Poor Economics
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Chapter 7
1 Dean Karlan and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Debt Cycles,” work in progress (2011).
2 Robin Burgess and Rohini Pande, “Do Rural Banks Matter? Evidence from the Indian Social Banking Experiment,” American Economic Review 95 (3) (2005): 780–795.
3 Shawn Cole, “Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1 (1) (2009): 219–250.
4 Scott Fulford, “Financial Access, Precaution, and Development: Theory and Evidence from India,” Boston College Working Paper 741 (2010).
5 Irfan Aleem, “Imperfect Information, Screening, and the Costs of Informal Lending: A Study of a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan,” World Bank Economic Review 4 (3) (1990): 329–349.
6 Julian West, “Pay Up—or We’ll Send the Eunuchs to See You: Debt Collectors in India Have Found an Effective New Way to Get Their Money,” Sunday Telegraph, August 22, 1999.
7 The Law Commission of India, Report Number 124, “The High Court Arrears—a Fresh Look” (1988), available at http://bombayhighcourt.nic.in/libweb/commission/Law_Commission_Of_India_Reports.html#11.
8 Benjamin Feigenberg, Erica Field, and Rohini Pande, “Building Social Capital Through Microfinance,” NBER Working Paper W16018 (2010).
9 Yet the physical threat may not be entirely absent. A credit officer of a particular MFI once complained to one of our research assistants that he would never be promoted: The men with the high titles all had larger, burlier, more intimidating physiques.
10 Microfinance Information eXchange, data available at http://www.mixmarket.org.
11 “What Do We Know About the Impact of Microfinance?” CGAP, World Bank, available at http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.1306/.
12 Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Cynthia Kinnan, “The Miracle of Microfinance?: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation,” MIT, May 30, 2009, mimeo.
13 Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman, “Expanding Microenterprise Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts in Manila,” Yale, manuscript (2010).
14 Brigit Helms, “Microfinancing Changes Lives Around the World—Measurably,” Seattle Times, April 7, 2010.
15 Erica Field and Rohini Pande, “Repayment Frequency and Default in Microfinance: Evidence from India,” Journal of the European Economic Association 6 (2–3) (2008): 501–509; Erica Field, Rohini Pande, and John Papp, “Does Microfinance Repayment Flexibility Affect Entrepreneurial Behavior and Loan Default?” Centre for Micro Finance Working Paper 34 (2009); and Feigenberg et al., ibid.
16 Xavier Giné and Dean Karlan, “Group Versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4008 (2006); and Xavier Giné and Dean Karlan, “Group Versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups,” working paper (2010).
17 Emily Breza, “Peer Pressure and Loan Repayment: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” working paper (2010).
18 Abhijit Banerjee and Kaivan Munshi, “How Efficiently Is Capital Allocated? Evidence from the Knitted Garment Industry in Tirupur,” Review of Economic Studies 71 (2004): 19–42.
19 Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, “Do Firms Want to Borrow More? Testing Credit Constraints Using a Directed Lending Program,” working paper (2004).
20 Dilip Mookherjee, Sujata Visaria, and Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal, “The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence from Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals,” BREAD Working Paper 254 (2010).
Chapter 8
1 Gary Becker and Casey Mulligan, “The Endogenous Determination of Time Preference,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (3) (1997): 729—758.
2 Stuart Rutherford, The Poor and Their Money: Microfinance from a Twenty-First-Century Consumer’s Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Daryl Collins, Jonathan Morduch, Stuart Rutherford, and Orlanda Ruthven, Portfolios of the Poor: How the World’s Poor Live on $2 a Day (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009).
3 Pascaline Dupas and Jonathan Robinson, “Saving Constraints and Microenterprise Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya,” NBER Working Paper 14693, revised November 2010.
4 Simone Schaner, “Cost and Convenience: The Impact of ATM Card Provision on Formal Savings Account Use in Kenya,” working paper (2010).
5 Esther Duflo, Michael Kremer, and Jonathan Robinson, “Why Don’t Farmers Use Fertilizer? Experimental Evidence from Kenya,” unpublished (2007); and Esther Duflo, Michael Kremer, and Jonathan Robinson, “How High Are Rates of Return to Fertilizer? Evidence from Field Experiments in Kenya,” American Economic Review 98 (2) (2008): 482–488.
6 Esther Duflo, Michael Kremer, and Jonathan Robinson, “Nudging Farmers to Use Fertilizer: Theory and Experimental Evidence,” forthcoming in American Economic Review, NBER Working Paper W15131 (2009).
7 Samuel M. McClure, David I. Laibson, George Loewenstein, and Jonathan D. Cohen, “Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary Rewards,” Science 306 (5695) (2004): 421—423.
8 Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan, and Wesley Yin, “Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121 (2) (2006): 635–672.
9 Pascaline Dupas and Jonathan Robinson, “Savings Constraints and Preventive Health Investments in Kenya,” UCLA (2010), mimeo.
10 Abhijit Banerjee and Sendhil Mullainathan, “The Shape of Temptation: Implications for the Economic Lives of the Poor,” MIT (April 2010), mimeo.
11 See, for example, Kathleen D. Vohs and Ronald J. Faber, “Spent Resources: Self-Regulatory Resource Availability Affects Impulse Buying,” Journal of Consumer Research 33 (March 2007): 537–548. In one experiment reported in this paper, college students were instructed to spend a few minutes writing down their thoughts, without thinking of a white bear. Given $10 afterward to save or spend on a small assortment of products, they spent much more money than students who had free-associated without having to avoid thoughts of bears.
12 For a description of the Townsend Thai data and detailed accounting conventions used there, see Krislert Samphantharak and Robert Townsend, Households as Corporate Firms: Constructing Financial Statements from Integrated Household Surveys, Cambridge University Press Econometric Society Monograph No. 46 (2010). We define household resources as average net assets from the household balance sheet. Net assets include all savings, capital, and household assets net of borrowing.
13 Dean Karlan and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Debt Cycles,” work in progress (2011).
14 Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Cynthia Kinnan, “The Miracle of Microfinance?,” MIT, manuscript (2010). Bruno Crépon, Florencia Devoto, Esther Duflo, and William Parienté, “Evaluation d’impact du microcrédit en zone rural: Enseignement d’une expérimentation randomisée au Maroc,” MIT, mimeo.
Chapter 9
1 C. K. Prahalad, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid (Philadelphia: Wharton School Publishing, 2004).
2 Tarun Khanna, Billions of Entrepreneurs: How China and India Are Reshaping Their Futures—and Yours (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2007).
3 Suresh de Mel, David McKenzie, and Christopher Woodruff, “Returns to Capital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a Field Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (4) (2008): 1329—1372.
4 David McKenzie and Christopher Woodruff, “Experimental Evidence on Returns to Capital and Access to Finance in Mexico,” World Bank Economic Review 22 (3) (2008): 457–482.
5 Abhijit Banerjee, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, and Jeremy Shapiro, “Targeting the Hard-Core Poor: An Impact Assessment,” MIT (2010), mimeo.
6 For a description of the Townsend data, see Krislert Samphantharak and Robert Townsend, “Households as Corporate Firms: Constructing Financial Statements from Integrated Household Surveys,” University of California at San Dieg
o and University of Chicago (2006), mimeo.
7 The study in Peru is Dean Karlan and Martin Valdivia,“Teaching Entrepreneurship: Impact of Business Training on Microfinance Clients and Institutions,” Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming. The study in India is Erica Field, Seema Jayachandran, and Rohini Pande, “Do Traditional Institutions Constrain Female Entrepreneurship? A Field Experiment on Business Training in India,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 100 (2) (May 2010): 125—129.
8 Alejandro Drexler, Greg Fischer, and Antoinette Schoar, “Keeping It Simple: Financial Literacy and Rules of Thumb,” London School of Economics, mimeo.
9 Suresh de Mel, David McKenzie, and Christopher Woodruff, “Are Women More Credit Constrained? Experimental Evidence on Gender and Microenterprise Returns,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1 (3) (July 2009): 1–32.
10 Andrew Foster and Mark Rosenzweig, “Economic Development and the Decline of Agricultural Employment,” Handbook of Development Economics 4 (2007): 3051–3083.
11 David Atkin, “Working for the Future: Female Factory Work and Child Height in Mexico,” working paper (2009).
12 Kaivan Munshi, “Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the U.S. Labor Market,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (2) (2003): 549–599.
13 Cally Ardington, Anne Case, and Victoria Hosegood, “Labor Supply Responses to Large Social Transfers: Longitudinal Evidence from South Africa,” American Economic Journal 1 (1) (January 2009): 22–48.
Chapter 10
1 The argument was made in the 1970s by Peter Bauer; see e.g., Peter Thomas Bauer, Dissent on Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).
2 Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson, “The Power of Information: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign to Reduce Capture,” working paper, IIES, Stockholm University (2004).
3 See, for example, Easterly’s post on randomized control trials, available at http://aidwatchers.com/2009/07/development-experiments-ethical-feasible-useful/.
4 See, for example, Jeffrey Sachs, “Who Beats Corruption,” available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/sachs106/English.
5 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
6 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail (forthcoming, Crown, 2012).
7 See, for example,Tim Besley and Torsten Persson, “Fragile States and Development Policy” (manuscript, November 2010), which argues that fragile states are a key symptom of underdevelopment in the world and that such states are incapable of delivering basic services to their citizens.
8 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review 91 (5) (2001): 1369—1401.
9 Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer, “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India,” American Economic Review 95 (4) (2005): 1190—1213.
10 Dwyer Gunn, “Can ‘Charter Cities’ Change the World? A Q&A with Paul Romer,” New York Times, September 29, 2009; and see “Charter Cities,” available at http://www.chartercities.org.
11 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); and Paul Collier, Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places (New York: HarperCollins, 2009).
12 William Easterly, “The Burden of Proof Should Be on Interventionists—Doubt Is a Superb Reason for Inaction,” Boston Review (July–August 2009).
13 See Rajiv Chandrasekaram, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone (New York: Knopf, 2006), as well as Easterly’s insightful critique of the army operation manual, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-easterly/will-us-armys-development_b_217488.html.
14 William Easterly, “Institutions: Top Down or Botton Up,” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 98 (2) (2008): 95–99.
15 See The White Man’s Burden, p. 133.
16 Ibid., p. 72.
17 William Easterly, “Trust the Development Experts—All 7 Billion,” Financial Times, May 28, 2008.
18 The White Man’s Burden, p. 73.
19 Marianne Bertrand, Simeon Djankov, Rema Hanna, and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Obtaining a Driving License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (November 2007): 1639–1676.
20 See his presentation on the subject, available at http://dri.fas.nyu.edu/object/withoutknowinghow.html.
21 Rohini Pande and Christopher Udry, “Institutions and Development: A View from Below,” Yale Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper 928 (2005).
22 Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padro-i-Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao, “Accountability in an Authoritarian Regime: The Impact of Local Electoral Reforms in Rural China,” Yale University (2010), manuscript.
23 Benjamin Olken, “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” Journal of Political Economy 115 (2) (April 2007): 200–249.
24 Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Daniel Keniston, and Nina Singh, “Making Police Reform Real: The Rajasthan Experiment,” draft paper, MIT (2010).
25 Thomas Fujiwara, “Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil,” University of British Columbia, mimeo (2010).
26 World Bank, World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People (2003).
27 Raghabendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo, “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India,” Econometrica 72 (5) (2004): 1409–1443.
28 Leonard Wantchekon, “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin,” World Politics 55 (3) (2003): 399–422.
29 Abhijit Banerjee and Rohini Pande, “Ethnic Preferences and Politician Corruption,” KSG Working Paper RWP07-031 (2007).
30 Nicholas Van de Walle, “Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging Party Systems,” Journal of Modern African Studies 41 (2) (June 2003): 297–321.
31 Abhijit Banerjee, Donald Green, Jennifer Green, and Rohini Pande, “Can Voters Be Primed to Choose Better Legislators? Experimental Evidence from Rural India,” working paper (2009).
32 Abhijit Banerjee, Selvan Kumar, Rohini Pande, and Felix Su, “Do Informed Voters Make Better Choices? Experimental Evidence from Urban India,” working paper (2010).
33 Raymond Fisman, “Estimating the Value of Political Connections,” American Economic Review 91 (4) (September 2001): 1095–1102.
34 Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Rachel Glennerster, “Putting a Band-Aid on a Corpse: Incentives for Nurses in the Indian Public Health Care System,” Journal of the European Economics Association 6 (2–3) (2009): 487–500.
35 Abhijit Banerjee, Rukmini Banerji, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Stuti Khemani, “Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Education in India,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2 (1) (2010): 1–20.
36 Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, and Michael Kremer, “Pupil-Teacher Ratio, Teacher Management and Education Quality” (June 2010), mimeo.
37 Rikhil Bhavani, “Do Electoral Quotas Work After They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India,” American Political Science Review 103 (1) (2009): 23–35.
38 Lori Beaman, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, and Petia Topalova, “Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (4) (2009): 1497–1540.
39 Ana Lorena De La O, “Do Poverty Relief Funds Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico,” Yale University (2006), manuscript.
40 Leonard Wantchekon, “Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin,” New York University (2009), manuscript.
Index
Abdelmoumni, Fouad
/> Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL)
Absenteeism
ACCION International
Acemoglu, Daron
Agriculture
Ahluwalia, Montek Singh
Akula, Vikram
Al Amana
American Enterprise Institute
Ananth, Bindu
Anemia
Annual State of Education Report (ASER)
Antibiotics
Ashraf, Nava
Atkin, David
Auma, Jennifer
Average return
Balsakhi program
Bandhan
Banerjee, Abhijit V.
Banerji, Rukmini
Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee (BRAC)
Bank of America
Banking Correspondent Act
Bankruptcy
Banks
problems with
Barker, David
Basic skills, focus on
Basix
Becker, Gary
Bed nets
buying
income gain and
subsidized
Beliefs
faith and
weak
Ben Sedan, Allal
Bhopa diseases, doctor diseases and
Bloomberg, Michael
Bongaarts, John
Boyce, Jim
Brain process
Breast-feeding
Bribes
Burgess, Robin
Business process outsourcing centers (BPOs)
Businesses
borrowing by
investment in
poor and
Businesses (continued)
profits for
small/medium
starting
Calories
consumption of
production and
Capital
capitalists without