by Greg Malone
In no way would Sir Alexander have been so sanguine and trusting of the constitutional arrangements and their outcome if his own country had been sitting at the table to decide its destiny with “neither the authority nor indeed the qualifications to enter into negotiations.”
As the Convention drew close to debate on Canada’s Terms of Union, J.R. Baldwin from the Department of External Affairs held discussions with Norman Robertson, now the Canadian high commissioner in London, and Sir Eric Machtig at the Commonwealth Relations Office (the renamed Dominions Office) on possible constitutional procedures to be followed during the period after the referendum and before Newfoundland officially became a province of Canada. They were ahead of the game and in agreement on two main points. Baldwin reported in a confidential memo to St. Laurent:
That in some fashion, representatives from Newfoundland should be associated with the final drafting and other detailed work required between the referendum and the required date of the union; and …
… [the] Commission of Government might be maintained until after the effective date of union; that during this period a representative group of Newfoundlanders might be called upon to cooperate with the Canadian and U.K. governments in any further drafting of terms of union.”20
It was becoming difficult to find a place for Newfoundlanders in the new Newfoundland. With only a ceremonial role at best in drafting the final terms of union, they would have no meaningful say over Newfoundland’s political arrangements if they co-operated, and even less if they did not.
On November 25, 1947, Scott Macdonald and J.R. Smallwood were shocked by a sudden turn of events. As Macdonald informed St. Laurent:
The local political scene was enlivened a bit yesterday by the launching, through an advertisement in the Daily News, of a new party, to be known as the “Union with America Party,” with the object of securing terms of union from Washington and having them submitted to the people in the forthcoming referendum. It is stated that 112 group heads have been chosen in various parts of Newfoundland and that a drive for membership, which will be open to all Newfoundlanders twenty-one years of age or over, will shortly be launched.
So far as I can ascertain, no one of any prominence is connected with the movement. It has already provoked a strong editorial in today’s Evening Telegram, a copy of which I enclose herewith for your information, together with a copy of the advertisement under reference.21
Announcing. Newfoundland Party for Economic Union with America to be known as the “Union With America Party”
1. Membership open to any man or woman in Newfoundland over 21.
2. A membership drive will be started shortly and will be announced in the local press.
3. A group of 15 local leaders with 112 group heads in various Newfoundland outports are now forming plans; other group heads are required.
4. The terms from Washington must be obtained as were the terms from Ottawa.
5. The American Republican Party will be asked to support the aims of the NEWFOUNDLAND UNION WITH AMERICA PARTY.…
6. If the PEOPLE of this country do desire to find out the terms of U.S. Union then why is it not being put on the ballot paper? GIVE THE PEOPLE ALL THE FACTS—WE WANT THE AMERICAN TERMS. ALL NEWFOUNDLANDERS ARE ASKED TO JOIN THIS PARTY. NEWFOUNDLANDERS, WAKE UP TO YOUR DESTINY … BECOME A MEMBER OF “THE UNION WITH AMERICA PARTY.”22
Of all the threats to Confederation, the possible union of Newfoundland with the United States was the greatest. There were hundreds of thousands of Newfoundlanders living and working in New York and Boston, more than there were in Newfoundland itself. In 1895 the large Newfoundland-Boston community of some 30,000 had been outspoken against Newfoundland joining Canada, and all for her coming in with the United States.23 Now, with thousands of American service personnel in Newfoundland, the threat was even more immediate. The Canadians might harass the British to eliminate the Commission of Government as a choice on the referendum ballot and insist that it and the responsible government option be stripped of any financial backing whatsoever, but what they feared most was to have union with America on the ballot in any form. If the Union With America Party could successfully link responsible government and Newfoundland independence with a political union or economic link to the United States, then Smallwood and company feared that Confederation would be finished.
The Canadian terms were finally delivered to Convention chairman McEvoy on November 6, 1947, in the middle of the debate on the report on the Island’s economic condition. Scott Macdonald’s memo on Smallwood’s speech is worth reading for what it reveals about the perils of propaganda. The report found, as expected, that Newfoundland was in excellent economic condition with a large cash surplus, none of which suited the Confederate cause or the Confederate candidate:
Unfortunately Mr. Smallwood … leaves the impression that he is deliberately and for his own purposes endeavouring to paint conditions as darker than they really are.…
Mr. Hollett (Grand Falls), who opened the debate, scored neatly at the expense of Mr. Smallwood. Referring to his attack on Major Cashin the previous day he quoted very effectively from Mr. Smallwood’s book on Newfoundland written in 1930 in the same period when Mr. Cashin was Minister of Finance.
“The Newfoundland note, then, is distinctly one of hope. The country has put its worse behind it. The future is most promising. This march to industrialism is no flash in the pan. Newfoundland is round the corner. Much remains to be done to make conditions ideal, it is true, but the encouraging fact is that much of it is being done. And after all, when all is said, where is the other country in which life is so comparatively free and easy, where men live so easily in health and happiness as in Newfoundland? One has only to witness the bread-lines in front of hospitals and various charitable institutions, and see the vast crowds of hungry unemployed men in New York and other American and Canadian cities, and read of the same terrible conditions in every country of Europe, to appreciate just how well off we really are in Newfoundland.… Those of us who are interested in the great changes that are coming over Newfoundland, and who have also some contact with the industrial life of the United States and Canada, have one fervent hope, and that is that, with the coming of modern industrialism to Newfoundland, we may never lose the fresh bloom of that wholesome life which constitutes much of the charm of our country.”
Macdonald concluded with some amusement, if not pleasure: “Rarely can a man have been more neatly hoist with his own petard.”24
But Smallwood would not be put off by history, his own or anyone else’s, and he was now out to prove the opposite true. He positioned himself in front of one of the microphones in the Convention Chamber and made full use of it. He always timed his major speeches for prime-time radio listening and dominated sessions with a steady stream of propaganda for Confederation. When the Convention finally turned to a discussion of the Canadian Terms of Union, Smallwood took to the floor to sell them, not to the delegates in the Convention but to the Newfoundlanders listening at home—the voters in the coming referendum. Scott Macdonald was suitably impressed by his performance and, in several dispatches, reported the goings-on in the chamber to Pearson:
The Convention and the country have been treated for a full week to the amazing spectacle of one man without any formal position or authority, dominating by sheer force of personality and a wide and accurate knowledge of Dominion-Provincial relations, the whole discussion. The debate was broadcast and the generally good expositions, interspersed with entertainment in the form of heated verbal duels, must have been of very considerable propaganda value. Indeed at times when interest flagged, Mr. Smallwood appeared deliberately to stir up controversy for this purpose. On one occasion, for example, he threw the Convention into an uproar through deliberately refusing to answer a question put to him by Mr. Higgins, and going so far as even to defy the Chair. He argued, in defence of his stand, that he had already answered the question the previous day, implying that Mr. Higgins hadn’t been
listening attentively and pointing out that in any case Mr. Higgins was, equally with himself, a member of the delegation and it was ridiculous to have to coach him on matters he should have learned at Ottawa. Newfoundland is accustomed to violent, personal abuse of the kind common in Canadian politics half a century ago and such attacks still appear to be good tactics here.…
I have to report that the remainder of the week was taken up with a running criticism of Mr. Smallwood’s hypothetical Provincial budget.25
Mr. Hollett argued that Mr. Smallwood’s estimate of revenue and expenditure was altogether irresponsible and misleading.…26
… Mr. Hickman … took the floor and expressed the view that Mr. Smallwood’s estimate of expenditure was far too low—half a million short in Education; a million short in Public Health; two and one-half million short in Reconstruction and that revenues would fall considerably short of Mr. Smallwood’s optimistic estimate. The new Province, he asserted, would face a deficit of between five and six million per annum in the first four-year period and when the time came for a review of the financial position, would find itself insolvent and forced to dispose of Labrador to Canada.27
Major Cashin … got in some of his oft-repeated assertions respecting the enormous size of the Canadian national debt and the interest charges on it. He claimed, also, that in return for taking over the very small Newfoundland debt Canada would be getting very valuable public utilities. The Major continued by repeating once again his oft-reiterated assertion that when Newfoundland went off the gold standard to save the Canadian Chartered Banks in 1931 the Banks had made some twenty millions of dollars and that in World War II the Bank of Canada had the advantage of using hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars spent in Newfoundland and it was estimated the Bank had made $150,000,000 from this source.28
The only reason Canada wants Newfoundland, said the Major, is for the iron ore and the fifty or sixty million cords of wood in Labrador. By the inclusion of Newfoundland into the federation Canada would be in the position of controlling the entire steel industry of the North American Continent. He then compared the present situation to the sale of Alaska by Russia to the United States for a mere pittance.29
Once again Cashin spoke the truth, but without the proof. Gordon Higgins, one of the delegates to Ottawa, followed Cashin in the debate and was more deferential:
He stated that every courtesy and assistance was extended to the delegation while in Ottawa and that he had nothing but the greatest praise and kindliest feelings for all those he had come into contact with from the Prime Minister down. He felt, however, that the Newfoundland delegation was seriously handicapped in the discussions by lack of knowledge of the many and intricate problems bound up with Confederation. The Canadian representatives, he pointed out, were assisted by some of the top men in the Civil Service of Canada who had had the question under active study since October, 1946, and, in a general way, had been studying it for some years past. The proper approach, he said, was that a complete study of the Canadian system should be made by the various Department heads of the Newfoundland Civil Service to advise on the effect Union would have on Newfoundland and that these experts should confer with a delegation which should have full power to negotiate.
A further point, which he emphasized strongly and which is bound to create a considerable impression here, is that while the offer received appears to be a fair one he is confident that a delegation properly informed, assisted by competent advisers and with the power to negotiate, would receive a better offer from Canada than the one they were now considering. The facts brought back by the present delegation would, he argued, be a good basis for future negotiations and he assured his hearers that if the present offer from Canada is not accepted it will not lapse unless world economic conditions greatly change. He therefore concluded that the proper course for Newfoundland was to return to Responsible Government and if later on they desire to consider Confederation further it could be brought up again under more favourable conditions from Newfoundland’s point of view.30
It was the most passionate debate of the Convention, and, on January 28, Scott Macdonald reported the final results to St. Laurent:
It was 5 o’clock this morning before Mr. Smallwood completed his rebuttal bringing the debate to a close. The roll was called and the motion to place the Canadian terms of Union before the electorate at the forthcoming Referendum was defeated by twenty-nine votes to sixteen.
I attach, herewith, to complete the record, a list of members who voted for the motion and those that opposed it.
While the terms offered are the minimum terms that would enable Newfoundland to carry on as a Canadian Province, they are, fairly considered, so advantageous from Newfoundland’s point of view that it is disappointing to find that they have not attracted a greater following in the Convention.31
The Canadian high commissioner was evidently surprised and even offended that the Newfoundlanders would reject terms from Canada which would barely allow the Island to survive. Smallwood was suitably outraged and called the majority who had voted to keep Confederation off the ballot the “29 Dictators.” But in truth the result was not unexpected by the Canadians or by Smallwood, and they were not overly concerned by it. Norman Robertson in London already had Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s personal assurance that it meant nothing:
Secret and Personal.… Mr. Attlee’s feeling was that it would be unjust and unreasonable to exclude the Confederation option from the referendum simply because a majority within the Convention, made up of the supporters of Responsible and Commission Government, were able to combine to vote down advocates of Confederation. Macdonald assumes that the report of the Convention will at least refer to the substantial minority vote in favor of adding Confederation to the ballot.…
United Kingdom Government would not, repeat not, of course put Confederation on ballot against wishes of Canadian Government.32
The UK government would not put Confederation on the ballot if the Canadians did not wish it but would, however, do so whether the Newfoundlanders wished it or not. Usually in a democratic contest it is a majority opinion that prevails, especially if it is a substantial majority. In this case the Commonwealth Relations Office chose to play by different rules and accepted the minority vote as conclusive. Lord Addison was particularly bitter about the Convention’s failure to “give us the result we desire,” as he had written to Attlee optimistically in November 1945. His memo to the prime minister in February 1948 bristles with imperial pique:
When it was decided to set up the Convention, it was hoped that this would consist of a body of responsible people who would look at the various possible forms of government dispassionately and clarify the issues to be put to the Newfoundland people for their decision. Actually this hope has not been realized. The Convention has consisted of political aspirants who have dealt with the matter on bitter party lines, and they have in fact tried to anticipate the decision which it was intended should be left to the people as a whole at the referendum. In spite of having received very generous terms, which the Canadian Government have indicated that they would be prepared to recommend to the Canadian Parliament as a basis for union between Canada and Newfoundland, the Convention so conducted their operations as to endeavour to prevent this issue being put before the people.
It is clearly open to the United Kingdom Government to decide that Confederation with Canada as well as the other two courses should be placed on the referendum paper, since it was not the intention that the Convention should in effect be able to decide the issue, and it would be intolerable if the opponents of Confederation in the Convention were successful in a manoeuvre which would prevent the matter being submitted to the people of Newfoundland. On the other hand, the tactics require some consideration.…
The term “responsible government” should be defined as Responsible Government as it existed in 1933 before the institution of Commission of Government. There would be no question at present of the adoption by Newfoundland
of the Statute of Westminster or of it assuming full Dominion status on the Canadian model.33
Lord Addison’s tone is that of a controlling Victorian father indignant at his daughter’s refusal of the marriage arranged for her. The punishments for Newfoundland’s defiance of the Commonwealth Relations Office were heavy indeed, and certainly a long way from Lord Beaverbrook’s plan to rearm the country with dominion status—a point on which Lord Addison seems to be confused. Newfoundland enjoyed full dominion status when its parliament was suspended in 1933 and it was expected to resume that status when its parliament was reinstated. That was Churchill’s understanding and also Lord Beaverbrook’s, whose memo to the War Cabinet in November 1943 demanded that Newfoundland be offered “the right to resume Dominion status.” As for political aspirants attempting to hijack the agenda of the National Convention, the delegate who most fit that description had to be their own agent, Joe Smallwood.
The National Convention had made its move. In a final attempt to limit the referendum to the original terms of the agreement in the Newfoundland Act of 1933 and control events, it recommended that only two choices be given on the ballot—a continuance of the Commission of Government or the restoration of responsible government. As Jim Halley remembered the moment:
We rejoiced when the National Convention rejected Confederation as a choice on the ballot paper and recommended just the two, responsible government or Commission of Government. We thought we’d won and shown Great Britain that Newfoundland didn’t want Confederation, or at least not through a referendum run by the British and the Canadians. The Canadian government’s terms had been debated thoroughly in the National Convention and found to be seriously inadequate, which became obvious to everyone later on. The Convention therefore wisely decided not to submit Confederation on the basis of those terms to the general public in a simple referendum. It was the correct thing to do to protect Newfoundland’s interests, especially its power to negotiate terms with Canada for itself.