ISIS

by Jessica Stern

  Iraq had erupted into civil war, and the allied mission quickly changed from combat to nation-building. When the mission changed direction, President Bush appointed L. Paul Bremer as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Bremer’s first major decisions would prove critical to the subsequent destabilization of Iraq: disbanding the military, and firing all members of Saddam Hussein’s ruling Ba’ath Party from civil service positions.

  More than 100,000 Sunni Ba’athists were removed from the government and military, leaving them unemployed, angry, and for the military personnel, armed.30 Lieutenant General Jay Garner warned that the policy rendered a large number of educated and experienced Iraqis “potential recruits for the nascent insurgency.”31 One particularly important function impacted by the purge was the Iraqi border patrol. The weakened force provided little resistance to the dramatic flow of foreign fighters into the country.32

  Zarqawi was there to seize the opportunity.

  ZARQAWI RISES

  Zarqawi’s career as a terrorist had been largely marked by failure and frustration, but the American invasion galvanized him to action and created an environment suitable for his brutal tactics and rabid sectarianism.

  The Sunni and Shi’a branches of Islam had split soon after the death of Muhammad over the issue of who should succeed the Prophet of Islam as leader of the Muslims, or caliph. Sunnis believe that the caliph can be chosen by Muslim authorities. Shi’ites believe that the caliph must be a direct descendant of the Prophet through his son-in-law and cousin Ali.

  Over generations, the separation had led to doctrinal differences and, at times, open sectarian conflict or war, although there were equally long periods of peace and cooperation. Today, sectarian tensions are intensely mixed with local and regional politics.

  Under the rule of Saddam Hussein, a Sunni Muslim, Iraq’s Shi’a majority had been persecuted, massacred by the thousands, and denied political participation. After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, some of the Shi’a had risen up against Hussein, expecting support from the West, only to be crushed by the regime, resulting in tens of thousands of casualties.

  “That’s when the Hussein regime became far more sectarian and placed a lot of restrictions on Iraqi Shi’a, their religious institutions and leaders, and on Shi’a pilgrims who once came to the country,” said Phillip Smyth, who studies Shi’a and Iranian politics and extremism in the region. “Plus, his regime became far more tribally based, meaning he was using Sunnis mainly from the Tikrit area.”33

  The U.S. invasion and subsequent efforts to institute a democratic system in Iraq had elevated the long-suppressed Shi’a into political power, while de-Ba’athification had simultaneously disenfranchised thousands of Sunnis.

  The change also represented a significant shift for U.S. interests and relationships in the region. Ever since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which had installed a Shi’a theocracy fueled by anti-American sentiment, most U.S. allies in the Middle East were ruled by explicitly Sunni regimes.

  “The elected officials of Iraq’s post-war government are the first Shi’a leaders that the United States has had any direct and meaningful contact with since the Iranian revolution,” wrote Vali Nasr, in his book The Shia Revival, arguing that America had imagined Sunni democracies would rise in the wake of its intervention and was ill-prepared for the religious politics that followed.

  Postwar Iraq was a recipe for sectarian conflict even without Zarqawi to stir the pot, but he wasted little time exploiting the opening.

  In August 2003, Zarqawi’s men bombed a UN mission center and the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad, setting a rapidly increasing pace of violence. At the end of August, he struck an important Shi’a mosque with a suicide bomber, killing at least ninety-five people, including Zarqawi’s primary target, Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al Hakim, one of the most prominent and beloved Shi’a clerics in Iraq.34

  Despite the tensions between Zarqawi and bin Laden, in 2004 Zarqawi finally declared bayah (allegiance) to bin Laden and announced the creation of a new jihadist movement: Tanzim Qaedat al Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn, or al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, a reference to the fact that the Tigris and the Euphrates converge in Iraq.35 It became more commonly known in the West simply as al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI. Aaron Zelin, a leading authority on al Qaeda and ISIS, described the affiliation as a “marriage of convenience,”36 rather than a meeting of minds.

  Over the next few months Zarqawi and his new group continued to sow discord and attract international attention. Suicide bombings became a trademark tactic, leading to a reprimand from his spiritual mentor, Maqdisi.37

  Foreign fighters also flocked to join AQI in large numbers, many of them passing through established smuggling routes in Syria. Most originated in Saudi Arabia, with significant numbers from Libya, Yemen, elsewhere in North Africa, and Syria. The Syrian regime made a show of trying to crack down on the cross-border trafficking, to little effect. “For every example of co-operation from Syria, there are an equal number of incidents that are not helpful,” a U.S. intelligence officer told one reporter.38

  Zarqawi and AQI also used the Internet to market their cause in a way that al Qaeda Central had never quite mastered. Under pressure from counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al Qaeda Central’s media output was devolving into long, boring videos of bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, bin Laden’s deputy, lecturing about the jihadi cause; Zarqawi and AQI, in contrast, began to release violent video clips of terrorist attacks and beheadings and distribute them online. (See Chapter 5.)39

  Despite his pledge of bayah, Zarqawi continued to act independently of al Qaeda Central, and he pursued a strategy sometimes at odds with bin Laden’s approach. Most central to the dispute were the related issues of takfir and the use of extreme savagery as a weapon.

  Takfir, the pronouncement of someone as an unbeliever, and therefore no longer a Muslim, is a matter of great gravity in Islam.40 Among jihadists, such a ruling is understood as a blanket permission to kill the subject or subjects as apostate.

  Bin Laden was deeply troubled by jihadi groups that targeted Muslim civilians. Many letters seized from bin Laden’s lair in Abbottabad when he was killed in May 2011 emphasize his frustration with regional groups that were undisciplined in their targeting. He urged his subordinates in al Qaeda to avoid domestic attacks that caused Sunni Muslim civilian casualties, pushing them to focus instead on targeting America.41 Bin Laden was serious about the matter; he had revoked his support of the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria in 1996 because of the group’s “worrying ideology.”42

  Zawahiri, who would subsequently take charge of al Qaeda after bin Laden’s death, tried to rein in Zarqawi’s bloody practices. In a 2005 letter, Zawahiri warned the al Qaeda in Iraq leader that he was far too free in his targeting of Muslim civilians and too prone to display “scenes of slaughter.”43

  Zarqawi reluctantly implemented some of Zawahiri’s advice. But what the senior leader saw as weakness and excess, the younger man and his followers understood as design. He found ideological support for his preexisting tendency in an important jihadi text by an ideologue known as Abu Bakr Naji (a pseudonym).

  Written in 2004, the 113-page tract in Arabic was titled Idarat al Tawahhush, or in English, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Ummah Will Pass. Attributed to an al Qaeda division devoted to research and analysis, it had been posted online to one of the earliest jihadist Internet forums, known as al Ekhlas, which is now defunct. It was translated into English in 2006 by noted scholar of political Islam Will McCants and released by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.44

  The Management of Savagery was a compilation of lessons learned from previous jihadist failures, as well as an advancement in thinking about the movement’s future direction. It outlined stages of the jihadist struggle including:

  •Disruption and exhaustion: In which terrorist attacks damage the economy of enemy powers and demoralize their populations.
>
  •Management of Savagery: A phase of violent resistance with an emphasis on carrying out acts of highly visible violence, intended to send a message to both allies and enemies.

  •Empowerment: The establishment of regions controlled by jihadists which can subsequently grow and unite toward the goal of re-creating the caliphate.45

  Al Naji recommended drawing the United States into a continual series of conflicts in the Middle East to destroy its image of invincibility, and he also endorsed an embrace and wide broadcast of unvarnished violence as a tool to motivate would-be recruits and demoralize enemies.

  Al Naji’s tract was widely read and influenced many, perhaps nowhere more than in Iraq. Although al Qaeda in Iraq and its successors were happy to improvise when it suited them, the influence of Management could be clearly seen in both its military and media strategies.46

  The use and depiction of violence are among the most important elements of the strategy:

  Those who have not boldly entered wars during their lifetimes do not understand the role of violence and coarseness against the infidels in combat and media battles. . . . The reality of this role must be understood by explaining it to the youth who want to fight. . . . If we are not violent in our jihad and if softness seizes us, that will be a major factor in the loss of the element of strength, which is one of the pillars of the Umma of the Message.47

  Zarqawi was also influenced by another jihadi ideologue, Abu Musab al Suri, whose 1,600-page book, A Call to a Global Islamic Resistance, famously advocated “leaderless resistance,” the use of so-called lone wolf attacks (see Chapter 3).

  Less discussed were the book’s series of apocalyptic prophecies. Zarqawi published many communiqués that detailed his fulfillment of al Suri’s prophecies (see Chapter 10). These included apocalyptic struggles against the “Persians,” which can be understood as Shi’a or Iranians.48

  Zarqawi had long held an implacable hatred for Shi’a Muslims, predating the publications of al Suri’s book. The two men may have met during the early 1990s, when they were both taking part in jihadist causes in Afghanistan. Many hours of video featuring al Suri’s lectures were distributed widely online.49

  Even as Zarqawi and AQI were sowing discord with their violent, sectarian attacks, in December 2005, Iraqis voted for their first full-term government and parliament.50 In 2006, the newly elected president, Jalal Talabani, a Sunni Kurd who was popular among both Sunnis and Shi’a, was pressured to compromise with Shi’a constituencies by appointing Nuri al Maliki prime minister, replacing another Shi’a politician who was perceived as showing favoritism to Sunni Arabs.51

  At the time, Maliki was also perceived as being the less sectarian option and less beholden to neighboring Iran, which had taken a growing interest in Iraqi politics since the fall of Hussein.52 Both of these expectations were destined to be met by spectacular disappointment.

  ZARQAWI FALLS

  Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s reign of terror had made an impression in Iraq, igniting a cascade of violence as he continued to focus on sectarian targets, over al Qaeda Central’s objections. In February 2006, the al Askari mosque in Samarra was bombed by militants, resulting in severe damage to its structure. AQI did not claim credit for the attack, but a captured member later confessed to orchestrating it. The remains of early Shi’a imams were interred at the mosque, considered a sacred site, and although no one was killed in the attack, it unleashed a wave of back-and-forth sectarian violence. There were dozens of retaliatory attacks on the first day, and thousands killed in the days that followed. The attack was widely seen as precipitating a full-on civil war that threatened the entire nation, portending massive bloodshed to come.53

  Nada Bakos, the CIA officer charged with taking Zarqawi down, was keenly aware of the missteps that had made her target into a clear and present danger to the ongoing stability of Iraq. Writing in Foreign Policy, she said:

  The war in Iraq provided al Qaeda with a new front for its struggle with the West. . . . The United States didn’t “face down” al Qaeda in Iraq; it inadvertently helped Zarqawi evolve from a lone extremist with a loose network to a charismatic leader of al Qaeda.54

  In June 2006, the efforts of Bakos and countless others were realized in an air strike that killed Zarqawi. There was optimism that the death of Zarqawi would change the situation on the ground in Iraq. The hope was that by taking out AQI’s top leaders—a strategy ironically known as decapitation—the organization would collapse.

  In its briefing on the attack, the Defense Department released a photo of Zarqawi’s corpse, a miscalculation when dealing with a movement that glorifies martyrdom and has no inhibitions about images of death. Within twenty-four hours, al Qaeda’s online supporters were using the photo of Zarqawi’s dead body in online banners, videos, and tributes to his martyrdom.55 (The lesson was taken to heart in 2011 when Osama bin Laden was killed; no photos were released, and the body was secretly buried at sea.)

  Zawahiri issued a statement eulogizing Zarqawi, commending him for his commitment to the cause and praising the great services he had done as a servant of al Qaeda.56 He also used the eulogy as an opportunity to call for AQI to establish an Islamic state. Within a few months, a coalition of jihadist insurgents known as the Mujahideen Shura Council announced the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The council’s formation had stemmed in part from AQI’s recognition that it could not simply compete against other jihadist factions in its sphere of influence, and that at least some appearance of accommodation was needed.57 Zarqawi’s successor as head of AQI, Abu Hamza al Muhajir, a seasoned Egyptian fighter, pledged loyalty to ISI, and its newly appointed leader, Abu Omar al Baghdadi, about whom little is known.58

  Brian Fishman, who closely followed al Qaeda in Iraq as a fellow with the New America Foundation, wrote that for a time, Zawahiri’s influence took hold. The ISI distanced itself from the sectarian slaughter and committed to the goals Zawahiri had sent to Zarqawi:59

  Establish an Islamic authority or emirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate—over as much territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq, i.e., in Sunni Arab areas, is [sic] in order to fill the void stemming from the departure of the Americans, immediately upon their exit and before un-Islamic forces attempt to fill this void.60

  Zawahiri would come to regret some of that advice.

  Despite its “clean slate,” ISI continued to target civilians, even as violence soared from multiple directions. In December 2006, an average of 53 civilians were killed every twenty-four hours.61 In response to the growing levels of violence, U.S. General David Petraeus led a “surge” of U.S. troops into Iraq with the goal of securing the Iraqi population against the attacks carried out by ISI and other violent militant groups. This required not only an increase in the number of troops, but an entirely new strategy.

  Instead of consolidating U.S. troops on big bases and handing the job as quickly as possible to Iraqi forces, General Petraeus sent the troops into the neighborhoods most affected by jihadi violence. Once the Iraqi people realized the troops were there to protect them they started to tell U.S. forces, by the general’s account, “Here, let us tell you where the bad guys are, because we want them out of our neighborhood.”62

  The key to recruiting Sunni Arabs to join the fight against al Qaeda was to reassure them that they would be safe, according to Petraeus. He also had to persuade his own commanders to work with former insurgents who had earlier been targeting U.S. forces.

  Over time, tens of thousands of former insurgents joined the fight to secure their communities against violence, as part of the so-called Sunni Awakening, or Sons of Iraq.63 The Awakening Movement was a critical part of the effort to defeat AQI. Aside from their own revulsion at the al Qaeda affiliate’s gory tactics and indiscriminate slaughter, militia members were enticed by the promise that some would be integrated into the Iraqi army and local police forces on a permanent basis. But many were skeptical of these promises, and
their skepticism would prove prescient.64

  The surge achieved its goals, if only temporarily. By 2008, al Qaeda and other violent militants no longer overran the country and the situation stabilized. Relations among the various religious and ethnic communities had greatly improved, as had the economy. In 2008, Maliki surprised observers by sending the Iraqi military against powerful Shi’a militias—which had also opposed the U.S. occupation—in Basra and the Sadr City section of Baghdad, temporarily easing concerns of sectarian favoritism.65

  “It was a new atmosphere and it was full of promise,” wrote Zaid Al-Ali, author of The Struggle for Iraq’s Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy.66 “U.S. officials, state security services, tribal forces, and some armed groups had forged an agreement to work together against the most extreme groups terrorizing Iraq’s population. The major roads in those areas were lined with the flags of the Awakening Councils, and local fighters had decided to protect ordinary Iraqis from al Qaeda.”67

  But in 2010, Maliki’s State of Law coalition failed to win a clear majority of the seats in parliament, endangering his position as prime minister. A series of political maneuvers ensued, some of which were questionably legal.

  Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. ambassador to Iraq from 2005 to 2009, believes that Maliki turned to Iran for support to keep his position.68 Phillip Smyth agrees, saying Maliki’s coalition was boosted by the addition of Iranian proxies such as the Badr Organization, an outgrowth of Iranian-armed and -funded militias dating back to the 1980s. The organization’s reward for supporting Maliki was a voice in government, including the appointment of one of its members as Iraq’s minister of the interior.69

  Khalilzad believes that pressure from Iran is what led Maliki to insist that U.S. forces leave in 2011, a turning point in the sectarian dimension of Iraqi politics. The timing of the exit was initially negotiated by the Bush administration. The Obama administration proposed an extension, but negotiations with the Iraqi government broke down.70 When the United States withdrew its troops in 2011, it also withdrew its “influence and its interest,” according to Ryan Crocker, U.S. ambassador to Iraq from 2007 to 2009.71