Hitler's Munich Man

by Martin Connolly

  In this ignorance of the real facts, the Chairman then moved on to the assertion that Domvile was ‘sympathetic’ to the Nazi regime in Germany. When asked directly if he was sympathetic to the regime his reply was interesting, as a piece of well-crafted equivocation:

  ‘No. I am sympathetic with the idea of friendship with Germany. That is all I am concerned with: whatever their government is, is their own affair: but the particular kind of government I am afraid is not my affair. If they have a Nazi government and it suits them that is their business.’

  When pressed as to whether he had ever praised the Nazi system he responded, ‘I have often said it had many good points and so it has.’ One can only conclude that Domvile considered Nazi Germany was not the anathema that the British Government believed it to be.

  This is further confirmed when Domvile makes an unguarded reaction to a question about his visit to the Dachau concentration camp. Asked if he preferred to be in Dachau or Brixton, his quick response was, ‘Dachau’. He then retracted this saying that it was unfair ‘because I have been very well treated at Brixton’. In other words, he may not be so well treated in Dachau, which puts a different slant on his comments earlier about how wonderful Dachau was. Asked if Jews were the main population at Dachau, Domvile said there were four categories including hardened criminals.

  The committee then appears to be a little unprepared for the next area of concern about Domvile. He had written an article for a Berlin newspaper in which the Government claimed he had given the impression that he supported the return of the Colonies to Germany. This, the Government argued, had given the Germans the idea that a high ranking naval officer was reflecting Britain’s view on the matter. The problem was that the committee had not seen the article and did not have a copy of it. They asked Domvile if he could give them a copy. He at first said he could not remember the article, yet he remembered that a translation into German was done before it was sent. When asked who confirmed the translation, Domvile replied that it was Carroll. The secret service had underlined this fact as important and the suspicion that Carroll may have manipulated the article. Domvile continues to come across as a bumbling fool who professes he cannot remember anything about the article written three years previously. Was this an act or does this reflect Domvile’s real character?

  The committee then turned to examine his preface to The Case for Germany’. Again, he comes across at worse as a fool or at best totally naïve or perhaps he was simply lying. Put to him, that the book was being used as propaganda by Nazi Germany, he denied knowing that would be the case. He stated he had not read the book and that he had only written ‘a little preface’. As we have noted, Domvile was present at a meeting where Laurie launched the book and spoke of it. His final statement on this point was interesting,

  ‘It was written for consumption in England. It was written with the object of the whole of the Link, to explain the German case, as Professor Laurie saw it, and my preface merely said that he was one of those who had been working for Anglo-German friendship and I did not pretend to have read the book.’

  Bearing in mind that the book was extravagant in praise of Hitler and the Nazi system, he seemed not to appreciate why the government was concerned that a senior retired naval officer should be associated with it.

  So what of Domvile’s activity with two pre-Nazi organisations, Information and Policy and the British Council for Christian Settlement in Europe? Again, the Admiral appears evasive and unclear in his answers. Yes, he did attend meetings. Yes, he did take subscriptions to their publications. However, no, he was not a member nor was he a ‘moving spirit’ within them, claiming he refused to ‘belong to any political group after the war started’. The committee was interested in his knowledge of Lord Tavistock’s secret visit to Dublin to meet a German minister. Once again Domvile acknowledged he knew of it but only after it happened and had attended two meetings to be informed of what had been agreed. The chairman advised Domvile that he was being given every chance to get the record straight, no doubt aware of some of the secret background papers and meetings. He therefore asked Domvile if he knew Captain Ramsay. Again the Admiral draws this out. Yes he did know Ramsay. The questioning went on:

  Birkett: Was he a friend of yours?

  Domvile: I knew his wife: yes

  Birkett: Why I am putting these questions is this: had you anything to do with Ramsay politically?

  Domvile: No. Nothing whatever.

  Birkett: Nothing whatever. Did you know of the Right Club?

  Domvile: No.

  The Admiral continued to deny any connection with Ramsay politically although he did admit he met him at meetings. The Chairman indicated he would be returning to these meetings, but did the Admiral know Oswald Mosley? Here the answer was clear, ‘I know him very well.’

  Although he knew Mosley, Domvile denied being a member of BUF. This was in fact not true; he was a member but the Security Service were unaware of this at the time. Domvile had been writing for Action, the BUF’s newspaper, under the name Canute. When asked if he sympathised with BUF the Admiral was careful in his response. ‘With portions of it, their foreign outlook particularly. I did not know a great deal about ... their domestic policy? ... their home organisation or policy, but their foreign outlook I did because it corresponded to my own views.’

  This portion of Domvile’s transcript is heavily underlined by the security service. When asked to put his views into one sentence Domvile replied, ‘Non-interference in the affairs of Eastern Europe and greater concentration on the affairs of the British Empire.’ He continued to assert he had no ‘association’ with BUF but yet admitted he had written for their publication Action. Domvile fails to indicate that he had a great admiration for Mosley from the start. In a diary entry of 8 July 1935, we find Domvile meeting up with Mosley and other fascists for an unusual ‘stag party’ noted by Domvile in his diary. It was a visit to a lecture. It was according to Domvile ‘a brilliant talk – mostly political’. He also adds ‘I sat next to Mosley who is very sincere’ and that he ‘admired him’. His antipathy towards Churchill is seen in this entry as the talk was given by ‘the red-headed Braken’, writing that he was ‘reputed to be Winston’s bastard’.

  He was then asked about his knowledge of Mrs Dacre-Fox, another Fascist. The Admiral said he knew her as Mrs Elam and she was no more than a friend of his. He admitted he had visited her flat and she had visited his home but he was not involved politically with her. Asked about his knowledge of her, the Admiral knew she was a Fascist and ‘an extreme character’. When pressed as to whether she was anti-British he was adamant; ‘certainly not’. The security service was interested in what he added, ‘No. I think her outlook on foreign affairs was precisely the same as my own, but I would certainly feel sorry to call them anti-British.’

  The chairman then returned to Domvile’s links to Oswald Mosley. Was he ‘closely associated’ with him? The Admiral was again careful to say he would not use that term but ‘knew him well’. In relation to Mosley, the committee now turned to another concern of the Government. Did Domvile meet with Mosley and other Fascists to plot a fascist revolution in Britain? It is no surprise to find Domvile is careful in his response. ‘I have attended several meetings but not of Fascist leaders, of all sorts of people who had been working in the same good cause as we were working for, and we agreed to go on meeting during the war.’

  Notes on the transcript show the Security Service’s interest in that reply and the subsequent drawing out of names that attended the meetings: Mosley, Ramsay, Elam, Tavistock, Lymington, Norman Hay and others. These were all Fascists. The Chairman asked Domvile to state clearly the purpose of the meetings.

  ‘The purpose was a very simple one. We met, as I say we had all been working in the same direction in time of peace, and we agreed to have these periodical meetings and discuss the situation of the day as it stood, the war situation and so forth, but to say it was in any way co-ordinating Fascist activities with a
view to achieving revolution is a most outrageous statement, most outrageous, and I take great exception to it. It was nothing of the kind. Nothing whatever went on at these meetings except just a discussion on the current position of the war.’

  As far as the Admiral was concerned these meetings were simply ‘tea parties’. He was obviously very angry at the charge and in addressing that anger, the Chairman expressed his understanding at his resentment only to be interrupted by Domvile angrily saying with such a serious charge he should be ‘on trial for treason’. His anger was not abated when the ques-tioning turned to the matter of whether he was a danger to public safety. It was suggested that the Admiral was more sympathetic to the Nazi regime than to the British regime, to which he responded that it ‘was a scandalous suggestion to make’. The committee chairman pushed him further.

  Birkett: Would you welcome the defeat of Hitler?

  Domvile: I certainly would ...

  Birkett: Would you welcome the defeat of Hitler and the Hitler regime?

  Domvile: No more than I would welcome the defeat of any other German government. I naturally want to win the war, but, as I say, I am no more concerned with the Nazi regime than any other regime.

  This last response is heavily underlined by MI5. Domvile appears to be unable to condemn the Nazi regime outright. The chairman again repeated the same line of questioning, explaining to Domvile the importance of being clear. Domvile, when asked if he wanted peace with Hitler, ‘regretted’ that that was now not possible. Sir Arthur Hazlerigg asked Domvile about the closure of the Link and why Domvile had continued to associate with Oswald Mosley who had refused to close down his organisation on the outbreak of war. The Admiral did not give a clear response, simply repeating he had closed down the Link. Professor Collinson then pursued the matter of the Link allowing distribution of German leaflets. The Admiral denied all knowledge of any such thing happening. However, MI5 annotated the transcript with a handwritten note that Domvile was aware of certain material being distributed.

  There followed some general conversation with Domvile and the committee members about his relationship with Himmler and de Sager, with Domvile repeating his earlier responses. The committee indicated they had exhausted their questions and invited Domvile to ask anything about his situation not covered by the committee. He expressed his anger at the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, for his House of Commons remarks about the Link and Domvile being financed by Germany. He was reminded that the committee had no responsibility for the Home Secretary’s actions. Clearly, the affair had upset Domvile and he bemoaned the fact that it had led to the press having ‘thoroughly enjoyed’ it. The idea that the Link had received any money from Germany had ‘rankled him very badly’. He expressed concern over hunting guns that the police had taken from his home but again the committee were unable to help. A further concern for Domvile was his son, who he said suffered from sleeping sickness. ‘They took him to this new Gestapo at Ham Common’ and he had been held there for four weeks. Domvile was concerned that ‘men with hoods’ were doing the questioning and suggesting some form of torture was in operation. The committee simply agreed to take a note of the matter, before turning again to Mosley and the idea of a fascist revolution. The Admiral again stressed he had no part in that.

  It was interesting when Domvile was asked about how the Admiralty thought of him, he reported that he had had ‘good conduct’ reports from them. Pushed as to what they thought of him now, he felt there was no change. He was obviously unaware of the letter the Admiralty had sent condemning him. However, he had received a letter from one of his former naval colleagues expressing concern about the Link and German influence which in turn led Domvile to write to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Stanhope, ‘strongly resenting’ any suggestion that the Link was in any way influenced by Germany.

  The discussion moved to the Link’s newspaper, the Anglo-German Review. Domvile appears to be either deliberately obtuse or truly ignorant of how the paper was financed. He insisted that he paid ‘£5 a week’ and that covered the expenses. He knew of no other financing and accepted the finances were looked after by Carroll. The transcript is again heavily underlined here by the Security Service. They had his diaries and knew that he was not being totally truthful. This ended the hearing and Domvile was informed that other enquires were needed but the committee would do its best to sort the matter out as soon as possible.

  Chapter 11

  The Security Service Response to Domvile’s Hearing

  Immediately following the hearing, Birkett was in touch by secret letter to MI5. It appears the committee were persuaded by Domvile that he was innocent of all the charges brought against him. Birkett informed Pilcher, of the Security Service, that the committee were ‘extremely disturbed’ about the cases against Admiral Domvile and his wife. He felt that ‘it is almost impossible that a case has been made out supporting any acts prejudicial [to public safety]’. Birkett’s intention was to recommend the release of the Domviles but before issuing the committee’s report, he wanted more evidence to support the government’s decision to intern them. In the letter, he then gave the committee’s opinion on the various allegations against the Admiral and his wife.

  In the matter of the Link being under German influence and control, Birkett stated Domvile’s anger at the charge and his ‘insistence’ that it was not true. Domvile had also been ‘highly indignant’ and had also insisted that ‘the Link was not in any manner an organisation used for spreading German propaganda’. It is notable that Pilcher has put a question mark and an exclamation mark against this point. However, Birkett stated he had no evidence to support the claim of German influence and therefore had to conclude the Link was a genuine organisation that ‘desired to promote Anglo-German relationships’. The Security Service would have to come up with evidence to support their claims. Birkett then turns to ‘a most important point’, which was the statement in the House of Commons by Sir Samuel Hoare, that the Link was being funded by Germany. He reported Domvile’s intense agitation at these comments and Domvile’s assertion that this was ‘an untruth’. Again, Birkett wanted evidence for the claim to be given to the committee.

  As to Domvile’s close links to the Germany leaders, Birkett stated that Domvile had shown this ‘to be utterly without foundation’. Whilst accepting that Domvile knew Himmler and had gone shooting with him, this had occurred earlier and before the war. His visits to the Nuremberg rallies had been as part of a larger group from Britain which had also included members of the aristocracy. This again meant that the allegations made had no support in fact. In the matter of the Admiral writing an article for the German newspaper, Birkett asked Pilcher to supply a copy of it to the committee so that they could form their own opinion. Domvile, he wrote, had claimed it was a Christmas goodwill gesture and was ‘astonished’ that it could be considered as the ‘English Naval Authorities in conflict with their Government’. The same situation arose with Domvile’s preface to The Case for Germany. The committee also wanted a copy of this as Domvile claimed he believed it was for British circulation only. Birkett also reported Domvile’s strenuous denials that he was a leading figure in the ‘Information and Policy Group’ and ‘The British Council for Christian Settlement’. As to the allegation that Domvile was involved in the plotting of a Fascist revolution in England, Birkett wrote that he ‘particularly resented’ the charge and that if it were true he should ‘be charged with treason’.

  The Admiralty’s use of the word ‘quisling’ in regard to Domvile was then challenged by Birkett. He stated that ‘if the Admiralty have some grounds upon which this terse paragraph was based the committee would be glad to see it’. Birkett reviewed the allegation that Domvile was ‘pro-German and anti-British and was not to be trusted with his liberty at this time’ and made clear his resentment and repudiation of these claims. Birkett stated that Domvile ‘desired a British victory in this war’. Pilcher had underlined this and annotated that he ‘at first wanted a negot
iated peace’. Expressing Domvile’s ‘being insulted’ by the allegations, Birkett wrote that the committee were impressed by ‘a sense of his sincerity and honesty’. Turning to MI5’s allegation that Domvile might help the Germans if they invaded this country, Birkett wrote that Domvile had repudiated such charges. Pilcher again annotates this part with the handwritten note, ‘We suggested that he might collaborate with the Germans after a British defeat’. The whole thrust of Birkett’s letter gives the distinct impression that Domvile was a simply bystander to affairs and should be released.

  Pilcher immediately brought Birkett’s letter to the attention of his colleagues at MI5. These included Sidney H Noakes, Edward Blanchard Stamp (who would both later become judges) and Brian Aikin-Sneath an MI5 agent who was ‘the expert’ on the Link. In his response to Birkett (which appears to be carefully planned to avoid any immediate action by the committee), Pilcher advised that Aikin-Sneath had broken his leg and steps were being taken to get urgent information from his department for the committee. Furthermore, there were ‘about 8 big files on the Link’ which would take some time to go through. He pointed out that Domvile was to be viewed in close connection to Carroll, the editor of the Anglo-German Review which ‘was subsidised through advertisements emanating from Germany’. Pilcher referred Birkett to the Home Office files on Domvile which the committee ‘should have before them’. In respect of Domvile’s involvement in Fascist activity, Pilcher attached a note of two agents who had been undercover and who had reported on Domvile’s involvement in meetings with Mosley and Ramsay. All three had confirmed that Domvile was ‘active’ in these meetings and not simply a passive attender. One informant in particular, who was the wife of an ex-agent and ‘of whose reliability we have no doubt’, Pilcher wrote, ‘was horrified at the general tenor of their [the Domviles] conversation which was little short of treasonable’. This woman had been present at the Domviles’ home on many occasions and was there when a Fascist, Mrs Whinfield, had called to warn the Domviles that Fascists were being rounded up. Pilcher was careful to write very little and ended by suggesting that he arrange for a member of MI5 to come before the committee to give any further information they might need.