Ghost Wars

by Steve Coll

  15. “Report to the CPSU CC on the Situation in Afghanistan,” June 28, 1979, Top Secret, Special Folder. Translated by the Cold War International History Project. The original Russian source was “The Tragedy and Valor of the Afghani” by A. A. Likhovskii, Moscow: GPI “Iskon,” 1995.

  16. “To the Soviet Ambassador,” June 28, 1979, Top Secret, translated by the Cold War International History Project. Kremlin records make clear that Taraki continued to ask for Soviet troops, in disguise if necessary, through the summer of 1979.

  17. The date of the finding is from Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 143 and 146. Years later Brzezinski would tell an interviewer from Le Nouvel Observateur (January 15 and January 21, 1998, p. 76) that he had “knowingly increased the probability” that the Soviets would intervene in Afghanistan by authorizing the secret aid. Brzezinski implied that he had slyly lured the Soviets into a trap in Afghanistan. But his contemporary memos-particularly those written in the first days after the Soviet invasion-make clear that while Brzezinski was determined to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan through covert action, he was also very worried that the Soviets would prevail. Those early memos show no hint of satisfaction that the Soviets had taken some sort of Afghan bait. Given this evidence and the enormous political and security costs that the invasion imposed on the Carter administration, any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism.

  18. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, passed into law in 1974, established the need for a formal presidential “finding” for covert action. Several subsequent executive orders and presidential security directives provided for the detailed process by which presidential covert action findings are drafted, approved, and implemented within the executive branch, including at the CIA, which is identified by the law as the primary federal agency for covert action. (If the president wants another U.S. agency to participate in a covert action, this must be spelled out in a finding; otherwise, the CIA is the default agency for such programs.) The provisions of Hughes-Ryan were overtaken in U.S. law by the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1991. This law spells out what had previously been a more informal standard, namely, that covert action must be “necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives” and also must be “important to the national security of the United States.” For a definitive review of U.S. law governing covert action, see Michael W. Reisman and James E. Baker, Regulating Covert Action, from which these quotes and citations are drawn.

  19. Gates, From the Shadows, p. 146.

  20. “The KGB in Afghanistan,” by Vasiliy Mitrokhin, English edition, Working Paper No. 40, Cold War International History Project, introduced and edited by Odd Arne Westad and Christian F. Ostermann, Washington, D.C., February 2002. Mitrokhin, a KGB archivist who defected to Great Britain as Soviet communism collapsed, has provided in this paper detailed citations of KGB files and cables relevant to Afghanistan dating back to the early 1960s.

  21. This account is drawn in part from recollections by American and Soviet participants in the events who appeared at the conference “Toward an International History of the War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989,” in Washington, D.C., April 29-30, 2002. That the KGB planted stories that Amin was a CIA agent is from Mitrokhin, “KGB in Afghanistan,” p. 50. The Indian document is from the recollection of a senior officer in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations at that time. See also “Partners in Time” by Charles G. Cogan, World Policy Journal, Summer 1993, p. 76. Cogan ran the Near East Division of the Directorate of Operations beginning in mid-1979. He wrote that the Soviets had “unfounded” suspicions that Amin worked for the CIA because of “Amin’s supposed American connections (he had once had some sort of loose association with the Asia Foundation).”

  22. Mitrokhin, “KGB in Afghanistan,” p. 93.

  23. Amstutz offered his recollections at the April 2002 conference. Recollections of the Near East Division officers are from the author’s interviews.

  24. Account of the Kabul station’s priorities and its failure to predict the 1978 coup is from the author’s interview with Warren Marik, March 11, 2002, Washington, D.C. (SC). Marik served as a CIA case officer in Kabul from late 1977 until early 1980. The general outline of his account was confirmed by other U.S. officials familiar with the Kabul station during those years.

  25. “What Are the Soviets Doing in Afghanistan?” memorandum is from Thomas Thornton, assistant to the president for national security, to Zbigniew Brzezinski, September 17, 1979, released by the Cold War International History Project.

  26. “Personal Memorandum, Andropov to Brezhnev,” in early December 1979, is from notes taken by A. F. Dobrynin and provided to the Norwegian Nobel Institute, translated and released by the Cold War International History Project.

  27. Multiple sources cite Politburo records of the tentative decision to invade on November 26, including Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, p. 51. The infiltration of Karmal on December 7 and the account of the attempts to poison Amin are from “New Russian Evidence on the Crisis and War in Afghanistan” by Aleksandr A. Lyakhovski, Working Paper No. 41, draft, Cold War International History Project. The KGB assault plans are from Mitrokhin, “KGB in Afghanistan,” pp. 96-106.

  28. Gates, From the Shadows, p. 133.

  29. Mitrokhin, “KGB in Afghanistan,” p. 106.

  30. “Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan,” memorandum for the president from Zbigniew Brzezinski, December 26, 1979, released by the Cold War International History Project.

  31. “Memorandum for the Secretary of State,” January 2, 1980, released by the Cold War International History Project.

  CHAPTER 3: “GO RAISE HELL”

  1. Interviews with Howard Hart, November 12, 2001, November 26, 2001, and November 27, 2001, in Virginia, as well as subsequent telephone and email communications (SC). Abdul Haq was killed by Taliban troops inside Afghanistan in October 2001. He had entered eastern Afghanistan, against the advice of the CIA, in order to stir up opposition to the Taliban in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks. That Hart and the CIA maintained a close relationship with Haq until the late 1980s comes not only from Hart but from the author’s interviews with several other U.S. officials.

  2. Interviews with Hart, November 12, 26, and 27, 2001. His biography is also described in George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War, pp. 117-21, also based on interviews with Hart.

  3. Interviews with former CIA officials from this period. That George was a postman’s son is from Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War, p. 62.

  4. Lessard’s conflict with Hart and the worries he expressed around the time of his death are from interviews with U.S. officials who knew Lessard.

  5. Quotes and Hart’s point of view are from interviews with Hart, November 12, 26, and 27, 2001.

  6. Interviews with U.S. officials familiar with the 1979 presidential findings. See also Steve Coll, The Washington Post, July 19 and 20, 1992.

  7. Charles G. Cogan, “Partners in Time,” World Policy Journal, Summer 1993. Cogan has written that the first Lee Enfield rifles authorized for the mujahedin by Carter’s amended finding arrived in Pakistan about ten days after the Soviet invasion. Details of other weapons supplied are from the author’s interviews with Hart and other U.S. officials.

  8. Martin Ewans, Afghanistan, p. 158. The KGB archivist Vasiliy Mitrokhin, in “The KGB in Afghanistan,” cites KGB statistics, unavailable to the CIA at the time, showing more than five thousand reported rebel actions in 1981 and almost twice as many the next year. “Using the methods of terror and intimidation and playing on religious and national sentiments, the counterrevolutionaries have a strong influence on a considerable part of the country’s population,” the Soviet Fortieth Army’s headquarters admitted to Moscow in June 1980. See “Excerpt from a report of 40th Army HQ,” released by the Cold War International History Project.

  9. The Bangkok meeting and Hart’s cabling are from interviews with Hart, Novembe
r 12, 26, and 27, 2001. See also Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War, pp. 125-26. The January 1982 cable is cited in Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows, p. 251. Gates reports that CIA director William Casey read this cable from Hart. Unbeknownst to the CIA, during the same month that Hart cabled seeking more and better weapons, the KGB Residency in Kabul reported to the Politburo that “the counter-revolutionary forces have managed to keep their zones of influence and to attract a considerable part of the population into the struggle against the existing regime.” See Mitrokhin, “KGB in Afghanistan,” p. 132.

  10. Interviews with former CIA officials. Typical was the observation of Fred “Fritz” Ermath, a former CIA Soviet analyst, who said, “The Kermit Roosevelts, the Cord Meyers were gone… . The old guys were hearts and minds guys… . But they were gone, see? And I think this generational shift, again with the Vietnam experience as part of the saga … The new guys said, ‘Well, we’re going to stick to our operational meaning, and what we can do is deliver mules, money and mortars.’ “

  11. The bounty idea is from interviews with Hart, November 12, 26, and 27, 2001. It is not clear whether the system was ever implemented by ISI.

  12. Mary Ann Weaver, Pakistan, p. 57.

  13. Ibid., p. 61.

  14. “Devout Muslim, yes,” is from Mohammed Yousaf, Silent Soldier, pp. 99-100.

  15. “Afghan youth will fight,” is from “Memorandum of Conversation,” President Reagan and President Zia-ul-Haq, December 7, 1982, released by the Cold War International History Project.

  16. Mitrokhin, “KGB in Afghanistan,” pp. 151-52. Mohammed Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap, p. 49.

  17. Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, pp. 256-57.

  18. “Your Meeting with Pakistan President …” Memo from Shultz to Reagan, November 29, 1982, and “Visit of Zia-ul-Haq,” from Shultz, also dated November 29, 1982, both released by the Cold War International History Project.

  19. The CIA’s analysts understood Zia’s ambivalence about the United States. In a special estimate prepared on November 12, 1982, the CIA reported, “Islamabad is aware that only the United States can offset Soviet pressures and provide Pakistan with the sophisticated weapons it believes it needs.” Yet “the Pakistanis continue to doubt the reliability of U.S. commitments and U.S. steadfastness in time of crisis.” See “Special National Intelligence Estimate on Pakistan,” November 12, 1982, released by the Cold War International History Project.

  20. Interviews with Hart, November 12, 26, and 27, 2001, and with Yousaf, June 1992, Dusseldorf, Germany (SC). A retired Pakistani brigadier general at the time of the interviews, Mohammed Yousaf is the coauthor of The Bear Trap, a detailed account of the ISI’s Afghan operations between 1983 and 1987.

  21. ISI telephone codes are from the author’s 1992 interviews with Yousaf, June 1992. ISI rules about CIA contact with Afghans are from Hart, November 12, 26, and 27, 2001, and other U.S. officials familiar with the liaison. Yousaf said that he and Akhtar were blindfolded while visiting the United States. A U.S. official interviewed in 1992 said he “wouldn’t steer you away from that. We do have sensitive facilities.”

  22. Yousaf, Silent Soldier, pp. 25-27. Akhtar’s professional information is on pp. 27-32.

  23. The size of the ISI Afghan bureau is from Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, pp. 1-3. How ISI was perceived is from interviews with Yousaf and other ISI and Pakistan army generals.

  24. Published estimates of U.S. covert aid between fiscal 1981 and 1984 include Barnett R. Rubin, Refugee Survey Quarterly, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1996. These estimates were confirmed in interviews with several U.S. officials. Fiscal year 1984 was an unusual, complicated year because surplus Pentagon funds were added to the pipeline at the last hour. The Soviet figures cited here are from Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, p. 63.

  25. Details of the weapons systems and financial details are from Yousaf, June 1992; Hart, November 12, 26, and 27, 2001; and other U.S. officials familiar with the pipeline during these years. Yousaf and Adkin describe many of these purchases in The Bear Trap. The Turkish incident comes from interviews with Yousaf. Hart recalled that the CIA paid the Chinese about $80 for a Kalashnikov copy that probably cost them about $12 or $15 to make. Because the Chinese enforced the greatest quality control in their manufacturing, over time most of the CIA’s covert purchases shifted toward Beijing. State-owned Chinese ships always seemed to steam into Karachi on just the date they were due, and the assistant Chinese defense attaché from the Islamabad embassy would invariably be standing at dockside, clipboard in hand.

  26. Interviews with Hart, November 12, 26, and 27, 2001, and Yousaf, June 1992.

  27. See Chapter 7 for a more detailed account of this issue.

  28. “The Secretary’s Visit to Pakistan: Afghanistan,” cable from U.S. embassy, Islamabad, to Secretary of State, June 1, 1983, released by the Cold War International History Project.

  29. A copy of the letter was obtained by the author. Hart’s trip into Afghanistan is from interviews with Hart, November 12, 26, and 27, 2001. He is the only source for the account of the trip. At least two other D.O. officers, including a later Islamabad station chief, also made unauthorized trips into Afghanistan during the Soviet phase of the war, according to U.S. officials familiar with the trips.

  CHAPTER 4: “I LOVE DOSAMA”

  1. This account of Badeeb’s trip to Pakistan and his meeting with Zia is from the author’s interview with Ahmed Badeeb and Saeed Badeeb on February 1, 2002, in Jedda, Saudi Arabia (SC). The interview lasted approximately two hours and was conducted in English. Subsequently, Ahmed Badeeb supplied to the author videotapes of two days of interviews he gave early in 2002 to an Arabic language satellite news service based in Lebanon, Orbit Television. The author employed a Washington, D.C.-based firm to translate these Orbit interviews from Arabic into English. Some of the quotations of Badeeb in this chapter, such as the account of his visit with boxes of cash to Pakistan, are from the author’s interview. Other quotations are from the Orbit interviews, as rendered into English by the translation service. The distinctions are indicated in the footnotes. That Badeeb attended college in North Dakota is from an interview with a U.S. official.

  2. Interview with Nat Kern, January 23, 2002, Washington, D.C. (SC). Kern maintains close contacts with the Saudi government as the editor of a newsletter about oil markets and Middle East politics. The quote from Turki is attributed by Kern to his business partner, Frank Anderson, a retired clandestine officer in the CIA’s Near East Division and at one time director of the D.O.‘s Afghanistan task force.

  3. Nawaf Obaid, “Improving U.S. Intelligence Analysis on the Saudi Arabian Decision Making Process,” master’s degree thesis, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1998. “Both believed fervently” is from Mohammed Yousaf, Silent Soldier, p. 87.

  4. The Saudi air cover over Karachi is from the Badeeb interviews with Orbit.

  5. The history of GID is from interviews with Saudi officials; with Nat Kern, January 23, 2002; a telephone interview with Ray Close, a former CIA station chief in Jedda who subsequently worked as a consultant to Prince Turki, January 10, 2002 (SC); and David Long, a former U.S. diplomat who also later worked for Prince Turki, January 22, 2002, Washington, D.C. (SC). By one account GID provided Sadat with a regular income during 1970 when Sadat was Egypt’s vice president. See Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987, p. 352.

  6. Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 213, quoting the British Arabist Gertrude Bell. Vassiliev’s history, translated from the original Russian, draws heavily on original Arabic and Ottoman sources as well as the accounts of travelers; it is the principal source of the pre-twentieth-century Arabian peninsula history in this chapter.

  7. The author owes the observation that Saudi Arabia was the first modern nation-state created by jihad to the anonymous author of a survey of the kingdom published in The Economist, March 23, 2002.


  8. The demographic statistics are from Vassiliev, History of Saudi Arabia, p. 421.

  9. The quotations are from a speech Prince Turki gave on February 3, 2002, in Washington, D.C.; it was transcribed and published on the World Wide Web by the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. Prince Turki also spoke briefly about his time at Lawrenceville during an interview with the author, August 2, 2002, in Cancun, Mexico (SC).

  10. That Clinton did not know Turki at Georgetown and only met him after taking office is from interviews with senior Saudi officials and with Kern, January 23, 2002.

  11. Quotations are from Turki’s speech on February 3, 2002.

  12. Ibid. The assassination of Turki’s father is from Vassiliev, History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 394-95.

  13. Interviews with Saudi and U.S. officials.

  Government budget statistics are from The Economist, March 23, 2002. GID’s computer expansion is from interviews with U.S. officials and Business Week, October 6, 1980.

  14. Interviews with U.S. officials.

  15. Author’s interview with Ahmed Badeeb and Saeed Badeeb, February 1, 2002.

  16. Interviews with Saudi officials. The George quote is from the author’s interview with Clair George, December 21, 2001, Chevy Chase, Maryland (SC).

  17. Interview with Saeed Badeeb, February 1, 2002. That their father was a modestly successful merchant in Jedda is from an interview with a Saudi newspaper editor.

  18. That the Saudis arranged contacts for the CIA at the hajj is from interviews with former U.S. intelligence officials. The “Safari club” is from Turki’s speech, February 3, 2002.

  19. “Memorandum of Conversation between HRH Prince Turki and Senator Bill Bradley,” April 13, 1980, author’s files.