The Dreadful Renegade: A Thrilling Espionage Novel (Techno thriller, Mystery & Suspense)

by Charles Z David

  June 29th, Islamabad, Pakistan

  Employees at the American embassy in the Diplomatic Enclave of Islamabad noticed that things were not as usual. The US ambassador to Pakistan was nominated to the office in recognition of his financial contributions to the President's election campaign and knew very little about Pakistan and even less about clandestine operations. When Blakey, the CIA station chief, asked for a meeting the ambassador was flattered because during his whole two year term as ambassador he was treated as a figurehead and practically ignored, even ridiculed behind his back, by the professional diplomats and intelligence agents. Blakey introduced Dr. Eugene Powers as a senior NNSA scientist sent on a secret mission by the President himself. He added that all he was allowed to say about the mission was that it concerned US national security and that Pakistan was the focal point, but he could not reveal any details except to say that it involved recovery of highly classified information that was illicitly stolen from a national laboratory that was overseen by the NNSA. The ambassador was taken aback by this introduction and asked Blakey what he was required to do with this, and Blakey said that he wanted the ambassador to arrange an informal, personal meeting with the Pakistani defense minister without the presence of any member from the Pakistani intelligence agency. The ambassador said that this was not according to protocol but he would try to comply with the request. He added that very little happened in Pakistan that the intelligence agency didn't know about, but he would try to arrange a cocktail party, the Fourth of July was just around the corner, and during the reception try to get a word in private with the defense minister. Blakey was a bit surprised that the ambassador came up with this good idea although he had to wait almost a whole week, but realized that any other arrangement was bound to be intercepted by Pakistani intelligence. Eugene also approved of the plan. The ambassador said that invitations will be sent out to the A list that included some ministers of the Pakistani government, some members of parliament, several other ambassadors as well as some high ranking officers in the air force, army and intelligence service. He promised to have the invitation to the defense minister delivered personally and make sure that he confirmed it. As soon as they left the ambassador's office Blakey said that after knowing the ambassador for two years this was the first time that he was impressed by him and believed that he may have some substance beneath the façade of a rich lightweight friend of the President.

  Eugene asked Blakey if there was anything they could do before the Fourth of July party and Blakey said that they could get the NSA to monitor telephones and e-mail addresses that were registered to key Pakistani personnel and try to find out whether there were any contacts with Nagib and Alia. He added that best thing would be to contact their man at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and find out if there was any word of blueprints of advanced designs turning up. Eugene commented that he had heard that when cellular phones were invented no one could wipe the smile off the faces of the NSA director. He believed that even the tiniest bit of communication would be recorded on the agency's powerful computers and analyzed by human experts or sophisticated software so the "bad guys" (and countless innocents) would have nowhere to hide. This had been confirmed by Edward Snowden who was considered by some as a whistleblower and by others as a renegade. The nightmare of the NSA director was soon to become a common reality – cheap, unregistered pre-paid SIM cards and single-use SIM chips or "burn-phones" as they were called. These devices combined with terrorists, or other people who were up to no good according to the NSA hit-list, who were reasonably intelligent enough not to use words that would obviously trigger the automatic monitoring system, made the task of randomly following the "bad guys" practically a futile exercise.

  Blakey agreed that the chances of the NSA striking gold were pretty slim and did what old agents liked to do – rely on HUMINT or human intelligence provided by flesh and blood agents and not by computers or machines. So he summoned Linda Katz to his office and when the young woman walked in Eugene saw the intelligent look in her eyes and her athletic body that was honed on the soccer field of her college and had a feeling that she could be trusted. After the brief introductions Eugene outlined the situation. Linda asked some astute questions about the form in which the information will be handed over to the Pakistanis and what it contained. Eugene said that it would probably be electronic files as no hardcopies were taken from the Lab although they could have been printed since the disappearance of the couple. The files contained classified designs and blueprints that were highly sensitive. Linda said she could imagine what kind of designs but a warning look from Blakey stopped her in mid-sentence before she could elaborate. She asked about the time frame and Blakey told her that the couple had arrived in Islamabad less than two days earlier but there was no trace of their whereabouts. Eugene said that the data would probably be given to the PAEC scientists within a day or two. Linda said she would contact Alma and make sure that she met with her scientist lover, Jairo, within a couple of days. Linda said she would discretely guide Alma how to obtain the information, but she emphasized that Alma was not consciously working for the CIA.

  ***

  Rahman arrived at the headquarters of the Pakistani intelligence service and went straight to General Masood's office. Rahman saw that there were two other men in the spacious room. The general was expecting him and as soon as he entered the office the general and the other two men stood up and gave him a quiet applause. Masood introduced the older man as Professor Abdul Malick, a physicist and senior research scientist with PAEC, and the younger man as Dr. Khadim Ansari, an engineer with the Kahuta Project. Masood said that he had already given the two gentlemen a brief description of the classified material that was now in their possession without specifying who brought it to the Pakistan intelligence service and where it had come from, although the logo of Los Alamos National Laboratory attested to its source. Masood explained that the blueprints they now had were the most advanced designs of small, tactical warheads, but the "treasure chest", as he called the asset, had detailed designs for many more nuclear devices that were more powerful than anything in Pakistan's arsenal.

  Rahman inserted the San Disk flash memory with the schematics of the small nuclear device in Masood's computer and switched on the overhead projector. Meanwhile the general pressed a button on his desk and the window shutters closed, so as soon as the projector's lamp reached its full luminosity even the most minor details could be clearly seen. The two scientists took a few minutes to study the images of the completed weapons that were displayed and then went over the detailed cross-sections of the components. The scientists talked to one another, completely ignoring the general and Rahman, and from the looks on their faces it was obvious that they were taken by surprise by the innovative design. After a few minutes Prof. Malick said that they were impressed by the simplicity and sophistication of the weapon and added that although the Pakistani arsenal had a weapon of similar geometrical dimensions the yield of the US design they were watching was probably higher by a factor of 10 or 20, making it equivalent to the large first generation atomic bombs like those used against Japan. Masood was extremely pleased with the response and asked Dr. Ansari how long it would take PAEC to produce two of these warheads. Here the scientists went into a short conference, once again ignoring the general and Rahman, and said that all the mechanical parts were easily copied. They had the proper machinery and construction materials on hand, but they were concerned that the core of the device that contained the fissionable material was made of an alloy of plutonium that they were not familiar with. In addition, they said, the quality of the plutonium used in the core, super-weapon grade plutonium that contained over 99% of the fissionable plutonium-239, was something that Pakistan had never produced.

  Seeing the question forming of General Masood's lips, the Professor went into his teaching mode and gave a short lecture on the production of plutonium. He explained that plutonium was produced in a nuclear reactor fueled with uranium. When ura
nium-238 captured a neutron it could be transmuted into plutonium-239, the fissionable atom used in nuclear weapons. The amount of plutonium produced in a reactor depended on the burn-up of the uranium fuel – more irradiation produced more plutonium. However, there was a catch – if irradiation continued some of the plutonium-239 also captured a neutron and was converted to the undesirable plutonium-240, and with further neutron captures even heavier isotopes of plutonium would be formed. Each of these complicated the construction of an efficient nuclear weapon. Plutonium-240 had a tendency to spontaneously emit neutrons that could lead to a premature ignition of a chain-reaction and result in a low yield or even a fizzle of the weapon. Plutonium-241 decayed to form americium-241 that emitted powerful gamma radiation that could deleteriously affect the conventional explosives used to compress the plutonium to a critical mass that enabled the chain-reaction to proceed. Rahman and Masood looked at each other for a moment and then asked why that concerned the scientists so the Professor explained that Pakistan had needed a lot of bombs quickly that required a lot of plutonium, and therefore the burn-up of fuel in Pakistani reactors was higher, leading to larger fractions of plutonium-240 and plutonium-241 and only about 93% plutonium-239. Thus the plutonium that Pakistan possessed may not be suitable for the advanced design brought to them. The general said that as far as he understood plutonium was plutonium and the whole lecture was just a waste of his time. The scientists protested but the now furious general said that if they couldn't deliver the advanced bombs he would find other scientists who could. Rahman was taken aback by the general's blatant reaction and tried to get everybody to calm down and discuss the matter in terms of scientific and engineering principles and see what could be done. He suggested that they convene a board of scientists to see how to overcome the concerns raised by the professor.

  The general's rage cooled down and he said that he would indeed form a committee to address the issue, and nominated Rahman to be his representative there. Prof. Malick would be appointed as chairman and he was asked to invite five top experts on nuclear physics in Pakistan, provided that they could be trusted to keep the secret. The professor said that it would be of the highest priority and he expected the first meeting to take place the following day.

  ***

  David Avivi returned to Mossad headquarters in Tel-Aviv and briefed Haim Shimony, the Mossad chief, on the events that had taken place in Germany and in Brussels. He said that they were ahead of the other intelligence agencies that took an interest in Nagib and Alia and in the information they had acquired, but always a step or two behind the couple. He also added that there was not much Mossad could do inside Pakistan and that they had to wait until the couple left that country and hopefully that it wouldn't be too late. Shimony told him that the Israeli Security Agency, the ISA, had interrogated Nagib's parents and all the relatives they could locate, but none seemed to have any idea about Nagib's plans. They were surprised to learn that he had left the United States as they were convinced that he was enjoying his life there and was prospering professionally and financially. Alia's relatives were also questioned but the last they had heard about her, from her parents, was that she had married a Palestinian and both were gainfully employed by the US federal government. David asked Shimony about contacting the cooperative scientist in the Pakistani nuclear establishment but was told that he would contact them if anything relevant came his way.

  ***

  The North Korean embassy in Pakistan was situated at House No. 9, on Street No. 18, F-8/2 in Islamabad, far from the US embassy and Diplomatic Enclave where many of the foreign institutions and embassies were located. Apparently the North Korean didn't feel threatened in Pakistan, after all the two countries cooperated in the fields of missile development and nuclear technology, although there was practically very little exchange of commercial goods between these two poor countries. Kim arrived at the embassy the previous night and convened with the ambassador and the military attaché and briefed them about the invaluable information that Nagib intended to hand over to the Pakistanis. He asked them if they had connections within the intelligence service and the PAEC that could inform them if the classified data was transferred and more to the point if the DPRK could also get a copy of the blueprints. The attaché was skeptical if the Pakistanis would share such information with anyone, but believed that for the proper price a copy could be obtained. The ambassador was even less optimistic and said that the cooperation between the two countries had its limits. Kim said that he would stay in Islamabad for a few days to see how the situation developed.

  ***

  The embassy of Iran in Islamabad was also in the Diplomatic Enclave as the Shiite Muslims didn't feel very much at home amidst the mostly Sunni Pakistanis. Mahmoud arrived at the embassy when it opened in the morning and asked for a meeting with the ambassador who was an appointee of the Revolutionary Guards to which he also belonged. The ambassador was pleased to see Mahmoud and listened attentively to his story about Nagib and Alia and the classified information they possessed. He said that these blueprints and advanced designs were exactly what Iran needed to deter the Big Satan America and the Little Satan Israel from attacking the nuclear facilities in Iran. They both knew that Iran was a threshold nuclear power – it had the technology to produce fissile materials, had done testing to simulate real atomic bombs and had delivery systems in the form of missiles of various ranges and capabilities – but as yet Iran had not crossed this threshold mainly because it feared the reaction from both the Big Satan and the Little Satan. The cooperation between Pakistan and Iran had its ups and downs but as a testament to the close relations was the fact that Iran had the embassy in Islamabad as well as three consulates in Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta while Pakistan had its embassy in Tehran and consulates in Mashad and Zahedan. Pakistan provided great assistance to Iran when it started working on uranium enrichment centrifuge technology. Part of the help was through official governmental channels and part was through the AQ Khan network. The countries also shared some aspects of missile technology. The ambassador said that he would reach out to his contacts in the Pakistani nuclear industry and the military but was doubtful that they will share the information with Iran unless promised something big in return. Mahmoud said that he would hang around for a few days in case something came up.

  Chapter 11

  July 1st, Islamabad, Pakistan

  Prof. Malick called the committee meeting to order. Rahman looked at the nuclear physicists that were gathered around the table and felt like the village idiot. Here were five of the most talented and intelligent people that lived in Pakistan, in addition to the professor and Dr. Ansari, and he, who had a bachelor's degree in engineering, was supposed to follow their discussion and report to General Masood. Before the professor could start the scientific part of the debate Rahman asked for permission to speak. He said that they had all been vetted by the Pakistani Intelligence service and were cleared to share the state's most sensitive information, but what they were about to see was much more sensitive as it could reflect on Pakistan's international relations, and potentially could even lead to the annihilation of the country. He glanced around the table again and saw the skeptical looks and the curiosity on the faces of the five physicists so he added that Professor Malick will explain what he was referring to but it was his duty to caution them that this was far beyond the usual top-secret material they had all dealt with before.

  Prof. Malick gave an abbreviated version of the events that led to possession of the advanced designs for the small warheads they were about to see on the screen and turned on the projector. The scientists were not initially impressed as they had seen designs that superficially looked quite similar to the one displayed on the screen. They were all familiar with the "football design" that included two subcritical masses of plutonium each shaped like half an American football (or a rugby ball in the rest of the world) that were placed inside a metal pipe. When compressed by detonating conventional explosives at both ends
they were joined to reach a critical density and configuration. This was much simpler and lighter than the classical implosion device that required precisely timed detonation of several dozen shaped explosives to compress a sphere of plutonium into the high density required for criticality. The professor reminded the scientists, not that they really needed it, that the committee headed by Rep. Dan Burton (R-Indiana), who was also one of the few supporters of Pakistan against India in the US Congress, displayed a mock-up hypothetical "suitcase nuke" at a press conference in the year 2000. This was supposed to demonstrate a model of the devices that General Lebed reported as missing after the dismemberment of the USSR.

  However, when they saw that the calculated yield of the small nuke was as large as the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki but its weight was in the range of 25 kg and not several tons they fell silent. Each one silently contemplated the implications of having such a weapon, or the repercussions if such a device fell into the wrong hands recalling that Pakistan had many enemies. As more detailed schematics of the small nuke were shown, one of the physicists interrupted the presentation pointing out the requirements of the plutonium core and saying that Pakistan had never produced such a high grade of plutonium-239, with less than 1% of all other plutonium isotopes. The professor was pleased with the comment and said that one of the objectives of this respectable committee was to assess what would happen if the super-grade plutonium in the design was replaced by the type of material they had produced for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. One of the physicists said that they should also discuss how the performance of the device would be affected if high enriched uranium would be used instead of plutonium, but this suggestion was immediately discounted by all other members of the committee from basic physical considerations. Another member asked if they could use uranium-233 that had relevant nuclear properties that were quite similar to plutonium but Dr. Ansari said that Pakistan had not produced this material and only half jokingly added that perhaps India could test that hypothesis as it was known that they had experimented with uranium-233 that was produced in thorium fueled reactors.