by Greg Malone
So we were jubilant. We didn’t think the UK government would go against the recommendations of the National Convention which they themselves had set up, and we had all participated and gone through a year of this Convention and its importance.… England still had enormous prestige after the war. Not everyone trusted them, of course. The more Irish you were, and the more familiar with the recent Irish history, the more unwilling you were to take anything the British said or did at face value. Trusting the English was not something the Irish could do. But we all got a shock. It’s one thing to suspect something and another to have it happen.34
On January 29, 1948, the National Convention dissolved, and Wainwright Abbott, the American consul in St. John’s, reviewed its performance:
By no stretch of the imagination can it be credited with having achieved with distinction and success its appointed task of considering possible future forms of government and objectively weighing their advantages and disadvantages. With the introduction of the Confederation issue, the Convention was split from the beginning with the issue dominating the debates to the extent of their revolving principally about it and nothing else; their usefulness suffered proportionally. If the Convention has served no other purpose, it has aroused political interest in this country which for 14 years has lived in a political vacuum. It is generally expected that a bitterly partisan campaign will now commence and be waged in preparation for the coming referendum.35
8
WORDS, WORDS, WORDS:
THE REFERENDUM BALLOT
Shortly after the National Convention dissolved in January 1948, thirty-two members of the Law Society of Newfoundland representing the cream of the country’s legal community petitioned Lord Addison to uphold the Convention’s decision and return responsible government to Newfoundland. Only three lawyers abstained:
Lawyers Protest to British Government
Maintain No Irrevocable Decision to Union with Canada Should Be Made Until Free Negotiation Is Conducted at Government Level
“The undersigned members of the Bar of Newfoundland are of the considered opinion and firmly maintain that … the Newfoundland Act of 1933 enacted by the British Parliament provided specifically that Newfoundland’s constitution would be merely suspended and would be restored to the people at their request when the country again became self-supporting. As the National Convention has decided that Newfoundland is self-supporting, therefore only two forms of government can be considered and submitted to the people in the referendum, namely Responsible Government and Commission Government. The issue of Confederation can be properly decided in the usual constitutional manner at a general election. [The] Canadian Government has presented unilateral proposals only and we consider that no irrevocable decision as to Union with Canada should be made without prior full examination by a Newfoundland Government and its financial and economic advisers and after detailed and exhaustive negotiations between governments.”1
Once again the UK government received a clear and unambiguous request to fulfill the terms of the Newfoundland Act of 1933. Newfoundland had already met the financial requirement set out in that Act. Britain had established the National Convention ostensibly to give body and voice to the vaguely phrased condition “on request from the people of Newfoundland,” and the Convention had been elected along lines specifically laid down by the Dominions Office to achieve the greatest and fairest possible representation of the Newfoundland people. A two-year residency requirement had been introduced to keep the influence of Water St. merchants to a minimum. The Convention was as representative and cooperative a body of Newfoundlanders as London could hope for. At the close of the Convention’s meetings, Gordon Higgins proposed a resolution that the people of Newfoundland be asked at the earliest possible time their choice between “Responsible Government as it existed in Newfoundland prior to 1934” and the existing form of government—the Commission of Government. This motion passed unanimously.2 The conditions had been met, but would responsible government be returned?
In 1943 Lord Beaverbrook had declared the terms of the Newfoundland Act to be fulfilled and the UK government to be in an illegal position in Newfoundland. Ten years earlier, during the debate on the Act in the British Parliament, Lord Snell had observed: “What is now proposed will clearly indicate that in as short a time as possible responsible government will again be in operation.”3 And D.H. Thomas, the dominions secretary at the time, had assured the House that “ ‘Temporary’ is written all over this bill.”4 It was now 1948, over fourteen years later, and the fulfillment of that promise was long overdue.
While the members of the Law Society and the rest of Newfoundland waited for the decision on the choice the United Kingdom would give them, Lord Addison entered into detailed negotiations with Canadian officials on the all-important wording of the options on the Newfoundland ballot paper. He took care to conceal these discussions just as Lester Pearson nervously reminded everyone at the Department of External Affairs of the need for absolute secrecy. The considerable tension within the department over the underhanded path being taken to acquire Newfoundland came to a climax in early February 1948. On the eve of their secret negotiations with Great Britain, a fierce battle erupted in Mackenzie King’s Cabinet over the procedure. Norman Robertson demanded non-interference and argued forcefully against the inclusion of Confederation on the ballot paper. Mackenzie King supported this position and recorded in his diary:
Robertson pointed out quite emphatically that what they [Newfoundlanders] should do is to decide between responsible governments and other governments, and when they had found responsible governments, come to negotiate with them [the Canadians]. That is the position I have taken from the beginning.…
St. Laurent was inclined to feel that all that had been done up to the present should not have been attempted if that was the view taken. In this, I think, he is quite wrong.… I could see St. Laurent was unwilling to do other than press the matter … seeing this I left the discussion to other members of the cabinet particularly Wishart, Robertson, McCann, Abbot—all of whom thought it would be wrong for Canada to express any opinion on what … Britain should do.5
Once the prime minister quit the field, the decision belonged to St. Laurent and the powerful C.D. Howe, along with R.A. MacKay, Jack Pickersgill, and Scott Macdonald—all ardent supporters for acquiring Newfoundland and Labrador while they were still under British control. Pickersgill, MacKenzie King’s executive assistant, kept him buoyed along towards a more active policy on Newfoundland. He believed that the “whole future of Canada” depended on Newfoundland and that, if the United States took over in Newfoundland, reaching into the east coast of Canada as Alaska did on the west coast, Canada would be “strangled not physically but spiritually.”6 St. Laurent was equally persuaded and, along with C.D. Howe, also anxious to acquire Labrador’s valuable mineral assets. If the Cabinet and External Affairs could not agree on the right way to proceed with Newfoundland’s entry into Confederation, however, they could unite on one key point. On February 13 the federal Cabinet issued a statement that, “in the Canadian view, the addition of Union with the United States on the ballot in the forthcoming referendum would be undesirable.”7 The statement was a perfect expression of “defensive expansionism” in play. “Each phase of expansion in Canada has been a tactical move designed to forestall, counteract or restrain the northward expansion of American economic and political influence.”8 Above all else, the Canadians did not want to be put into competition with the Americans.
The next series of top-secret memoranda between Ottawa and London is marked with no less tension than that within the Department of External Affairs, and, although Canada did not get all the concessions it wanted, the shift in the centre of gravity in Newfoundland affairs from London to Ottawa is clear. On February 14, 1948, Sir Eric Machtig at the Commonwealth Relations Office opened up the dialogue with a telegram to High Commissioner Alexander Clutterbuck in Ottawa:
Secret.… We are … sending you
a separate official telegram asking you to advise Canadian Government what we propose. This should be done informally and confidentially as it might well be embarrassing to the Canadian Government if it could be said that they had been formally consulted by us [on the Newfoundland referendum]…. We should of course like to know as quickly as possible whether they have anything to say, since the Governor of Newfoundland is anxious that he should be able to make an announcement on the subject early in March.… We would let you have an advance copy of this despatch.9
Clutterbuck in turn outlined the Canadian position for Sir Eric:
Important. Secret. Your telegram No 151. Newfoundland. I saw Pearson about this yesterday and had further word with him today.
Officially Canadian attitude is that they are grateful to us for informing them in advance of announcement but that they do not wish to be consulted and are quite content that we should proceed as we think best. They are anxious to be able to say, if questions are asked in Parliament here after announcement, that the Canadian Government were not repeat not consulted, that there was no reason why they should have been consulted and that the matter was purely one for United Kingdom decision in light of the local circumstances.
Unofficially however, while greatly welcoming decision to place confederation on ballot paper and also proposal for second referendum if necessary, Pearson expressed some concern on following three points:
(1) They feel that if Commission of Government is placed on ballot paper with suggested limitation to five years, there would be strong temptation for people of Newfoundland to vote for this course and scales would be unduly weighted against confederation …
(2) As regards continuation of Commission of Government they wondered also whether we had it in mind to explain to Newfoundland people before voting takes place the financial implications of this course … viz. that in view of the United Kingdom’s own dollar difficulties it would be impossible for the United Kingdom Government to help them much in the future as they had done in the past.
(3) In connection with the placing of Confederation on ballot paper … Canadians were anxious … for it to be made clear by United Kingdom Government in proposed announcement that in the event of vote being in favour of confederation, means would be provided to enable final details of proposed terms and arrangements for constitution of Newfoundland as a province of Canada to be discussed and settled officially between the two countries.…
(5) As regards (3) Pearson at first suggested … that it might perhaps be improved by addition of words “whether by the formation of a provisional government or otherwise” after the words “means would be provided.” Point in mind is that it would presumably be for responsible Newfoundlanders (possibly with our assistance) to settle matters finally with Canadian Government.10
Unofficially the Canadians had quite a shopping list for the British. Pearson’s phrase “means would be provided” begged more questions than it answered. What “means,” and “provided” by whom and for whom? It was exactly the sort of high-sounding, fuzzy ambiguity the British relished. In the end it would allow some ad hoc groups of co-operative Newfoundlanders to be picked by the governor to ratify the whole deal.
In London Lord Addison, having accommodated as many of Pearson’s suggestions as he felt possible, advised Governor Gordon Macdonald in St. John’s:
Immediate. Personal and Secret.… In drafting the despatch we have had the advantage of assistance of Clutterbuck who has just arrived here and has advised us of the confidential discussions he had with Canadian authorities on receipt of our telegram referred to in my No 43. Wording of second sentence of paragraph 7 of the despatch has in particular been adopted to meet observations made to him by Canadian authorities.11
The second sentence of paragraph 7 read as follows: “In the event of the vote being in favour of confederation, means would be provided to enable final details of the proposed terms and arrangements for the constitution of Newfoundland as a province of Canada to be discussed and agreed between representatives of Newfoundland and Canada.”12
MacKay and Bridle replied from Ottawa that this phrasing was not satisfactory and that some mention of Canada’s terms must be included in the statement. Clutterbuck wrote to Machtig and Addison and, after a great deal of back-and-forth, St. Laurent weighed in with this decision to Norman Robertson, the high commissioner in London:
Immediate. Secret.… The essential point in our suggestion was that a qualification such as “on the basis of the Canadian Government’s offer” should be inserted in the sentence. So long as some such phrase is included, we are not disposed to object to insertion of the words “the full” before the “terms,” or to the substitution of “settled” for “discussed and agreed,” although the latter seems preferable since it would tend to give Newfoundland people a clearer impression of active participation by Newfoundland representatives in the working out of the final terms.13
The Canadians were at pains to stay as close as possible to the unilateral terms of 1947 while also creating the “impression of active participation by Newfoundland representatives” in negotiating the final terms. In St. John’s, Governor Sir Gordon Macdonald told Canadian High Commissioner Scott Macdonald of Lord Addison’s final decision and, on March 3, 1948, the high commissioner broke the “bad news” to St. Laurent.
Confidential. His Excellency the Governor was good enough to receive me for an hour this morning and to outline his conversations with Prime Minister Attlee and members of the Government on the form of the ballot in the forthcoming referendum.
It has been agreed during the discussions in London and Lake Success, he stated, that three questions would be placed on the ballot, namely, Responsible Government as it existed prior to 1934; Commission of Government for a period of five years; and Confederation with Canada. With respect to the latter question the electorate would be asked to vote merely on the question of principle, leaving the terms to be discussed and agreed between the Commission of Government and the Government of Canada.
I asked him if the Government of Canada was aware that such proposals were contemplated. He assured me that they had been communicated to the Canadian Government through the British High Commissioner in Ottawa and that Mr. Robertson, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, had recently been in Canada for consultations on them. In this connection he pointed out that there was some difference of opinion as to the conditions under which the Commission of Government would negotiate terms of union with Canada and stated that the formula proposed by the Canadian Government, namely, the substitution of “settled” for “discussed and agreed” would not be acceptable to him as it took for granted there could be no negotiation on matters of substance. As I was not aware of these discussions I did not feel it wise to pursue the matter further.…
The Governor, who was very friendly, continued to express the hope that Newfoundland might someday become a part of the Dominion. As his sentiments appeared to be genuine, I refrained from pointing out that a third defeat for Confederation—the likely result of a referendum carried out under the conditions he had mentioned—would make it a good deal more difficult than it would be in a fair contest now.14
Scott Macdonald did not try to conceal his bitterness. He thought “discussed and agreed” sounded too much like real negotiations. Lord Addison’s compromise reflected not only the high commissioner’s concerns but the pressure he was feeling from both Macdonalds in St. John’s. After extensive talks with Clutterbuck and Robertson, Addison advised the acting British high commissioner in Ottawa: “Important. Secret and personal. We have considered very fully [the] wording.… If Canadian authorities should still feel difficulty, Clutterbuck will be able to explain position to them more fully on his return to Ottawa at beginning of next week.”15
The Canadians did still continue to “feel difficulty,” and even panic, about the possibility of further negotiations over Newfoundland. St. Laurent telegraphed MacDonald: “We do not feel we can agree to this wording si
nce it seems to open much wider consideration than the Prime Minister’s letter to the Governor covering the proposed terms.”16 Nevertheless, on March 10 Lord Addison released the final version of the Newfoundland Referendum Ballot:
The questions to be put before the people at the National Referendum will therefore be:
(a) Commission of Government for a further period of five years.
(b) Responsible Government as it existed in 1933 prior to the establishment of Commission of Government.
(c) Confederation with Canada.17
The Commonwealth Relations Office had completely ignored the wishes of the National Convention—the voice of the people. The National Convention had not been set up to ascertain the wishes of the people in the first place but only to introduce Confederation on the ballot. The ballot paper was the ultimate place to direct the Newfoundland voter to the new choice both Britain and Canada wanted them to make—Confederation. The wording was therefore crucial, and a great deal of thought and effort went into it on both sides of the Atlantic. In the final version, the Commission of Government was presented first but for only “a period of five years,” which immediately gave it a limited future and more uncertainty. Next, responsible government was presented, but qualified with the phrase “as it existed in 1933”—in other words, with the negative association of the Great Depression. Finally came Confederation with Canada—clean, simple, without qualification or further uncertainty.
The Canadians had wanted a definite qualification attached to the Confederation option—“on the basis of the Canadian government offer.” That wording would have given voters as much pause as the conditions on the other two choices, but the British understood the psychological implications and, to shorten the odds, left out the reference to Canadian terms. With every constitutional advantage at their disposal, British officials felt confident they could control the final negotiation process and manage Canadian anxiety over better terms for the Newfoundlanders. They could take these calculated risks because they were not Canadians. They therefore cleverly positioned Commission Government with the unsatisfactory present, responsible government with the past, and Confederation with the future. Lord Addison had given Confederation as much psychological advantage as he dared—and it was considerable.