’t exist inherently. This analysis can be applied to the other elements as well.

  360.In both these ways the elements are unreal,

  so a composite formed from them is also unreal.


  And since the composite is unreal,

  form is also ultimately unreal.

  Form Is Not Inherently Existent

  In both ways — individually and as a composite — the elements do not exist inherently. Therefore, a collection of elements — such as form — cannot exist inherently. Since there are no inherently existent objects or sense faculties that cause physical pleasure, it too lacks inherent existence.

  Earlier we noted that while hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas realize the same emptiness, bodhisattvas do so by means of many reasonings, which enable them to understand emptiness from many perspectives. Here we see an example of the extensive way in which inherent existence is refuted in Madhyamaka texts such as the Precious Garland. Spend some time reflecting on these various reasonings to expand your understanding of emptiness.

  361.Consciousness, feeling, discrimination,

  and volitional factors individually

  in no way have any ultimate essence.

  Therefore, they are ultimately unreal.

  Refuting the Entity of Real Pleasure

  Previously Nagarjuna refuted incorrect “proofs” of inherently existent pleasure. Now he refutes the entity or nature of feelings being inherently existent.

  Someone says, “Pleasure inherently exists because consciousness, feeling, discrimination, and volitional factors arise simultaneously.” Nagarjuna replies that feeling doesn’t inherently exist because consciousness and the other aggregates do not inherently exist, neither individually nor as a collection. When each aggregate is examined individually, we see that it is made up of different components. In the case of feeling, for example, there are pleasurable, painful, and neutral physical feelings and mental feelings.

  When the aggregates are examined as a group, it is again evident that the group depends on each aggregate. Furthermore, each aggregate is posited as an aggregate in dependence on the others. Therefore, the collection of aggregates doesn’t inherently exist. In short, each aggregate consists of components, and each aggregate is posited in relation to the other aggregates. For both of these reasons, they lack inherent existence.