Don't Tell the Newfoundlanders

by Greg Malone

  Robertson replied: “United Kingdom authorities here did not know of Clutterbuck’s arrival. They were under the impression that he was to be a member of the party accompanying the other person mentioned in your letter. Under the circumstances it would probably be a suitable and gracious act for you to invite Clutterbuck to your dinner.”2

  By way of underlining the need for confidentiality, Burchell added in a following correspondence:

  You will note that … The Fishermen-Workers Tribune is suggesting that Clutterbuck’s visit is for the purpose of conspiring to rush Newfoundland into Confederation.… It is amazing to discover from time to time to what a large section of the people the thought of Confederation is sort of a nightmare hanging over them all the time.…3

  For example, I am enclosing herewith a very interesting editorial which appeared in The Evening Telegram … in which the writer, probably Mr. Jeffrey, the editor of the paper, says: “It is something more than a coincidence that this talk of—or more correctly in some quarters, fears of—Confederation with Canada should crop up so regularly when discussions are held between the Commission and the British or Canadian leaders.4

  Burchell got on well with the governor, Sir Humphrey Walwyn, but he had little understanding of the workings of the Dominions Office in Newfoundland. Clutterbuck was in fact head of Newfoundland Affairs at the office at the time and secretary to Attlee during his visit. Officials in the governments of both Great Britain and Canada in the early 1940s, and even in different departments in the same government, were often ignorant of each other’s affairs. But that situation was about to change. Clutterbuck came to lunch, and Burchell was impressed with him—as, a month later, he was with Attlee too, after their tour of the Island. In September, on the eve of their departure, Burchell wrote again to Robertson:

  I thought Attlee was very adroit in turning aside the issue of confederation.… “Asked [in a press interview] whether he would discuss confederation with Ottawa officials his answer was that he would not take the initiative of raising that or any other question.” You will note that [the Evening Telegram] says that that reply … seems to have turned discussions of his visit away from confederation to the possible return of responsible government.… I find also that, in some quarters at least, Clutterbuck is highly regarded in spite of the fact that he was Secretary of the Amulree Commission.… I take it that Mr. Attlee and Mr. Clutterbuck are both giving a good deal of study and thought to the present form of government and perhaps may evolve some improvement.…

  On the other hand, the fact must be kept in mind, in fairness to the Commissioners, that the people of this country are difficult people to deal with. This country has been so badly governed during the whole period of its history of over four hundred years that I think it is inevitable, and no matter how good a government may be, it is inbred in the people here to be always in revolt against governmental authority.5

  The Newfoundlanders’ well-developed skepticism and spirit of independence were not qualities appreciated by Ottawa, at least not for purposes of assimilation.

  Following this visit, Attlee and Clutterbuck continued to play key roles in British Newfoundland right up to the handover to Canada six years later. In November, Attlee wrote to Governor Walwyn:

  Secret and Personal. Since my return from Newfoundland I have been thinking over my impressions. Although there appears at present to be little or no demand in the Island for any constitutional change while war conditions continue, it is clear that we ought to be turning over in our minds the various possibilities that may arise as soon as the war ends, and I am anxious to make as much progress as possible in working out with the Commission [of Government] an agreed line of policy in order that we not be caught unprepared by events.… The present constitution is the result of a contract with the Newfoundland people which was confirmed by the Newfoundland Act [of 1933], and no matter how strong the case might be on merits, it would not be open to us to vary the terms of this contract of our own volition without the express consent of the other party to the bargain. In other words, if Newfoundland could be regarded as self-supporting and there were a general demand in Newfoundland for the restoration of self-government, it would not be practicable to refuse it.6

  This assessment was an entirely accurate description of Great Britain’s contractual and constitutional obligation to Newfoundland. It is unfortunate that, when he later became prime minister, Attlee would do exactly the opposite and unilaterally “vary the terms” of the original “contract with the people of Newfoundland” and consider the case for Confederation “on its merits.” His reference to “the various possibilities” after the war is a fair warning that the constitutional course in Newfoundland was about to take some curious turns.

  In his reply to Attlee on January 7, Walwyn suggested, after a flight of imperial fancy, what one such meritorious case might be. He also indicated an apparent willingness to stray from the terms of the Newfoundland Act:

  6. It may be that the final solution lies in the political incorporation of this country in a larger unit.

  7. In this connection the possibility of some association with Great Britain on the Northern Ireland pattern should not be ruled out. We do not think that distance any longer precludes such a possibility.

  8. The only other political incorporation which deserves consideration is Confederation with Canada. It may be, as you assert, that confederation is unlikely to be acceptable to public opinion in either country. We feel that on a plebiscite in this country at this time the assertion would be proved true.…

  9. Canada’s present and growing interest in this country, her fear of an increase of United States influence, her desire to acquire the Labrador, are all powerful factors. At no time has our bargaining position been so favourable and it is doubtful if it ever will be so again.7

  That the Dominions Office entertained thoughts of joining Newfoundland to Great Britain along the lines of Northern Ireland, with Newfoundland MPs sitting in the Parliament at Westminster, shows the reach of imperial thinking even in 1943. Walwyn’s casual reference to the British “bargaining position” in relation to Newfoundland suggests the true British perspective. Fully one hundred years after self-government had been granted, Britain still regarded Newfoundland as its own, to possess or dispose of at will.

  Governor Walwyn was wrong in his prognostication on Confederation. The British would have an even better opportunity to “sell” Newfoundland to Canada in 1948, and for a much better price. If conditions were propitious for Confederation in 1943, however, the timing was not. Newfoundland opinion was almost unanimously against any union with Canada. It would be an uphill fight for Canadians to win the hearts and minds of Newfoundlanders and capture the prize of Labrador. There is clear frustration and even resentment in Burchell’s gloomy dispatches to Hugh Keenleyside at External Affairs about his own country’s miserable history on the Island:

  It appears that February 16th is the 9th Anniversary of the Commission of Government. I am enclosing an editorial on the Anniversary which appeared in the Daily News of today’s date. I am also enclosing an article by the Wayfarer in the same paper.

  I do not usually agree with much of what the Wayfarer has to say but I think he pretty nearly hits the nail on the head this time. I do not think the British Government can be at all proud of the fact that they set up this form of Government here. Neither do I think that as Canadians we can take any pride in the fact that there were two Canadians, C.A. Magrath and Stavert, sitting on the Amulree Commission which recommended the doing away with responsible Government and the setting up of the Commission of Government. Nor do I think Canadians can take much pride in the fact that they stood aside when the people of Newfoundland were in the depths of despair in 1933. That was the time, if ever, that we might have been of real help to Newfoundland, and we did nothing except allow two Canadians without any experience or background in constitutional matters to sit in judgment on them.8

  Jack Pickersgill, Prime
Minister Mackenzie King’s private secretary, was listening to Burchell’s lament. He, along with the influential justice minister, Louis St. Laurent, and External Affairs officers R.A. MacKay and Hugh Keenleyside, was much in favour of Canada taking Newfoundland into Confederation, and they consistently pushed the Department of External Affairs in this direction. Pickersgill’s memorandum of May 1943 puts the best face on the situation in Newfoundland and reads like a pep talk to Burchell:

  [Secret] The Canadian attitude to Newfoundland is very like the American attitude to Canada, an amicable indifference coupled with a complete ignorance of local susceptibilities.…

  Assuming that it is of first importance to Canada to maintain and extend our position in Newfoundland after the war and, if possible, to incorporate Newfoundland into Canada, and assuming further that we can only accomplish these ends with the consent of the Newfoundlanders, it is clear that every effort should be made now to win their goodwill, and, equally, that no opportunity should be lost in presenting them in as favourable light as possible to Canadians.

  It is suggested that a programme looking to these ends should be mapped out jointly by Executive Affairs and WIB [Wartime Information Board] and that WIB with discreet assistance from the High Commissioner undertake to implement it.…

  Needless to say, it should all be done unobtrusively and in a simple spirit of neighbourliness, but there should be no doubt that it was being done by Canadians. [Marginal note: Simple like a serpent].9

  In June 1943 a question in the House of Commons in Ottawa from J.W. Noseworthy, MP for South York, about the state of Newfoundland after the war drew this premature and now fateful reply from the ever-cautious Mackenzie King: “If the people of Newfoundland should ever decide they wish to enter the Canadian federation and should make that decision clear and beyond all possibility of misunderstanding, Canada would give most sympathetic consideration to the proposal.”10 In London at the Dominions Office, Clutterbuck observed with interest that “Mr. MacKenzie King’s statement … follows very much the line one would expect.… Reading between the lines this certainly suggests that Canada is now prepared to adopt a more forthcoming attitude than in the past, but I fear that there is little likelihood of the statement influencing Newfoundland opinion.”11

  The Dominions Office was also moving slowly towards formulating its postwar policy on not returning responsible government to Newfoundland. To help it along, the year after his own tour Attlee sent over a “Goodwill Mission” to report back to the UK government and Parliament and to suggest the next constitutional step for the Island. Many in Newfoundland were surprised at the arrival of another fact-finding mission so soon after Attlee and Clutterbuck’s extensive visit. It seemed to them that Newfoundland was getting a lot of attention but very little information or action.

  The Goodwill Mission, composed of Sir Derrick Gunston, Charles Ammon, and A.P. Herbert, arrived in St. John’s in June 1943. Herbert, the Independent member for Oxford University, was a published author, something of a wit, and a highly regarded member of the House. He was also Newfoundland’s champion in the British Parliament for the return of self-government, as promised by the terms of the Newfoundland Act of 1933. As Jim Halley recalled:

  I met Herbert in Corner Brook that summer. I was walking back from a tennis game with Tommy Williams when I saw him across the street. I knew who he was and what he was doing here of course, and introduced myself. We were both staying at the Glynmill Inn so we had lunch together and he asked me: “What do you and your friends see for Newfoundland after the War?” “Oh,” I said, “we’re going with the United States.” “Why do you think that?” he asked. “Well just look around you,” I said, “there’s Americans and American activity and American money all over the Island. We’d be crazy not to go with them.”12

  In St. John’s, Herbert and his colleagues had extensive discussions with Governor Walwyn about the possibility of some form of future elections on the Island. The idea for an elected council, or National Convention, was being discussed in the local papers. Initially suggested by R.B. Job, a prominent Water Street merchant, it appealed to Herbert as a possible mechanism for Newfoundland to request the restoration of responsible government.13 He also had several conversations with Charles Burchell, not all of them satisfactory. On their last encounter, Burchell reported to Norman Robertson: “Herbert and Captain Rowland followed me … and as we were leaving, he put out his hand to say good-bye and told me he was leaving tomorrow. As he was shaking hands with me he said to me, ‘Keep your hands off Newfoundland.’ Somehow or other I managed to keep my Irish temper under control but I could not help making the statement that some of us who lived in the Dominions are trying to build up the British Empire but some people who live in England are trying to break it up. As I was walking away from him I heard him muttering to himself, ‘Canadian banking in Newfoundland and Canadian life insurance companies!’ ”14

  The return of the Goodwill Mission to Britain once again focused the attention of the Parliament of Parliaments on Newfoundland. Many MPs besides Herbert were troubled that the United Kingdom continued to maintain a benevolent dictatorship on the Island. Frustrated with the reasons offered for the continued delay in returning responsible government, Beverley Baxter, the MP for Wood Green and a popular novelist, declared, “We do not give self-government as a prize, as a lollipop. We give it as a command. When Newfoundland owed us money we put in the Commissioners. We have heard it is now paying us money. I should say that we have had on deposit (in war loans) about $10,000,000. Suppose we cannot pay it when the war is over. Will Newfoundland be entitled to send three Commissioners to Britain and close this House? It sounds absurd certainly, but the principle is the same.”15 Bartle Bull, the MP for Enfield, asked Attlee the obvious question that troubled the members: “How in the world without a Parliament in Newfoundland can we find out whether the people of Newfoundland have made a request to Great Britain for Dominion status, or return to self-government or however you wish to put it?”16

  In his final report to Churchill’s War Cabinet on the return of the Goodwill Mission in November 1943, Attlee concluded:

  [Secret] … In view of Newfoundland’s important rôle as a Naval and Air Base we should clearly wish to avoid any disturbance of public opinion which would distract from the war effort.… There should be no change in the present form of Government while the war lasts; as soon as practicable after the end of the war, that is the war in Europe, we must provide machinery … for enabling the Newfoundland people to examine the situation and to express their considered views as to the form of government they desire.… One proposal for the solution of this problem which appeals to me is that made by Mr A.P. Herbert MP, viz., that a national Convention should be set up after the war, composed of members representative of all classes and interests in Newfoundland, and empowered to discuss and determine amongst themselves, with the guidance of a constitutional lawyer from home, the form of government to be recommended both to the Newfoundland people and to the United Kingdom Government.17

  This memo marks the first official mention of the National Convention that Herbert had discussed with Governor Walwyn and others in St. John’s that summer. However, when the terms of reference for the convention were ultimately released by the Dominions Office in December 1945, they included two key changes that, in effect, subverted any intention of returning responsible government to Newfoundland. By then, the British had determined that they must control the constitutional situation in Newfoundland completely.

  The threat of increased American and even Canadian activity displacing Britain in the North Atlantic, as well as some sense of responsibility for their own obligations, eventually drove the Dominions Office to prepare a comprehensive, even generous, policy of reconstruction in Newfoundland. With the international spotlight increasingly focused on the Island, a horrified cry arose from the bowels of the Dominions Office: “There must be no Imperial slum on the back doorstep of the United States.”18 Faced wi
th the failure of direct British rule in the form of the Commission of Government and the de facto rebuilding of Newfoundland around the American bases, Britain felt compelled to announce its own plans to rebuild the country.

  The commissioners in St. John’s were so used to receiving so little from the British Treasury that they were visibly “surprised at the generosity and magnitude of the assistance contemplated” when Lord Cranborne, the dominions secretary, told them at a special meeting in London of his plan to spend £20 million ($100 million) on the Island’s reconstruction. “The Commissioners appeared, however, to be of the opinion that if the scope and purpose of the scheme were to be made public prior to the holding of a referendum on the constitutional issue … the Newfoundland people’s mind would be made up for them in advance and that there was little doubt that there would be an overwhelming vote in favour of a return to responsible Government.”19 The commissioners felt that with such generous financial support, Newfoundlanders would feel comfortable with Responsible Government again and reject Confederation with Canada. The political argument for denying Newfoundland any funds for reconstruction as a necessary condition to induce Newfoundlanders to vote for union with Canada was apparently not recognized by the Dominions Office either in this instance from the Newfoundland commissioners, or later by the Canadians themselves.