Just eight days later the Germans threw over four divisions at the Anzio beachhead. Fortunately the US VI Corps weathered the storm.
The British assessment was that once Overlord was under way, there would only be enough landing craft in the Mediterranean to shift a single division. Even if they managed two, this would hardly constitute the strategic pincer movement that Eisenhower and Stalin envisaged. In early February Churchill was proposing to land two armoured divisions in Bordeaux twenty days after the cross-Channel operation. The British Chiefs of Staff were not keen on this and Brooke recalled, ‘I think we have ridden him off this for the present.’
On returning to London on 17 February after visiting his troops, Monty found that things were drifting the other way:
During my absence on tour the question of the craft and shipping necessary for Overlord made little headway. Actually matters got worse as two delegates were sent over from Washington with a plan for cutting down our demands and giving more craft to Anvil. Their proposals were put to me and I refused to accept.
Eisenhower, whose ultimate role was to become a first class diplomatic adjudicator, proposed on behalf of the Washington planners that 30 LCIs and 7 LSTs be assigned to Anvil. Montgomery was having none of it and immediately sent Eisenhower a terse message. He complained that the initial success must be guaranteed as well as the subsequent build-up once ashore.
Montgomery felt that Eisenhower’s proposals did nothing short of endangering Overlord’s success by compromising tactical flexibility. He made it perfectly clear that he would not budge on this issue: ‘From an Army point of view the proposals put forward to me are not acceptable. I recommend, definitely, that the proposals be turned down, and that the craft and shipping essential for Overlord be made available.’
The following day Eisenhower urged Montgomery to compromise, and perhaps surprisingly Monty, who had got his way with all other issues with the new Overlord plan, acquiesced. When Montgomery dined with Brooke on 18 February, the latter was dismayed to learn that Overlord was to be compromised in favour of Anvil, especially in light of the parlous situation in Italy. Alexander was already secretly pressing to have Lieutenant-General Truscott, the American commander at Anzio, replaced by someone like Patton. Brooke had lost his temper with Churchill, who was all for placing Alexander in charge of the bridgehead and having Wilson assume general command in Italy. Brooke had prevailed on the Prime Minister not to intervene and to leave it to the commanders on the ground, but Montgomery’s news was the final straw.
Eisenhower hosted a Chiefs of Staff meeting on the 19th to discuss the desirability of Anvil coinciding with Overlord. Brooke noted with disbelief in his diary:
Luckily I had discovered last night from Monty that he and [Admiral] Bertie Ramsay had agreed to curtail the cross-Channel operation to provide for a south of France operation. They should have realised that the situation in Italy now made such an operation impossible. They had agreed to please Eisenhower, who was pressing for it to please Marshall!
Going in to fight Monty’s corner Brooke added:
I had a little difficulty with Eisenhower, but not much, to make him see sense, as all he required was a little pressure to go back to the plans he really liked best now that he had at least shown some attempt to support Marshall’s idea. I think the matter is now all right.
Captain Harry Butcher, Eisenhower’s Naval Aide, witnessed the difficult position his boss was placed in:
Ike, representing the US Chiefs of Staff, went into the ‘ifs and ands’ of Overlord and Anvil to the British Chiefs of Staff this morning. The fact that he represents the US Chiefs of Staff in dealing with the British Chiefs throws a tremendous weight on his shoulders. It makes him the recipient of all the arguments and pressures which the British, particularly the Prime Minister, may wish to advance for or against any particular project involving the US Joint Chiefs and affecting the European Theatre. The Supreme Commander has wrestled continually to keep Anvil alive; by today it had a bad sinking spell.
Butcher went on to observe that this was all the work of Montgomery:
Monty thinks Anvil should be abandoned. He would rather have plenty of landing craft for the cross-Channel operation. He prefers a strong Overlord. He has lunched with the Prime Minister at Chequers and strongly advocates to Ike that the Combined Chiefs be advised that it is better to have two really major campaigns, one in Italy and one in Overlord.
Fully appraised of Brooke’s views, Montgomery sought a briefing on Italy from his friend Major-General Frank Simpson, Director of Military Operations at the War Office. ‘I am told by the Operations Directorate at the War Office that the divisions in Italy have had a lot of casualties, are tired, and generally are not too well situated for getting on to Rome and beyond,’ he wrote to Eisenhower. ‘They require regrouping, resting, and so on. Also the battle has to be continued so as to keep drawing German divisions down that way – all of which is very good.’
Monty now went on to show his hand, effectively abandoning his previous agreement with Eisenhower:
Under these circumstances, I do not see how the withdrawal of divisions from Italy for Anvil is possible. If this is the case I hope that we shall get the full number of craft that we would really like for Overlord, there is no point in cutting ourselves down and accepting a compromise solution for Overlord, if Anvil can never come off; it would be better to have a really good Overlord, with a good choice of craft, a good reserve of craft, a good margin all round, and so on. I suggest that this aspect should be cleared up.
But Eisenhower, with a million and one things to think of with the planning of Overlord, was not quick to reply. Having been prepped by Brooke, Montgomery then dined with Churchill on the 20th and the following day called on Eisenhower to cancel Anvil once and for all:
As a result of what he told me about the situation in Italy it is my definite opinion that all resources in the Mediterranean theatre should be put into the campaign in Italy. I further consider that we should now make a definite decision to cancel Anvil; this will enable the commanders in the Mediterranean theatre to devote their whole attention to fighting the Germans in Italy – at present they have to keep Anvil in their minds, and plan for it, and this must detract from the success of the present battle in Italy.
If para 2 above is agreed, then all the craft now being kept for Anvil can be released at once for Overlord. The effect of this on Overlord will be tremendous.
To sum up: I recommend very strongly that we now throw the whole weight of our opinion into the scales against Anvil. Let us have two really good campaigns – one in Italy and one on Overlord.
To General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, the British theatre commander in the Mediterranean, the American preoccupation with France’s southern ports seemed to imply a strategy aimed at defeating Germany during the first half of 1945 at the cost of an opportunity of defeating her before the end of 1944.
Interestingly, as demonstrated in his war directives, Hitler saw the Italian front as the key, since holding on in Italy helped reduce Allied air attacks on his factories in central Europe and protected the vital raw materials of the Balkans. In contrast, southern France had no strategic value to him whatsoever. A withdrawal from there would surrender nothing of military or economic value and would not give the Allies access to airbases that were any nearer his war industries than they already possessed. His U-boat bases on the Bay of Biscay were no longer of any great utility and the disruption of the French railways had already curtailed what raw materials he obtained from France and Spain. The Battle of the Atlantic was all but won by the Allies, having climaxed during March–May 1943 with heavy U-boat losses. Subsequent German efforts launched in September 1943 to wrest back the initiative in the Atlantic failed to halt Operation Bolero, the Allies’ huge build-up in Britain for Overlord, and resulted in further heavy losses. In terms of providing Hitler’s first line of defence and preventing the opening of the Second Front, the failure of the U-boats to strangle the flow of troops and sup
plies from North America to Britain was a very significant blow to his war effort. By the end of the war the German Navy had sunk 3,500 merchant vessels and 175 warships with the loss of over 30,000 lives, at a cost of 783 U-boats and 28,000 crew.
After all the horse-trading over LST allocations for the Pacific in mid-February 1944 the Americans were able to remove Truk Island from their invasion list. Air power proved to be the key, not LSTs. At the beginning of February the Americans had secured Kwajalein Atoll. Admiral Chester Nimitz then eyed Eniwetok Atoll, which would complete the liberation of the Marshall Islands. As the Kwajalein operation had not required the 5th Amphibious Forces reserves, these were now available for Operation Catchpole.
First, though, Task Force 58, consisting of fleet carriers, battleships and cruisers, launched a devastating air attack on Truk. The Japanese lost 2 light cruisers, 4 destroyers, 2 submarines, 5 auxiliaries, 24 merchantmen and 250 aircraft, most of the latter caught on the ground. Never again would the Japanese use Truk as a major operating base. The carriers returned in April to finish their work, while Eniwetok was captured by 21 February.
Top-level meetings
Under pressure from Marshall, Brooke, Montgomery and Churchill, Eisenhower must surely have wished that Roosevelt had never raised the prospect of Anvil with Stalin. He had little choice but to convene another top-level conference about Anvil on 26 February, attended by Montgomery, Bedell Smith, Leigh-Mallory, Freddy de Guingand and Admiral Ramsay. The latter understandably needed an immediate decision, otherwise his finely laid naval plans for Overlord would become useless if Anvil was cancelled and its landing craft were suddenly to become available. In effect, with these additional craft the landing schedules for the follow-up troops could be brought forward by 24 hours, a factor that could be critical to the success of Overlord if the Germans launched swift and powerful counter-attacks. Montgomery made it clear he would only countenance leaving enough craft in the Mediterranean to lift one division.
Eisenhower was minded to call it a day, give in and abandon Anvil, but instead he dithered, as Harry Butcher noted:
Following Ike’s representations to the British Chiefs of Staff as to the need for continued planning for Anvil, conclusions now have been agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President and the Prime Minister.
The Italian Fronts are to be given overriding priority of all the existing and future operations in the Mediterranean, but Anvil is to be planned with the hope of launching it shortly after Overlord. Another appraisal will be made 20 March.
As this action largely meets Ike’s wishes, he is satisfied. He does not want to abandon Anvil unless absolutely necessary, despite the position previously taken by the British Chiefs of Staff, who favoured its abandonment in harmony with the views expressed by General Montgomery.
Montgomery and Ramsay were aghast, for all Eisenhower had done was put off for yet another month any firm decision on Anvil. As a personal concession to Monty, Eisenhower did offer to send a telegram to Marshall stating that in his opinion Anvil was impossible, but Bedell Smith put a stop to this for fear that it would look as though Eisenhower was pre-empting the 20 March feasibility assessment.
Smarting at this reversal, Monty tried to put a brave face on the situation, acknowledging that Eisenhower was caught between two masters. He recorded in his diary:
This is, at last, a firm statement. There has been a great deal of passing the ball backwards and forwards between London and Washington. Eisenhower has had great pressure from Washington, where opinion is very much in favour of Anvil….
So it is very necessary that we should all try to save Eisenhower from reproaches from Washington, and save his face when he wants to come down hard on the side of what we want to do.
Ike was given just two days’ respite from the matter while Montgomery went on an inspection tour of Canadian Army units and the London docks. In the afternoon of 28 February Monty turned up at Eisenhower’s headquarters and urged him to cancel Anvil now rather than wait three weeks. To add to Eisenhower’s woes, Alexander was now being difficult and refusing to release thirteen LSTs for Overlord, which he said he needed to supply the Anzio beachhead.
In fact, it was not until 20 March that Eisenhower officially came down in favour of cancelling Anvil, three months after Monty had first pleaded with him to favour Overlord over Anvil. It was agreed that a directive be prepared for General Wilson:
A draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, based on the assumption that the Anvil assault is impossible of execution was discussed.
The Supreme Commander directed that the draft directive be changed in respect to the method for assisting Overlord to provide for maintenance of the highest possible tempo of offensive action, including the mounting of a positive threat against the South of France and the [Italian] Ligurian coast and provision for taking immediate advantage of Rankin conditions should they occur.
Rankin was a three point contingency plan for bringing the invasion of France forward should Germany suffer an economic/military collapse, or if the Germans either withdrew their troops from the occupied territories or surrendered during 1943/4. Implementing Rankin in 1943 would have been largely impossible, especially once the Allies had committed their amphibious resources to the invasions of Sicily and Italy. However, even by November 1943 the British Chiefs of Staff were still referring to Rankin, in the vain hope that the inevitable casualties incurred by Overlord could be avoided.
It was envisaged that Operation Rankin A could be launched against the Cotentin peninsula in January 1944 or the Normandy coast in April 1944, and would be supported by supplementary landings in the Pas-de-Calais and or in the south of France. By this stage it would have meant moving Overlord forward using all available resources. While the existence of Rankin was strategically prudent it was yet another factor impinging on the planning staffs’ decisions over implementing Overlord and Anvil. Eisenhower’s reference to it was largely wishful thinking.
On the afternoon of the 21st Eisenhower drafted a Top Secret personal message for Marshall, in which he cast doubt on Anvil:
I will be asked to meet with the British Chiefs of Staff tomorrow on the final question of Anvil. I have been giving constant thought to this subject together with the staff and several commanders during the past month. While I have no recent appreciation from General Wilson, yet I intend to present the following based on our own careful study and earnest conviction….
2. It is now the firm opinion of the Supreme Commander that Anvil, as originally visualised, is no longer a possibility, either from the standpoint of time in which to make the necessary preparations, or in probable availability of fresh and effective troops at the required date….
He went on to point out that the landing ships allocated to Overlord were barely sufficient, even assuming they arrived on time, serviceability rates were maintained and that none were lost to enemy action. There was simply no margin and the operation was in fact short of the minimum number of LSTs by four vessels. He continued:
4. The fact has been constantly realised, and the Supreme Commander has been willing to accept the situation only so long as he felt reasonably sure of a strong and simultaneous Anvil. With the cancellation of a simultaneous Anvil he considers it essential to strengthen Overlord and also to increase flexibility of the build-up during the critical days….
5. The Supreme Commander, accordingly, is of the opinion that all serviceable landing ships and craft presently allocated to the Mediterranean and above those necessary to furnish ship-toshore lift for one division should be reallocated to Overlord.
In an effort to placate Marshall, Eisenhower added:
6. Although convinced that Anvil as at present conceived is no longer possible, the Supreme Commander feels that the abandonment of this project must not lessen our intention of operating offensively in the Mediterranean, initially in Italy and extending from there into France as rapidly as we can. He believes that the forces in
the Mediterranean must constantly look for every expedient, including threat and feint, to contain the maximum possible enemy forces in that region.
However, there could be no hiding the blow that Churchill and Montgomery had been so vigorously lobbying for:
7. The Supreme Commander accordingly recommends:
a. That the decision be made to abandon Anvil in its present conception of a two-division assault building up to ten divisions, and that a directive for operations in lieu thereof, similar to the attached, be transmitted to the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Theatre.
b. That there be withdrawn from the Mediterranean the following craft and ships for reallocation to Operation Overlord: twenty-six LCT, forty LCI(L), one LSH (the Bulolo), one LSE, one LSD. The above ships and craft to arrive in the UK by 30 April.
Marshall did not take what was going on in London lightly. Eisenhower called another Chiefs meeting on 27 March, involving Brooke, Cunningham, Ismay, Portal, Ramsay and Bedell Smith, to discuss the US Chiefs’ proposals for operations in the Mediterranean. Before them was a new target date for Anvil set for 10 July.
The US Chiefs were so concerned about keeping Anvil alive they were prepared to withdraw landing craft from the Pacific. Eisenhower as usual sought to please everyone, though he emphasised that to his way of thinking a two-divisional assault in July ‘would contribute substantially to the success of Overlord’.
Bedell Smith tried to act as peacekeeper, reminding everyone that Anvil was not the Second Front in itself but was intended as a diversionary operation in support of Overlord. He also pointed out that the French should take responsibility for this operation under the command of General Giraud. Lieutenant-Commander J.E. Reid, the meeting secretary, recorded Bedell Smith’s thinking:
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