Brilliant New Light (Chance Lyon military adventure series Book 3)

by Van Torrey

  As soon as Chambers received the message from the shopkeeper and cabled the information to Langley, CIA Director Mitchell dispatched her ace troubleshooter, Max Jenkins, who was waiting for orders at the American Embassy in Dubai, to Islamabad in anticipation of the return of Colonel Kim to Islamabad. Upon arrival he met with Chambers at the Embassy.

  Chambers and Jenkins were old hands at CIA and had trained at The Farm together early in their careers. Chambers was one of the few career station chiefs who was not threatened or intimidated by Jenkins’ aloof and often brusque methods. As a station chief in a sensitive post, one had either assiduously paved the way with unqualified cooperation for one of Max Jenkins’ Missions-to-Hell at the behest of unknown masters at the top of the CIA food chain, or seriously regretted that they had impeded his carte blanche methods and means to whatever end he was pursuing. Chambers immediately escorted Jenkins to an area of the embassy free from any potential for electronic bugs and offered him a single malt scotch from his private reserve. “I see Marilyn has sent the heavy artillery, Max. How can I get out of your way?” asked Chambers facetiously.

  “Doug, you’re one of the few I haven’t tangled assholes with in the past few years,” replied Jenkins. “These guy’s egos just can’t stand it when Langley sends someone out to deal with an issue on their turf. I used to get defensive about their theatrics, but I just blow it off now. Maybe I’m getting soft. Ya think?”

  “You, going softer, Max? Not a chance! Maybe older, but not softer.”

  “That was low blow, Doug, but probably true,” he said with resignation. “One of these days I’m gonna pack it in, or get packed in by one of my tormentees. But, down to business. I’ve been briefed at Langley on Colonel Kim, but I’ve found there’s nothing like getting it from the guy on the ground. Apparently, that’s you. By the way, you probably lengthened your career and buoyed your retirement by bringing this guy in.”

  The next few minutes were spent with Chambers giving Max Jenkins a detailed crash course on Colonel Kim and the dealings between him and the Station Chief up to the very moment.

  “Yesterday I got word from a resource here in Islamabad that Colonel Kim is back and needs to check-in. This might be connected with him being sighted in Pyongyang recently. Anyway, I cabled Langley with the news and here you are. Want to tell me what’s up?”

  Max thought for a moment and then answered. “Doug, this guy is an extremely important asset for us. According to the people I talk to back home, aside from some unreliable small fry, he’s about the only HUMINT asset we have into the upper echelons of the DPRK. The South Koreans have some sources, but they don’t share them with us as much as we would like.”

  “So they sent you out to get to know him,” suggested the Station Chief.

  “Yes, and to see how he responds to talking to someone other than his regular handler. We don’t want to get careless with this guy, and give him a chance to double on us. The fact that he has just returned from Pyongyang and has asked to see you could either be a clumsy attempt at becoming a double-agent, or something legitimate. The former would be unfortunate and very messy. The latter might be a positive for us. I am prepared for either eventuality.”

  The Station Chief knew that the presence of Max Jenkins was a major turning point in the relationship with Colonel Kim. Up until now the information he had turned over to Chambers had been useful and thought to be accurate. Additionally, the tradecraft had been refined to the point that contacts had been easy to arrange, with no danger of compromise to either party. It was now time to ratchet up the expectations from Colonel Kim for more detailed information about the Pakistani nuclear program as well as whatever cooperative activities were taking place between Pakistan and North Korea, particularly in light of the new regime of General Fhang. This would entail greater risk on the part of Colonel Kim, but he was being paid well. Up to now the risk-to-reward ratio had been decidedly in the Colonel’s favor. Max Jenkins was in Islamabad to either terminate the relationship or level the playing field more in favor of the CIA.

  General Kim was seated in the upper room of the smoke shop when the two Americans cautiously entered a little after midnight. He rose and greeted Doug Chambers as Chamber’s alias of “Mr. Roberts” and gave a tentative glance at Max Jenkins. “Good evening, Colonel. I would like to introduce you to my colleague, Mr. Hill,” said Chambers evenly. “He has come a long way and is very interested in meeting you in person.”

  Kim extended his hand confidently to Jenkins and took the lead, “I am pleased to meet you if you are a colleague of Mr. Roberts. Are you, by chance, the person who has communicated with me previously under the name of Marker?” General Kim was referring to the original written communication he had received from Rachel Hunter, then Director of National Intelligence, informing him in gracious, but blunt, terms that he had basically one choice to make about his immediate future. He was to become a paid HUMINT asset, more bluntly, a spy, for the CIA, or have his illegal, disloyal, and unethical activities cooperating with the Islamic Republic of Iran revealed to his masters in Pyongyang. The latter would result in death to him and torture for as many of his family members, however far removed, that could be found. The fact he was here in the upper room of the smoke shop tonight was testimony to the choice he had made that fateful day.

  “It is good to meet you, Colonel,” replied Jenkins. “I am not Marker. That person is also my employer. I have been asked to convey their best personal regards to you. I am also interested in knowing whether our... arrangement...is working to your satisfaction.”

  “Quite so, Mr. Hill. I have developed a trusting relationship with Mr. Roberts, and I see him as an honorable man, if there is such a thing as honor in your profession,” Kim replied carefully.

  “I have found that there is nothing dishonorable in a civilized exchange of information if both parties are benefitting, but as far as this being an honorable profession, I can render an opinion that it has occasional moments of honor and otherwise,” countered Max Jenkins matter-of-factly. “This is, above all, a profession of expediency.”

  “Of course,” answered Kim, anxious to end this tedious exchange. Both parties knew this was not a social encounter. There was covert work to be done in the dark of this Pakistani night.

  “I understand you wanted to meet, Colonel. Is it something important?” asked Chambers warily.

  “Yes, very much so, Mr. Roberts. I have just returned from a professional visit to Pyongyang and there is much news I wish to pass on. There is also a matter with which I will need your considerable help,” Kim responded.

  For the next thirty minutes Kim produced a treasure trove of intelligence based on what had transpired over the few days he had been in Pyongyang. Chambers and Jenkins were careful not to reveal they had known of his visit there out of caution not to make him aware of the advanced capability of electronic surveillance available to American intelligence.

  The two bombshells Kim revealed were his promotion to the rank of general in the People’s Army and the fact he was to be posted back to Pyongyang as a liaison officer and Aide-de-Camp in the office of General Fhang himself. As Kim’s improbable story unfolded, Max Jenkins’ mind, disciplined and rational as it was, sped out of control with the increased possibilities for vastly increased intelligence from the DPRK that was portended by General Kim’s dramatic change in status.

  It was quickly established that General Kim was genuinely interested in maintaining his arrangement with the American CIA, and Max Jenkins’ preliminary instincts were that Kim was being sincere. When General Kim revealed he had only a very limited time to wrap up his Pakistani affairs and fly back to Pyongyang, both Chambers and Jenkins knew they were going to be taxed to the limit to create some new contact and communications protocols that Kim could securely use from his new post.

  As stringent as the internal security situation was in Pakistan, it was light years easier to conduct covert intelligence gathering activities and get information out of t
hat country than it would be from North Korea. For General Kim to be able to provide the American CIA with meaningful intelligence in a timely manner a unique communications system would have to be established and maintained. Jenkins understood the need, but the technical details would have to be quickly imagined and set up by CIA communications technicians and operations specialists.

  The three men tentatively agreed to meet in one week here in the smoke shop where the protocols and communications systems could be put in place. The fateful meeting broke up as three connected individuals walked away separately into the warm Pakistani night, lost in their own thoughts about the challenges, opportunities, and dangers that lay ahead.

  *

  As wired in to the inner workings of the Central Intelligence Agency apparatus as the veteran Max Jenkins was, given the compartmentalization of the disparate activities in this highly secret mega-institution, he was not aware such a situation as he suddenly encountered with General Kim had already been war-gamed by an elite group of experienced field operators and communications technicians. Thus, when he returned to the embassy in Islamabad and sent a detailed encrypted cable to Langley about the meeting with Gamma, he was pleasantly surprised when early the next day he received a cable indicating that a communications and operational team was on its way to Islamabad and would arrive at the embassy the next day with a comprehensive communication solution for Gamma’s change of status.

  Unlike the days of World War Two, or even the Cold War, when espionage agents took to an attic or a basement and set up a clandestine short-wave radio out of a bulky suitcase to tap away military secrets in Morse code to a faraway receiver, ever fearful of German or Japanese soldiers triangulating their position with mobile radio direction finders, today’s communications technologies were far different. Greatly miniaturized equipment, code-encrypted with sophisticated software algorithms, and capable of compressing a lengthy message in a millisecond burst transmission to an orbiting satellite circling thousands of miles above the Earth made communications very effective and nearly impossible to detect and counter, except with identical code-breaking technology. Such technology was not a strong suit in North Korea’s military intelligence arsenal, and the CIA intended to exploit this weakness to their advantage.

  Blake Simmons of the CIA Office of Technical Services and Helmut Rassner, from the Deputy Director(Operations) office led the small team who came to Islamabad to brief Jenkins and Chambers on the transition plan for Gamma as he moved from Islamabad to Pyongyang. To ensure security of the HUMINT asset and allow physical separation of non-need-to-know CIA people from the asset who might be able to identify and compromise him, the Langley team would have to brief Jenkins and Chambers on the Langley plan. Chambers and Jenkins would, in turn, brief General Kim. Not even South Korean intelligence would be in on the fact that the Americans had a HUMINT asset working at a high level in Pyongyang.

  Rassner briefed on the operations aspect of General Kim’s activities. “The Director feels we have to move slowly with the integration of this asset into a new environment. This is for maximum safety on both sides of the equation. We don’t want to compromise his security as he enters this sensitive environment. Therefore we want to nurture his transition so he can become comfortable with what types of information he can actually provide. Think just because someone can have frequent access to the Presidential Oval Office in Washington doesn’t mean he or she has access to important intelligence. Finally, to validate Gamma’s operational integrity, we want him to provide us with the answers to some questions he may not believe we know already. For background, the South Koreans are obligated to provide us with some intel, maybe reluctantly in some cases, but we are paying part of the bill. For example, we provide certain electronic imagery they do not have. So, in return, they have to fork over some stuff that, quite frankly, we don’t understand how they get. In the end, info from Gamma will either validate or be in conflict with such information and, if the latter, we’ll have to smoke out who’s not being straight with us. It’s basic tradecraft.”

  “How about a handler? Am I about to lose a source?” asked Chambers.

  “The decision is that you will continue as his handler, Doug,” answered Helmut. “Apparently he will be coming back here in Islamabad from time-to-time to manage the new rookie nuke team leader, so face-to-face should be able to be arranged.”

  “What about communications?” asked Jenkins. “Looks like this is going to be all cloak and very little dagger, at least for a while.”

  Once again, Rassner answered, “Tech services has a few interesting goodies up their sleeves. I let Blake Simmons brief you on this. I can’t even program my alarm system at home.”

  Blake Simmons was a veteran CIA electronic “spook” going back to pre-Desert Storm days and had watched electronic communications technology change dramatically since then. He had been the CIA liaison to NSA during the Snowden flap and had navigated the rocks and shoals of various conspiracy theories during the NSA surveillance controversy. His waggish advice to his CIA colleagues during that time was, “Unless you and your girlfriend are having sex in a lead cave, NSA is going to have it on tape - forever!”

  “As far as tools are concerned, we are going to start simple. We’ll start with an Android phone and a tablet computer that will not be suspected as they will probably be issued to General Kim by the army when he gets there. Fortunately, many of the military and otherwise connected elite do have Internet access in North Korea and a few mobile devices are available. We’re sure the Bureau of People’s Security monitors the ‘net and tries to ensure these devices are used strictly for legitimate business, so he will have to be careful. CIA has managed to determine which Chinese company supplies Android communications devices to the DPRK, and we have our hands on some of the latest ones. We have been able to modify the internal electronic hardware of these to replace the original and still fit into the original form factor. At Tech Services we have also managed to modify the electronic guts of an Android phone and tablet to allow for burst transmissions of data to an American communications satellite. For example, we can compress a one megabit.jpeg image or a 20 page written memo into a two millisecond burst of data. Let’s say a monitoring scanner is sweeping frequencies at a point-five megahertz interval. That’s a thousand hits a second over a five megahertz spectrum. If my transmission lasts two milliseconds this scanner has an infinitesimal statistical chance of locking on that burst. And, if so, what do they get? Hash that only a supercomputer with decryption software they don’t have could decipher in several hours. If my sender doesn’t get an immediate confirm signal, he or she aborts what they are doing and knows the transmission has been intercepted.”

  Simmons continued to his fascinated audience. “Rather than working on whatever primitive Internet network the North Koreans have, Gamma will be connected to Tor, the underground network developed by the super-geeks who want to make their presence and activities on the ‘net completely invisible to anyone else.”

  “Basically, transmissions on the Tor network do not go from server-to-server, but rather, through a convoluted series of connected computers and servers which make the origin and the end point of transmissions invisible, in some cases, even to the NSA. Tor, if utilized as a communications medium by a terrorist network, is a tremendous security problem for the United States. To the North Koreans this will be the confusing equivalent of what the American Navajo Code Talkers were to the Japanese in World War Two.”

  The rest of the day was given over to discussing various short phrases meant as code for certain situations or subjects to be memorized by Gamma. The list was short and in Korean, the dominant verbal language of Korea, so General Kim could memorize it with a little repetition. There was to be no written record to accompany him. In a pinch he could send such an innocuous phrase, in of itself benign in nature, to someone who might monitor it. For example, “Beautiful Sunrise” could be code for a certain pre-anticipated event or situation, details of whi
ch could be sent later. “Happy Birthday” could be something associated with a specific date. “I am busy in my work,” would mean traveling to Islamabad in the near future.

  Finally, Blake Simmons had assembled the vital miniature components for substitution into the Android devices General Kim was likely to receive and placed them in a box of chocolates to be carried by General Kim on his return to Pyongyang. Another identical set and the device itself were given to Max Jenkins so he could train Gamma in the substitution when they met for the final time prior to his departure. Simmons supervised the group in sending several pre-arranged test messages over the Tor network and through CIA satellite networks to validate to the group the hardware worked as advertised. Immediate confirming messages from Langley indicated receipt and validity of the process.

  Two days before General Kim was scheduled to leave Pakistan for Pyongyang, he and his two CIA handlers met for the last time in the upper room of the smoke shop. For a full two hours they went over the contact and communications protocols that had been carefully devised by the Operations and Communications planners at Langley. Every known contingency was discussed and a plan to deal with it was devised. Fortunately General Kim was an intelligent man, quick to understand, and agreeable. The final point pleasing Max Jenkins was his perception that General Kim was courageous and, if he did fear compromise that would mean torture and certain death, he appeared to have it under control. In Max Jenkins’ world, fear was a given. Giving in to it was not an option.

  Finally, all the preparations that were possible were complete and the three made their good-byes.

  “There is one thing I have not told you gentlemen,” remarked General Kim off-handily. My sister, So-song, is the companion and mistress to General Fhang. She is an intelligent, but simple person, whom I do not wish to become involved in any of this. She must not know I am working for you or her life would be in danger.”