The Illustrated Gettysburg Reader: An Eyewitness History of the Civil War's Greatest Battle

by Rod Gragg

  The advance lines of the two armies in many places were not more than fifty yards apart. Everything was on the shoot. No favors asked, and none offered.

  My gun was so dirty that the ramrod hung in the barrel, and I could neither get it down nor out. I slammed the rod against a rock a few times, and drove home ramrod, cartridge and all, laid the gun on a boulder, elevated the muzzle, ducked my head, hollered “Look out!” and pulled the trigger. She roared like a young cannon and flew over my boulder, the barrel striking John Griffith a smart whack on the left ear. John roared too, and abused me like a pickpocket for my carelessness. It was no trouble to get another gun there. The mountainside was covered with them....6

  “The Blood Stood in Puddles on the Rocks”

  The 15th Alabama Infantry Is Bled White on the Slopes of Little Round Top

  While the troops of Hood’s division were fighting their way through the jumble of boulders in Devil’s Den, General Law ordered Colonel William C. Oates, commander of the 15th Alabama Infantry, to take his regiment—which was flanked on the left by the 47th Alabama under Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Bulger—and suppress enemy fire coming from the lower slopes of Big Round Top. The fire was coming from a detachment of the 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters, who were armed with rapid-fire Sharps rifles. Oates immediately led his men toward the source of the fire—a typical act for the bold young officer. Born to a poor family on a hardscrabble farm in southeastern Alabama, he received scant education and fled the state at age sixteen following a brush with the law. After stints as a deckhand, house-painter, and gambler, he earned enough money to attend school, became a teacher and, eventually, a lawyer in Abbeville, Alabama. When the war began, he raised an infantry company, served under “Stonewall” Jackson in his 1862 Valley Campaign, and was colonel and commander of the 15th Alabama by age twenty-seven.

  Oates and his regiment had marched about twenty-five miles earlier that day to reach Gettysburg and had to be tired, but they pressed onward up Big Round Top’s steep, forested slopes as the Sharpshooters withdrew before them. Oates wanted to occupy Big Round Top and to haul artillery to its summit, but his orders commanded him to advance and take Little Round Top. The Alabamians came off the big hill, crossed a rocky stretch of woodland, began moving up the boulder-strewn southern slope of Little Round Top—and received a shock-force blast of enemy fire at close range. The volley dropped scores of men and stunned the rest. It was delivered from a makeshift wall of piled-up rocks by troops of the 20th Maine Infantry—part of the Federal Fifth Corps—which had reached the southern slope of Little Round Top only minutes earlier.

  When General Warren sent for troops to secure Little Round Top, just as the Confederate assault on the Federal left commenced—the call was taken up by Colonel Strong Vincent, who commanded a brigade of troops from Pennsylvania, New York, Michigan, and Maine—soldiers of Major General George Sykes’s Fifth Corps. A Pennsylvania native and a Harvard graduate who disguised his youthfulness with a bushy set of mutton-chop whiskers, Vincent—age twenty-six—was the youngest brigade commander in the Army of the Potomac. Upon learning of the firing on Fort Sumter, he had set aside a law career in order to join the army and had seen his share of bloody combat. He reacted quickly when he heard the frantic call for troops to hold Little Round Top. Backed by a section of artillery under Lieutenant Charles Hazlett, Vincent hustled his brigade into line on the western slope of Little Round Top—just in time to be attacked by a large force of Hood’s Confederates, who had pushed through Devil’s Den. It was composed of another Alabama regiment from Law’s brigade and two regiments of Texas troops from Brigadier General Jerome B. Robertson’s brigade. The three regiments—all from Hood’s Divison—had fought their way through Devil’s Den and were advancing on the left of Oates’s and Bulcher’s regiments.

  Strong’s brigade met them head-on, beginning with a countercharge by the 140th New York Infantry under Colonel Patrick H. O’Rorke, which staggered Robertson’s Texans. Colonel Strong hastily set up a firing line, striding up and down giving orders, but he was soon struck down with a mortal wound. Just as Strong’s brigade appeared on the verge of being overwhelmed, another Fifth Corps brigade arrived and poured fire into the bloodied Texans. Commanded by Brigadier General Stephen H. Weed, it, too, had been summoned by General Warren and showed up just in time to turn back the Confedera assault on Little Round Top’s western slope. It was a costly victory: Federal casualties were heavy, and included the twenty-nine-year-old Weed, who fell dead from a head wound. Hazlett, the artillery commander, and Colonel O’Rorke of the 140th New York were also killed in action.

  Meanwhile, on the south slope of Little Round Top—the extreme left flank of the Federal line—a bloody drama was being played out between the 15th Alabama and the 20th Maine. Repeatedly, Oates’s Alabama troops assaulted the men from Maine, and repeatedly, the Alabamians were driven back. Finally, exhausted and dehydrated, with their numbers severely reduced, they gave up the fight for Little Round Top. Decades later in the Southern Historical Society Papers, Oates would record a vivid account of his assault against the extreme left flank of the Federal line—and the 20th Maine. As excerpted here, it begins with the Alabamians ascending Big Round Top.

  Forced to flee Alabama as a teenaged lawbreaker, Colonel William C. Oates eventually became an Alabama teacher, lawyer, and commander of the 15th Alabama Infantry—which attacked the Federal far left flank at Gettysburg.

  Wikimedia Commons Images

  I continued to advance straight up the southern face of Round Top. My men had to climb up, catching to the bushes and crawling over the immense boulders, in the face of an incessant fire of their enemy, who kept falling back, taking shelter and firing down on us from behind the rocks and crags that covered the mountain side thicker than grave stones in a city cemetery. My men could not see their foe, and did not fire, except as one was seen here and there, running back from one boulder to another. In this manner I pressed forward until I reached the top and the highest point on top of Round Top. Just before reaching this point, the Federals in my front as suddenly disappeared from my sight as though commanded by a magician. From the top of the mountain a Federal soldier could not be seen, except a few wounded and dead ones on the ground over which we had advanced. Here I halted and permitted my men to lie down to rest....

  Little Round Top, on the left, and Big Round Top, on the right, anchored the southern end or far left flank of the Federal line on Cemetery Ridge. As they came off Big Round Top and approached the smaller hill, the troops of the 15th Alabama were stunned by a blast of Federal volley fire.

  Library of Congress

  I think not more than five minutes after I halted, Captain Terrell, A. A. G. to General Law, rode up and inquired why I had halted. I told him that the position I then occupied was, in my opinion, a very important one, and should be held by us. He informed me that the order was to press forward. I replied that some of my men, from heat and exhaustion, were fainting, and could fight a great deal better after a few minutes rest, and inquired for General Law. He then informed me that General Hood was wounded and that Law, who was the senior brigadier, was in command of the division, and was along the line somewhere to the left, and said that General Law’s order was for me and Colonel Bulger to lose no time, but to press forward and drive the enemy before us as far as possible. To move then was against my judgment. I felt confident that General Law did not know my position, or he would not order me from it....

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  “Oh, God! That I Could See My Mother”

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  But notwithstanding my conviction of the importance of holding Round Top and occupying it with artillery ... I considered it to be my duty to obey the order communicated to me by the latter, who was a trustworthy and gallant officer. I ordered my line forward, and passed to the left oblique entirely down the northern or northeastern side of Round Top without encountering any opposition whatever. After I had reached the level ground in rear of Vincent’s Spur, in plain v
iew of the Federal wagon trains, and within two hundred yards of an extensive park of Federal ordnance wagons, which satisfied me that I was then in the Federal rear, advancing rapidly, without any skirmishers in front, I saw no enemy until within forty or fifty steps of an irregular ledge of rocks—a splendid line of breastworks formed by nature, running about parallel with the front of the Forty-seventh Alabama and my two left companies, and then sloping back in front of my center and right at an angle of about thirty-five degrees. Our foes, who had so suddenly and mysteriously disappeared from Round Top, had evidently fallen back to a second line behind this ledge, and now, unexpectedly to us, this double line poured into us the most destructive fire I ever saw.

  Our line halted, but did not break. As men fell their comrades closed the gap, returning the fire most spiritedly. I soon discovered that the left of the Forty-seventh Alabama was disconnected—I know not how far—from the right of the Fourth Alabama, and consequently the Forty-seventh was outflanked on its left, and its men were being mowed down like grain before the scythe. Just at this time Lieutenant-Colonel Bulger, a most gallant old gentleman over sixty years of age, commanding the Forty-seventh Alabama, fell severely wounded, and soon afterwards his regiment, after behaving most gallantly and sustaining heavy losses, broke and in confusion retreated back up the mountain.

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  “To Stand There and Die Was Sheer Folly”

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  Just as the left of the Forty-seventh regiment was being driven back, I ordered my regiment to change direction to the left, swing around and drive the Federals from the ledge of rocks, partly for the purpose of enfilading their line and relieving the Forty-seventh. My men obeyed, and advanced about half way to the enemy’s position, but the fire was so destructive that my line wavered like a man trying to walk against a strong wind, and then, slowly, doggedly, gave back a little. Then, with no one upon the right or left of me, my regiment exposed, while the enemy was still under cover, to stand there and die was sheer folly; either to retreat or advance became a necessity.

  My Lieutenant-Colonel, J. B. Feagin, had lost his leg; the heroic Captain Ellison had fallen, while Captain Brainard, one of the bravest and best officers in the regiment, in leading his company forward, fell, exclaiming: “Oh God! that I could see my mother,” and instantly expired. Lieutenant John A. Oates, my beloved brother, was pierced through by eight bullets, and fell mortally wounded. Lieutenants Cody, Hill and Scoggin were killed, and Captain Bethune and several other officers were seriously wounded, while the hemorrhage of the ranks was appalling. I again ordered the advance, and knowing the officers and men of that gallant old regiment, I felt sure that they would follow their commander anywhere in the line of duty, though he led them to certain destruction. I passed through the column waiving my sword, rushed forward to the ledge, and was promptly followed by my entire command in splendid style.

  On the summit of Little Round Top, troops of the 140th New York Infantry under Colonel Patrick O’Rorke hurriedly gathered rocks and piled them into makeshift breastworks.

  Library of Congress

  We drove the Federals from their strong defensive position; five times they rallied and charged us—twice coming so near that some of my men had to use the bayonet—but vain was their effort. It was our time now to deal death and destruction to a gallant foe, and the account was speedily settled with a large balance in our favor; but this state of things was not long to continue. The long blue lines of Federal infantry were coming down on my right and closing in on my rear, while some dismounted cavalry were closing the only avenue of escape on my left, and had driven in my skirmishers. I sent my Sergeant-Major with a message to Colonel Bowles, of the Fourth Alabama, to come to my relief. He returned and reported the enemy to be between us and the Fourth Alabama, and swarming up the mountainside. By this time.... the Fifteenth Alabama had infantry to the right of them, dismounted cavalry to the left of them, infantry in front of them and infantry in rear of them.

  With a withering and deadly fire pouring in upon us from every direction, it seemed that the entire command was doomed to destruction. While one man was shot in the face, his right hand or left hand comrade was shot in the side or back. Some were struck simultaneously with two or three balls from different directions. Captains Hill and Park suggested that I should order a retreat; but this seemed impracticable. My dead and wounded were then greater in number than those still on duty. Of 644 men and 42 officers, I had lost 343 men and 19 officers. The dead literally covered the ground. The blood stood in puddles on the rocks. The ground was soaked with the blood of as brave men as ever fell on the red field of battle. I still hoped for reinforcements. It seemed impossible to retreat; I therefore replied to my captains: “Return to your companies; we will sell out as dearly as possible.” Hill made no reply, but Park smiled pleasantly, gave me the military salute, and replied: “All right, sir.”

  On reflection, however, a few moments later, I did order a retreat, but did not undertake to retire in order. I had the officers and men advised that when the signal was given every one should run in the direction from whence we came, and halt on the top of the mountain. When the signal was given, we ran like a herd of wild cattle right through the line of dismounted cavalrymen. Some of my men as they ran through, seized three or four of the cavalrymen by the collar and carried them out prisoners. On the top of the mountain I made an attempt to halt and reform the regiment, but the men were helping wounded and disabled comrades, and scattered in the woods and among the rocks, so that it could not be done....7

  “We Had Held the Ground-‘At All Costs’”

  The 20th Maine Successfully Defends the Federal Extreme Left Flank

  When Colonel Strong Vincent assigned the 20th Maine to its place on Little Round Top—defending the extreme left flank of the Federal line—he emphasized the critical importance of the position to the regiment’s commander, Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. “I place you here!” Vincent stated emphatically. “This is the left of the Union line.” Chamberlain later said that he felt as if Vincent was explaining the importance of the Ten Commandments, so explicit was he on the consequences of defeat. He charged Chamberlain’s force, numbering about 360 men, with keeping any Confederate attack from turning the Federal left flank, which could destroy the Federal line and lose the battle for the Union. “You understand,” Vincent forcefully told him. “You are to hold this ground at all costs.”

  Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, commander of the 20th Maine Infantry, was a theologian and college professor, not a professional soldier. He was a natural leader, however, as he demonstrated on the rocky, wooded slope of Little Round Top.

  National Archives

  “I did understand,” Chamberlain would later observe, “but I had more to learn about costs.” Learning proved central to Chamberlain’s life: he was a college professor and theologian, and not a professional soldier. The thirty-four-year-old Maine native was an alumnus of Bowdoin College and of Bangor Theological Seminary, married to a minister’s daughter, had fathered five children, and was fluent in ten languages. When he joined the army in 1862, he had walked away from a prestigious professorship at Bowdoin, where he taught “revealed and natural religion,” foreign languages, rhetoric, and a variety of other courses. He and the 20th Maine had undergone a bloody baptism by fire at the Battle of Fredericksburg, and, due to his natural leadership abilities, received promotion to colonel and to regimental commander less than two months before Gettysburg.

  The “costs” Chamberlain discovered on the south slope of Little Round Top were calculated in blood. Although outnumbered, he and the 20th Maine withstood the repeated assaults against their line by the hard-fighting 15th Alabama under Oates and by some of the veteran troops of the 47th Alabama. After turning back one assault after another, the 20th was low on ammunition and men, and was in danger of being overwhelmed by the enemy. In a desperate gamble, Chamberlain ordered a sweeping bayonet charge, which shocked and turned back the exhaust
ed Alabamians. “We had held the ground,” Chamberlain would later recall, “at all costs.”

  Forty years after Gettysburg, Chamberlain would be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for displaying “daring heroism and great tenacity” that chaotic afternoon on Little Round Top. On the fiftieth anniversary of the battle, he wrote a detailed memoir of the 20th Maine’s defense of Little Round Top for Hearst’s Magazine.

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  “These True- Hearted Men ... Dashed Down the Death- Strewn Slope”

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  Thick groups in gray were pushing up along the smooth dale between the Round Tops in a direction to gain our left flank. There was no mistaking this. If they could hold our attention by a hot fight in front while they got in force on that flank, it would be bad for us and our whole defence. How many were coming we could not know. We were rather too busy to send out a reconnoissance. If a strong force should gain our rear, our brigade would be caught as by a mighty shears-blade, and be cut and crushed. What would follow it was easy to foresee. This must not be. Our orders to hold that ground had to be liberally interpreted. That front had to be held, and that rear covered. Something must be done,—quickly and coolly. I called the captains and told them my tactics: to keep the front fire at the hottest, without special regard to its need or immediate effect, and at the same time, as they found opportunity, to take side steps to the left, coming gradually into one rank, file-closers and all. Then I took the colors with their guard and placed them at our extreme left, where a great boulder gave token and support; thence bending back at a right angle the whole body gained ground leftward and made twice our original front. And were not so long doing it. This was a difficult movement to execute under such a fire, requiring coolness as well as heat....