Caesar: Life of a Colossus

by Adrian Goldsworthy

  Caesar had returned to Rome for the first time in nine years. At most, he stayed for a couple of weeks and then pressed on to join the army massing for the Spanish campaign. Mark Antony was left in charge of Italy. From Cicero's correspondence we know that men like Curio, Caelius and Dolabella were all confident that the campaign in Spain would be both swift and successful. Sardinia and Sicily were soon taken without meeting any serious resistance. Caesar had won a victory in the Italian campaign, but it was a hollow one in the sense that Pompey and his army had escaped. The war would go on and was already widening. In time it would spread to virtually all the lands around the Mediterranean. Caesar's enemies were still powerful and would grow stronger. In Italy people were relieved that he had not turned out to be a Sulla, but few had so far been turned into his enthusiastic supporters.21

  THE ILERDA CAMPAIGN, APRIL TO AUGUST, 49 BC

  Caesar described the Pompeians in Spain as an army without a general. Three legates commanded the seven Pompeian legions in the Spanish Peninsula, but they did not prove an effective team. One, Marcus Terentius Varro, was widely respected as a scholar and during his lifetime wrote a long list of books on an exceptionally broad range of subjects. He had a long political association with Pompey, having in 70 BC written a manual for him on the procedures of the Senate. He had served as his legate before and in 49 Bc had charge of Further Spain, but seems to have had only modest military ability. During the campaign his army did not join the main Pompeian force and played no significant role. Most of the fighting was done by the remaining five legions under the command of Marcus Petreius and Lucius Afranius. Petreius was the more experienced of the two. He had been in effective control of the army that defeated Catiline in 63 BC. According to Sallust he had already served for thirty years at that time. It is possible that he was the son of one of Marius' senior centurions. By the time of the Civil War he must have been about sixty and, although a very experienced campaigner, had mainly acted as someone else's subordinate. Afranius was the consul for 60 BC, better known as a dancer than for any other talents. He had taken part in several of Pompey's campaigns and so had some military experience, but had never held an independent command. As an ex-consul he was senior to Petreius, but it is unclear whether he took charge or the two men acted as if they had joint authority. In addition to their five legions they had substantial auxiliary forces, including some 10,000 cavalry and eighty cohorts of Spanish infantry. The latter were predominantly heavy infantry (scutati), but also included units of light infantrymen (caetrati) armed with javelins and small circular shield S.22

  Caesar sent orders for his legate Caius Fabius to take the three legions in the west of the Transalpine province at Narbo and secure the passes of the Pyrenees. Once this was done, Fabius pushed on to close with Afranius and Petreius who had concentrated near the town of Ilerda (modern Lerida). Messengers went to three other legions instructing them to march and join Fabius, along with 5,000 auxiliary infantry and 6,000 allied and auxiliary cavalry. Caesar himself followed, but paused en route outside Massilia. This ancient Greek colony was one of Rome's oldest allies. As proconsul of Gaul he had taken care to honour and favour the community, but the place also had a strong connection with Pompey dating back to the war against Sertorius. Now the city closed its gates to Caesar's men and refused to let him enter. The Massilian magistrates claimed that they did not understand the intricacies of Roman politics, but felt that they could not side with either Caesar or Pompey against the other. This plea of neutrality soon rang a little hollow when they let Domitius Ahenobarbus sail into their harbour with a force raised from his own household and slaves. The latter's family connections with the region may also have encouraged them to welcome him. Unabashed by his recent surrender and release, Domitius Ahenobarbus had finally reached the province he had craved for so many years. The Massiliotes immediately gave him command of the defence and readied themselves to face a siege. Caesar moved three legions to the town and placed them under the command of Caius Trebonius. In support was a squadron of warships under the command of Decimus Brutus, the same man who had led the fleet against the Veneti. After moving them into place and beginning the siege, Caesar left his subordinates to the task and pressed on, escorted by a personal bodyguard of 900 German auxiliary horsemen. It was a busy time, with plans having to be made and appropriate orders despatched. The loss of Massilia to the enemy was a blow, for it was a major port and its facilities and merchant fleet would have been a great asset in supplying the army fighting in Spain. Yet time was not on Caesar's side and he could not afford to wait. However, in spite of the pressures of command he still found time to write letters to prominent men. Cicero received one from him that had been written just a few days before he reached Massilia. In it Caesar urged the orator against any rash act such as joining Pompey.23

  By the time Caesar joined Fabius in June, the six legions were already concentrated in one force along with most of the allies and auxiliaries. The units were probably the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Fourteenth. In numbers the enemy may - or may not, since we do not know the strengths of individual units on either side - have had a slight numerical advantage. Spirit and experience were very much in Caesar's favour. In spite of the money taken from the Treasury it remained a struggle to meet all the costs of fighting the war. Therefore, `at this time he borrowed money from the military tribunes and centurions; and distributed the cash to the soldiers. By doing this he achieved two things at once, since he took a security for the loyalty of the centurions and won the enthusiasm of the legionaries with his largess.' Caesar's army was confident, but the enemy had taken up a strong defensive position. Their main camp was situated on the same ridge as the town of Ilerda itself. A smaller force controlled the bridge over the River Sicoris (modern Segre), which separated the two armies. Before Caesar arrived Fabius had constructed two bridges some 4 miles apart and crossed over to the enemy-held west bank. With two substantial armies sitting in position close to each other over the following days and weeks supply soon became a problem, and both sides regularly sent foraging expeditions to the east side of the river as food and forage became increasingly difficult to obtain. Two of Fabius' legions were out on such an expedition when the bridge they had crossed suddenly collapsed. Fortunately, a relief force crossing by the more distant remaining bridge was able to reach them before they were too badly handled by four legions and a strong force of cavalry sent by Afranius to attack them.24

  Caesar arrived two days after the skirmish. The broken bridge was almost repaired and under his orders the work was completed during the night. That same day he carried out a thorough reconnaissance, looking particularly at the terrain. The next morning he led out the entire army, save for six cohorts left behind to protect the camp and the bridge, and advanced to form up in battle order at the bottom of the slope in front of the Pompeian camp. Afranius and Petreius responded to this challenge, but deployed their line no more than halfway down the slope, not too far from the rampart of his own camp. In the manner typical of warfare in this period, the two armies then stared at each other for some time, neither wishing to go forward any further and force a battle. Caesar was reluctant to risk fighting with the ground in the enemy's favour. At some point in the day he claims to have learnt - presumably from prisoners or deserters - that it was Afranius' caution that was holding the enemy back. He decided to establish a new camp on the spot, but as on similar occasions in the past was careful to make sure that his troops did not become vulnerable to attack by the nearby enemy during the construction. The legions were formed in the normal triplex acies, so Caesar withdrew the cohorts of the third line and set them to digging a 15-foot wide ditch. As an added precaution they did not construct a rampart, since this would have been too visible. Even without its protection, such a wide ditch would seriously obstruct an enemy charge. By the evening it was ready, and Caesar withdrew the rest of the army behind the line of the ditch. During the night he kept the men under arms, but the enemy mad
e no hostile move. On the following day three legions formed up for battle facing the enemy, while the remaining units, sending parties out to fetch the necessary material for a rampart, in the meantime dug ditches leading back at right angles from the first to create a greater semblance of a camp. The covering force easily repelled enemy harassing attacks and the work was completed. The next day ramparts were finally added behind the ditches.25

  Caesar next attempted to occupy a hillock that dominated the ground between the Pompeian camp and the town of Ilerda. He took three legions with him and sent the leading elements of one of them to seize the hill. Afranius had observed the column marching out and his own men were able to beat them in the race to get there first, driving back Caesar's men as they tried to scramble up the slope. The Commentaries lay some of the blame for this failure on the enemy fighting in the same style as the Spanish tribes, moving at speed and caring little about their formation. While this may well be true - Caesar notes that troops stationed in one place for a long time tend to be influenced by local fighting styles - it may also have been intended to depict his enemy as less Roman than his own men. It was harder to excite an audience by a description of fighting against fellow countrymen than against the wild tribes of Gaul. The fighting went on for much of the day, as each side fed in reserves. The position was narrow and no more than three cohorts could fit into the space and form a fighting line. Losses were heavy on both sides, but after five hours men of the Ninth Legion had enough energy left to charge sword in hand and close one last time with the enemy. The Pompeians gave way for long enough to allow Caesar's men to withdraw Caesar lost seventy dead, including a senior centurion of the Fourteenth Legion and some 600 wounded, while the enemy suffered around 200 casualties including one Primus pilus and four other centurions. Both sides believed that they had won, but the basic truth was that Caesar had failed to capture the position he had attacked.26

  The weather then took a hand, heavy rain causing the river to flood and wash away both of Fabius' bridges. For the moment Caesar and the army were cut off from the supplies brought by allies as well as reinforcement. One party of Gauls coming to join Caesar was attacked by a large enemy raiding force and took some losses before it was able to pull back to a defensive position. All attempts to repair the bridges at first failed and the basic ration had to be cut to a level that could not long be sustained without the soldiers' health suffering badly. After some days the legionaries were set to making simple leather-covered, timber-framed boats of the type they had seen in Britain. Under cover of darkness these were carried in carts to a spot 22 Roman miles away and a small camp was built behind a hill next to the river. Later a legion was sent there and, after sending detachments across to the far bank, was able to build a new bridge in just two days. The Gauls, along with the supply convoy they were escorting, were then able to use the bridge and join the main army. For the moment the crisis was over, but Caesar was no nearer to defeating the enemy. There were encouraging signs when a number of Spanish communities, sensing that the odds were shifting in his favour, sent envoys promising to defect to him. All were asked to supply him with the wheat he so desperately needed. The new bridge was a vital lifeline, but the distance did not make it convenient for all purposes. Caesar's legionaries now dug canals to channel the water of the Sicoris and so create a crude ford. By this time the two Pompeian legates felt that they were too exposed, for the enemy cavalry had grown in numbers and confidence and was making their own foraging difficult. They decided to withdraw to the region occupied by the Celtiberians who were especially well disposed towards Pompey.27

  They prepared carefully, ordering ships and barges to be gathered all along the River Ebro and brought to the town of Octogesa, some 30 miles from their camp. The craft were used to create a pontoon-style bridge over the wide Ebro. The work did not go unnoticed by Caesar's scouting patrols, and by coincidence the project was completed on the same day as the improvised ford in the Sicoris was felt to be usable. Afranius and Petreius had a route across the biggest obstacle in their path. They knew that once over the Ebro they would be free from immediate pursuit, at least for a few days. However, they also knew that they first needed to get the army as far as Octogesa. Two of their legions crossed the Sicoris by the bridge outside the town and camped on the eastern bank. During the night the rest of the Pompeian army, save for two cohorts left to garrison Ilerda, marched across to join up with the two legions and the entire force then set off towards the Ebro. Caesar's outposts reported the movement, and Caesar sent out cavalry to harass and slow down the enemy column. When the sun rose he could see from the high ground near his camp that the Pompeian rearguard was hard pressed by his own horsemen and was having to stop and form up repeatedly to drive the pursuers back. The legionaries knew what was happening and via the tribunes and centurions urged Caesar to let them risk the man-made ford and go across the river to fight. Encouraged by their enthusiasm, he led out five legions, leaving the remaining unit to guard the camp. The cavalry formed a screen above and below the crossing point, and the troops managed to wade through without suffering any losses. In spite of their later start, the advance guard came up with the Pompeian rearguard by late afternoon. Both armies deployed facing each other, but the Pompeians had no wish to fight and remained on high ground, while Caesar's men were tired. Both armies camped for the night. Ahead of the Pompeians was a line of hills and the two legates planned another night march in order to reach the pass through these before the enemy. The plan failed when it was revealed to Caesar by some prisoners. Though it was still dark he ordered the trumpet call to he sounded that would raise his men. Hearing this, and realising that surprise was lost, the Pompeians went back to camp.28

  The next day both sides sent out small reconnaissance patrols to investigate the routes through the hills and confirm the presence of a pass some 5 miles away. Whoever gained possession of this would he able to deny the route to the enemy. The night march having failed, the Pompeians decided to move at dawn. Their camp was between Caesar and the pass, but they were encumbered by a baggage train, whereas the Caesareans had only basic equipment and minimal rations. Caesar set out before dawn, surprising his enemies by heading off in a different direction. Relief turned to dismay as his column slowly began to swing to the right and head round towards the pass. The Pompeians set out and the two sides raced to get there first. Caesar's men had a more difficult route, but had started earlier and were more lightly burdened. His cavalry also continued to harass the enemy column and slow it down. The Caesareans won the contest, and Afranius and Petreius halted their despondent troops. The officers and men in Caesar's army were all keen for battle with the enemy at such a disadvantage of position and morale, and pressed him to give the order to attack. Caesar refused, believing that the enemy, cut off from all supplies, would have to surrender anyway. He saw no need to waste the lives of any of his soldiers, or even of the citizens fighting for the enemy. This provoked some muttering from his veterans and half-hearted talk of not fighting whenever he finally did give the order.

  Battle of Ilerda

  Over the next days the two sides began building lines of fortification, the Pompeians to secure a water supply and Caesar to hem them in and deny them this. During the work large numbers of men on both sides began to fraternise with the enemy, seeking out relatives, friends and neighbours. Some Pompeian officers were already speaking of capitulation, and Afranius' own son sent a friend to treat with Caesar. His father's will to go on seems to have collapsed, but Petreius was still determined and led out his bodyguard of Spanish cavalry and light infantry to massacre every Caesarean soldier they found mingling with their own troops. Some managed to fight their way out, while others were hidden by Pompeian troops and allowed to slip away during the night. Caesar let all the enemy troops in his own lines either go freely or stay as they wished. Petreius begged his soldiers to remain loyal and took an oath never `to desert or betray the army and its officers, or to think of personal safety befor
e the common good'. He cajoled Afranius into taking the same oath, followed by the senior and then the more junior officers, and finally the ordinary soldiers.29

  The Pompeians made one last attempt to break out of the encirclement. Caesar followed, continually harrying the retreating column. The enemy was again hemmed in, this time in an even worse position with no water supply at all. Caesar still wished to avoid battle and both sides again set to building lines of fortifications. An attempt by the Pompeians to recross the Sicoris was blocked and with their forage almost exhausted Afranius sought peace terms from Caesar. The latter berated the enemy generals for needlessly wasting lives. Nevertheless, as at Corfininium and throughout the war so far, all of them were allowed to go free. Their army was disbanded, Caesar carefully supervising the process. By this time in Further Spain, the remaining legate Varro had been so encouraged by Afranius' earlier, highly optimistic reports, that he decided to prove himself a keen agent of Pompey and the cause. He held levies and massed supplies. After the surrender at Ilerda was complete Caesar headed towards the Further province. Varro's confidence had by this time ebbed as news reached him of Caesar's success and it became apparent that the population of his province was generally well disposed to the victor. His troops deserting him, he swiftly sent word to Caesar and surrendered. All of Spain was now under Caesar's control. Although there were difficult moments, his expectation of rapid success had proved to be justified. By the end of the summer the resistance at Massilia also ended. This time Domitius Ahenobarbus managed to escape by ship shortly before the city surrendered and so was not captured for a second time. He would fight against Caesar again. So would Afranius and Petreius, who like him were ready to accept their enemy's mercy, but did not hate him any the less for it. Nor was there any sign that Pompey and his more senior allies were any more eager for peace other than through victory. The war would go on.3o