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Caesar: Life of a Colossus

Page 37

by Adrian Goldsworthy


  Caesar decided to rejoin the army earlier than usual. Before he arrived, the migrants had begun to move again, pushing south into the lands of the Eburones and Condrusi. The ensuing campaign very quickly became a source of controversy, with Caesar's actions being publicly attacked in the Senate by Cato, who accused him of serious misconduct. Therefore, even more than usual, the account presented in the Commentaries was intended to defend his every move and show that he had behaved reasonably and honourably, as well as with his accustomed calm efficiency. Yet even his sternest critic would have conceded that the arrival of the two German tribes threatened Roman interests. In the last three years Caesar had spread Roman power throughout Gaul. The region was not as yet formally annexed as a province and the tribes continued to govern themselves, but virtually all openly or tacitly acknowledged Rome's dominance. The Menapii were one of the few exceptions, and had yet to submit and give hostages to Caesar, but the Eburones and Condrusi had almost certainly done so in 57 Bc. From the beginning the proconsul had emphasised his readiness to protect allied peoples from any enemy, making clear in each campaign both the advantages offered by alliance with Rome and the terrible punishment awaiting any who opposed its legions.

  The migrants introduced a new and unstable element into the balance of power that had been created. There was no unoccupied land in Gaul for them to settle, and they had already demonstrated their willingness to use force against anyone who did not admit them. Individual tribes - or more probably chieftains within them - might choose to welcome the new arrivals, feeling that the numbers and reputation of these warriors would be a great asset to them as allies. Exactly the same motive had led some Gallic leaders to welcome Ariovistus, the Helvetii and Caesar himself. Such a course was now most attractive to those who had not done well since the area had been dominated by the Romans, and especially those recently defeated by the legions. There was the prospect of new rivalries and conflict within and between tribes, made worse by the possibility that the victors may eventually win through Germanic rather than Roman support. When Caesar had expelled Ariovistus from Gaul, he had publicly proclaimed his refusal to admit German tribes across the Rhine. As we have seen he clearly exaggerated the distinction between Gauls and Germans, and continually presented the latter as a potential threat to Rome. Yet if he exaggerated, he did not entirely invent either the differences between the peoples or the menace posed to Roman interests. The Romans had never welcomed the incursions of peoples into the regions around their frontiers.'

  When Caesar reached his army in Gaul he received more information about the migrants. Presumably much of this, along with the earlier reports that had reached him south of the Alps, came from his legates left in command of the winter camps. These seem to have taken no direct action against the Germans. In part this was because campaigning was always difficult in the winter months, but more importantly legates were not expected to display too much initiative and it would have been inappropriate for them to have embarked on a major operation on their own. Caesar also received reports from allied tribes. A comment in a subsequent passage of the Commentaries suggests that it was his normal custom to stay in the houses of Gallic noblemen while he was travelling in Gaul. This was a useful way of showing how highly he valued their friendship, for hospitality played an important role in Gallic culture, but it also helped him to gauge their mood and views. As in Rome, many of the great affairs of a Roman magistrate were conducted at a very intimate level. Overall his various sources presented a worrying picture. Already some chieftains and tribes had approached the German migrants seeking alliance and making offers of land in return for their military aid. Caesar summoned the leaders of all the tribes to a council, where he arranged for them to supply the usual contingents of cavalry and grain supplies. He did not feel that it was useful to reveal that he knew some of the chieftains had been dealing with the Germans. If he could quickly defeat the two tribes, then such negotiations would not matter. The Roman army concentrated and marched north.6

  When the column was within a few days march of the two German tribes, a deputation came from them. The envoys told of how they had been driven from their homes by the Suebi and asked Caesar to grant them land, or at least let them keep what they were able to seize by force. As usual, his account emphasised the barbarians' pride, making them declare that they were fully ready to fight if he refused them, since they feared no one apart from the Suebi. The proconsul replied `as seemed appropriate', but made it clear that he would not permit them to settle in Gaul. However, he offered to arrange for them to settle amongst the Ubii, another German tribe who lived on the east bank of the Rhine. They were also under pressure from the Suebi and had recently sent ambassadors to him requesting support. The envoys from the two tribes agreed to take this offer back to their people, and return to Caesar in three days' time with a decision. In the meantime they asked him to halt his advance. Caesar refused, suspicious that this was merely a ploy to gain time, for he knew that the bulk of the German cavalry was away on a plundering and foraging raid.7

  The Romans pressed on, until they were within 12 miles of the main tribal encampment. This had probably taken three days, since Caesar was met by the same deputation returning as arranged. Once again they asked him to stop and wait, but the legions continued to advance. Caesar did grant their plea to send orders forward to his cavalry screen telling them not to engage any Germans they met. If they were attacked then the auxiliary and allied horse were to do no more than defend themselves. In addition, the Germans wanted permission to send envoys to the Ubii so that they could themselves negotiate a settlement. Once again they requested that he grant them three days for this to occur. Caesar remained sceptical of their motives, feeling that this was simply another pretext to gain time for the raiding party to return. This was not unreasonable, for even if the Germans were sincerely hoping for a peaceful settlement it was obviously in their interest to negotiate from a position of greater strength. Equally, if they intended to fight they would want to have these troops, who had spearheaded the attack on the Menapii and doubtless included some of their best warriors. In addition, if the raiders returned with food and forage this would make it easier for the tribes to maintain themselves during days of either negotiating or military manoeuvring.

  Caesar made one modest concession, saying that he would only advance 4 miles during the day, moving to a position where his camp would have a convenient water supply. In the meantime fighting had already broken out between the cavalry of the two sides. The Germans had some 800 horsemen still guarding their encampment. Caesar had 5,000 cavalry, although if these were performing their duties as a patrolling and screening force properly, then they would not all have been concentrated in one place. Even so, the Gallic auxiliaries probably had a significant numerical advantage, and were mounted on larger horses than their opponents, which makes it all the more notable that the Germans quickly gained an advantage. In Caesar's account the Germans charged first, chasing away part of the Gallic cavalry, but were in turn met by their supports. Many of the Germans then dismounted to fight on foot - perhaps with the support of the picked infantrymen who regularly supported the horsemen of some Germanic tribes. The Gauls were routed and fled, spreading panic amongst a large part of the auxiliary and allied cavalry who galloped in terror back to the main force, which was probably several miles away. Caesar maintains that the Germans were the ones to break the truce with an unprovoked attack on his unsuspecting allies. Elsewhere he notes that the Germans did not ride with saddles and, despising horsemen like the Gauls who did so, were inclined to attack them on sight. The truth of what happened will never be known, and may have been unclear even at the time. Both the Gauls and the Germans were individualistic warriors who prized displays of conspicuous valour and skill. It was difficult for their leaders to impose any rigid discipline upon such men, and when large numbers of warriors from different tribes met, then there was always the potential for violence. Taunting could easily escalate into persona
l duels or massed fighting. Throughout the Gallic campaigns German warriors consistently defeated their Gallic counterparts, each success adding to their fierce reputation. In this case seventy-four of Caesar's Gallic allies were killed, one of the very rare occasions where he gives a specific figure for his own casualties. Amongst them was an aristocrat from Aquitania called Piso, whose grandfather had been the king of his tribe and was recognised by the Senate as a `friend of the Roman people'. Piso turned back during the rout to rescue his brother, but as they escaped he was thrown from his horse, surrounded and cut down. His brother spurred back towards the enemy and was also killed.'

  Caesar claims that the skirmish showed that the German tribes were acting treacherously, spinning out peace negotiations until they were strong enough to attack him. This may or may not have been true, but if it was, then provoking a fight at this stage was clearly not in their interest. Worried that rumours of the skirmish might be inflated into a major defeat and encourage unrest amongst the Gallic tribes, Caesar summoned his legates and quaestor and gave orders for an all-out attack on the following day. The next morning, as the legions prepared for battle, a large deputation arrived from the Germans. It included all of their main leaders and chieftains, who wanted to apologise for the fighting on the previous day and explain that they had not intended to break the truce in this way, but were still keen to negotiate. The Commentaries stress the `treachery and dissimulation' of the German leaders, and in a rare moment of emotion say that `Caesar rejoiced' because they had placed themselves into his hands. Forgetting his outrage at the detention of his own officers - and that was the key difference, for they had been Romans and his own men - he arrested the envoys. The legions marched out in three columns, which could readily be converted into the battle line of the triplex acies, and advanced the 8 miles to the German camp. The Usipetes and Tencteri were surprised and leaderless, so that what followed was more of a massacre than a battle:'

  When their terror was made clear by the confusion and chaos, our soldiers, enraged by the treachery of the previous day, surged into the camp. There, those who were able to take up arms quickly fought for a while amongst the wagons and baggage: All the rest, a mob of women and children ... started to run in all directions; Caesar sent his cavalry to hunt them down.

  Hearing the clamour from their rear, and seeing their own people killed, the Germans threw down their arms, dropped their military standards, and fled from the camp; and when they reached the point where the Meuse and the Rhine join, they despaired of flight; many had already fallen, and the remainder jumped into the river, and drowned there, overcome by fear, fatigue or the current of the water.'o

  Caesar's army suffered no fatal casualties and only a small number of wounded in the one-sided fighting. He gives no figure for the German losses, but these were probably considerable, with many being killed or taken to be sold as slaves. Even more escaped, but at the cost of losing their possessions in their abandoned wagons. If, as seems likely, the two tribes were not all in a single encampment but in a number of parties spread over a fairly wide area, then the other groups may have got away more lightly. The only organised group of fugitives was the raiding band of cavalry, which recrossed the Rhine and took refuge amongst the Sugambri tribe. After the destruction and dispersal of their peoples the tribal leaders were granted their freedom, but chose to stay in the Roman camp rather than face possible retribution from the Gauls whose lands they had plundered."

  The Romans celebrated the easy victory that had freed them from `the fear of such a great war'. The success reinforced the Roman dominance of Gaul created by Caesar's earlier campaigns. If he wanted to mount a British expedition this year, then the speed of the campaign left this possibility open. In practical respects the victory was good for Rome, but when news of this episode reached the city it was not well received by a number of senators. It is unlikely that the first report came from Caesar himself, and more probable that it reached Rome in letters written by men on his staff, or - directly or indirectly- from merchants with the army. Cato led the attack against Caesar, which focused not so much on the massacre itself, but on the belief that the proconsul had violated the truce by seizing ambassadors and attacking by surprise. The Romans set great store on their `good faith' (fides), contrasting it with the - in their view - duplicity of other races. While their record was in fact scarcely unblemished, nevertheless they were aware that honouring treaties and other formal agreements had the practical advantage of helping future negotiations. At a more fundamental level, Rome's special relationship with the gods, which was demonstrated by its remarkable success in war, relied upon virtue and honouring sacred obligations or oaths. In the Senate: `Cato urged them to surrender Caesar to those whom he had wronged, and not to turn upon themselves, or allow to fall upon their city, the pollution of his crime. "However," said he, "let us also sacrifice to the gods, because they do not turn the punishment for the general's folly and madness upon his soldiers, but spare the city.""'

  On a handful of occasions in the past the Romans had formally handed over one of their magistrates to a foreign enemy in expiation of an injustice. The most recent case had occurred in 137 Bc after the consul Caius Hostilius Mancinus had let his army be surrounded by Celtiberians outside their town of Numantia. Mancinus had saved the lives of his soldiers by surrendering. His army was allowed to go free, but the Romans were to accept a peace that favoured the Numantines. Subsequently the Senate refused to ratify the treaty, and ordered that Mancinus, as its guarantor, be clapped in irons and left outside the walls of Numantia. (The Celtiberians did not see this as much consolation and ignored him. Mancinus returned to Rome and, since he was a Roman aristocrat, commissioned a statue of himself naked and in chains. This was displayed prominently in his house to remind visitors of the time he had been willing to sacrifice himself for the good of the Republic.) Cato did not have a good case for comparing Caesar to men like Mancinus. In the past men had only been handed over to an enemy when the Romans were seeking reasons for recent defeats or wished to avoid an inconvenient treaty. Caesar had won victory after victory, and as long as he continued to do so it was unthinkable that the Senate would actually agree to Cato's demand, particularly while Pompey and Crassus were consuls. Yet there clearly was disquiet among the senators and it may well have been on this occasion that the Senate actually voted to send a commission to `investigate the state of the Gallic provinces'.13 As far as we know no such commission was ever actually sent. Cato's criticism had clearly stung Caesar, for he chose to send a letter defending his actions to a friend who read it out at a meeting of the Senate, `and when it was read, with its abundant insults and denunciations of Cato, Cato rose to his feet and showed, not in anger or contentiousness, but as if from calculation and due preparation, that the accusations against him bore the marks of abuse and scoffing, and were childishness and vulgarity on Caesar's part'.14 Cato was too good an actor not to be able to milk the situation to his advantage. Had Caesar been present then his oratory might well have been more persuasive, and at the very least he could have realised that he was losing the debate and changed tack. This was the weakness of his position in these years, for he could not take part in the meetings of the Senate or public gatherings at Rome. After his letter had been read out, Cato was able to plunge into a detailed attack of all of Caesar's actions. For the moment he, and those who shared his hostility to Caesar, could do no more than this, but their continued sniping showed no sign of going away and was always in the background, even when the Republic was formally celebrating the proconsul's achievements."

  News of the slaughter of the Tencteri and Usipetes would not have reached Rome for some time, so it is unlikely that these debates occurred until late in 55 BC. Immediately after his success, Caesar had decided to take his army across the Rhine in a display of force intended to deter any other German tribes from invading Gaul. The Ubii had already given him hostages and sought his protection from the Suebi, providing further justification for the
expedition. The tribe now offered to supply him with boats to ferry the army over the river, but the proconsul felt that it was `too risky, and beneath his own dignity and that of the Roman people' to employ such a method. Instead he set the legions to building a bridge, the design of which was described in loving detail in the Commentaries, for the Romans valued the engineering skills of their soldiers almost as much as their battlefield successes. In ten days the bridge was complete and strongly garrisoned forts set to protect both ends of it. The location of the bridge remains a mystery - as, in spite of Caesar's description, do some details of its construction. However, somewhere between modern Coblenz and Andernach seems likely 16

 

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