Caesar: Life of a Colossus

by Adrian Goldsworthy

  During his own campaign Cicero had thought about visiting Cisalpine Gaul to canvass amongst the wealthy citizens there and throughout his life tried to maintain links with many parts of Italy. Where past favours and friendship did not suffice, money might win the day. There were men in each tribe who were recognised as able to sway the vote of their fellow tribesmen, whether they voted as a whole or each in their own century. In 61 BC it was widely reported that many of these men had visited the garden of Pompey's house to receive payment for their support for his candidate Afranius. In 60 BC the bribery was less blatant, but still employed by all candidates. Lucceius' money acted for himself and Caesar, while Bibulus drew not only on his own resources, but was aided by a number of prominent senators. Cato approved, just as he had refrained from prosecuting his brother-in-law from electoral bribery in 63 BC when he had attacked Murena for the same thing. Like any senator, he wanted his family to succeed. Suetonius claims that he and Bibulus' other backers were also motivated by fear of what Caesar might do if as consul he had a colleague who was closely tied to him politically. This may well simply be the view of hindsight - the connections and status of Bibulus' family probably were far more important factors.17

  On the day of the election Caesar came first by a very comfortable margin. Bibulus secured the second place, so that Lucceius ended up with little return for his expenditure. Many of the voters must have named Caesar and Bibulus on their ballots. Having reached the most senior magistracy, it was now a question of what Caesar would do and how he would behave in his twelve months of office.

  THE LAND LAW

  In December 60 BC, just a few weeks before Caesar would take up the consulship on 1 January 59 BC, Cicero received a visitor in his country villa. The caller was Lucius Cornelius Balbus, the Roman citizen from Gades in Spain who had recently served on Caesar's staff and was now starting to act as his political agent. Balbus spoke mainly of the agrarian law that Caesar was planning to introduce in his consulship. Throughout his life Cicero had a landowner's aversion to any redistribution, and his opposition had done much to block Rullus' bill three years before. This time he had a choice between opposing the new law, absenting himself for a while to avoid committing himself, or supporting it. As Cicero wrote to Atticus, Caesar expected him to back the bill. Balbus had `assured me that Caesar will follow my own and Pompey's opinion in every issue, and that he will strive to reconcile Crassus to Pompey'. If Cicero followed this course he had the prospect of `a very close alliance with Pompey, and, if I want, with Caesar as well, and a reconciliation with my enemies, peace with the mob, and security in old age'. Caesar was preparing carefully for his year of office and trying to gain as many political allies as possible. Cicero, in spite of his successes as consul, remained a `new man', never entirely accepted by the established families of the Senate, and his execution of the conspirators in 63 BC left him vulnerable to attack for overstepping his powers. For the last decade he had consistently presented himself as Pompey's loyal supporter. Now Pompey was clearly associated with Caesar's land bill and both men wanted to secure Cicero's oratory to help their cause. 18

  After some thought, Cicero refused to commit himself. This was certainly a disappointment for Caesar, but not a critical one, since he had already secured two allies who were far more powerful. Balbus had hinted to Cicero of the prospect of an alliance between Pompey and his arch-rival Crassus. At some point during these months, Caesar was able to achieve just that, bonding himself to both men so that, as Suetonius put it, `nothing could be done in the Republic, which displeased any one of the three'.19 This political alliance is known to scholars as the First Triumvirate - the Second Triumvirate being formed between Mark Antony, Octavian and Lepidus in November 43 BC to oppose Caesar's murderers. Triumvirate simply means board of three, but unlike the latter alliance, which was formally instituted by law with the three men receiving dictatorial powers, the association between Crassus, Pompey and Caesar was informal. At first it was also secret. The fact that in December 60 BC Balbus spoke only of the possibility of reconciliation between Pompey and Crassus should not be taken as an indication that the triumvirate had not yet been formed, merely that it had not yet become public knowledge. Caesar had been closely associated with Crassus for some time, and the latter had invested heavily in him when he chose to act as surety for the debts that nearly prevented Caesar from leaving to govern Further Spain. Caesar had time and again been a vocal supporter of measures favouring Pompey. He had doubtless also met him - the world of the Roman aristocracy was a small one, and the two had both been in Rome for much of 70-67 BC - although there is no record of any particular intimacy. Caesar had seduced Pompey's wife during his absence overseas, which had surely not endeared him to her husband, but then he had also slept with Crassus' wife without it preventing their political collaboration. Both Pompey and Crassus had been frustrated in the last few years, discovering that their wealth and influence were not sufficient to get everything that they wanted. Pompey needed a more gifted and determined consul than Piso or Afranius to do his bidding. Caesar had sacrificed a triumph to reach the consulship immediately. For this to have been worthwhile, he needed an opportunity for far greater military adventures after his year of office was over, something that the `woods and paths' of Italy would certainly not provide. To make this possible he wanted influential supporters. If he had joined with either Pompey or Crassus individually, it was likely that the mutual antipathy of these two would have ensured that the other opposed him. With Cato, Bibulus and their associates certain to resist his every move, he simply could not afford another powerful enemy. Therefore, the elegantly simple answer was to unite Pompey and Crassus, knowing that their combined weight ought to be irresistible. Cato and the other nobles who had blocked and embittered the two greatest men in the Republic had created the opportunity to do this. Even so, it doubtless took all of Caesar's persuasiveness and charm to convince the old enemies that he could deliver what they wanted if only they combined to support hi M.21

  The negotiations to create the triumvirate may have begun by letter, but it is unlikely that any real decision was made until Caesar returned to Italy in the summer of 60 sc. Agreement may not have come until after the consular elections, when Caesar's success strengthened his bargaining position. It is not clear whether Pompey and Crassus openly joined forces to canvass on his behalf. Even had they done so, this might not have been seen as especially significant, since it was quite normal for personal enemies both to support the same candidate if each had individual ties of friendship with him. Co-operation between the three men was not widely suspected until January 59 BC at the earliest. Later, it became even more obvious and provoked outrage and the usual cries of the end of the Republic. Varro, the polymath who had in 70 BC advised Pompey on senatorial procedure and later served as his legate, wrote a pamphlet decrying the `three-headed beast'. Over a century and a half later, Plutarch was adamant that the friendship between the triumvirs, especially between Caesar and Pompey, was the root cause of civil war and the end of the Roman Republic. It was the way in which Caesar could gain so much power that in the end he could overcome even Pompey. It was a judgement based on hindsight, but certainly not a unique one, though it suggests an inevitability about future events that is questionable. Yet in one sense Plutarch had understood that the triumvirate was not at heart a union of those with the same political ideals and ambitions. Pompey, Crassus and Caesar were all seeking personal advantage. Pompey wanted land for his veterans and the ratification of his Eastern Settlement, and Crassus relief for the tax collectors of Asia. Caesar was very much the junior member, who needed powerful backers if he was to achieve anything in the face of a recalcitrant consular colleague and gain an important provincial command afterwards. He was effectively the tool of the other two, for they needed a magistrate to introduce and force through the legislation they needed. For this he would be rewarded. Each of the three knew that the others would benefit from the arrangement, but were content for
this to happen so long as they achieved their own aims. It was ultimately a marriage of convenience, to be broken by any of the members as soon as it ceased to be to his advantage. To see it as anything more solid or permanent risks misunderstanding the events of this and subsequent years. Dio speaks of the three men taking solemn oaths, but this is most probably just later propaganda. The secret swearing of oaths was always viewed as a sinister act by the Romans. Catiline was supposed to have done this with his followers. In later centuries this would also be one of the accusations against the early Christians."

  The two consuls were equal in power, but each took precedence over his colleague on alternate months. Caesar had come first in the polls on election day, and so when he and Bibulus took up office on 1 January 59 BC, it was he who held precedence and so began the Republic's year with prayers and sacrifices. Each consul was accompanied by twelve lictors carrying the fasces which symbolised a magistrate's power. The consul with precedence in that month was said to hold the fasces. Normally the lictors went ahead of a magistrate, clearing a path through the crowd if this was necessary. As a mark of respect to his colleague, Caesar stated at the beginning of the year that whenever Bibulus held the fasces, his own lictors would follow behind him. Instead only a single lesser official, the clerk or accensus, would precede him. It was just one of a number of reasonable gestures that Caesar made at the very beginning of the year. He also wanted his deeds and words, as well as those of everyone else, to be a matter of public knowledge. Therefore, speeches in the Senate and at public meetings were to be recorded by scribes and published in the Forum. In the past this had only been done occasionally, for instance, for some of the debates during Cicero's consulship.22

  Yet his immediate priority was the land bill, and it is probable that this was read in the Senate and debated on either 1 or 2 January. Haste was necessary, for a bill needed to be published twenty-four days before the Tribal Assembly was called to vote upon it. If Caesar was to have this vote in January while he himself held the fasces, then every day was precious, for the Senate could not meet on the 3rd or 4th. Considerable effort had already been devoted to preparing the bill and securing its passage before the end of the previous year. We have already seen that Balbus had been sent to canvass for Cicero's active support. Caesar had been careful to learn from the failed land bills of Rullus and Flavius. The publicly owned land in Campania - the ager Campanus, which supplied the Treasury with a healthy revenue - was formally exempted. Clauses also made it clear that private property was to be respected. A commission would oversee the purchase and distribution of the land to both Pompey's veteran soldiers and large numbers of the urban poor. The commissioners were only permitted to purchase land from owners willing to sell, and would do so at the value recorded in the last census. The funding for this was to come from the vast surplus provided by Pompey's victories. Other clauses of the law expressly recognised all existing land occupation, lest fears grow up that there would be investigations into whether or not it was legally owned. It also barred the new settlers from selling their land for twenty years, to emphasise that it wanted to set up stable and permanent new communities. There were to be twenty commissioners, so that no one or two men should have overwhelming patronage in their hands, although there does appear to have been an inner council of five members to take some decisions. The commissioners would be elected, and the law expressly excluded Caesar from being amongst their number, so there would be no question of his proposing legislation from which he would derive tangible benefit. Roman laws tended to be long and complex - one of Rome's most enduring legacies to the world is cumbersome and tortuous legal prose. Before Caesar read the entire text to the Senate, he announced that he would alter or remove any clause to which an objection was raised.'3

  The bill was well crafted and sensible. There was little or nothing within it that could be reasonably criticised, and the senators were aware that anything they said in the debate was to be published. It was most probably on 2 January that Caesar began to ask individual senators their opinion. Crassus was the first of the ex-consuls and presumably gave his approval, as did Pompey who would have been asked second. The others were somewhat sullen, but unwilling to go on record as opponents of the bill. The same was true of the former praetors. It was only when Caesar reached the ex-tribunes and called upon Cato to speak that there was anything other than unenthusiastic support or equivocation. Even Cato was forced to acknowledge that the bill was a good one, but he felt that it was badly timed and claimed that it would be a mistake to bring in any innovation during this year. Some of the earlier speakers had managed to delay proceedings by introducing tangential matters, but Cato was the true master of manipulating the conventions of the House. Having been asked his view he gave it, and then continued to give it, speaking without interruption as the minutes stretched into hours. It was obvious that he planned once again to keep on talking until the Senate had to end its session for the day and so prevent a vote from being taken. He had employed the same tactic in the past and always succeeded.

  This time Caesar's temper snapped and he ordered his attendants to arrest Cato and lead him off to prison. Extreme though this action seems, there was no other way of stopping a member of the House from continuing to speak once he had been asked his opinion, since someone like Cato could not simply be shouted down. It was a sign of Caesar's frustration and rapidly proved to be a mistake. Cato knew how to milk the situation by playing the part of the righteous defender of the Republic who refused to bow to `tyranny'. In the Senate at least, there was widespread sympathy for him, even though for a while the debate continued. One senator, Marcus Petreius, the man who had defeated Catiline in battle in 62 Bc and had already undergone thirty years of military service, got up and left the House. Caesar demanded to know why he was leaving before the session had ended and received the tart reply from the grizzled veteran that he would rather be in prison with Cato than here with Caesar. The consul was already realising that he had misjudged the situation. He is supposed to have hoped that Cato would call upon one of the tribunes of the plebs to veto his arrest. However, the prisoner was enjoying the moment too much to provide Caesar with an easy way out. In the end the consul had to order his release. The day had been spent without the Senate ever voting on a motion supporting the bill.24

  Cato had won a victory and added once again to his reputation. Yet, like many of the successes of his career, it was a hollow triumph that in the long run made things worse. This time he was not facing a Piso or Afranius who could easily he diverted or blocked. Caesar, who had done so much to appear conciliatory, now declared that since the Senate would do nothing, he would go directly to the Roman people. Probably the next day he held a meeting in the Forum, and once again made every effort to be reasonable. He summoned his colleague Bibulus to the Rostra and asked him his opinion of the land bill in full view of the crowd. It is always difficult to know precisely who attended these public gatherings and whether they were genuine reflections of the views of the wider population or more like modern party rallies. On the one hand there was little to stop any citizen - or indeed noncitizen - who was in Rome from turning up and watching proceedings. On the other hand the space in the Forum was limited and could not possibly have contained more than a small fraction of the city's vast population. It seems doubtful that more than 5,000 people could actually have heard a speech being made, although parts of the Forum could probably have contained bigger crowds than this. Most scholars assume that the magistrate calling the meeting would ensure that the gathering was packed with his supporters. This is quite possibly true, although there is no real evidence for how this was organised, and we should probably be a little cautious about making their control of such gatherings absolute. In this case, the mood of the crowd was certainly favourable to Caesar. Nevertheless, Bibulus repeated Cato's argument that whatever the merits of the bill, there should be no innovations in his year of office. Caesar kept trying to persuade his colleague, and told the crowd t
hat they could have the law if only Bibulus would consent. He lead the chant that called upon his fellow consul to agree, but the pressured Bibulus only shouted out that, `You shall not have this law this year, even if you all want it.' After this crass comment, Bibulus stormed off."s

  Roman magistrates were not elected to represent anyone, and neither they nor senators were answerable to any sort of constituency In this way Roman politics differed markedly from the theory - if not necessarily the practice - of modern democracies. Yet in the end the will of the Roman people was supposed to be sovereign and for a consul to express such disdain for the voters was a serious error. Caesar had pressured him into making the mistake and now built upon this success. He summoned no more magistrates to his meeting - or meetings, as there may well have been more than one - but instead called upon distinguished senior senators. This was entirely normal practice, and Caesar began with Crassus and Pompey. Both enthusiastically supported the bill, for the first time giving a clear public indication of their association with the consul. Pompey spoke of the need to reward with land the soldiers who under his own command had fought so well for Rome. He also reminded them that the spoils won by his armies had given the Republic ample funds to make the distribution practical. Caesar worked on the crowd once again, getting them to beg Pompey to ensure that the bill became law Always susceptible to adulation, he announced in reply to Caesar's questioning that if anyone `took up the sword' to stop the bill, then he was `ready with his shield' (or in another version `with his sword and shield'). The threat was more than a little clumsy. It delighted the cheering crowds, but made many senators nervous. Cato and Bibulus had blocked Caesar in the Senate, but raising the stakes in the struggle had not deterred him or his backers. In the end, Caesar was at least as stubborn and determined as they were. Like Tiberius Gracchus in 133 BC, having failed to gain the Senate's approval, Caesar took his law directly to the voters. A date was set in the last days of January for a Tribal Assembly to vote on the land bill. Caesar had handled his public meetings well and all indications suggested that it would be approved. Although they presented themselves as the true defenders of the Republic, it is doubtful that Cato and Bibulus spoke for more than a small minority of citizens. In fact, their views were probably only shared by a minority, if perhaps a larger one, of the Senate, but in that case it included many of the most distinguished and influential nobles.26