No Better Death

by John Crawford

  The Wellington Battalion formed up in Happy Valley at 8.30pm and then took its place, behind the Otago Battalion, in the assaulting column. For the operation each infantryman carried 120 rounds of ammunition, two empty sandbags, two water bottles, rations for 48 hours, a field dressing and his rifle and bayonet.13 At the same time as the Right Assaulting Column was preparing to move out of Happy Valley, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the rest of the covering force began their silent attack with the bayonet to clear the foothills between the ANZAC perimeter and the Sari Bair range. Russell’s men were well prepared for this task and after bitter, close quarter fighting achieved their objectives. It was, as the Australian official historian, C.E.W. Bean, later wrote a ‘magnificent feat of arms, the brilliance of which was never surpassed, if indeed equalled, during the campaign’. Although the covering force had done great work, the whole operation was already beginning to fall behind its tight timetable.14

  Johnston’s orders called for the Right Assaulting Column to move to No.2 Outpost; from there it was to move north following a route just inland from Ocean Beach. The whole force, apart from the Canterbury Battalion, was then to move east up Chailak Dere, the valley south of Bauchop’s Hill. The Otago Battalion, which was to lead the column, would then take Rhododendron Ridge (also known as Rhododendron Spur) that led up to Chunuk Bair. The Wellington Battalion had the task of seizing Cheshire Ridge that was just to the north, and overlooked Aghyl Dere (the next Valley to the north) and the area known as ‘The Farm’. The Auckland Battalion was to be in reserve. While the rest of the column advanced up Chailik Dere, the Canterbury Battalion was to move up Sazli Dere, the next valley to the south and occupy the southern side of Rhododendron Ridge. The column was then to attack and capture Chunuk Bair.

  From the beginning of the advance it was clear that the Right Assaulting Column would be hard put to keep to its schedule. The Auckland and Canterbury Battalions became entangled and their progress was impeded. Later in the night, the Canterbury Battalion took the wrong route up Sazli Dere, and became lost and disorganised. Bauchop’s Hill and Table Top, two key features on either side of Chailik Dere took longer to secure than had been anticipated. It was easy for troops to lose their way in the rugged country, and the valley itself was found to be blocked by barbed wire entanglements. Small parties of Turks in the area, who had been overlooked by the mounted rifles, also caused delays. As a result, the Wellington Battalion spent nearly two hours waiting at Outpost No.2 before the way was clear for them to advance up Chailik Dere. It was clear to all involved that the operation was falling well behind schedule. Malone, who was in the head of his battalion, was acutely aware of the need to speed up the advance, but there was little he could do. Johnston ordered Malone’s battalion to advance up the valley through the Otago Battalion, that had become dispersed during its actions to clear Chailik Dere and seize Table Top. Dawn, which was at 4.30am, was approaching when Malone’s troops got clear of the valley and began to advance onto Rhododendron Ridge near the position later known as the Apex; an area of sheltered ground near the intersection of Rhododendron and Cheshire Ridges below and about 500 metres from Chunuk Bair.15 Just what took place at the Apex and later on Chunuk Bair, and why the New Zealand commanders made certain decisions is difficult to determine because of gaps in the available evidence and significant differences in the various primary sources covering the actions.16

  Looking down Rhododendron Ridge (also known as Rhododendron Spur), which runs west from Chunuk Bair. The road that can be seen was built after the end of the campaign.

  Australian War Memorial

  Exactly when the Wellington Battalion reached the Apex is unclear, although the battalion war diary states that the position was in their hands by dawn, at 4.30am. Other sources, however, indicate that the battalion was not in full possession of the Apex until significantly later in the morning, most probably at about 5.45am or 6am, and possibly not until shortly before 7am.17 The most probable explanation is that the leading elements of the battalion reached the Apex just before dawn, but that because the Wellingtons were strung out in a long column, it was not until later in the morning that Malone had his full unit at the position and would have been able to push on towards Chunuk Bair in some force.18 This is a point of some importance because it has been alleged that Malone and the New Zealand Infantry Brigade as a whole missed an opportunity to push on and capture a lightly defended Chunuk Bair before or at dawn on 7 August.19 It was, it seems, clear to Malone when he reached the Apex that any chance of taking Chunuk Bair at dawn, as originally planned, had gone. He immediately set about securing what was a valuable position that included the initial objective set for his battalion by Johnston. He sent the following message to Johnston: ‘I am occupying a position nearly at the head of gully. As it is day and I am not sure of my position I am lining the crest of surrounding ridges so as to ensure reasonable safety. I am reconnoitring further and will act on further knowledge and report.’20 Unfortunately, this message is not timed, but it must have been written before Johnston arrived at the Apex, at about 8.00am. The Auckland Battalion joined Malone’s battalion at the Apex and helped secure the position.21 Turkish reserves were sent to Chunuk Bair on the morning of 7 August and by 8am, it appears, that a force of about 250 men was holding the hill.22

  Malone’s sketch map of the position he was holding very near the head of the Chailik Dere, where Cheshire and Rhododendron Ridges intersect, on the morning of 7 August. This area, which was concealed from the Sari Bair Range, was later called the Apex. This sketch map and its accompanying message to Johnston are the last pieces of Malone’s writing to survive.

  Malone Family Collection Wellington (now in ATL)

  The crucial question that faced Malone and other New Zealand commanders on the morning of 7 August was whether they should press on and attack Chunuk Bair as soon as possible or secure their position at the Apex, before launching an assault. Bean, in the Australian official history, suggests that Temperley, Johnston’s Brigade Major, advocated pressing on, but that Malone ‘the most forcible of the New Zealand commanders, was against the attempt.’23 Bean’s view, is based at least in part on a discussion he had with Temperley in late 1918 or early 1919.24 This position is supported by the Wellington Battalion history, the Gallipoli chapters of which were written by W.H. Cunningham, who was Malone’s second in command.25 An attempt to seize Chunuk Bair would certainly have been consistent with Birdwood’s instructions to the commanders of units involved in the offensive, that they had to press on as quickly as possible.26 It would, however, be in keeping with the views Malone expressed in his diaries and letters for him to oppose a quickly organised and risky attack. His lack of confidence in Johnston would also probably have influenced his position. By this time Johnston was in a very bad state of health and he may also have been drunk. In any case, he was by this time incapable of exercising effective command over his force.27

  The British official historian of the Gallipoli campaign privately stated that it was ‘a national calamity’ that Johnston was not removed from his command before the offensive.28 Temperley, however, states in his unpublished account of the battle that a pause and a period of consolidation seemed to be the most prudent approach. This was the course of action agreed at a conference between Malone, Robert Young, the Auckland Battalion commanding officer and Johnston, which took place at the Apex after the brigade commander arrived at about 8.00am. This view was sent in a message to Godley, who responded by ordering Johnston to attack at once.

  Johnston received this order at 9.30am, Temperley stated later that he was so strongly opposed to this course of action that he recommended to Johnston that he disobey the order. Brigadier-General Johnston would not countenance such a course. He ordered the Auckland Battalion to attack along the 60-metre wide saddle linking the Apex with Chunuk Bair. Support was to be provided by the 2/10th Gurkhas from the Left Assaulting Column, which had become lost during the night advance and had agreed to cooperate wi
th the New Zealand brigade. Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Young personally reconnoitred the ground over which his battalion would have to attack and was convinced that if the attack was to have any real chance of success, it should be delayed until after nightfall, but Johnston was adamant that Godley’s order had to be obeyed. The attack at 11am was a disaster. Because of the narrowness of the saddle, the Auckland Battalion had to attack with its companies arranged in echelon (one after another). The Aucklanders and Gurkhas were savaged by intense rifle and machine gun fire from Chunuk Bair, from the Turkish positions on Battleship Hill on their right flank, and from Hill Q on their left flank. A small force of Aucklanders managed to seize a Turkish trench about 100 metres along with saddle at a cost of some 300 men killed or wounded.29

  After the failure of that attack, it appears that Johnston may have ordered the Wellington Battalion and the available element of the Canterbury Battalion to launch another hopeless assault. This attack did not eventuate, probably because of Malone’s violent opposition to what would have been a useless waste of life. Many years later, Corporal Charles Clark of the Wellington Battalion recalled Malone arguing with two British officers (probably Johnston and Temperley). According to Clark, Malone refused to attack saying that he was ‘not going to ask my men to commit suicide’ and stating that his battalion would seize Chunuk Bair the next day, once it was dark.30

  The New Zealand Infantry Brigade spent the rest of the day digging in at the Apex. They steadily lost men to enfilading fire from Battleship Hill, which appears to have caused many more losses than fire from Chunuk Bair. Three of the Brigade’s four battalions were not immediately fit for further offensive operations. The Otago Battalion was being reorganised. The Auckland Battalion had been shattered and the Canterbury Battalion had suffered heavy losses when it was caught in the open by Turkish artillery firing from Hill Q. Most of the Allied troops involved in the attack were also exhausted and in need of a rest to recover their strength.31

  The New Zealanders were much closer to the objective then their comrades in the Left Assault Column, which had become disorganised and disorientated in the steep hills and gullies leading to Hill 971 and Q. Monash, the Commander of the 4th Australian Brigade, seems to have lost his nerve and halted his brigade at dawn on 7 August, well short of his objective; Hill 971. The 29th Indian Brigade had pressed on more effectively and had halted only about 1000 metres from Hill Q.32 Malone considered Monash’s brigade to be a bad one, an opinion apparently shared by, at least, some Australians.33 Although Monash went on to great achievements on the Western Front, he had a very mixed reputation at Gallipoli, where it appears he was known as the ‘the dug-out king’.34

  During the afternoon of 7 August, Godley reviewed the situation, and planned a new assault on the Sari Bair range for dawn the following day. The New Zealanders were to assault Chunuk Bair, the 29th Indian Brigade was to seize Hill Q and Monash’s brigade was to renew its efforts to capture Hill 971. As part of this plan Godley reinforced the Indian brigade with a British brigade and dispatched two inexperienced battalions from ‘Kitchener’s New Army’, the 7th Gloucesters and the 8th Welsh Pioneers to join the New Zealand Infantry Brigade. The Auckland Mounted Rifles and the Maori Contingent were also placed under Johnston’s command as reserves for the new assault.

  The summit of Hill 971 from Chunuk Bair looking north, in early 1919. The road that can be seen did not exist in 1915.

  Australian War Memorial

  The New Zealand Infantry Brigade headquarters received orders from Godley for the new assault at 9.45pm, but it appears that Malone whose battalion was to lead the attack was not given his orders until midnight or 1am on the morning of 8 August. This delay may have been due to concerns Johnston and Temperley had about Malone’s tactical judgement (see below), but the state of the other battalions of the brigade meant that the Wellington Battalion had to lead the attack. After returning from the brigade headquarters, Malone discussed the operation with his second in command, Major Cunningham. The necessary orders for the company commanders were prepared and Cunningham took these round while Malone returned to the brigade headquarters to ask for additional supplies of water and ammunition for his battalion. Malone apparently did not doubt that his men could capture Chunuk Bair, but was acutely aware that his battalion would need adequate supplies if it were to hold the hill against the inevitable Turkish counter-attacks. As a result of Malone’s request, a party of men was sent back to Anzac Cove in an effort to obtain the necessary extra supplies. During his visit to the brigade headquarters Malone also met with Captain Jesse Wallingford, the brigade machine gun officer, who promised to send forward four machine guns as soon as Chunuk Bair was secured. There was nothing more Malone could do and he returned to his bivouac where he apparently had a short, but sound sleep.35

  At about 3am Malone woke his batman, Private Benjamin Smart, and told him about the attack in which he was to lead his battalion. Smart later wrote in his diary that Malone ‘gave me an address of his wife to write to in case he got hit. I thought he would pass out as he shook hands with me before he went over and said “good-bye”!’36 Half an hour later, Malone and Cunningham went around the battalion rousing their men. At the same time a heavy and quite accurate bombardment of Chunuk Bair began. The Wellington Battalion formed up in four lines each of four platoons in the weak moonlight at the Apex. The Hawkes Bay Company was on the right, the Wellington West Coast Company on the left; they were supported by the Ruahine Company (on the left) and the Taranaki Company (on the right). At 4.15am the bombardment ceased, and the Wellington Battalion with bayonets fixed moved across the narrow saddle connecting the Apex with Chunuk Bair in a solid column.37

  Malone and his men could see Chunuk Bair in front of them, clearly and fatefully defined by the first rays of dawn as they crossed the saddle. The battalion then spread out over a frontage of about 200 metres on the open ground leading to the crest. They advanced at a steady pace, ‘expecting every second to receive the full blast of rifle and machine-gunfire which greeted the Auckland Battalion’s advance the day before.... tired and weary though the men had been when they started from the Apex, instinctively, the battalion seemed to feel that at last the great chance had come and that Chunuk Bair was to be its supreme test. The men in a few strides had recovered their old jaunty spirit of the training days of Egypt and, led by their gallant Colonel, they were in the right mood to tackle with cold steel any enemy that might stand to face them on the top.’38 No blast of fire, however, greeted the Wellingtons as they advanced. Confused command arrangements for the Turkish troops on Chunuk Bair and the heavy and accurate artillery bombardment caused virtually all the Turkish defenders to flee the hill. Malone’s troops captured a machine gun and its German crew, and occupied their objective at about 4.40am; after meeting very little resistance.39 The New Zealanders discovered that Chunuk Bair consisted of two crests about 200 metres apart, connected by a saddle. In front of them, towards the east, the land fell away fairly steeply until it reached some flatter ground where there were some vacant Turkish howitzer positions. Beyond these positions lay a valley. To the north, Chunuk Bair was dominated by Hill Q, which remained in Turkish hands. As it became light, the men of the Wellington Battalion could see the village of Boghali and the important north-south road that ran through it, and further east, catch a glimpse of the Dardanelles.40

  Lieutenant Allan Preston (on right), the Wellington Battalion machine gun officer, passes a trench on the Apex as soldiers of the 7th Gloucesters (left) wait to ascend Chunuk Bair to reinforce the Wellington Battalion, dawn, 8 August 1915. The New Zealand machine guns are on the ridge line firing on the Hill Q area. Preston was wounded just after this photograph was taken.

  Hampton Coll, National Army Museum

  The Dardanelles from Chunuk Bair, looking southeast. Chanak (now Canakkale) on the far side of the Narrows is on the right, Boghali (now Canyayla) is on the extreme left centre. This photograph was taken in early 1919, from the position furth
est inland reached by the New Zealanders on 8 August 1915. It is one of a series taken on the Gallipoli Peninsula by the Australian Historical Mission during the months of February and March 1919.

  Australian War Memorial

  Malone may have briefly considered taking advantage of the surprisingly easy capture of Chunuk Bair by pressing further forward. The size of his force, the strong position occupied by the Turks and his clear orders to secure Chunuk Bair and his lack of communications with his brigade headquarters all seemed to have combined to quickly convince him that the best course open to them was to dig in on the crest.41

  Temperley would later allege that Malone hopelessly compromised the chances of a successful defence of Chunuk Bair by instructing his force to dig in on the reverse or western side of the ridge. In his unpublished memoirs, Temperley, who was no friend of Malone, suggested that the Wellington Battalion’s commander was a dogmatic man with few ideas and little interest in or knowledge of tactics. He went on to allege that Malone was obsessed with the idea, set out in a booklet dealing with lessons learned on the Western Front, of occupying the reverse slopes of hills or ridges to reduce the effectiveness of enemy artillery fire.42 As Brigade Major, Temperley was very well placed to influence official records of the battle and his unfair and inaccurate views on Malone’s actions were widely accepted.43 An official booklet, Notes from the Front (London, 1914) that sets out the advantages of holding a reverse slope position, with a covering force on the forward slope, was amongst Malone’s effects.44 Malone apparently supported the views set out in the booklet in an argument with Johnston and Temperley, who believed that because Turkish artillery at Gallipoli was comparatively weak the older idea of occupying forward or crest lines was still appropriate. According to Malone’s adjutant, Captain (Later Major Sir) Ernest Harston, this question was still bothering Malone during the advance on Chunuk Bair and he decided to hold both the forward and the reverse slope. Each position was to be occupied by two of his companies and saps or trenches dug between the two as quickly as possible.