Decision at Sea
Page 1
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Copyright © 2005 by Craig L. Symonds
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First issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, 2006
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Symonds, Craig L.
Decision at sea : five naval battles that shaped American history /
Craig L. Symonds.
p. cm. Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-19-531211-9 (PBK.)
1. United States—History, Naval—Anecdotes.
2. Naval battles—United States—History. I. Title.
E182.S995 2005 359.4’773—dc22 2004029394
Book design and composition by Mark McGarry, Texas Type & Book Works
Set in Minion
DECISION AT SEA
Five Naval Battles
that Shaped American History
CRAIG L. SYMONDS
ALSO BY CRAIG L. SYMONDS
The Battle of Midway
Craig L. Symonds
There are few moments in American history in which the course of events tipped so suddenly and so dramatically as at the Battle of Midway. At dawn of June 4, 1942, a rampaging Japanese navy ruled the Pacific. By sunset, their vaunted carrier force had been sunk and their grip on the Pacific had been loosened forever.
Available October, 2011
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Confederate Admiral: The Life and Wars of Franklin Buchanan
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EDITED BY CRAIG L. SYMONDS
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A Year on a Monitor and the Destruction of Fort Sumter
Jubal Early’s Memoirs
Jefferson Davis: A Memoir by His Wife
The Civil War Recollections of Ellis Spear
The Civil War Reader, 1862
The Lost History of Gettysburg
DECISION AT SEA
For those in peril on the sea
[CONTENTS]
Acknowledgments
Author’s Note
Foreword by Thomas B. Buell
PROLOGUE: NAVAL BATTLES AND HISTORY
PART ONE: WOODEN WARSHIPS AND THE WESTERN FRONTIER
The Battle of Lake Erie, September 10, 1813
PART TWO: IRON, STEAM, AND NATIONAL UNION
The Battle of Hampton Roads, March 8–9, 1862
PART THREE: ARMORED CRUISERS AND EMPIRE
The Battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898
PART FOUR: NAVAL AVIATION AND WORLD WAR
The Battle of Midway, June 4, 1942
PART FIVE: MISSILE WARFARE AND THE AMERICAN IMPERIUM
Operation Praying Mantis: The Persian Gulf, April 18, 1988
EPILOGUE: NAVAL BATTLES AND THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Notes
Index
[ACKNOWLEDGMENTS]
My initial acknowledgment must go to the late Tom Buell, who originally conceived of this project—or at least a project similar to this one—and who invited me to take up the challenge of making it a reality. If the final product is very different from what Tom had in mind, his vision informed the way I attacked and presented the material. Nevertheless, all the conclusions and interpretations offered in this volume, as well as any errors that may have crept in, are mine alone.
I also want to thank Bob Pratt, the excellent cartographer at National Geographic, who produced the maps in the book; Tim Wooldridge and Janis Jorgensen of the U.S. Naval Institute Photo Archives, Claudia Jew at the Mariners’ Museum, and Scott Harmon, director of the Naval Academy Museum, all of whom helped me with the illustrations; and, at Oxford, Peter Ginna, my superb editor, who had faith in the project from the start, as well as the efficient and accomplished Furaha Norton. Finally, I offer thanks to Barbara Breeden, Barbara Manvel, and the wonderful staff at the Nimitz Library at the United States Naval Academy.
Prologue. I am indebted to my friend John Hattendorf, the Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History at the Naval War College, who read the Prologue and made several helpful suggestions about my treatment of the Battle of the Capes.
Part One: Lake Erie. Gerard Altoff, the park historian at the Perry Memorial and International Peace Monument at Put-in-Bay, Ohio, very generously shared with me the results of his many years of research about the Battle of Lake Erie and offered valuable criticism on, and corrections to, an early draft of the text. His generosity of spirit defines academic collegiality.
Thanks are due as well to John C. Dann, director of the William L. Clements Library on Early Americana at the University of Michigan, who allowed me to quote from the Oliver Hazard Perry Papers, and to Elisabeth Proffen, the special collections assistant at the Maryland Historical Society, for allowing me to quote from the Samuel Hambleton Diary.
Part Two: Hampton Roads. Dr. Francis J. DuCoin of Stuart, Florida, who has made the technical aspects of the Monitor a special study, helped me to appreciate the fine details of Ericsson’s revolutionary vessel, particularly the characteristics of the pilothouse. John W. Hinds of Shoreline, Washington, helped me with information about Hawthorne’s visit to the Monitor just after the battle. Versions of this chapter were presented orally at various meetings of the Civil War Weekend at the Mariners’ Museum, and I wish to thank all those whose comments and observations helped me sharpen my argument, including William C. “Jack” Davis, David Min-dell, and John Quarstein. I benefited as well from a collaboration on the construction of the CSS Virginia with Harold Holzer, Lincoln scholar and vice president for communications at the Metropolitan Museum of Art.
The Hagley Museum and Library in Wilmington, Delaware, generously granted permission to use the Samuel F. Du Pont Papers; the P. K. Yonge Library at the University of Florida gave permission to use the Stephen Mallory Papers; and the Research Collection at the Mariners’ Museum, the final resting place for the remains of the USS Monitor, generously allowed me access to its extended holdings about the Battle of Hampton Roads.
Part Three: Manila Bay. Rich Baker at the U.S. Army War College Military History Institute aided me in finding and identifying the Wayne Long-necker Papers. My friend and Naval Academy colleague Fred Harrod brought my attention to several important sources about the Spanish-American War and offered valuable comments on the manuscript that helped me rethink critical aspects of the battle.
Part Four: The Battle of
Midway. Vice Admiral William D. Houser, USN (ret), and Captain Jack Crawford, USN (ret), Midway veterans and stewards of the history of the Battle of Midway, not only provided oral reminiscences but directed me to other Midway veterans who helped me get a better feel for this pivotal battle. Otis Kight, who (like Jack Crawford) served aboard Yorktown during the battle, helped me with several details of that vessel’s operations, as did Ronald W. Russell. Not only was Paul Stillwell, head of the oral history collection at the U.S. Naval Institute, the midwife of this project, but in addition his oral histories of Midway veterans provided much of the raw material for this section. Thanks, too, to Barbara Manvel, who guided me to the Action Reports microfilm collection in Nimitz Library.
Part Five: Praying Mantis. I am grateful to Lieutenant Commander Don Donegon, USN, a former student of mine at the Naval Academy and now a friend, who conducted two interviews with Persian Gulf veterans aboard the USS Carl Vinson. Thanks as well to Lieutenant Commander Tom Cutler, USN (ret), a friend and former colleague at the Academy and author of the Bluejacket’s Manual, who tipped me to several useful sources. Members of the Naval Academy History Department’s Works-in-Progress seminar read a draft of the chapter and made their usual insightful observations. In particular, Commander Steve Bates, USN, Commander Dan Redmond, USN, and Lieutenant Commander Scott Herbener, USN, all helped explain the intricacies of the weapons technology. Robert W. Love Jr. and Joseph Stanik each read the entire text carefully and made a number of valuable suggestions.
Part Five could not have been written at all without the generous cooperation of the many participants of the Persian Gulf conflict who agreed to be interviewed or who supplied firsthand information to the author. They are listed here along with the job each held in April 1988: the Hon. Colin Powell, general, USA (ret), President Reagan’s national security advisor; the Hon. William J. Crowe Jr., admiral, USN (ret), chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Captain James Chandler, USN (ret), commanding officer of USS Wainwright; Captain Jerry O’Donnell, USN (ret), commanding officer of USS Thatch; Captain Henry “Hank” Sanford, USN (ret), executive officer on USS Merrill; Captain James “Red” Smith, USN, lieutenant on USS Thatch; Commander Alfred Eakins, USN (ret), lieutenant on USS California; Commander Leo Carling, USNR (ret), lieutenant on USS Wainwright; Senior Chief Petty Officer Ruben Vargas, USN, operations specialist first class on USS Wainwright; Mr. Richard Molck, weapons technician second class on USS Wainwright; and Chief Petty Officer Walter Brown, USN, yeoman second class on USS LaSalle.
Though I have never met him, I want to acknowledge the journalistic work of William Matthews of the Navy Times, whose careful reporting from the Gulf helped provide the chronological structure for this chapter.
Epilogue. Lieutenant Commander Randy Balano, USNR, and Lieutenant Commander Scott Herbener helped verify some of the factual information in this section, but I need to emphasize that although my views about the U.S. Navy’s role in the twenty-first century are a product of thirty years of teaching, speaking, and writing about American naval history, and therefore dependent on the insight provided by colleagues, students, and others, both in and out of uniform, I am solely responsible for the interpretive conclusions offered here and indeed throughout the book.
As always, my most insightful editor was my wife, Marylou, a partner in all my writing efforts as well as in everything else in my life, to whom I owe more than I can ever repay.
CRAIG L. SYMONDS
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND
[AUTHOR’S NOTE]
The original idea for this book belonged to Thomas B. Buell, a retired naval officer and respected historian. Early in 2002 he envisioned a book that examined the changing nature of warfare at sea by describing three critical sea battles of American history: Lake Erie, Hampton Roads, and the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Tom composed a proposal based on this idea and won a contract from Oxford University Press for a book to be called The Sea Warrior Trilogy. Soon thereafter, Tom’s doctor informed him that he had leukemia.
Though it was hardly his first thought upon hearing this devastating news, Tom was disappointed that his vision for this book would go unfulfilled. It was a mutual friend, Paul Stillwell, who in conversation with Tom suggested that perhaps I might take over the project. Tom and I had known each other since the 1970s when we had both served in uniform at the Naval War College, and he was immediately enthusiastic about the idea. After several phone conversations during which we discussed the project, Tom sent me a small package containing some preliminary notes he had made and a few of the books he was consulting. Two days after I received that package, Tom died.
This is, of course, a very different book from the one that Tom would have written. For one thing, I decided not to include the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, and I have added three other battles: Manila Bay, Midway, and the Persian Gulf. I made these decisions for reasons that I think are compelling and which are explained in the Prologue. But if the coverage is different, I tried to be faithful throughout to Tom’s notion that a key element in the analysis of any naval battle should be a consideration of the impact of warfare on the individual officer and sailor. Some idea of how Tom felt about those ideas is evident in the Foreword, drawn from Tom’s original proposal, which follows this note.
[FOREWORD]
by Thomas B. Buell
A large stained-glass window in the Naval Academy chapel depicts a newly commissioned ensign in dress white uniform reading his commission, held reverently in his outstretched hands. A seascape occupies the background, and a figure of Christ rises on the horizon. This vision inspired me when I worshiped there as a midshipman. I perceived the naval profession as a special calling that demanded selfless devotion to the United States Navy and the nation. The spirit of naval heroes was everywhere, in portraits, banners, murals, busts, monuments, and memorials. The essence of the Naval Academy was clear and unmistakable: a naval officer was part of an elite society of which much was expected, and he led a life governed by ethics, morals, and certitudes. While he was in the world, he was not of it.
As I matured in the profession, reality replaced imagery through observation and study. Though I recognized that naval leaders were fallible, they continued to fascinate me. There were two principal reasons. One was that as a career naval officer, my professional goal was command at sea, and I recognized that such an aspiration required the ability to lead under stress. I studied in order to learn from the masters. The other reason was intellectual inquiry: to learn how the great naval leaders developed their talents, how they thought and reasoned, and what compelled their actions. How did they manage the responsibilities and tension of high command? How did they prepare themselves for war, reflect about war, and behave when they made war? To discover the answers, I read—and eventually I wrote—naval history, for although history is a constantly changing tableau, it is also a seamless cloth, and by understanding how sea warriors in the past attempted to answer these questions, I could discern the essential nature of war at sea.
The antagonists in the battles described in this book first had to contend with the sea. The sea’s most fundamental characteristic is its vastness, for the oceans cover 75 percent of the earth’s surface. While army officers think in terms of kilometers over terrain ranging from deserts to mountains, naval officers think in terms of transit time over great distances, hundreds and even thousands of nautical miles over a uniform water surface disturbed only by the wind. Naval officers prefer the freedom of the open seas, though they must nonetheless sometimes fight at close quarters in restricted waters, forcing them to think three-dimensionally by considering the depth of water under the keel as well as the precise distances between ship and shoals. By the middle of the twentieth century their warfare environment included carrier-launched airplanes, and by the end of that century it embraced orbiting satellites as naval warfare became genuinely global.
Alfred Thayer Mahan notwithstanding, no one navy can truly control the sea, for a fleet is but a pinprick upon 135 milli
on square miles of water. It may be a fleet of great power, able to defeat any enemy within range of its weapons and thus temporarily control an area within its combat radius, but when the fleet moves on, the sea in its wake is again open to other ships to pass undisturbed. Hence there is no equivalent to the trenches, fortifications, and front lines of land warfare, which allow armies to remain in place and in control indefinitely. Barclay “controlled” Lake Erie until defeated by Perry; the Virginia seized “control” of Hampton Roads for a day, only to lose it the next; in the western Pacific, Japanese “control” of the waters around the Philippines proved almost equally fleeting. In the Persian Gulf, and in the modern world generally, the “control” of any sea is an elusive and ephemeral quality.
The accountability of command, however, is absolute. This sometimes leads naval officers to be careful, even meticulous—their degree of caution (or boldness) contingent upon their willingness to take calculated risks. But sea duty also instills a sense of enormous confidence and independence first experienced when a junior qualifies as an officer of the deck under way and assumes the burden of responsibility for the ship while the captain is below. Decisions must often be made instantaneously, and as a junior officer makes those decisions and exercises his authority, he may over time come to feel more liberated than inhibited by the mantle of authority. Once in command, a captain’s authority becomes nearly as absolute as his accountability.
In the midst of battle, that authority must be exercised in an environment that is both chaotic and constantly changing. War is messy. The orderly battle line disintegrates into a melee. The eternal question for captains engaged in combat is one of assigning priorities. Which of the many crises a captain confronts must be dealt with first? Does he maneuver to conform to instructions that seem to have been overtaken by events, or does he exercise his authority and independently close with the enemy? At the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, the great British hero of the Age of Sail, Horatio Lord Nelson, informed his commanders that “no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.” Nelson encouraged independent thought among his subordinates, and that day, at least, it paid off for him—and for England. Despite dramatic improvements in communication since Nelson’s day, the central dilemma remains, and both responsibility and accountability continue to reside with the ship’s commanding officer.