If we accept the proposed allocation of additional landing craft, it would be possible to launch a two-divisional assault with French troops. He estimated that there are sufficient French divisions in the Mediterranean to continue the follow-up until the middle of August, by which time Overlord should be firmly established. An American division could be added to lend support. The net result would be that by taking full advantage of utilising all available French forces for the Anvil operation, it would be possible to achieve an effective diversionary assistance to Overlord and at the same time other forces available for the Mediterranean could be employed to maintain a strong position in Italy.
This in principle was a good idea; nonetheless everyone knew that the French Army was not in a position to be able to spearhead a seaborne assault. It simply did not have the experience or indeed the equipment, regardless of what de Gaulle or de Lattre might say about French honour.
Understandably, the British were not happy. Brooke ‘was not prepared to accept firm commitments at this time regarding the precise location of a diversionary attack to be made four months hence’. Reid’s minutes also recorded Brooke’s displeasure over what he saw as the Americans prioritising the Pacific campaign over Europe:
Sir Alan Brooke then drew attention to the point that if our basic strategy, which was to defeat Germany first, had been adhered to, the landing craft required for Anvil would now be available and they would not be in the Pacific, as was the case. He considered that the failure to adhere strictly to the basic strategy had already resulted in a setback of approximately six months in the defeat of Germany. Furthermore, he said the lack of sufficient landing craft and other resources in the Mediterranean resulted in our failure to take full advantage of the fall of Italy.
This conveniently overlooked the fact that the Allies had become embroiled on the Italian mainland in the first place at the behest of the British and Churchill’s indirect strategy. Brooke agreed that the key objective in the Mediterranean was to draw as many German troops away from Overlord as possible, and he felt that the capture of Rome would best achieve this. He added that launching Anvil would need at least ten divisions and that stripping the Mediterranean could only leave the Allies on the defensive both there and, inevitably, in the south of France.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal supported Brooke, feeling they should not commit themselves to the US Chiefs’ proposals. He advised that by 10 July opportunities might have arisen that would allow the deployment of their forces to far greater advantage than envisaged by Anvil. Eisenhower defended Marshall’s corner, replying that he had been ‘pleading’ for the past two years to give the war effort against Germany priority. In addition, he pointed out that it was Marshall who had secured Pacific resources for use in the Mediterranean. Also Roosevelt could not ignore public opinion nor indeed Congress, where there was a groundswell of opinion for an all-out offensive in the Pacific.
Eisenhower was not convinced that an offensive to capture Rome was a good Anvil substitute in terms of containing German forces. He sought to find a reply that would be acceptable to both the British and the US Chiefs of Staff. It was clear to him that the main concern of the US Chiefs was to gain assurances that preparations for Anvil would continue, though they were not so interested in exactly where the diversion was to be directed. Essentially he was still dragging his feet by suggesting that nothing should be allowed to harm General Wilson’s ability to contain the maximum German forces in Italy; they would get the sea lift in place by 10 July, but the point of attack could be settled later. Ultimately the decision would rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
During the meeting the British still pressed for Italy to be given priority:
Sir Andrew Cunningham inquired as to whether or not it would be in harmony with the US Chiefs of Staff’s proposals, if the Supreme Commander, at a later date, should recommend that the capture of Rome was the best means of containing the maximum number of German forces. He wondered whether or not that would constitute the breaking of our engagements.
General Smith did not help matters by stating he thought the US Joint Chiefs of Staff would consider it a breach of commitment if an attack were made south of Pisa, but that an attack to the north might not be considered as such.
To further irritate Marshall, the following day the British Chiefs of Staff signalled him to highlight how the difficulties in Italy were presenting problems in timetabling Anvil, or indeed committing to it at all. Marshall felt General Alexander was dragging his heels and disagreed with his assessment that an operation to link the front and the bridgehead could not be mounted until 14 May. To Marshall’s way of thinking Alexander was looking to hold on to his resources for subsequent operations. As far as he was concerned, General Wilson must be ordered to commence preparations for Anvil.
Nor did Eisenhower’s ‘carefully worded answer to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff’s proposals’ have the desired effect. General Marshall would have nothing less than a firm commitment to Anvil: ‘We cannot accept a diversion of landing craft from the Pacific operations unless it is the firm intention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff now to mount Anvil on a two-division basis, target date, 10 July, in time to support Overlord.’
As far as Marshall was concerned, if the British Chiefs of Staff got their way and postponed the order to General Wilson to get the ball rolling, then the initiative would pass to the Germans. Quite rightly, he would not provide the resources if a firm plan did not exist and everyone had signed up to it. Marshall concluded:
Our view is that there should be no delay in providing the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, with a firm directive…. In this directive, the three US fighter groups remain in the Mediterranean and we have allowed for the British Chiefs of Staff to make adjustments in the matter of total LSTs withdrawn from the Mediterranean to support Overlord.
Matters came to a head in early April and the Americans for the first time offered to transfer assault craft from the Pacific, promising to place 26 tank landing ships and 40 landing craft at Wilson’s disposal if the British would commit themselves to Anvil. The British reluctantly agreed to 10 July, though insisted that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be allowed to veto the operation if the situation changed in Italy.
Brooke recorded the seemingly unending wrangling:
17 April. Arrived back early in the office to find myself swamped with telegrams. After COS lunch with PM at 10 Downing Street; Eisenhower, Bedell Smith and Alexander were there. The conversation at once again turned to the Mediterranean strategy and to the American Chiefs of Staff’s failure to agree with us as to the necessity to press on with operations in Italy without impairing the prospect by preparations for an operation against southern France. Eisenhower produced all the arguments we heard the other day …
The Combined Chiefs of Staff finally issued their directive to General Wilson two days later. The objective of Anvil was ‘to give the greatest possible assistance to Overlord by destroying or containing the maximum number of German formations in the Mediterranean’. General Brooke recorded on a sour note:
19 April. At last all our troubles about Anvil are over. We have got the Americans to agree, but have lost the additional landing craft they were prepared to provide. History will never forgive them for bargaining equipment against strategy and for trying to blackmail us into agreeing with them by holding the pistol of withdrawing craft at our heads …
Chapter Four
Ike says ‘No’ to Churchill
In Italy on the night of 11/12 May 1944 the US 5th and British 8th Armies launched their long-awaited spring offensive against the German defences known as the Gustav Line along the Sangro river. Thwarted in their repeated attempts to break through at Cassino in February, March and April, the Allies were relieved when the Germans abandoned Monte Cassino after a week of heavy fighting by Polish forces, and the French Expeditionary Corps and US II Corps succeeded in breaking the Gustav Line by the 15th.
The French took credit fo
r Operation Diadem as this was an opportunity for their military honour to be restored. The French Expeditionary Corps started to arrive in Italy in November 1943 and by May 1944 was fully up to strength. The French colonial troops were quite distinctive, particularly the Moroccan goumiers in their striped djellebah that formed part of their uniform and American M1917A pattern helmets. The goumiers were originally irregular forces, nominally raised to serve the Moroccan Sultan, but now serving with the French as regular soldiers. The Algerians tended to be kitted out with a mixture of French and American uniforms.
The Moroccans first really made their presence felt in Italy, when General André Dody’s division tipped the balance during Operation Raincoat in mid-December 1943. His men helped push the Germans back to the Gustav Line, but overall the offensive failed to put the Allies in a strong position to support the forthcoming Anzio landings.
Diadem was launched in May 1944 and de Gaulle arrived to lend General Juin his support. While the US 5th Army suggested advancing along the Ausente valley, it was Juin who proposed attacking through the mountains while making no attempt to outflank Aurunci. To do this it was necessary to break out of the Gargliano bridgehead so the French could take Monte Majo and the Ausonia defile. General Clark, impressed by Juin’s boldness, agreed.
The 2nd Moroccan Infantry Division under General Dody was given the task of taking Majo and its three spurs. On the right was Brosset’s 1st Free French Division and on the left de Monsabert’s 3rd Algerian Infantry Division, which was tasked with securing Castleforte to open up the Ausente. Afterwards the Mountain Corps comprising General Savez’s 4th Moroccan Mountain Division and General Guillame’s Group of Moroccan Tabors could then push to the Aurunci massif.
On 13 May, in the face of stiff German resistance, the Moroccans succeeded in breaching the Gustav Line at Monte Majo, one of its deepest (though most weakly defended) points. Ausonia was captured two days later. The fall of Majo unhinged the XIV Panzer Corps’ left wing, greatly contributing to the Allies’ success.
Then II Corps pushed north towards Terracina, which fell on 23–24 May, and on towards the Anzio beachhead against rapidly crumbling resistance as the Germans began withdrawing north-east towards Rome. On the 23rd the US VI Corps broke out from Anzio and two days later linked up with the II Corps troops. In a surprising move, considering how they normally treated occupied cities, the Germans declared Rome an open city and US forces took possession of it on 4 June.
In the Vatican at the time was 15-year-old Haroldino Tittmann, who recorded in his diary:
Today we did nothing except watch the Germans retreat. I got the best view of all, as I had gone into the nuns’ garden, which overlooks the road on which the Germans were retreating … They were extensively using horses to draw carriages, wagons and every kind of contraption you could think of. Some were even on bicycles. They had stolen all Rome’s horse-drawn cabs. They also used horses to pull their artillery. One felt rather sorry for them; they looked so young…. They looked terribly depressed.
President Roosevelt remarked on the success of this joint effort in Italy and proclaimed:
It is also significant that Rome has been liberated by the armed forces of many nations. The American and British armies – who bore the chief burdens of battle – found at their sides our own North American neighbours, the gallant Canadians. The fighting New Zealanders from the far South Pacific, the courageous French and the French Moroccans, the South Africans, the Poles and the east Indians – all of them fought with us on the bloody approaches to the city of Rome….
Our victory comes at an excellent time, while our Allied forces are poised for another strike at western Europe – and while the armies of other Nazi soldiers nervously await our assault. And in the meantime our gallant Russian allies continue to make their power felt more and more.
A slightly sour note crept in as he added his thanks to those who would also be key players in the coming invasion of southern France:
No great effort like this can be a hundred per cent perfect, but the batting average is very, very high.
And so I extend the congratulations and thanks tonight of the American people to General Alexander, who has been in command of the whole of the Italian operation; to our General Clark and General Leese of the 5th and 8th Armies; to General Wilson, the Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean theatre, [and] General Devers his American deputy; to [Lieutenant-] General Eaker; to Admirals Cunningham and Hewitt, and to all their brave officers and men.
However, the gloss of this victory was soon to be tarnished, as General Clark pleaded with Marshall when he came to the Italian capital that month for an invasion of the Balkans. As ever, Marshall was inflexible on the matter and Clark despairingly recorded in his diary: ‘The Boche is defeated, disorganised and demoralised. Now is the time to exploit our success. Yet, in the middle of this success, I lose two corps headquarters and seven divisions. It just doesn’t make sense.’
Riviera or Po Valley
Operation Overlord, the long-anticipated invasion of Nazi-occupied northern France, commenced just two days after the fall of Rome. In total, 236 LSTs were committed to Overlord, along with 768 Landing Craft Tank and 48 Landing Craft Tank (armoured). To bring ashore the thousands of motor vehicles there were 839 Landing Craft Vehicles and Personnel, 128 Landing Craft Mechanised (1) and 358 Landing Craft Mechanised (3). There were also 228 Landing Barge Vehicles (2) to support the landing operations.
By the end of D-Day, 6 June 1944, about 150,000 men had been put ashore and the Allies had occupied a front of some 50 km. Churchill broke the news to the House of Commons:
I have also to announce to the House that during the night and the early hours of this morning the first of the series of landings in force upon the European continent has taken place. In this case the liberating assault fell on France. An immense armada of upwards of 4,000 ships, together with several thousand smaller craft, crossed the Channel.
He then added with a flourish, ‘I cannot, of course, commit myself to any particular details.’
Roosevelt’s intention was that France, once liberated, would be run by an American military administration, which was the last thing de Gaulle wanted. On returning to Britain just before D-Day, he became embroiled in bitter arguments with both Churchill and Eisenhower. At one point Churchill was on the verge of sending him back to Algiers, and by the time Overlord began no agreement had been reached over how the newly liberated territory in France was to be governed or by whom. De Gaulle finally came ashore in Normandy on 14 June, and once at Bayeux he ensured that the American military administration was stillborn. His FFI supporters moved quickly to take power in order to pre-empt the socialist and communist-dominated resistance groups.
General Wilson was ordered to continue his Italian offensive on 14 June as far as the Pisa-Rimini Line (known as the Gothic Line) and after that to prepare for a diversion of resources against southern or western France or the head of the Adriatic. Wilson met Generals Marshall and Arnold in Italy on the 17th and suggested that Alexander be given the resources to get through the Pisa-Rimini Line and on into the Po valley. Then, supported by an amphibious assault against the Istrian peninsula, he could exploit the Ljubljana Gap and push into the Hungarian plains beyond. Hitler would thus be forced to withdraw substantial troops from France if Alexander’s force threatened the Upper Danube and the strategic heart of Europe. Wilson argued that while the support this would give to Eisenhower would certainly be less direct, it would be more effective than Anvil.
Competing British and American plans for the southern assault on Nazi Germany. (Dennis Andrews)
Marshall responded that Eisenhower wanted Anvil because ‘the need for an additional major port was more pressing … than the diversion of enemy troops from northern France’. There were, he added, ‘some forty or fifty divisions in the United States ready for action’, and these would be used ‘only in France where they could be deployed more rapidly and on a broader front, and tha
t none would be sent to the Mediterranean other than as a possible build-up for an attack on southern France’.
Marshall made it clear that whatever happened these troops would not be sent to south-eastern Europe. In effect, he was simply echoing the advice given to Roosevelt that the way to defeat Germany was ‘to mount one big offensive and then slam ’em.’
Appreciating that the US Chiefs were clearly digging in their heels, General Wilson signalled the British Chiefs of Staff on the 19th, stressing the importance of creating a decisive threat to southern Germany before the end of the year. The current success in Italy was offering enticing strategic possibilities. In the last two weeks the Allies had pushed forward 160 km, but this momentum could not be maintained if seven divisions (a quarter of Alexander’s land strength) were diverted to Anvil. Wilson also warned that a diversion of forces for Anvil would cause a break in offensive operations in the Mediterranean of at least six weeks, which would enable the Germans to establish themselves more strongly along the Gothic Line. Marshall was not impressed by such arguments, as he felt that once the Germans had been driven from their defences they could abandon the Po valley and withdraw into the Alps. He believed Alexander would be chasing thin air to no effect, but such reasoning was nonsensical in the light of the tenacious resistance the German Army had offered in Italy to date.
Indeed, the last thing Hitler wanted was Allied bombers operating from the Po valley and intensifying their strategic bombing campaign against his industries. Nor did he want the Allies forcing the head of the Adriatic and entering Yugoslavia where partisans were already holding down a dozen security divisions. He needed the Balkans’ abundant raw materials and he did not want them exposed to the risk of Allied invasion. While Italy could serve as a shield for the Balkans, France was of much less value to his war effort now that the French railway system lay in tatters.
Operation Dragoon Page 8