Complete Works of Edmund Burke

by Edmund Burke

  Great mistakes have been committed; at least I hope so. If there have been none, the case in future is desperate. I have endeayoured to point out some of those which have occurred to me, and most of them very early.

  Whatever may be the cause of the present state of things, on a full and mature view and comparison of the historical matter, of the transactions that have passed before our eyes, and of the future prospect, I think I am authorized to form an opinion without the least hesitation.

  That there never was, nor is, nor ever will be, or ever can be, the least rational hope of making an impression on France by any Continental Powers, if England is not a part, is not the directing part, is not the soul, of the whole confederacy against it.

  This, so far as it is an anticipation of future, is grounded on the whole tenour of former history — In speculation it is to be accounted for on two plain principles.

  First, That Great Britain is likely to take a more fair and equal part in the alliance, than the other Powers, as having less of crossing interest, or perplexed discussion with any of them.

  Secondly, Because France cannot have to deal with any of these continental Sovereigns, without their feeling that nation, as a maritime Power, greatly superiour to them all put together; a force which is only to be kept in check by England.

  England, except during the excentrick aberration of Charles the Second, has always considered it as her duty and interest, to take her place in such a confederacy. Her chief disputes must ever be with France, and if England shews herself indifferent and unconcerned when these Powers are combined against the enterprizes of France, she is to look with certainty for the same indifference on the part of these Powers, when she may be at war with that nation. This will tend totally to disconnect this kingdom from the system of Europe, in which, if she ought not rashly to meddle, she ought never wholly to withdraw herself from it.

  If then England is put in motion, whether by a consideration of the general safety, or of the influence of France upon Spain, or by the probable operations of this new system on the Netherlands, it must embrace in it’s project the whole as much as possible, and the part it takes ought to be as much as possible a leading and presiding part.

  I therefore beg leave to suggest,

  First, That a Minister should forthwith be sent to Spain, to encourage that Court to persevere in the measures they have adopted against France; to make a close alliance and guarantee of possessions, as against France, with that power, and whilst the formality of the treaty is pending, to assure them of our protection, postponing any lesser disputes to another occasion.

  Secondly, To assure the Court of Vienna, of our desire to enter into our antient connexions with her, and to support her effectually in the war which France has declared against her.

  Thirdly, To animate the Swiss, and the King of Sardinia, to take a part, as the latter once did on the principles of the Grand Alliance.

  Fourthly, To put an end to our disputes with Russia, and mutually to forget the past. I believe if she is satisfied of this oblivion, she will return to her old sentiments, with regard to this Court, and will take a more forward part in this business than any other Power.

  Fifthly, If what has happened to the King of Prussia is only in consequence of a sort of panick or of levity, and an indisposition to persevere long in one design — the support and concurrence of Russia will tend to steady him, and to give him resolution. If he be ill disposed, with that power on his back, and without one ally in Europe, I conceive he will not be easily led to derange the plan.

  Sixthly, To use the joint influence of our Court, and of our then Allied Powers, with Holland, to arm as fully as she can by sea, and to make some addition by land.

  Seventhly, To acknowledge the King of France’s next brother (assisted by such a Council and such Representatives of the Kingdom of France, as shall be thought proper) Regent of France, and to send that Prince a small supply of money, arms, cloathing and artillery.

  Eighthly, To give force to these negociations, an instant naval armament ought to be adopted; one squadron for the Mediterranean; another for the Channel. The season is convenient, most of our trade being, as I take it, at home.

  After speaking of a plan formed upon the antient policy and practice of Great Britain, and of Europe; to which this is exactly conformable in every respect, with no deviation whatsoever, and which is, I conceive much more strongly called for by the present circumstances, than by any former, I must take notice of another which I hear, but cannot persuade myself to believe, is in agitation. This plan is grounded upon the very same view of things which is here stated, namely, the danger to all Sovereigns, and old Republicks, from the prevalence of French power and influence.

  It is to form a Congress of all the European powers, for the purpose of a general defensive alliance, the objects of which should be,

  First, The recognition of this new Republick (which they well know is formed on the principles, and for the declared purpose of the destruction of all Kings), and whenever the heads of this new Republick shall consent to release the Royal Captives, to make Peace with them.

  Secondly, To defend themselves with their joint forces against the open aggressions or the secret practices, intrigues and writings, which are used to propagate the French principles.

  It is easy to discover from whose shop this commodity comes. It is so perfectly absurd, that if that, or any thing like it, meets with a serious entertainment in any Cabinet, I should think it the effect of what is called a judicial blindness, the certain forerunner of the destruction of all Crowns and Kingdoms.

  An offensive alliance, in which union is preserved, by common efforts in common dangers, against a common active enemy, may preserve it’s consistency, and may produce for a given time, some considerable effect; though this is not easy, and for any very long period, can hardly be expected. But a defensive alliance, formed of long discordant interests, with innumerable discussions existing, having no one pointed object to which it is directed, which is to be held together with an unremitted vigilance, as watchful in peace as in war, is so evidently impossible, is such a chimera, is so contrary to human nature, and the course of human affairs, that I am persuaded no person in his senses, except those whose Country, Religion and Sovereign, are deposited in the French funds, could dream of it. There is not the slightest petty boundary suit, no difference between a family arrangement, no sort of misunderstanding, or cross purpose between the pride and etiquette of Courts, that would not entirely disjoint this sort of alliance, and render it as sutile in it’s effects, as it is feeble in it’s principle. But when we consider that the main drift of that defensive alliance must be to prevent the operation of intrigue, mischievous doctrine and evil example, in the success of unprovoked rebellion, regieide, and systematick assassination and massacre, the absurdity of such a scheme becomes quite lamentable. Open the communication with France, and the rest follows of course.

  How far the interiour circumstances of this country support what is said with regard to it’s foreign politicks, must be left to better judgments. I am sure the French faction here is infinitely strengthened by the success of the assassins on the other side of the water. — This evil in the heart of Europe must be extirpated from that center, or no part of the circumference can be free from the mischief which radiates from it, and which will spread circle beyond circle, in spite of all the little defensive precautions which can be employed against it.

  I do not put my name to these hints submitted to the consideration of reflecting men. It is of too little importance to suppose the name of the writer could add any weight to the state of things contained in this paper. That state of things presses irresistibly on my judgment, and it lies, and has long lain, with an heavy weight upon my mind. I cannot think that what is done in France, is beneficial to the human race. If it were, the English Constitution ought no more to stand against it than the antient Constitution of the kingdom in which the new system prevails. I thought it the duty of a
man, not unconcerned for the publick, and who is a faithful subject to the King, respectfully to submit this state of facts at this new step in the progress of the French arms and politicks, to his Majesty, to his confidential servants, and to those persons who, though not in office, by their birth, their rank, their fortune, their character and their reputation for wisdom, seem to me to have a large stake in the stability of the antient order of things.

  Bath, November 5, 1793.

  REMARKS ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES WITH RESPECT TO FRANCE. BEGUN IN OCTOBER, 1793.

  AS the proposed manifesto is, I understand, to promulgate to the world the general idea of a plan for the regulation of a great kingdom, and through the regulation of that kingdom probably to decide the fate of Europe for ever, nothing requires a more serious deliberation with regard to the time of making it, the circumstances of those to whom it is addressed, and the matter it is to contain.

  As to the time, (with the due diffidence in my own opinion) I have some doubts whether it is not rather unfavourable to the issuing any Manifesto, with regard to the intended government of France; and for this reason, that it is, (upon the principal point of our attack) a time of calamity and defeat. Manifestoes of this nature are commonly made when the army of some Sovereign enters into the enemy’s country in great force, and under the imposing authority of that force employs menaces towards those whom he desires to awe; and makes promises to those whom he wises to engage in his favour.

  As to a party, what has been done at Toulon leaves no doubt, that the party for which we declare must be that which substantially declares for Royalty as the basis of the government.

  As to menaces — Nothing, in my opinion, can contribute more effectually to lower any Sovereign in the publick estimation, and to turn his defeats into disgraces, than to threaten in a moment of impotence. The second Manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick appeared therefore to the world to be extremely ill-timed. However, if his menaces in that Manifesto had been seasonable, they were not without an object. Great crimes then apprehended, and great evils then impending, were to be prevented. At this time, every act, which early menaces might possibly have prevented, is done. Punishment and vengeance alone remain, and God forbid that they should ever be forgotten. But the punishment of enormous offenders, will not be the less severe, or the less exemplary when it is not threatened at a moment when we have it not in our power to execute our threats. On the other side, to pass by proceedings of such a nefarious nature, in all kinds, as have been carried on in France, without any signification of resentment, would be in effect to ratify them; and thus to become accessaries after the fact, in all those enormities which it is impossible to repeat, or think of without horror. An absolute silence appears to me to be at this time the only safe course.

  The second usual matter of Manifestoes is composed of promises to those who co-operate with our designs. These promises depend in a great measure, if not wholly, on the apparent power of the person who makes them to fulfil his engagements. A time of disaster on the part of the promiser, seems not to add much to the dignity of his person, or to the effect of his offers. One would hardly wish to seduce any unhappy persons to give the last provocation to a merciless tyranny, without very effectual means of protecting them.

  The time therefore seems (as I said) not favourable to a general Manifesto, on account of the unpleasant situation of our affairs. However, I write in a changing scene, when a measure very imprudent to day, may be very proper to-morrow. Some great victory may alter the whole state of the question, so far as it regards our power of fulfilling any engagement we may think fit to make.

  But there is another consideration of far greater importance for all the purposes of this Manifesto. The publick, and the parties concerned, will look somewhat to the disposition of the promiser indicated by his conduct, as well as to his power of fulfilling his engagements.

  Speaking of this nation as part of a general combination of powers, are we quite sure, that others can believe us to be sincere, or that we can be even fully assured of our own sincerity in the protection of those who shall risque their lives for the restoration of Monarchy in France, when the world sees, that those who are the natural, legal, constitutional representatives of that Monarchy, if it has any, have not had their names so much as mentioned in any one publick act; that in no way whatever are their persons brought forward, that their rights have not been expressly or implicitly allowed, and that they have not been in the least consulted on the important interests they have at stake. On the contrary, they are kept in a state of obscurity and contempt, and in a degree of indigence at times bordering on beggary. They are in fact, little less prisoners in the village of Hanau, than the Royal captives who are locked up in the tower of the Temple. What is this, according to the common indications which guide the judgment of mankind, but, under the pretext of protecting the crown of France, in reality to usurp it?

  I am also very apprehensive, that there are other circumstances which must tend to weaken the force of our declarations. No partiality to the allied powers, can prevent great doubts on the fairness of our intentions as supporters of the Crown of France, or of the true principles of legitimate Government in opposition to Jacobinism, when it is visible that the two leading orders of the State of France, who are now the victims, and who must always be the true and sole supports of Monarchy in that country, are, at best, in some of their descriptions, considered only as objects of charity, and others are, when employed, employed only as mercenary soldiers; that they are thrown back out of all reputable service, are in a manner disowned, considered as nothing in their own cause, and never once consulted in the concerns of their King, their country, their laws, their religion, and their property! We even affect to be ashamed of them. In all our proceedings we carefully avoid the appearance of being of a party with them. In all our ideas of Treaty we do not regard them as what they are, the two leading orders of the kingdom. If we do not consider them in that light, we must recognize the savages by whom they have been ruined, and who have declared war upon Europe, whilst they disgrace and persecute human nature, and openly defy the God that made them, as real proprietors of France.

  I am much afraid, too, that we shall scarcely be believed fair supporters of lawful Monarchy against Jacobinism, so long as we continue to make and to observe cartels with the Jacobins, and on fair terms exchange prisoners with them, whilst the Royalists, invited to our standard, and employed under our publick faith, against the Jacobins, if taken by that savage faction, are given up to the executioner without the least attempt whatsoever at reprisal. For this, we are to look at the King of Prussia’s conduct, compared with his Manifestoes about a twelvemonth ago. For this we are to look at the capitulations of Mentz and Valenciennes, made in the course of the present campaign. By these two capitulations, the Christian Royalists were excluded from any participation in the cause of the combined powers. They were considered as the outlaws of Europe. Two armies were in effect sent against them. One of those armies (that which surrendered Mentz) was very near overpowering the Christians of Poitou, and the other (that which surrendered at Valenciennes) has actually crushed the people whom oppression and despair had driven to resistance at Lyons, has massacred several thousands of them in cold blood, pillaged the whole substance of the place, and pursued their rage to the very houses, condemning that noble city to desolation, in the unheard of manner we have seen it devoted.

  It is then plain by a conduct which overturns a thousand declarations, that we take the Royalists of France only as an instrument of some convenience in a temporary hostility with the Jacobins, but that we regard those atheistick and murderous barbarians as the bonâ fide possessors of the soil of France. It appears at least, that we consider them as a fair Government de facto, if not de jure; a resistance to which in favour of the King of France, by any man who happened to be born within that country, might equitably be considered by other nations, as the crime of treason.

  For my part, I would sooner put my han
d into the fire than sign an invitation to oppressed men to fight under my standard, and then on every sinister event of war, cruelly give them up to be punished as the basest of traitors, as long as I had one of the common enemy in my hands to be put to death in order to secure those under my protection, and to vindicate the common honour of Sovereigns. We hear nothing of this kind of security in favour of those whom we invite to the support of our cause. Without it, I am not a little apprehensive that the proclamations of the combined powers might (contrary to their intention no doubt) be looked upon as frauds, and cruel traps laid for their lives.

  So far as to the correspondence between our declarations and our conduct, let the declaration be worded as it will, the conduct is the practical comment by which, and which alone it can be understood. This conduct acting on the declaration, leaves a Monarchy without a Monarch; and without any representative or trustee for the Monarch, and the Monarchy. It supposes a kingdom without states and orders; a territory without proprietors; and faithful subjects, who are to be left to the fate of rebels and traitors.

  The affair of the establishment of a Government is a very difficult undertaking for foreign powers to act in as principals; though as auxiliaries and mediators, it has been not at all unusual, and may be a measure full of policy and humanity, and true dignity.

  The first thing we ought to do, supposing us not giving the law as conquerors, but acting as friendly powers applied to for counsel and assistance in the settlement of a distracted country, is well to consider the composition, nature, and temper of its objects, and particularly of those who actually do, or who ought to exercise power in that state. It is material to know who they are, and how constituted, whom we consider as the people of France?

  The next consideration is, through whom our arrangements are to be made, and on what principles the Government we propose is to be established.