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Caesar: Life of a Colossus

Page 50

by Adrian Goldsworthy


  It is not clear why Pompey chose 13 November as the new date for the end of Caesar's command. It was not much of a concession, since he would still have had the best part of a year to wait before the consular elections in the autumn of 49 BC. It might have been acceptable to Caesar if he wanted to stand for the consulship in the elections at the end of 50 BC, but he does not seem to have made any attempt to secure exemption from law decreeing a ten-year interval between consulships. In any case, given the circumstances he may have decided that this was unlikely to succeed. By June, Caelius was reporting that Marcellus suggested negotiating with the tribunes, but the Senate voted against any such compromise. Curio continued to insist that Caesar's command should not be discussed independently and that he must be treated in the same way as Pompey. A year before there had been talk of Pompey going out to Spain - now some suggested that either he or Caesar should go to deal with the Parthians. Cicero was very nervous that the latter might launch an all-out invasion of Rome's eastern provinces before he could give up his own post as governor of Cilicia - knowing that once an attack occurred it would be dishonourable for him to leave. That summer the Senate decided to take one legion from Pompey's and another from Caesar's armies and send the troops out to bolster Rome's forces on the Parthian border. Pompey decided to send the one that he had loaned to Caesar in 54 BC, and which had been campaigning with him ever since. Effectively this meant that Caesar lost two legions, but before he sent the men on their way he gave each soldier a bounty of 250 denarii, a sum amounting to more than one year's pay. The whole affair seemed even more suspicious when the two units marched back to Italy and then remained there, no one making any effort to send them overseas. A young member of the Claudian family had collected the troops from Gaul and returned claiming that Caesar's entire army was disaffected. It was just what Pompey wanted to believe.

  Soon afterwards Pompey fell ill, suffering from a recurring fever that may possibly have been malaria. Apparently spontaneously, people throughout Italy began praying and making offerings for the return to health of the man who had performed such great services to the Republic. When he recovered the celebrations were ecstatic, crowds greeting him all along his route as he went from Naples back to the outskirts of Rome. Pompey had always thrived on adoration, whether from his wives, his soldiers or the people, and was deeply moved. More dangerously he interpreted this enthusiasm as a clear sign of widespread devotion to his cause. While still ill he had sent word to the Senate that he was willing to resign his command, assuring them that Caesar would do the same. Curio responded by saying that that would be fine, as long as Pompey laid down his post first. By August Caelius was speaking to Cicero of the prospect of civil war. `If neither of the two sets off on a Parthian war, then I can see great discord ahead, which will be decided by cold steel and brute force. They are both well prepared in spirit and with armies."2

  Yet there was little enthusiasm for conflict beyond the immediate partisans, as was shown when the Senate debated the issue on 1 December. Curio again proposed that both Caesar and Pompey should give up their commands simultaneously. The consul Marcellus split this into two and presented separate motions to the House. The first, that Caesar should resign, was passed by a big majority, but the second asking Pompey to do the same was defeated by a similarly large margin. When Curio responded by asking the Senate to divide on the motion that both men should resign, the result was highly revealing. Only twenty-two senators voted against this, but no fewer than 370 backed it. The `back bench' pedarii had lived up to their name and voted with their feet, even though most of the great names had been with the twenty-two. Marcellus dismissed the meeting, declaring `If that is what you want, be Caesar's slaves!', and the votes were ignored. It had not been a victory for Caesar, since a clear majority had wanted him to lay down his provinces and his army, while supporting Pompey's claim to retain his command. Yet in the end what it had shown was that nearly the entire Senate wanted peace above all else. They were certainly not committed to Caesar's cause, but nor were they eager to risk civil war on behalf of Pompey, still less of Cato, Domitius and their associates. By this time Cicero had come back to Italy from his province and his view was similar. He felt that Caesar's demands were outrageously excessive, but even so preferred to grant them rather than allow the Republic to tear itself apart. He, like many others, remembered the dark days of the struggle between Sulla and the Marians and had no wish to see such ghastly strife repeated. In his view there was still the chance for compromise and a peaceful settlement. Perhaps there was, but the mood of the main participants in the dispute had hardened to the point where war was becoming more and more likely.13

  A hard core of distinguished senators loathed Caesar, many of them for personal as well as political reasons. Much of this hatred was not entirely rational. There were memories of his popularis behaviour as aedile and praetor, and even worse his turbulent consulship. To Cato and his associates Caesar was the Catiline who had never quite allowed his villainy to become so open. They saw the effect of his charm on others - on other men's wives as often as on the crowd in the Forum - but felt that they had seen past it, which only made it all the more frustrating that others had not. It can never have helped that Cato's half-sister had been one of Caesar's most ardent lovers. Cato, his son-in-law Bibulus and brother-in-law Domitius Ahenobarbus had stood up to Caesar in the past and had had their moments of success. More often they had simply pushed Caesar into going further, and time after time he had got away with it, riding roughshod over them in 59 BC. They despised Caesar as a man, which made his obviously exceptional talent in public life and as an army commander all the more galling. Appius Claudius, older brother of Clodius, who had co-operated with Caesar much of the time, was obsessed with maintaining the dignity of his ancient patrician heritage. One of his daughters was married to Servilia's son and Cato's nephew Brutus, and another to Pompey's eldest son. Opposition did not just come from Cato's extended family, for families like the Marcelli and Lentuli did not like to see their current resurgence of electoral success overshadowed. For Metellus Scipio there was concern both to live up to his famous ancestors - both real and adopted - and eagerness to exploit the advantages offered by his marriage tie to Pompey.

  Ultimately, no Roman senator liked to see another man excelling him in glory and influence. It was not so much what Caesar had done that provoked their hostility - most would have happily praised the same deeds, especially his victories in Gaul, if only they had been performed by someone else, or better yet by several other men so that no one individual gained too much glory. Men from established families were raised to believe that they deserved to guide the Republic, but Caesar's eminence robbed them of much of this role. Now there was a chance to end his career - preferably in court, and a court that shared their view of the accused and the need to be rid of him, but if not, by armed force. Pompey's aid made this possible and so, for the moment, he was useful enough for his own anomalous position to be ignored. In the future then it might be possible to discard him or at least reduce his dominance. Since he first hinted that he was not firmly committed to backing Caesar's demands, Pompey had encouraged his opponents. Cato at least does seem to have hoped to avoid civil war, and once it began made some effort to moderate the vehemence with which it was fought. His expectation was that Caesar could be forced to submit. The attitude of his allies was less clear. Some of them clearly hoped to profit from war. Cicero was surprised and rather disgusted by the militancy he saw in many of these men. He could also see no sense in fighting Caesar after years of allowing him to become so powerful.14

  Pompey's attitude was different. Even at the end he would have been content for Caesar to return to public life so long as it was in a way that made it clear that he was not Pompey's equal, still less his superior. This desire had hardened as the months had gone by, and Curio had made such efforts to place the two men on the same level. Crassus he had been able to accept as an equal, for he was several years his senior and had
fought for Sulla. Perhaps as importantly, Pompey had always been confident that his own charisma and spectacular military exploits - three triumphs compared with Crassus' mere ovation - gave him a comfortable advantage over his rival. Caesar was younger by just six years, but more importantly he had done nothing when Pompey had formed and led his own armies to victory, and in this respect his career was decades behind. He found it easier to like Caesar than Crassus, but perhaps in part that was because he did not see him as a competitor, at least at first. Even after Caesar's successes in Gaul, Germany and Britain, Pompey still viewed him as a junior ally. After all he had won triumphs on three continents - Asia, Africa and Europe - and defeated many different opponents, some of them Roman, in the process and not just barbarian tribes. `What if my son wants to attack me with a stick?' - the comment implied not just the ease of dealing with such a threat, but how absurdly unlikely it was that it would even happen. Pompey did not want civil war, but had little doubt that he could win it if the worst came to the worst and it occurred. Around this time he would begin to boast that he had only to stamp his foot and armies would spring up from the soil of Italy. In the end Caesar must realise that he needed to respect Pompey, accept his terms for coming back, and trust to his friendship for protection in the courts. Curio's attack on his own position made him all the less inclined to grant too many concessions to the proconsul in Gaul. Caesar would have to see sense, but he could still be very useful to Pompey, who was aware that Cato and his allies had no great love for him either.

  Caesar claimed later that he had to fight a civil war in order to defend his dignitas - his reputation. In his view the laws of his consulship had been necessary and effective, especially the land laws. Since then he had served the Republic well, defending its interests and its allies, and making Roman power respected in regions that had never before seen a legion. For these achievements the Senate had awarded him no less than three public thanksgivings of unprecedented length. Now his command was to be prematurely curtailed - at least in his view - while the law put forward by all ten tribunes in 52 BC as an expression of the will of the Roman people was being set aside both in detail and in spirit. His enemies, ignoring all his successes, were boasting of attacking and condemning him because of his consulship almost a decade ago. The great men of the Republic were not taken to court. Pompey had not been prosecuted since his youth, before he had raised his own legions. No one had ever dared to bring Crassus to trial. Simply having to defend himself would have been a great blow to Caesar's pride and auctoritas. There was also the very real danger that he might be condemned, especially if the court was controlled by enemies. As consul his behaviour had been controversial at the very least, although innocence or guilt was seldom the decisive factor in Roman trials. Milo's fate offered a warning, as did that of Gabinius, the man who as tribune in 67 BC had secured Pompey the command against the pirates, and as consul in 58 IBC: with Caesar's father-in-law Calpurnius Piso had helped to secure the triumvirate's position. After that he had gone to govern Syria and, largely on his own initiative, had taken his army into Egypt to restore the deposed Ptolemy XII, a highly profitable enterprise. Yet he was a deeply unpopular man and, in spite of his money and the support of Pompey, he was eventually condemned when he returned to Rome in 53 BC, going into exile.

  Caesar could easily have suffered a similar fate, but at the very least would have been politically damaged, when any hint of vulnerability would attract further prosecutions. He would therefore be taking a great risk if he placed his trust in Pompey's protection and gave up his command. Even if he chose to support Caesar, Pompey might not have been able to save him. In any case, Cicero's exile had demonstrated that Pompey was not always reliable. Had Caesar given up his command he could have retained his imperium and the command of some detachments of troops and remained just outside Rome, on the reasonable basis of waiting to celebrate the triumph that must surely be awarded for his victories in Gaul. Until he entered the city and so laid down his imperium he would remain exempt from prosecution. Yet there was no guarantee that if he did this he would still be permitted to become a consular candidate in accordance with the tribunician law While still in command of three provinces and an army of ten legions, his bargaining position was strong. After well over a year of attacks on his position, he was very reluctant to sacrifice this. He knew that his enemies were determined to destroy him. Pompey's attitude was never easy to read. By the close of 50 BC Caesar felt himself backed into a corner, reluctant to place too much faith on his old ally."s

  A century later the poet Lucan would write that `Caesar could not accept a superior, nor Pompey an equal.' For him, the Civil War was virtually inevitable after Julia's death severed the close bond between them, while Crassus' loss in Parthia removed from each the fear that he could end up fighting alone against the other two. It was a fairly common view in the ancient world and contains more than a grain of truth. Yet this tends to imply an inevitability about the Civil War, and this should not be pushed too far. Even in the last months before the war broke out, neither Caesar nor Pompey seems to have believed that the other would not back down, or at least offer acceptable terms. The long dispute had eroded their trust in each other, however, and this made compromise far harder. They had raised the stakes, which added to their nervousness about making a mistake at the last minute. The outcome of the autumn's elections further increased the tension. The third Marcellus would become consul in the new year, with a colleague from another noble family. They had beaten Servius Sulpicius Galba, who had served competently as Caesar's legate for most of the Gallic campaigns, one of the few patricians to serve with him for any length of time. Appius Claudius and Caesar's father-in-law Calpurnius Piso became censors. The former began to purge the Senate of men he considered to be unfit, something that was generally seen as ironic given his own dubious reputation, and his targets were mostly men believed to be associated with Caesar. Sallust, the future historian, was expelled at this time and soon joined Caesar. An attack on Curio was thwarted by Piso and the consul Paullus, but still resulted in a brawl in the Senate during which the tribune tore the censor's robe. There was also a vacancy in the priestly college of augurs and Domitius Ahenobarbus was enraged to be beaten in the race for this by Mark Antony, who was also elected tribune for the coming year. Most of Caesar's opponents were united only in their hatred of him, so it would be a mistake to see their actions as co-ordinated. Yet there was a sense that the proconsul of Gaul was vulnerable, and this encouraged their hostility and so helped to make him even more suspicious and nervous. The mood on both sides was scarcely conducive to compromise.16

  Mark Antony would play a major role in what followed and it is worth pausing to consider this flamboyant character. He had already proved himself to be a courageous and skilful soldier, leading Gabinius' cavalry during the operations in Judaea and Egypt. In 52 Bc he was Caesar's quaestor and had served in the campaign against Vercingetorix, as well as the rebellions of the following year. The two men were distant relations, for Antony's mother was a Julia, although from the other branch of the family. Her brother was the Lucius Julius Caesar who was consul in 64 BC. In the familiar Roman way, Antony's father and grandfather were both also named Marcus Antonius. His grandfather was one of the leading orators of his day, but was killed in the purge that accompanied Marius' return to Rome in 87 iic. His father was given a special command to deal with the pirate problem in 74 iic but could not call on the resources later lavished on Pompey and was defeated, dying shortly afterwards. Antony was only nine at the time. His mother soon remarried, and the boy spent much of his formative years in the house of his step-father Lentulus, one of the Catilinarian conspirators executed on Cicero's orders in 63 BC. This may well have given little cause for Antony to like the orator, but there is no evidence that the bitter feud between the two men developed until much later. After Caesar's death, Cicero's rhetoric - especially his famous Philippics, a series of virulent speeches modelled on those originally delivere
d by the famous orator Demosthenes warning the Athenians of the threat posed by Alexander the Great's father, King Philip II of Macedon - would do much to blacken Antony's name. Yet in spite of the exaggeration and bias, other sources suggest that Antony had genuinely provided plenty of material with which Cicero could work. As already noted, tradition maintained that it was Curio who had first introduced Antony to wild parties, wine and women (see p.365). Whether or not this was true, there is no doubt that Antony took immediately to all such things with enormous enthusiasm and almost no self-restraint. There was a great passion in the man that seemed always ready to boil over, and which gave force and massive determination to all that he did. His oratory, his soldiering - as well as his drunkenness and womanizing - all seem to have had a power behind them that came from his personality more than skill or training. A big, burly man, it was said that he liked to be compared with Hercules, just as Pompey had enjoyed references to himself as a new Alexander. As tribune, Antony's strident character would make him hard to ignore, and even harder for Caesar's opponents to browbeat. Yet for more subtle negotiation Caesar would need to rely more on men like Balbus, the equestrian from Spain who privately acted as his agent. Antony was unlikely to give anyone the impression that the proconsul was keen for compromise and did not plan a radical second term as consul."

  'THE DIE IS CAST'

  Rumour and misinformation also played their part in the growing crisis. In October the story circulated that Caesar had concentrated four legions in Cisalpine Gaul, which was taken as an indication that he was preparing for war. In fact he had only one legion in the province, the Thirteenth, which he claimed was there to secure the border areas against barbarian raiding. In early December, shortly after the disgusted Marcellus had dismissed a Senate for wanting to disarm both men and avoid conflict, another report came to Rome claiming that Caesar had already massed his army and invaded Italy. The story was false, but the consul probably did not know this and now urged the Senate to act. Helped no doubt by Curio, but also by the reluctance of the overwhelming majority to plunge into war, the House refused. Accompanied by the consuls elect, but not by his own colleague, Marcellus went to Pompey and presented him with a sword and called on him to protect the Republic. He was given command of the two legions recalled from Gaul ostensibly for the projected war against Parthia and instructed to raise more troops. None of this was legal, since the Senate had not approved the action or granted emergency powers. Pompey told them that he would accept their charge and fight, if this proved necessary. He began trying to recruit troops, but no aggressive moves were made. In part this was because the troops were not ready to fight, but the discovery that the rumour was untrue must have played a part.

 

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