ISIS

by Jessica Stern

  The Muslim Brotherhood was an organization composed of both liberals and ultraconservatives. Its influence over ultraconservatives outside the movement expanded when a subset of its members fled the persecution of the Egyptian government and migrated to Saudi Arabia during the 1960s and 1970s. A number of these refugees became teachers, and injected their political engagement into Saudi Arabia’s more quietist Salafism.24 At the same time, the oil boom of the 1970s ensured that the Saudi Arabian government had the funds to spread Salafism—now influenced by these politically oriented thinkers from Egypt—throughout the region via a far-reaching network of schools and institutions.25 By the 1980s and 1990s a distinctly conservative and political strand of Salafism had taken root in Saudi Arabia and the greater region; still concerned with ensuring the purity of Islam, this faction believed that doing so required engaging in political action and overthrowing corrupt regimes that threatened Islam.

  Political Salafis didn’t claim to be as religiously knowledgeable or sophisticated as the quietist Salafis; their authority was based, instead, on their political analysis of the modern world.26 In articulating their position, they drew on the thinking of Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), who had been influenced by both Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Abd al Wahhab.27 Debates about whether or not Qutb was really Salafi still persist, but there is no question that he spoke a language understood by both the quietist Salafis from Saudi Arabia and the political Salafis from Egypt. He was, as a result, a central figure in both the growing political Salafi movement and the nascent jihadi Salafi movement that soon followed.28 Interestingly, Qutb’s younger brother was among those who emigrated from Egypt to Saudi Arabia. Like many of his colleagues, he secured a teaching position once in Saudi Arabia and offered lectures that were sometimes attended by a young Osama bin Laden.29

  JIHADI SALAFISM

  The jihadi faction coalesced in large part due to the 1980s war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The war functioned, unfortunately, as a “dangerous incubator” in which Salafis from across the region came into contact—sometimes on actual battlefields; sometimes in military training camps—with radicalized groups that believed violence could be a solution to some of the problems confronting the Muslim world.30 Like both the quietist and political Salafis, the jihadi Salafis were concerned about the corruption of Islam and the oppression of the Muslim world. This faction also accepted that the quietists were more knowledgeable about Islam, but they were concerned that the symbiotic relationship between the quietists and the governments (for example, the relationship between the Wahhabi religious establishment and the Saudi Arabian government) had corrupted the religious leadership. They believed, moreover, that it was acceptable to use violence to respond to this crisis.31

  SALAFISM, WAHHABISM, AND ISIS

  By the late twentieth century Salafism had quietist, political, and jihadi factions. Additionally, Wahhabism had managed to “co-opt the language and symbolism of Salafism . . . until the two had become practically indistinguishable.”32 As a result, when analysts, academics, and journalists writing today say that ISIS is following Salafi principles, what they mean is that ISIS’s ideology contains elements of both Salafism and Wahhabism. And when they say that the movement is following Wahhabi principles, they mean the same thing.33 That said, mentioning Wahhabism unquestionably evokes the thought of Saudi Arabia given the long-standing relationship between the Wahhabi religious authorities and the Saudi Arabian government. As a result, describing the movement as Wahhabi is a subtle reference to the fact that Saudi Arabia has been an influential champion of Salafism. It suggests, in a sense, that Saudi Arabia is responsible for movements such as ISIS because of the role that the Saudi Arabian government has played in facilitating the spread of Salafism across the region.34

  Importantly, while today’s Salafis share a set of core beliefs—about monotheism, about the corrupting threat posed by human interpretation, and about the importance of returning to a pure and authentic Islam—the movement is wholly decentralized. Salafism has no official leaders, and individuals are empowered to trust their own understandings of the Quran and sunnah. This simultaneous marginalization of religious scholars and authorization of the individual has, according to scholars like Khaled Abou El Fadl, resulted in a crisis of authority.35 As a result, there is space within Salafism for both increasingly radical interpretations of Islam and the popular embrace of self-proclaimed experts with little to no training in Islamic law (to include a number of prominent leaders within organizations like al Qaeda and ISIS). There are, consequently, significant differences not only between the major factions of Salafism, but also between individuals and groups within the same faction. While knowing that a group is jihadi (and not quietist or political) is important to understanding the group’s commitments, it is still necessary to look closely at the group’s specific beliefs and practices.

  DECLARING WAR: THE PRACTICE OF JIHADI SALAFISM

  Making sense of the disagreements between jihadi Salafi movements requires looking closely at both justifications for engaging in war and accepted practices within war. In doing so, we cannot offer the thinking of “all Salafis” because the movement is diverse and fragmented; nor can we summarize the thinking of “all jihadi Salafis” given that there are clear disputes between groups like al Qaeda and ISIS. We can, however, highlight the issues that separate the non-violent Salafi population from violent Salafi movements like al Qaeda and ISIS. And we can bring to the fore the different interpretations that create conflicts between these jihadi groups.

  TAKFIR

  One issue that is central to these disagreements is that of takfir. To declare a person a nonbeliever is, in Islam, a matter of great significance and the process for doing so is known as takfir (the “pronouncement that someone is an unbeliever and no longer Muslim”).36 There is, as a result, considerable debate among Salafis over when invoking takfir is appropriate. The quietist and political Salafis typically refrain from using takfir, even in the case of dictators ruling corrupt regimes. In fact, the quietists adhere to a “high evidentiary threshold” that makes it quite difficult to use takfir.37 In many instances they do this by differentiating action from belief. They concede that you might accuse a person of engaging in heretical acts, but they maintain that this fails to establish that the person is not Muslim because—unless this person claims that the heretical act is Islamic or in some way superior to Islam—there is simply no way to know what the person believes.38 This high standard functions as a check against rampant accusations of apostasy; because it is difficult to know what a person is thinking, it is difficult to demonstrate that a person is a nonbeliever. Unfortunately, this also makes it difficult to denounce terrorists in a black and white way that might be appealing; the terrorists might be accused of committing acts of apostasy, but without a thorough investigation they cannot be labeled as nonbelievers or said to be no longer Muslim.

  Unlike the quietist and political factions, the jihadi faction has adopted a more expansive use of takfir. Groups in this faction have demonstrated little tolerance for pluralism, and prefer instead to effectively excommunicate those who fail to embrace their interpretation of Islam. They argue that a ruler’s refusal to heed the warnings of scholars (that is, warnings that the ruler or government is engaged in un-Islamic practices) is evidence of corrupt belief.39 In other words, they argue that if the ruler’s actions are un-Islamic then his beliefs must also be un-Islamic. One important consequence of this interpretation is that the religious trials required by the quietists play a smaller role for jihadi Salafi groups like ISIS. Actions, it seems, offer sufficient insight to justify declaring an individual an apostate. This doesn’t mean, however, that there is no evidentiary requirement. As one scholar noted, most of today’s jihadi Salafis believe that “proper evidence must be presented” to sustain the charge of apostasy.40 The barrier to using takfir isn’t wholly removed; it is, though, considerably lower for jihadi Salafis than for quietist or political Salafis.

  This more
radical approach to takfir has clear roots in the positions articulated by Ibn Abd al Wahhab. It can also, however, be traced to the early twentieth century Indo-Pakistani Islamic scholar Sayyid Abu’l A’la Mawdudi (d. 1979). Mawdudi argued that the world was experiencing a modern jahiliyyah—a period of ignorance; “a government system, ideology, or institution based on values other than those referring to God”—that threatened Islam.41 He argued that it was the duty of true Muslims to respond to this crisis by fighting against the influence of the heretical individuals that undermined Islam.42 For Mawdudi, it was critically important to differentiate between believers and nonbelievers. In separating the two, he argued that those whose behavior was not wholly Islamic were nonbelievers.43 In other words, Mawdudi believed that much of the Muslim world was ruled and inhabited by nonbelievers, and that devout Muslims were obligated to change these circumstances. Mawdudi was read extensively by Qutb who agreed that the world was experiencing a modern jahiliyyah, accepted that much of the Muslim world was ruled and inhabited by nonbelievers, and embraced the idea that Muslims were obligated to respond to this crisis.44 Unlike Mawdudi, though, Qutb concluded that this obligation must take the form of militant jihad.

  JIHAD

  Jihad is an incredibly complex term. In the Quran, it is used to “refer to the act of striving to serve the purposes of God on this earth.”45 In some instances this might mean struggling to be a good person; in other instances this might mean fighting on a battlefield. The word has, as a result, been used to capture a wide spectrum of behaviors ranging from spiritual struggle (sometimes referred to as greater jihad) to armed conflict (sometimes referred to as lesser jihad). In the context of jihadi Salafism, jihad most frequently refers to physical warfare or armed struggle. It is this particular definition of jihad that Mawdudi and Qutb were invoking, and it is the call to this type of jihad that they split over. Mawdudi didn’t object to violence on principle and much of his project does sound revolutionary.46 In fact, though, he advocated for a methodical approach to reform and preferred political solutions to violent ones. He maintained that only a government could declare a jihad, he insisted that it be an option of last resort, and he suggested that it could only be pursued when there was some assurance of victory.47 His was a decidedly moderate approach to jihad. Qutb, by contrast, adopted a more aggressive approach. He criticized the idea that corrupt governments could be changed from within the system and instead advocated for revolution. However, he understood militant jihad to be merely part of the solution and he insisted that it be coupled with an internal re-education.48 He did not—notwithstanding his reputation as the founder of modern jihadism—advocate for indiscriminate violence. Qutb’s argument was popular and influential as he offered his readers a compelling and articulate call to jihad. He was not, however, alone in this line of thought and a series of increasingly radical thinkers extended this argument (very possibly beyond what Qutb might have accepted).

  An important argument was offered, for example, by Mohammad Abd al Salam Faraj (d. 1982), who wrote in his widely read pamphlet, The Neglected Duty, that “jihad is second only to belief,” a neglected sixth pillar of Islam, and an obligation of every devout Muslim.49 Faraj rejected al Banna and Qutb’s call for education, suggesting that it was no path to change and that militant jihad was the only viable way forward. As Nelly Lahoud, a Senior Associate at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, noted: “Faraj’s treatise essentially argued that military jihad and Islam are one and the same.”50 Faraj argued for a highly deregulated approach to jihad in which individuals acting independently were obligated to attack corrupt regimes. Quietist Salafis have, for some time, rejected the idea of independent jihad and argued that the sanction of a Muslim ruler is necessary to justify jihad; in Saudi Arabia, for example, individual jihad is impermissible and the country’s deradicalization programs take pains to emphasize that “only the legitimate rulers of Islamic states, not individuals such as Osama bin Laden, can declare a holy war.”51 Even al Banna had advocated for a regulated approach to jihad, and so Faraj’s position was quite radical.52 The jihadi Salafi faction has, however, followed Faraj and adopted this less centralized approach to jihad that doesn’t seem to require the sanction of authority.

  DEFENSIVE JIHAD

  A similar position—coupled with a gripping call to action—was articulated by Abdullah Azzam (d. 1989). Writing against the backdrop of the 1980s conflict in Afghanistan, Azzam suggested that the non-Muslim invasion of a Muslim territory created an obligation to engage in jihad even if the threat was not local.53 Azzam essentially shifted the parameters of jihad, transitioning away from Qutb’s focus on corrupt Muslim regimes and towards a new focus on the defense of Muslim lands. This argument was particularly powerful because it framed jihad as defensive. A defensive jihad is understood to be a justified response to an external party invading a Muslim state; in such a situation, Muslims are obligated to respond. Because defense is a widely accepted justification for jihad (few question that there is an obligation to respond to invasion), jihadi Salafis frequently argue that the United States is occupying Muslim lands by maintaining military bases in some Muslim-majority countries. By casting the Americans in the role of invading force, the violent Salafis are able to argue that their response is a defensive jihad and thus justified and obligatory.

  HIJRA

  In addition to framing the jihad in Afghanistan as defensive, Azzam consistently invoked the language of hijra. Hijra is typically understood to be a reference to Muhammad’s migration from Mecca (a city that was in conflict with the new Muslim community) to Medina (a city that welcomed Muhammad and his companions). Using Muhammad as an example, many Muslims have concluded that the only acceptable ways to respond to an un-Islamic environment are jihad (that is, to fight in defense of Islam) and hijra (to flee the un-Islamic environment).54 That said, Fred Donner, a scholar of Islam at the University of Chicago, has noted that a careful examination of the Quran reveals that in some passages hijra is invoked in a way that is almost synonymous with jihad and is associated with “leaving home for the purpose of fighting.”55 This is the meaning that Azzam appears to have been gesturing toward when he suggested that Muslim men were obligated to travel to Afghanistan in order to defend Islam. Azzam also argued that these men did not need to obtain the sanction of political leaders before undertaking jihad; they could, in other words, engage in individual jihad anywhere that Islam was under threat.56 Azzam was, a result of these arguments, quite influential. By invoking both obligations—by explicitly linking jihad and hijra—and by authorizing people to act independently, he laid the groundwork for the flood of foreign fighters that have filled the ranks of groups like ISIS.

  TAKFIR, JIHAD, AND ISIS

  To be clear, the invocation of takfir has no necessary relationship with the decision to engage in jihad. An individual or group might invoke takfir with respect to a corrupt ruler and yet simultaneously believe that militant jihad is only appropriate on rare occasions. The innovation of these jihadi Salafi theorists was to expand the use of takfir while simultaneously describing militant jihad as an individual global obligation. In combination this meant that there were both more justified opportunities for militant jihad and a requirement to participate. Thus this thought—moving through thinkers like Qutb, Faraj, Azzam, and others—significantly influenced jihadi Salafi movements like al Qaeda and ISIS. It influenced Osama bin Laden, who took up the concern with Muslim oppression by non-Muslim parties and radically extended the territory in which jihad was permissible; it was invoked by al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi who expanded the range of viable targets by arguing that it was acceptable to kill both Muslims and non-combatants; and it has shaped the thinking of Ayman al Zawahiri (currently the leader of al Qaeda) who has claimed that to renounce jihad is an act that betrays Islam and deserves death.57 Each of these earlier thinkers, in other words, contributed a small piece to the arguments used to fuel and justify jihad today.

  WAGIN
G WAR: THE JIHADI FACTION ON THE BATTLEFIELD

  Justifying jihad and engaging in jihad are, however, two very different endeavors and important questions remain even in a situation in which a jihad appears to be justified: Who is the appropriate target of the jihad? Are civilian casualties acceptable? Should it be permissible to kill Muslims? What types of violence can be deployed?

  SELECTING A TARGET (NEAR ENEMY AND FAR ENEMY)

  Most jihadi Salafis agree that it is appropriate to use violence to challenge corrupt governments in the Middle East. Beyond this consensus, though, a number of strategic, logistical, and moral issues split the faction. To begin, there is the issue of whom to target. The overwhelming military and police power of today’s Middle Eastern governments were, prior to the Arab Spring, understood to pose serious challenges to those hoping to launch successful revolutions. As a result, some jihadi Salafis conclude that it makes more sense to undermine these governments by targeting the Western countries that support these regimes. This position found a particularly clear articulation in the writings of Zawahiri, who worked with Bin Laden to launch a global jihad in the late 1990s. This approach was not uncontroversial, though, and a number of jihadi Salafis expressed concern that such a move was strategically unsound because it might provoke an overpowering military response from Western nations, and because it might engender anti-Muslim feelings worldwide.58 It is, as a result, possible to think of jihadi Salafism as being divided into two camps: a near-enemy group (committed to the use of violence directly against corrupt Middle Eastern governments; Zarqawi’s al Qaeda in Iraq is an excellent example of this type) and a far-enemy group (committed to the use of violence against Western governments; Bin Laden and Zawahiri’s al Qaeda is an excellent example of this type).