21.Karen Armstrong, Islam (New York: Random House, 2002), 165.
22.Allison Smith, Peter Suedfeld, Lucian Conway, and David Winter, “The Language of Violence: Distinguishing Terrorist from Nonterrorist Groups by Thematic Analysis,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways Toward Terrorism and Genocide 1, no. 2 (2008) http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17467580802590449#.VHwBmTFvr6g.
23.“Suedfeld’s Integrative Complexity Research,” Peter Suedfeld’s Home Page, last updated June 2004, http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~psuedfeld/index2.html; L. Myyry, “Everday Value Conflicts and Integrative Complexity of Thought,” Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 43, no. 5 (2002): 385–95.
24.Jose Liht, “Preventing Violent Extremism Though Value Complexity: Being Muslim Being British,” Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 4 (Winter 2013), http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=jss.
25.“Although the Disbelievers Dislike It,” ISIS video, November 15, 2014.
26.“ADL Report Finds Right Wing Extremist Use Shortwave Radio to Target U.S. Audiences; Asks FCC to Investigate Possible Violation of Regulations,” ADL, http://archive.adl.org/presrele/dirab_41/2655_41.html.
27.“U.S. Designates Al-Manar as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity[;] Television Station Is Arm of Hizballah Terrorist Network,” U.S Department of the Treasury, press release, March 23, 2006, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js4134.aspx.
28.Jillian York, “Terrorists on Twitter,” Slate, June 25, 2014, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/06/isis_twitter_suspended_how_attempts_to_silence_terrorists_online_could_backfire.html.
29.Colby Itkowitz, “State Department Trolls Islamic State Militants on Twitter,” Washington Post, November 18, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/2014/11/18/state-department-trolls-islamic-state-militants-on-twitter/.
30.“Islamic State Group ‘Executes 700’ in Syria,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/islamic-state-group-executes-700-syria-2014816123945662121.html; J. M. Berger, “For Global Jihadist Supporters, Islamic State’s Massacre Wipes Out Any Sympathy Over U.S. Strikes,” IntelWire, August 18, 2014, http://news.intelwire.com/2014/08/for-global-jihadist-supporters-islamic.html.
31.“Full Transcript of Bin Ladin’s Speech,” Al Jazeera, November 1, 2014.
32.Max Fisher, “6 Concrete Policy Ideas for Fixing America’s Drone Dilemma,” Washington Post, February 6, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/02/06/6-concrete-policy-ideas-for-fixing-americas-drone-dilemma/.
33.David Rothkopf, “Coming Clean, with Bloodstained Hands,” Foreign Policy, December 9, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/09/coming-clean-with-bloodstained-hands-senate-torture-report-cia-bush-administration-obama/.
34.George W. Bush, speech at the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC, October 6, 2005, http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/10.06.05.html.
35.For instance, in a 2007 study of public opinion in Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, and Pakistan, conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, majorities in those countries believed that Washington’s primary goal was to dominate the Middle East and weaken Islam and its people. Steven Kull, “Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and Al Qaeda,” Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, April 24, 2007, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/. . ./START_Apr07_rpt.pdf.
36.Thomas Carothers, “Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2003.
37.Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” American Economic Review 96, no. 2 (2006): 50–56, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034613, accessed January 30, 2014. Political scientist Erica Chenoweth found that post-1997, so-called anocracies, weak states between autocracies and democracies, have become most vulnerable to terrorism. However, she reports that terrorism in anocracies is most closely linked to the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. Removing Iraq, Aghanistan, and Pakistan from her data, Chenoweth shows that democracies still remain the most vulnerable to attacks. Erica Chenoweth, “Is Terrorism Still a Democratic Phenomenon?” International Relations 8, no. 32 (Winter 2012): 85–100. Burcu Savun and Brian J. Phillips report a similar idea, that it is not democracy itself but foreign policy that is a risk factor for vulnerability. They find that states involved in international politics, a policy often persued by democracies, are more likely to be targed for a terrorist attack than their less involved counterparts. Burcu Savun and Brian J. Phillips, “Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 6 (2009): 878–904. Robert Pape found that suicide bombers almost always are deployed to fight a military occupation and that they almost always target democracies. Robert Anthony Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). Thomas Carothers believes that democracy promotion was tainted due to the Bush administration’s association of democracy promotion with intervention and regime change, and their failure to put pressure on friendly authoritarian regimes under the pretense of protecting economic and security interests. Thomas Carothers, “U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 5, 2007.
38.Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Prone to Violence: The Paradox of Democratic Peace,” National Interest no. 82 (Winter 2005): 39.
39.The term marries two closely connected ideas. It is liberal because it draws on the philosophical strain, beginning with the Greeks, that emphasizes individual liberty. It is constitutional because it rests on the tradition, beginning with the Romans, of the rule of law. Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1997, 2; Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: Norton, 2007).
40.Zakaria, “The Rise of Illberal Democracy,” 2; Zakaria, The Future of Freedom.
41.Marwan Muasher, The Second Arab Awakening (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014).
42.“Jordan’s King: Fight on ISIS ‘a Third World War,” CBS News, December 5, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/jordan-king-abdullah-on-isis-middle-east-conflict/.
APPENDIX
1.Fred M. Donner, “Muhammad and the Caliphate: Political History of the Islamic Empire Up to the Mongol Conquest,” in The Oxford History of Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 9.
2.Richard W Bulliet, Islam: The View from the Edge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 5.
3.Ibid., 110.
4.Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival (New York: Norton, 2006), 49.
5.Ibid., 57.
6.Ibid., 70.
7.Nelly Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 105.
8.Donner, “Muhammad and the Caliphate,” 31.
9.Ibid., 31–2.
10.Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798–1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 10.
11.Drew Desilver, “World’s Muslim population more widespread than you might think,” Pew Research Center, June 7, 2013; http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/07/worlds-muslim-population-more-widespread-than-you-might-think/.
12.Donner, “Muhammad and the Caliphate,” 7.
13.Ibid.
14.John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 90.
15.Mohammad Abu Rumman, I Am A Salafi (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2014), 43.
16.Hillel Fradkin, “The History and Unwritten Future of Salafism,” Current Trends in Islamic Ideology, 6 (2008): 13.
17.R. Scott Appleby, “Introduction,” in Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East, ed. R. Scott Ap
pleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 3–4.
18.A number of taxonomies have been offered by scholars studying Salafism and this particular language—quietist, political, and jihadi—is adapted from multiple sources. One prominent example of this approach to Salafism can be found in Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006). A similar taxonomy that breaks Salafism into more than three factions has been offered by Mohammad Abu Rumman, I Am a Salafi.
19.Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” 218.
20.Ibid., 221–2.
21.Hasan Al-Banna, “Our Mission,” in Five Tracts of Hasan Al-Banna, trans. Charles Wendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 46.
22.Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction, 109.
23.Ibid.
24.Muslim Brotherhood members fled persecution in Egypt by migrating to a number of countries. Saudi Arabia is singled out principally because its oil wealth made it possible for it to proselytize far beyond its borders thus spreading both political and jihadi Salafism across the region. For an analysis of Salafism in Jordan that discusses a similar pattern of politicization, see Mohammad Abu Rumman, I Am a Salafi.
25.Nasr, The Shia Revival, 155.
26.Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” 225.
27.Ibid., 222.
28.Ibid.
29.Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf, 2006), 79.
30.Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” 225.
31.Ibid., 225–7.
32.Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft (New York: Harper One, 2007), 79.
33.To further complicate the issue, “Wahhabism” is an “outsider’s designation” with a controversial and somewhat derogatory connotation. Individuals that we might describe as practicing Wahhabism are actually more likely to describe themselves as “Salafi” or “Muwahhidun” (typically translated as “unitarian” and understood to be a reference to the “unity and uniqueness of God”). Christina Hellmich, “Creating the Ideology of Al Qaeda: From Hypocrites to Salafi-Jihadists,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (2008): 114; “Tawhid,” in The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
34.For an example of this position, see Ed Husain, “Saudis Must Stop Exporting Extremism: ISIS Atrocities Started With Saudi Support for Salafi Hate,” New York Times, August 22, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/opinion/isis-atrocities-started-with-saudi-support-for-salafi-hate.html.
35.El Fadl, The Great Theft, 76.
36.“Takfir,” in The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, ed. John L. Esposito.
37.Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” 232.
38.Quintan Wiktorowicz, “A Genealogy of Radical Islam,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28 (2005): 77.
39.Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” 233.
40.Ibid., 230.
41.“Jahiliyyah,” in The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, ed. John L. Esposito.
42.Wiktorowicz, “A Genealogy of Radical Islam,” 78.
43.Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 68.
44.El Fadl, The Great Theft, 83.
45.Ibid., 221.
46.Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism, 70.
47.Ibid., 74.
48.Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction, 115–7.
49.Mohammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins, quoted in Quintan Wiktorowicz, “A Genealogy of Radical Islam,” 79.
50.Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction, 123–4.
51.Abdulaziz H. Al-Fahad, “From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism,” New York University Law Review 79, no. 2 (May 2004): 514; Jessica Stern, “Mind over Martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamic Extremists,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (January/February 2010): 99.
52.Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction, 121.
53.Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 7.
54.John L. Esposito, “Contemporary Islam: Reformation or Revolution?” in The Oxford History of Islam, ed. John L. Esposito, 645.
55.Fred Donner, Muhammad and the Believers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 86.
56.Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction, xv.
57.David Bukay, “The Religious Foundations of Suicide Bombings,” Middle East Quarterly 13, no. 4 (Fall 2006), http://www.meforum.org/1003/the-religious-foundations-of-suicide-bombings.
58.Joas Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 72–3.
59.Wiktorowicz, “A Genealogy of Radical Islam,” 87.
60.Ibid., 89.
61.Ibid., 89–90.
62.Ibid., 91.
63.Nasr, The Shia Revival, 94, 96–8.
64.Sabrina Tavernise and Robert F. Worth, “Relentless Rebel Attacks Test Shiite Endurance,” New York Times, September 19, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/19/international/middleeast/19shiites.html.
65.El Fadl, The Great Theft, 247–8.
66.Timothy Furnish, “Beheading in the Name of Islam,” Middle East Quarterly 12, no. 2 (Spring 2005), http://www.meforum.org/713/beheading-in-the-name-of-islam.
67.Hellmich, “Creating the Ideology of Al Qaeda: From Hypocrites to Salafi-Jihadists,” 114.
68.Assaf Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attack,” International Security 33, no. 3 (2009): 59–60.
69.Wiktorowicz, “A Genealogy of Radical Islam,” 93.
70.Mary Anne Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” Atlantic, June 8, 2006, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/.
71.Ayman Zawahiri, “Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi,” trans. Center for Combating Terrorism at West Point, July 9, 2005, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2.
72.William McCants, “Militant Ideology Atlas,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, November 1, 2006, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/militant-ideology-atlas, 8; Joas Wagemakers, “Reclaiming Scholarly Authority: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s Critique of Jihadi Practices,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 7 (July 2011): 526.
73.Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction, 243.
74.Wagemakers, A Quietest Jihadi, 92–3.
75.Ibid., 47.
76.Wagemakers, “Reclaiming Scholarly Authority,” 525–6.
77.Wagemakers, A Quietest Jihadi, 74.
78.Ibid., 83.
79.Ibid.
80.Wagemakers, “Reclaiming Scholarly Authority,” 524.
81.Patrick Cockburn, “ISIS Consolidates,” London Review of Books 36, no. 16 (August 21, 2014), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n16/patrick-cockburn/isis-consolidates.
82.Douglas A. Ollivant and Brian Fishman, “State of Jihad: The Reality of the Islamic War in Iraq and Syria,” War on the Rocks, May 21, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/state-of-jihad-the-reality-of-the-islamic-state-in-iraq-and-syria/.
83.Aaron Y. Zelin, “ISIS is Dead, Long Live the Islamic State,” Washington Institute, June 30, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/isis-is-dead-long-live-the-islamic-state.
84.Ibid.
INDEX
The pagination of this electronic edition does not match the edition from which it was created. To locate a specific entry, please use your e-book reader’s search tools.
al Abadi, Haider, 240
Abadie, Alberto, 255
Abbas, Hassan, 220–21
Abbasid dynasty, 261
Abdullah, king of Jordan, 256
Abu Sayyaf Group, 182, 197
al Adnani, Abu Muhammad,
43, 124
and caliphate announcement, 46, 116–17
“The Islamic State Will Remain,” 105–6, 118
response to Western strikes, 95–96, 97
“This Is the Promise of Allah,” 116–17
al Afghani, Ibrahim, 67, 70
Afghanistan:
al Qaeda in, 53–54, 56, 182
and Day of Judgment, 219
foreign fighters in, 53
ISIS supporters in, 200
Soviet occupation of, 14, 53, 82, 101, 103, 268, 272
training camps in, 16, 54
U.S. invasion of, 17, 18, 56, 57, 65, 103
videos in, 153
Ahrar al Sham, 48–49, 153, 238, 239
al Ali, Zaid, 28
al Askari mosque, Samarra, bombing of (2006), 25
Alawites, 116
Albani (Salafi), 226–27
al Ekhlas, 23
al Fidaa, 68
Algeria:
Islamic State in, 184, 185
protests in, 39
terrorists in, 177, 200, 234
al Hayat Media Center, 86, 113, 119–20
al Hussam, 128
Ali, caliph as descendent of, 20, 258–59
Ali, Abu, 33–34
al Jahad, 67
al Khansa’a, 89, 167
al Khansa’a Brigade, 91
al Manar television station, 246
al Muhajiroun, 183
al Qaeda:
activities of, 55, 59–61
affiliates of, 57–61, 62, 65, 68–69, 143, 179–80, 181, 186, 187–89
in Afghanistan, 53–54, 56, 182
apocalyptic predictions of, 220
and bin Laden, 54, 56, 59, 61
and caliphate, 277
centralized elitism of, 223
diaspora of, 58
emergence of, 54–55
financial support to jihadists from, 16–17
founding of, 233
funding of, 46
on governance, 114
growth of, 55, 94
ideology of, 60, 73, 108, 138, 192, 195
Internet used by, 64–65, 89, 137
ISIS-AQ war, 177–98
ISIS challenges to, 39, 43–44, 157, 180
ISIS Page 39