Complete Works of Edmund Burke

by Edmund Burke

  My clear opinion is, that Toulon ought to be made, what we set out with, a royal French city. By the necessity of the case, it must be under the influence, civil and military, of the allies. But the only way of keeping that jealous and discordant mass from tearing its component parts to pieces, and hazarding the loss of the whole, is to put the place into the nominal government of the regent, his officers being approved by us. This, I say, is absolutely necessary for a poise amongst ourselves. Otherwise is it to be believed that the Spaniards, who hold that place with us in a sort of partnership contrary to our mutual interest, will see us absolute masters of the Mediterranean, with Gibraltar on one side, and Toulon on the other, with a quiet and composed mind, whilst we do little less than declare that we are to take the whole West Indies into our hands, leaving the vast, unwieldy, and feeble body of the Spanish dominions in that part of the world, absolutely at our mercy, without any power to balance us in the smallest degree. Nothing is so fatal to a nation as an extreme of self-partiality, and the total want of consideration of what others will naturally hope or sear. Spain must think she sees, that we are taking advantage of the confusions which reign in France, to disable that country, and of course every country from affording her protection, and in the end to turn the Spanish Monarchy into a province. If she saw things in a proper point of light, to be sure, she would not consider any other plan of politicks as of the least moment in comparison of the extinction of jacobinism. But her ministers (to say the best of them) are vulgar politicians. It is no wonder that they should postpone this great point, or balance it, by considerations of the common politicks, that is, the questions of power between state and state. If we manifestly endeavour to destroy the balance, especially the maritime and commercial balance, both in Europe and the West Indies, (the latter their sore and vulnerable part) from fear of what France may do for Spain hereafter, is it to be wondered, that Spain, infinitely weaker than we are, (weaker indeed that such a mass of empire ever was,) should feel the same fears from our uncontroled power, that we give way to ourselves from a supposed resurrection of the antient power of France under a Monarchy? It signifies nothing whether we are wrong or right in the abstract; but in respect to our relation to Spain, with such principles followed up in practice, it is absolutely impossible that any cordial alliance can subsist between the two nations. If Spain goes, Naples will speedily follow. Prussia is quite certain, and thinks of nothing but making a market of the present confusions. Italy is broken and divided; Switzerland is jacobinized, I am afraid, completely. I have long seen with pain the progress of French principles in that country. Things cannot go on upon the present bottom. The possession of Toulon, which, well managed, might be of the greatest advantage, will be the greatest misfortune that ever happened to this nation. The more we multiply troops there, the more we shall multiply causes and means of quarrel amongst ourselves. I know but one way of avoiding it, which is to give a greater degree of simplicity to our politicks. Our situation does necessarily render them a good deal involved. And, to this evil, instead of increasing it, we ought to apply all the remedies in our power.

  See what is, in that place, the consequence (to say nothing of every other) of this complexity. Toulon has, as it were, two gates, an English, and a Spanish. The English gate is, by our policy, fast barred against the entrance of any Royalists. The Spaniards open theirs, I fear, upon no fixed principle, and with very little judgment. By means, however, of this foolish, mean, and jealous policy on our side, all the Royalists whom the English might select as most practicable, and most subservient to honest views, are totally excluded. Of those admitted, the Spaniards are masters. As to the inhabitants they are a nest of Jacobins which is delivered into our hands, not from principle, but from fear. The inhabitants of Toulon may be described in few words. It is differtum nautis, cauponibus atque malignis. The rest of the seaports are of the same description.

  Another thing which I cannot account for is, the sending for the Bishop of Toulon, and afterwards forbidding his entrance. This is as directly contrary to the declaration, as it is to the practice of the allied powers. The King of Prussia did better. When he took Verdun, he actually re-instated the Bishop and his Chapter. When he thought he should be the master of Chalons, he called the bishop from Flanders, to put him into possession. The Austrians have restored the clergy wherever they obtained possession. We have proposed to restore Religion as well as Monarchy; and in Toulon we have restored neither the one nor the other. It is very likely that the Jacobin Sans-Culottes, or some of them, objected to this measure, who rather chuse to have the atheistick buffoons of clergy they have got to sport with, till they are ready to come forward, with the rest of their worthy brethren, in Paris and other places, to declare that they are a set of impostors, that they never believed in God, and never will preach any sort of religion. If we give way to our Jacobins in this point, it is fully and fairly putting the government, civil and ecclesiastical, not in the King of France, to whom, as the protector and governor, and in substance the head of the Gallican Church, the nomination to the bishopricks belonged, and who made the bishop of Toulon; it does not leave it with him, or even in the hands of the King of England, or the King of Spain; but in the basest Jacobins of a low sea-port, to exercise, pro tempore, the sovereignty. If this point of religion is thus given up, the grand instrument for reclaiming France is abandoned. We cannot, if we would, delude ourselves about the true state of this dreadful contest. It is a religious war. It includes in its object undoubtedly every other interest of society as well as this; but this is the principal and leading feature. It is through this destruction of religion that our enemies propose the accomplishment of all their other views. The French Revolution, impious at once and fanatical, had no other plan for domestick power and foreign empire. Look at all the proceedings of the National Assembly from the first day of declaring itself such in the year 1789, to this very hour, and you will find full half of their business to be directly on this subject. In fact it is the spirit of the whole. The religious system, called the Constitutional Church, was on the face of the whole proceeding set up only as a mere temporary amusement to the people, and so constantly stated in all their conversations, till the time should come, when they might with safety cast off the very appearance of all religion whatsoever, and persecute christianity throughout Europe with fire and sword. The Constitutional Clergy are not the Ministers of any religion: they are the agents and instruments of this horrible conspiracy against all morals. It was from a sense of this, that in the English Addition to the Articles proposed at St. Domingo, tolerating all Religions, we very wisely refused to suffer that kind of traitors and buffoons.

  This religious war is not a controversy between sect and sect as formerly, but a war against all sects and all religions. The question is not whether you are to overturn the catholick, to set up the protestant. Such an idea in the present state of the world is too contemptible. Our business is to leave to the schools the discussion of the controverted points, abating as much as we can the acrimony of disputants on all sides. It is for christian Statesmen, as the world is now circumstanced, to secure their common Basis, and not to risque the subversion of the whole Fabrick by pursuing these distinctions with an ill-timed zeal. We have in the present grand Alliance, all modes of Government as well as all modes of religion. In Government, we mean to restore that which, notwithstanding our diversity of forms we are all agreed in, as fundamental in Government. The same principle ought to guide us in the religious part; conforming the mode, not to our particular ideas (for in that point we have no ideas in common) but to what will best promote the great general ends of the Alliance. As Statesmen we are to see which of those modes best suits with the interests of such a Commonwealth as we wish to secure and promote. There can be no doubt, but that the catholick religion, which is fundamentally the religion of France, must go with the Monarchy of France; we know that the Monarchy did not survive the Hierarchy, no not even in appearance, for many months; in substance, not
for a single hour. As little can it exist in future, if that pillar is taken away, or even shattered and impaired.

  If it should please God to give to the Allies the means of restoring peace and order in that focus of war and confusion, I would, as I said in the beginning of this Memorial, first replace the whole of the old Clergy: because we have proof more than sufficient, that whether they err or not in the scholastick disputes with us, they are not tainted with atheism, the great political evil of the time. I hope I need not apologize for this phrase, as if I thought religion nothing but policy; it is far from my thoughts; and I hope it is not to be inferred from my expressions. But in the light of policy alone I am here considering the question. I speak of policy too in a large light; in which large light, policy too is a sacred thing.

  There are many, perhaps half a million or more, calling themselves protestants, in the south of France, and in other of the provinces. Some raise them to a much greater number, but I think this nearer to the mark. I am sorry to say, that they have behaved shockingly since the very beginning of this rebellion, and have been uniformly concerned in its worst and most atrocious acts. Their Clergy are just the same atheists with those of the Constitutional catholicks; but still more wicked and daring. Three of their number have met, from their Republican associates, the reward of their crimes.

  As the antient catholick religion is to be restored for the body of France, the antient calvinistick religion ought to be restored for the protestants with every kind of protection and privilege. But not one Minister concerned in this rebellion ought to be suffered amongst them. If they have not Clergy of their own, men well recommended as untainted with Jacobinism, by the synods of those places where calvinism prevails and French is spoken, ought to be sought. Many such there are. The presbyterian discipline ought, in my opinion, to be established in its vigour, and the people professing it ought to be bound to its maintenance. No man, under the false and hypocritical pretence of liberty of conscience, ought to be suffered to have no conscience at all. The King’s commissioner ought also to sit in their synods as before the revocation of the Edict of Nantz. I am conscious, that this discipline disposes men to Republicanism: but it is still a discipline, and it is a cure, (such as it is) for the perverse and undisciplined habits which for some time have prevailed. Republicanism repressed may have its use in the composition of a State. Inspection may be practicable, and responsibility in the teachers and elders may be established in such an Hierarchy as the presbyterian. For a time like ours, it is a great point gained, that people should be taught to meet, to combine, and to be classed and arrayed in some other way than in Clubs of Jacobins. If it be not the best mode of protestantism under a Monarchy, it is still an orderly christian church, orthodox in the fundamentals, and what is to our point, capable enough of rendering men useful citizens. It was the impolitick abolition of their discipline which exposed them to the wild opinions and conduct, that have prevailed amongst the Hugonots. The toleration in 1787 was owing to the good disposition of the late King; but it was modified by the profligate folly of his atheistick Minister the Cardinal de Lomenie. This mischievous Minister did not follow, in the Edict of toleration, the wisdom of the Edict of Nantz. But his toleration was granted to Non-Catholicks — a dangerous word, which might signify any thing, and was but too expressive of a fatal indifference with regard to all piety. I speak for myself: I do not wish any man to be converted from his sect. The distinctions which we have reformed from animosity to emulation, may be even useful to the cause of religion. By some moderate contention they keep alive zeal. Whereas people who change, except under strong conviction (a thing now rather rare) the religion of their early prejudices, especially if the conversion is brought about by any political machine, are very apt to degenerate into indifference, laxity, and often downright atheism.

  Another political question arises about the mode of Government which ought to be established. I think the proclamation (which I read before I had proceeded far in this Memorial,) puts it on the best footing, by postponing that arrangement to a time of peace.

  When our politicks lead us to enterprize a great, and almost total political revolution in Europe, we ought to look seriously into the consequences of what we are about to do. Some eminent persons discover an apprehension that the Monarchy, if restored in France, may be restored in too great strength for the liberty and happiness of the natives, and for the tranquillity of other States. They are therefore of opinion that terms ought to be made for the modification of that Monarchy. They are persons too considerable from the powers of their mind, and from their situation, as well as from the real respect I have for them, who seem to entertain these apprehensions, to let me pass them by unnoticed.

  As to the power of France, as a State, and in its exteriour relations, I confess my fears are on the part of its extreme reduction. There is undoubtedly something in the vicinity of France, which makes it naturally and properly an object of our watchfulness and jealousy, whatever form its Government may take. But the difference is great between a plan for our own security, and a scheme for the utter destruction of France. If there were no other countries in the political map but these two, I admit that policy might justify a wish to lower our neighbour to a standard which would even render her in some measure, if not wholly, our dependent. But the system of Europe is extensive and extremely complex. However formidable to us as taken in this one relation, France is not equally dreadful to all other States. On the contrary, my clear opinion is, that the Liberties of Europe cannot possibly be preserved, but by her remaining a very great and preponderating power. The design at present evidently pursued by the combined Potentates, or of the two who lead, is totally to destroy her as such a Power. For Great Britain resolves that she shall have no Colonies, no Commerce, and no Marine. Austria means to take away the whole frontier from the borders of Switzerland, to Dunkirk. It is their plan also to render the interiour Government lax and feeble, by prescribing by force of the arms of rival and jealous nations, and without consulting the natural interests of the kingdom; such arrangements as in the actual state of Jacobinism in France, and the unsettled state in which property must remain for a long time, will inevitably produce such distraction and debility in Government, as to reduce it to nothing, or to throw it back into its old confusion. One cannot conceive so frightful a state of a Nation. A maritime country, without a marine, and without commerce; a continental country without a frontier, and for a thousand miles surrounded with powerful, warlike, and ambitious neighbours! It is possible, that she might submit to lose her commerce and her colonies; her security she never can abandon. If, contrary to all expectations, under such a disgraced and impotent Government, any energy should remain in that country, she will make every essort to recover her security, which will involve Europe for a century in war and blood. What has it cost to France to make that frontier? What will it cost to recover it? Austria thinks that without a Frontier she cannot secure the Netherlands. But without her Frontier France cannot secure herself. Austria has been however secure for an hundred years in those very Netherlands, and has never been dispossessed of them by the chance of war, without a moral certainty of receiving them again on the restoration of peace. Her late dangers have arisen not from the power or ambition of the King of France. They arose from her own ill policy, which dismantled all her towns, and discontented all her subjects by Jacobinical innovations. She dismantles her own towns, and then says, Give me the Frontier of France. But let us depend upon it, whatever tends, under the name of security, to aggrandize Austria, will discontent and alarm Prussia. Such a length of Frontier on the side of France, separated from itself, and separated from the mass of the Austrian country, will be weak, unless connected at the expence of the Elector of Bavaria (the Elector Palatine) and other lesser Princes, or by such exchanges as will again convulse the Empire.

  Take it the other way, and let us suppose that France so broken in spirit as to be content to remain naked and defenceless by sea and by land, is such a
country no prey? Have other Nations no views? Is Poland the only country of which it is worth while to make a partition? We cannot be so childish as to imagine, that ambition is local, and that no others can be infected with it but those who rule within certain parallels of latitude and longitude? In this way I hold war equally certain. But I can conceive that both these principles may operate, ambition on the part of Austria, to cut more and more from France, and French impatience under her degraded and unsafe condition. In such a Contest will the other Powers stand by? Will not Prussia call for indemnity as well as Austria and England? Is she satisfied with her gains in Poland? By no means. Germany must pay; or we shall infallibly see Prussia leagued with France and Spain, and possibly with other Powers for the reduction of Austria; and such may be the situation of things, that it will not be so easy to decide what part England may take in such a Contest.

  I am well aware how invidious a task it is to oppose any thing which tends to the apparent aggrandizement of our own country. But I think no country can be aggrandized whilst France is Jacobinised. This post removed, it will be a serious question how far her further reduction will contribute to the general safety which I always consider as included. Among precautions against ambition, it may not be amiss to take one precaution against our own. I must fairly say, I dread our own power and our own ambition; I dread our being too much dreaded. It is ridiculous to say we are not men; and that, as men, we shall never wish to aggrandize ourselves in some way or other. Can we say, that even at this very hour we are not invidiously aggrandized? We are already in possession of almost all the commerce of the world. Our Empire in India is an awful thing. If we should come to be in a condition not only to have all this ascendant in commerce, but to be absolutely able, without the least controul, to hold the commerce of all other Nations totally dependent upon our good pleasure, we may say that we shall not abuse this astonishing, and hitherto unheard of power. But every other Nation will think we shall abuse it. It is impossible but that sooner or later, this state of things must produce a combination against us which may end in our ruin.