by Lori Peek
18. The general tendency in postdisaster media reporting, especially in the immedi-
ate aftermath of an event, is to overestimate deaths, injuries, and economic damages.
Overestimates may occur as a result of the disruptive impact of disaster and the special
pressures these events introduce regarding the production of news, conflicting estimates
from different sources, and the absence of authoritative sources of information. reliance
on unofficial sources and eyewitness accounts may lead to the inflation of disaster-loss
estimates. A political advantage also may emerge from issuing high property-damage
estimates, as the disaster-stricken area is more likely to be declared a federal disaster area,
resulting in federal aid and/or low-cost loans for rebuilding. see Henry W. Fischer, iii,
Response to Disaster: Fact versus Fiction and Its Perpetuation: The Sociology of Disaster,
3rd ed. (lanham, mD: University press of America, 2008); Kathleen J. Tierney, michael
K. lindell, and ronald W. perry, Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and
Response in the United States (Washington, DC: Joseph Henry press, 2001).
19. The national institutes of standards and Technology has estimated that between
16,400 and 18,800 civilians were in the World Trade Center complex at the time of the
first plane collision on the morning of september 11, 2001. The death toll on september
11 would have almost certainly been much higher had the hijackers struck later in the day,
when more employees and visitors would have been inside the Twin Towers. For more
information, see national Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United states, The
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the United States (Washington, DC: U.s. Government printing Office, 2004), 316.
198 / Notes to Chapter 5
20. irwin Garfinkel, neeraj Kaushal, Julien Teitler, and sandra Garcia, “vulnerability
and resilience: new yorkers response to 9/11,” in Wounded City: The Social Impact
of 9/11, ed. nancy Foner (new york: russell sage Foundation, 2005), 28–75; louis
Uchitelle, “A nation Challenged: The Consumer; sales Drop and spending Waits as
Uncertainty Grips economy,” New York Times, september 30, 2001, A-1.
21. randall Collins, “rituals of solidarity and security in the Wake of Terrorist
Attack,” Sociological Theory 22, no. 1 (2004): 53–87.
22. Wahiba Abu-ras and soleman H. Abu-Bader, “The impact of the september
11, 2001, Attacks on the Well-Being of Arab Americans in new york City,” Journal
of Muslim Mental Health 3 (2008): 217–239; Anny Bakalian and mehdi Bozorgmehr,
Backlash 9/11: Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans Respond (Berkeley: University of
California press, 2009).
23. Council on American-islamic relations, “American muslims: One year after
9/11” (report, Council on American-islamic relations research Center, Washington,
DC, 2002).
24. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, “1991 report on Anti-Arab
Hate Crimes” (report, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Washington,
DC, 1992).
25. Council on American-islamic relations, “The price of ignorance” (report,
American-muslim research Center, Washington, DC, 1996).
26. Council on American-islamic relations, “American muslims.”
27. Joe r. Feagin and Karyn D. mcKinney, The Many Costs of Racism (lanham, mD:
rowman and littlefield, 2003).
28. south Asian American leaders of Tomorrow, “American Backlash: Terrorists
Bring War Home in more Ways than One” (report, south Asian American leaders of
Tomorrow, Washington, DC, 2001).
29. ibid.
30. Hussein ibish, ed., “report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination against Arab
Americans: The post september 11 Backlash” (report, American-Arab Anti-Discrim-
ination Committee, Washington, DC, 2003).
31. Ann Coulter, “This is War: We should invade Their Countries,” National Review
Online, september 13, 2001, available at www.nationalreview.com/coulter/coulter.shtml
(accessed January 30, 2010).
32. “The Wisdom of Ann Coulter,” Washington Monthly, October 2001, available
at www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0111.coulterwisdom.html (accessed
January 30, 2010).
33. Bakalian and Bozorgmehr, Backlash 9/11.
34. Joe r. Feagin and melvin p. sikes, Living with Racism: The Black Middle-Class
Experience (Boston: Beacon press, 1994), 224.
35. robert n. Bellah, richard madsen, William m. sullivan, Ann swidler, and steen
m. Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life, updat-
ed ed. (Berkeley: University of California press, 1996); Joe r. Feagin, “The Continuing
significance of race: Antiblack Discrimination in public places,” American Sociological
Review 56, no. 1 (1991): 101–116; Alice Fothergill, Heads above Water: Gender, Class, and
Family in the Grand Forks Flood (Albany: state University of new york press, 2004).
36. michael Welch, Scapegoats of September 11th: Hate Crimes and State Crimes in
the War on Terror (new Brunswick, nJ: rutgers University press, 2006).
Notes to Chapter 6 / 199
37. Council on American-islamic relations, “American muslims.”
38. eliott C. mclaughlin, “FBi planting spies in U.s. mosques, muslim Groups say,”
CNN, march 20, 2009, available at www.cnn.com/2009/Us/03/20/fbi.muslim.groups/
index.html (accessed may 6, 2010).
39. Bakalian and Bozorgmehr, Backlash 9/11.
40. Council on American-islamic relations, “American muslims”; ibish, “report on
Hate Crimes and Discrimination against Arab Americans.”
41. ibish, “report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination against Arab Americans.”
42. Council on American-islamic relations, “The status of muslim Civil rights in
the United states: Unpatriotic Acts” (report, Council on American-islamic relations
research Center, Washington, DC, 2004).
43. Hussein ibish, ed., “report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination against
Arab Americans 2003–2007” (report, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,
Washington, DC, 2008).
ChapTer 6
1. lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, 2nd ed. (Glencoe, il: Free press,
1964); emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. W. D. Halls (new york:
Free press, [1893] 1984); Georg simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations
(Glencoe, il: Free press, 1955).
2. Henri Tajfel, The Social Psychology of Minorities (new york: minority rights
Group, 1978).
3. For a discussion of master status-determining traits, see everett C. Hughes, The
Sociological Eye: Selected Papers (new Brunswick, nJ: Transaction Books, 1984).
4. Jane i. smith, Islam in America (new york: Columbia University press, 1999), 181.
5. ibid., 181–182.
6. earle H. Waugh, “north America and the Adaptation of the muslim Tradition:
religion, ethnicity, and the Family,” in Muslim Families in North America, ed. e. H.
Waugh, s. m. Abu-laban, and r. B. Qureshi (edmonton: University of Alberta press,
1991), 68–95.
7. Anny Bakalian and mehdi Bozorgmehr, Backlash 9/11: Middle Eastern and
Muslim Americans Respond (Berkeley: University of California press, 2009).
&nbs
p; 8. peter skerry, “America’s muslims never Had to Unite—Until now,” Washington
Post, January 5, 2003, B-2.
9. Council on American-islamic relations, “American muslims: One year after
9/11” (report, Council on American-islamic relations research Center, Washington,
DC, 2002).
10. ibid.
11. in their book Backlash 9/11, Bakalian and Bozorgmehr observe that “despite
the painful outcomes of the terrorist attacks, new opportunities opened up for middle
easterners and muslims, allowing them to emerge as a distinct, visible category in
American society.” Bakalian and Bozorgmehr convincingly argue that muslim American
community-based organizations used the post-september 11 “window of opportunity”
to mobilize their constituents and to encourage greater integration into U.s. society.
muslim Americans were invited to participate in meaningful ways in groups that had
previously been closed off to them, they fought for and won reasonable religious accom-
200 / Notes to Chapter 6
modations in the workplace and in schools, and they asserted their political voice as an
influential voting bloc. For a complete discussion of the organizational response to 9/11,
see Bakalian and Bozorgmehr, Backlash 9/11.
12. yvonne yazbeck Haddad, Not Quite American? The Shaping of Arab and Muslim
Identity in the United States (Waco, TX: Baylor University press, 2004), 1.
13. According to a national survey conducted soon after 9/11, approximately 90
percent of Americans turned to religion as a coping response to the trauma caused by
the attacks. in particular, increased religious practice and rising church attendance rates
across the nation marked the post-9/11 period. The spike in religious attendance was rel-
atively short-lived, however. By november 2001, polls indicated that church attendance
had retreated back to normal levels. see Janice Bell meisenhelder and John p. marcum,
“responses of Clergy to 9/11: posttraumatic stress, Coping, and religious Outcomes,”
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 43, no. 4 (2004): 547–554; mark A. schuster,
Bradley D. stein, lisa H. Jaycox, rebecca l. Collins, Grant n. marshall, marc n. elliott,
Annie J. Zhou, David e. Kanouse, Janina l. morrison, and sandra H. Berry, “A national
survey of stress reactions after the september 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks,” New England
Journal of Medicine 345, no. 20 (2001): 1507–1512; Jeremy e. Uecker, “religious and
spiritual responses to 9/11: evidence from the Add Health study,” Sociological Spectrum
28 (2008): 477–509.
14. Uecker analyzed the influence of september 11 on the religious and spiritual lives
of young protestant and Catholic adults in the United states. He found that the attacks
exerted only modest and short-lived effects on various aspects of young adults’ religios-
ity and spirituality. Based on this nationally representative study, Uecker concluded that
no remarkable “religious revival” occurred after september 11. Because of small sample
sizes, muslims—among other religious groups—were not included in the analysis. see
Uecker, “religious and spiritual responses to 9/11.”
15. “Transcript of president Bush’s Address.” CNN.com, september 21, 2001, avail-
able at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/Us/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/ (accessed January
31, 2010).
16. Darren W. Davis, Negative Liberty: Public Opinion and the Terrorist Attacks on
America (new york: russell sage Foundation, 2007), 201.
17. Bakalian and Bozorgmehr, Backlash 9/11.
18. Wahiba Abu-ras, Ali Gheith, and Francine Cournos, “The imam’s role
in mental Health promotion: A study at 22 mosques in new york City’s muslim
Community,” Journal of Muslim Mental Health 3 (2008): 155–176.
19. Arwa Gunja, “Give religion a Home at nyU,” Washington Square News,
February 8, 2005, 4.
20. Wahiba Abu-ras and soleman H. Abu-Bader, “The impact of the september
11, 2001, Attacks on the Well-Being of Arab Americans in new york City,” Journal of
Muslim Mental Health 3 (2008): 217–239.
21. louise A. Cainkar, Homeland Insecurity: The Arab American and Muslim
American Experience after 9/11 (new york: russell sage Foundation, 2009).
22. Geneive Abdo, Mecca and Main Street: Muslim Life in America after 9/11 (new
york: Oxford University press, 2006), 2–3.
23. Kristin Hanley, “panel examines islam in media,” Washington Report on Middle
East Affairs (november 2002): 84–90.
Notes to Chapter 7 / 201
24. lori peek, “Becoming muslim: The Development of a religious identity,”
Sociology of Religion 66, no. 3 (2005): 215–242.
25. Jennifer l. Bryan, “Constructing ‘the True islam’ in Hostile Times: The impact
of 9/11 on Arab muslims in Jersey City,” in Wounded City: The Social Impact of 9/11, ed.
nancy Foner (new york: russell sage Foundation, 2005), 133–159.
26. Cainkar, Homeland Insecurity.
27. Bryan, “Constructing ‘the True islam’ in Hostile Times”; Haddad, Not Quite
American?
28. it is important to note that the contention that God commands wearing the hijab
is by no means universally accepted by all muslims or all islamic scholars. Jane smith
argues that “the Qur’an, despite what some muslim women [and men] seem to think,
does not actually specify exactly how much of the body has to be covered.” see smith,
Islam in America, 108.
29. muslim public Affairs Council, “The impact of 9/11 on muslim American
young people: Forming national and religious identity in the Age of Terrorism and
islamophobia” (report, muslim public Affairs Council, Washington, DC, 2007).
ChapTer 7
1. michael Welch, Scapegoats of September 11th: Hate Crimes and State Crimes in the
War on Terror (new Brunswick, nJ: rutgers University press, 2006).
2. For discussions regarding the need for more systematic investigations of blame
and scapegoating, see David m. neal, “Blame Assignment in a Diffuse Disaster situation:
A Case example of the role of an emergent Citizen Group,” International Journal of
Mass Emergencies and Disasters 2 (1984): 251–266; Brenda phillips with mindy ephraim,
“living in the Aftermath: Blaming processes in the loma prieta earthquake” (Working
paper #80, natural Hazards research and Applications information Center, University
of Colorado, Boulder, 1992).
3. Anny Bakalian and mehdi Bozorgmehr, Backlash 9/11: Middle Eastern and
Muslim Americans Respond (Berkeley: University of California press, 2009), 13.
4. For an excellent comparison of communal response to natural disasters, techno-
logical accidents, and terrorist attacks, see Krzysztof Kaniasty and Fran H. norris, “social
support in the Aftermath of Disasters, Catastrophes, and Acts of Terrorism: Altruistic,
Overwhelmed, Uncertain, Antagonistic, and patriotic Communities,” in Bioterrorism:
Psychological and Public Health Interventions, ed. r. J. Ursano, A. e. norwood, and C. s.
Fullerton (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2004), 200–229.
5. Thomas e. Drabek and enrico l. Quarantelli, “scapegoats, villains, and Disasters,”
Trans-action 4 (1967): 12–17.
6. ibid., 12.
7. ibid., 12.
8. This statement is
not meant to imply that “natural disasters” are wholly “natural”
events. in fact, consensus within the scientific community is that all disasters are in large
measure a consequence of human action or, all too often, inaction. yet, regardless of how
scientists conceptualize disaster, the pervasive view of natural disasters is that they are
inevitable. To wit, the general public continues to see natural disasters as random, tragic
acts of God or nature.
202 / Notes to Chapter 7
9. Kaniasty and norris, “social support in the Aftermath of Disasters, Catastrophes,
and Acts of Terrorism.”
10. Drabek and Quarantelli, “scapegoats, villains, and Disasters,” 13.
11. Kai T. erikson, A New Species of Trouble: The Human Experience of Modern
Disasters (new york: W. W. norton, 1994), 142.
12. ibid.
13. rue Bucher, “Blame and Hostility in Disaster,” American Journal of Sociology 62,
no. 5 (1957): 467–475.
14. J. stephen Kroll-smith and stephen robert Couch, The Real Disaster Is Above
Ground: A Mine Fire and Social Conflict (lexington: University press of Kentucky, 1990),
170.15. ibid., 170.
16. in their meta-analysis of disaster mental health research, Fran norris and col-
leagues found that survivors of mass violence were far more likely to experience severe
psychological impairment than other disaster-affected populations. specifically, they
report that 67 percent of samples that experienced mass violence were severely or very
severely impaired, compared to 39 percent of those assessed after technological disasters
and 34 percent of those assessed after natural disasters. see Fran H. norris, matthew J.
Friedman, and patricia J. Watson, “60,000 Disaster victims speak: part ii. summary
and implications of the Disaster mental Health research,” Psychiatry 65, no. 3 (2002):
240–260.
17. Fran H. norris, matthew J. Friedman, patricia J. Watson, Christopher m. Byrne,
eolia Diaz, and Krzysztof Kaniasty, “60,000 Disaster victims speak: part i. An empirical
review of the empirical literature, 1981–2001,” Psychiatry 65, no. 3 (2002): 207–239.
18. ibid.
19. Kaniasty and norris, “social support in the Aftermath of Disasters, Catastrophes,
and Acts of Terrorism.”
20. The White House, “press Briefing by Ari Fleisher,” september 12, 2001, avail-