Lone Wolf Terrorism

by Jeffrey D. Simon

  The Internet, however, has made it easier and faster for lone wolves to communicate whatever messages and statements they want. Some recent examples of lone wolves who used the Internet to reach out to others, and, in doing so, may have tipped their hand as to their violent plans, include the following:

  Colleen LaRose (also known as Jihad Jane)—She used MySpace, YouTube, and e-mails to express her desire to become a martyr for the Islamic cause. She was in contact with other extremists online and traveled to Europe in August 2009 to be involved in an assassination plot.

  Nidal Malik Hasan—He communicated through e-mails with Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born radical Islamic cleric who was living in Yemen, before he opened fire on fellow soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas, in November 2009, killing thirteen people and wounding thirty-two others.

  Anders Breivik—He posted an anti-Islamic manifesto on the Internet before he embarked on a terrorist mission that involved setting off a bomb in Oslo and massacring scores of youths on a Norwegian island in July 2011.

  Joseph Stack—He posted an anti–US government manifesto on the Internet before flying a plane into a building in Austin, Texas, in February 2010. The building contained offices of the Internal Revenue Service. One person was killed, in addition to Stack himself.

  Richard Poplawski—He frequented a neo-Nazi chat room on the Internet and was responsible for killing three police officers in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in April 2009.

  James von Brunn—He posted anti-Semitic and racist writings on the Internet for years before killing a security guard at the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC, in June 2009. He also sent several e-mails with violent content to a friend in the weeks before the attack.

  Bruce Ivins—He sent several alarming e-mails to a former colleague in the year before he launched the 2001 anthrax letter attacks that killed five people. In the e-mails, he described how he was experiencing “incredible paranoid, delusional thoughts at times.”

  Nicky Reilly—He was in contact over the Internet with extremists in Pakistan who encouraged him to commit a suicide terrorist attack in Britain, which he attempted to do in May 2008. The attempt failed when one of three nail bombs he was preparing in a restroom of a restaurant exploded in his hands.

  Even Roshonara Choudhry, the “purest” of lone wolves, in that nobody knew anything about her radicalization and intentions to commit a violent act, still inadvertently revealed herself by downloading more than one hundred sermons by Anwar al-Awlaki, who influenced many lone wolf terrorists from his base in Yemen until he was killed in 2011. While the downloading of the al-Awlaki material by itself might not have been enough to alert the authorities to her desire to commit a terrorist attack (had they been monitoring everyone who was downloading his inflammatory sermons), when that information is combined with her suddenly dropping out of college near the end of her final year, even though she was expected to graduate with honors, it very well could have been a warning sign that she might be planning a terrorist mission.

  The radicalization of individuals via the Internet, however, is not always the result of their just reading extremist groups’ websites or downloading documents. Sageman argues that terrorist websites only reinforce what these individuals already believe in.56 He notes that it is the online forums commonly known as “chat rooms” that are among the most influential aspects of the Internet for inspiring terrorist attacks by those who might otherwise never consider going to such extremes. Sageman writes:

  The interactivity is what is important…. Since physical militant sites, like radical mosques, are closely monitored by law enforcement authorities, militants have moved online. The new forums have the same influences that these radical mosques played in the previous generation of terrorists. It is the forums, not the images of the passive websites, which are crucial in the process of radicalization…. It is the…interactive exchanges in the chat rooms that inspire and radicalize.57

  Regarding Islamic lone wolves, Sageman notes: “These loners appear as ‘lone wolves’ only offline. Most are part of a forum, where they share their plans and are encouraged by chat room participants to carry them out.”58 The same could be said for any lone wolf who has interactions with other extremists, or “wanna-be extremists,” over the Internet. They are “lone wolves,” but their desire for communication and human interaction via the Internet can give them away to the authorities. The monitoring of extremist chat rooms, which law-enforcement agencies in many countries already do, together with the identification of who the anonymous “chatters” are, is one way to get a head start on identifying potential lone wolves, whether they are Islamists, antiabortion militants, environmental extremists, right-wing militants, or others.

  More problematic, of course, is how to discover the lone wolves who do not frequent any extremist chat rooms yet are still using the Internet to advance their plans. How to uncover that activity without violating law-abiding individuals’ civil liberties is one of the more difficult tasks concerning Internet monitoring. However, real-time monitoring of the Internet for the posting of inflammatory manifestos, and the ability to react quickly, might have given some warning, albeit just a few hours, of Breivik's carnage in Norway and Stack's suicide plane mission in the United States. Both men posted their manifestos online the day of their attacks. It is not known if the authorities in either country knew about the postings before the attacks took place.

  Governments around the world have been increasing their efforts to monitor Internet activity, although not always just for signs of potential terrorist threats. The US Department of Homeland Security, at its National Operations Center, monitors social media networks such as Twitter and Facebook. It has the authority “to provide situational awareness” for government officials “in the event of a natural disaster, act of terrorism or other man-made disaster” and to “ensure that critical terrorism and disaster-related information reaches government decision makers.”59 It was discovered, though, that a 2011 DHS manual called on analysts to identify and write reports about discussions on social media networks concerning “policy directives, debates and implementations related to DHS.”60 It was not determined whether DHS analysts actually produced such reports, but it is those kinds of revelations that alarm many people regarding government monitoring of the Internet.

  Let us suppose, though, that the day will come when people believe that compromising some civil liberties and privacy rights in the name of being protected against terrorism is worth the trade-off, even to the extent of having their Internet activity monitored. After all, we have already made several trade-offs in the name of preventing terrorism, ranging from agreeing to pass through metal detectors and submit to full-body scans at airports (although the full-body scans have raised the ire of some people) to being watched by CCTV cameras when we enter buildings, attend events, or even just walk around a city. And our Internet activity is already being monitored by Google and other companies for advertising and marketing purposes. In 2011, for example, Google generated an estimated $36.5 billion in advertising revenue “by analyzing what people sent over Gmail and what they searched on the Web, and then using that data to sell ads.”61 However, even if everybody's Internet activity were monitored in order to identify the lone wolves or other types of terrorists among us, it would still probably not be effective. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish a terrorist from a student, researcher, Internet surfer, and the like. For example, had such a monitoring system been in place as I wrote this book, then I would probably be at the top of the list of potential lone wolf terrorists. During the time that I conducted research, I visited numerous extremist web pages and postings; conducted Google searches for “bomb,” “anthrax,” “mass casualties,” and other related words and phrases; and downloaded various documents about terrorism that would likely have raised a red flag.

  There is little doubt, however, that the Internet is an indispensable tool in combating lone wolf terrorism. In some cases, Internet acti
vity by lone wolves may be the only intelligence that the authorities have prior to an attack. Intercepting the e-mails of lone wolves who are in communication with radical extremists abroad, monitoring militant chat rooms and blogs, and uncovering online postings of the final manifestos by lone wolves, in which they basically announce their plans, are just some of the Internet preventive measures that can be taken.

  In addition, the online purchase of large amounts of precursor chemicals that can be used for making improvised explosive devices or even chemical warfare agents is another possible indicator of lone wolf activity. For example, Anders Breivik, the Norwegian lone wolf, was put on a watch list, as noted in chapter 2, after purchasing large quantities of ammonium nitrate fertilizer from an online store in Poland. He was taken off the list after he explained to the authorities that the fertilizer was for use on a farm he had rented. However, he used it instead to produce the car bomb that he set off in Oslo as part of his dual terrorist attacks. Another suspicious online purchase would be for large amounts of seeds from the castor bean plant by an individual without any legitimate reason for doing so. The seeds can be used to produce the deadly toxin ricin. Although Breivik was not planning an attack with a weapon of mass destruction, the next lone wolf might be, and he or she could use the Internet to purchase the necessary ingredients for the weapon.

  Before the advent of the Internet it was often said that there was a symbiotic relationship between terrorists and the media. Each needed and used the other for mutual benefit. The terrorists needed the media to publicize their cause(s), generate fear in the targeted country's population, and win new recruits around the world. The media, meanwhile, needed terrorist crises and other terrorist-related events to generate ratings for television and increased circulation for newspapers and magazines. While this is still the case regarding “traditional” media, the Internet has changed the dynamics of this relationship. Terrorists now have another option besides traditional media for getting their messages across, and they have certainly taken advantage of that with their websites, YouTube videos, Facebook pages, and other material they generate on the Internet. But this is a one-sided relationship; terrorists need the Internet more than the Internet needs them. And that fact may prove helpful to law-enforcement and intelligence agencies aiming to prevent lone wolf attacks.

  Early Warning Signs

  In addition to tipping their hands through their Interact activity, there are several other early warning signs that an individual may be on the road to becoming a lone wolf terrorist. One would be individuals who have broken away, been expelled, or been rejected by extremist or other fringe-type groups. These types of individuals can be dangerous, since they are sometimes viewed as too unstable or too extreme for membership in a terrorist or other type of militant group. Without the group decision-making apparatus to control their activities, these individuals may decide to launch their own terrorist attacks. I noted in chapter 2 that Timothy McVeigh began plotting the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City after a Michigan militia group distanced itself from him because its members found his views to be too radical. “Many lone wolves approached extremist groups but were rejected for being too extreme and unstable,” observed Mark F. Giuliano, assistant director of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division. “The groups do not want to attract the attention of the FBI so they don't want these people as members.”62 Identifying who these individuals are may help prevent some lone wolf attacks.

  Another characteristic often exhibited as an early warning sign of lone wolf terrorism is individuals who have had a troubled past, have displayed abnormal behavior, or have various personality issues. For example, the New York Times quoted an FBI bulletin that described people with difficult work and personal relationships and who have stood out to others due their erratic behavior as potential lone wolves. “Often there are early warning signs concerning these individuals that could be useful to law enforcement,” the bulletin stated. “Many lone extremists, for example, have a history of functioning poorly within traditional communities, such as educational institutions, churches, and places of employment.”63 However, how to distinguish these types of individuals from those with similar behavioral patterns who, instead of becoming lone wolves, actually become very successful in life is difficult to determine.

  Yet many lone wolves have exhibited psychological and personality disorders that, given their jobs and access to weapons and targets, should have been an early warning sign of trouble. Bruce Ivins, the perpetrator of the anthrax letter attacks, had a history of mental problems that, as a panel of behavioral scientists concluded, should have prevented him from attaining a security clearance and from being allowed to work with biological warfare agents. Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, also displayed abnormal behavior for a person employed by the US Army. As noted in chapter 2, an instructor and a colleague each described him as a “ticking time bomb,” and he once told his supervisor that, as an infidel, she would be “ripped to shreds” and “burn in hell.”

  Sudden changes in behavior could be another indication that an individual is considering an act of violence. Several suicide terrorists in the Middle East and elsewhere withdrew from their family and friends once they decided, or were persuaded, to embark upon a suicide attack. Others, who may have had personal problems, suddenly appeared calm and relaxed to their friends after they decided they would launch an attack that would result in their death. The flip side of this are those individuals who are normally calm and friendly but who suddenly become extremely agitated and angry. This was true of Joseph Stack, who, as mentioned earlier, flew a plane into a building containing IRS offices in Austin, Texas. Stack, who was described by most people who knew him as easygoing, became increasingly angry in the weeks before his suicide mission, leading his wife to leave their house with their daughter the night before the attack.64

  Another early warning sign of potential lone wolf terrorism is the suspicious purchase of various materials that can be used in constructing bombs or other weapons. In addition to monitoring the online purchases of such material, it is also important that law-enforcement agencies be able to know who has made such purchases in person at various stores throughout the country. The FBI, therefore, has a program in place known as Operation Tripwire, which enlists the aid of businesses in identifying such individuals. FBI agents meet with owners and employees of gun stores, chemical companies, beauty supply stores, and other industries to explain what types of suspicious activities to look out for. This includes, among other things, large purchases of precursors for making explosives (beauty shops, for example, sell hydrogen peroxide for coloring hair and acetone for removing nail polish, two ingredients that can also be used to make peroxide-based explosives, also known as “liquid bombs”), purchases of short lengths of pipe for constructing pipe bombs, and using cash for large transactions. The FBI urges these businesses to engage their suspicious customers in conversation, asking them questions and observing their responses, to gauge whether something doesn't sound quite right. If an interaction or transaction seems unusual, the business owners and workers are advised to contact the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, which has offices throughout the United States.65

  Lone wolves may also give themselves away by their recent travels. Visits to countries or regions known for their presence of militants, terrorists, and the like should obviously raise red flags for any nation's security personnel. While such travel is not necessarily an indicator of being part of a terrorist plot or having ties to a militant organization, individuals who have recently traveled to these areas might nevertheless return home more radicalized and more susceptible to the influences of extremist groups and other militants than they were before they left their home country.

  Countering the Message of Terrorists

  Part of the battle against terrorism is a propaganda war. Al Qaeda has been among the best at the game of exploiting the Internet and traditional media for maximum benefit. Its media arm, al Sahab,
has produced numerous videos and other online content over the years. Related groups, such as AQAP, have also played the propaganda game very well, particularly al-Awlaki, who, until he was killed in 2011, was the most influential media personality in terms of reaching potential lone wolves around the world. It remains to be seen if anybody else will be able to replace him as the Internet star that he became, but just like a corporation that has a high-profile vacancy at the top, there are likely to be several militants eager to advance their careers by taking his place.

  How to counter the message of not just al Qaeda and related groups but also other extremist movements has been a major challenge for governments around the world. With respect to Islamic extremism, working with Muslim moderates to convey the message that the terrorism preached by al Qaeda and other militant groups goes against the teachings of the Koran has been one approach tried. The message that bin Laden and others “hijacked Islam” has been heard many times. However, as Sageman points out, there are limits to the effectiveness of counter-ideology as a strategy against terrorism. “I am not sure,” Sageman writes, “that this strong emphasis on ideology, religion, and fighting ‘extremist Islam’ is fruitful…. I have come to the conclusion that the terrorists in Western Europe and North America were not intellectuals or ideologues, much less religious scholars. It is not about how they think, but how they feel. Let us not make the mistake of over-intellectualizing this fight. It is indeed a contest for the hearts and minds of potential terrorists, not an intellectual debate about the legitimacy of an extreme interpretation of a religious message.”66