Notes on a Century: Reflections of A Middle East Historian

by Bernard Lewis

  The general impact all over the Middle East of the tolerance and acceptance of Saddam Hussein’s tyranny was catastrophic. I remember suggesting at the time that instead of the code name “Desert Storm,” the operation should have been named “Kuwaitus Interruptus.”

  But the first Iraq war was by no means entirely a failure. Kuwait recovered its independence and the neighboring Gulf states were no longer under immediate threat. More important, a significant part of Iraq, about a fifth of the country in the north, was no longer ruled by Saddam Hussein but by an autonomous regime, an alliance of Kurds and mostly Shi‘ite Arabs.

  The running of the northern zone was a remarkable success story. With astonishing speed life returned to normal—the economy, education, both at the school and university level, and civil life in general. The groups who were running the north did an excellent job in creating an effective, smoothly functioning independent society. I was in touch with some of the leaders of the north and was told that they also had a substantial following in the remainder of Iraq, including many senior army officers, and that when the time was ripe they would be able to take over.

  The method they proposed was that they would establish and proclaim a “provisional government of free Iraq.” A government of free Iraq proclaimed in New York or Washington or Europe would be meaningless, but such a government proclaimed on the soil of Iraq, with a base in that country, was another matter. The rulers of the north were quite convinced that they could do this and that they would immediately get powerful support in the rest of the country. They proposed this on at least two occasions to the U.S. government, once during the first Bush administration, the second time during the Clinton administration. On both occasions their proposal was the same. They did not ask for any military help as they felt confident that they could handle the military side themselves. All they asked for was political support and a clear statement of recognition.

  They were not able to get either. I and others pleaded for action along these lines, but there were always reasons to postpone and delay. I still feel that the liberation of Iraq could have been achieved far more peacefully and more effectively by collaborating with the rulers of the free zone in the north rather than by a second war against Saddam Hussein.

  I have sometimes been blamed by the media for the second invasion of Iraq. This is the opposite of the truth. What I actually proposed, the recognition of a “Free Government of Iraq,” would have given international legitimacy to a homegrown, independent movement and thus would have accelerated the overthrow, from within, of the already crumbling tyranny of Saddam Hussein.

  But it was not to be.

  “The Lewis Doctrine”

  A changing and multifaceted aspect of my life has been the so-called “Bernard Lewis Doctrine,” which has appeared in a variety of different and sometimes contradictory forms. It was invented by Lyndon LaRouche, a well-known political eccentric, in the late 1970s. According to LaRouche and his publications, I had not, as was the general view, discerned the development of Muslim radicalism. I had caused it. I had deliberately fomented this in order to serve my ulterior purposes. It was in this capacity that, among other things, I organized and conducted the Iranian Revolution and other later examples of Muslim extremism.

  As absurd as this may appear, his explanation is even more so. In doing all this I was acting as a secret agent of British intelligence; the purpose of all my nefarious activities was to restore British imperial power and extend it in new directions.

  For a while I was subjected to a treatment which might not unfairly be described as harassment by Lyndon LaRouche agents. Some of them attended my lectures, interrogated my audiences and more generally my students, and tried in various ways to prove my guilt. The reason why Islamic radicalism served British imperial purposes was never made clear, but neither reason nor clarity ever ranked high among the LaRouche objectives.

  The LaRouche connection gradually faded but the “Lewis Doctrine” survived, and metamorphosed into often mutually exclusive forms. The most remarkable was a front-page article in The Wall Street Journal in 2004 by Peter Waldman, a journalist. This was published with no interview or inquiry to me directly. The article was an interesting selection of nonsense. The most recent and the most persistent form of the “Lewis Doctrine” makes me responsible for the policies of the Bush administration, and more particularly for the invasion of Iraq.

  The story of my connection with the Bush presidency did have some slender basis in fact, but was wildly exaggerated, distorted and misrepresented. It began with my acquaintance with Dick Cheney, and it was chiefly with the Vice President’s office that I maintained contact.

  I was invited to Cheney’s home twice after 9/11 to dine with him and a small group of staff. My task was to talk about the Middle East and Islam and I found them a receptive audience asking excellent questions. I also met with this group in Cheney’s office several times. My job was not to offer policy suggestions but to provide background—some of the detail and information which is taken into consideration when policy decisions are made.

  My role in policy making was, at most, minimal. The exaggeration of this in some of the media was absurd. This experience deepened my mistrust of what I read and heard about goings-on in the administration.

  I was sadly reminded of the old British principle that intelligence and policy must be totally separate. Intelligence people provide information but make no recommendations so that policy people get just the facts and make decisions with unvarnished information. The danger to be avoided is that intel should be selected and presented to promote a policy line or a course of action. This “separation of powers” is an important part of effective democracy and its erosion can be dangerous.

  I found Cheney to be thoughtful and unusual among politicians in that he wanted to hear what I had to say. We discussed the challenge posed by specific countries as well as issues facing the region. He asked excellent questions, listened intently to my answers and asked probing follow-ups.

  During the last two years of the Bush administration the Vice President’s office was virtually sidelined, to the detriment of U.S. policy and interests. I was saddened by the willful vilification of Cheney by the liberal media. The Cheney that they described was not the Cheney I knew and respected.

  On one occasion I was invited to give an off-the-record talk to the White House staff. It was a pleasant occasion, socially interesting and intellectually stimulating. My most vivid recollection is of a wide-ranging conversation with Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor, who asked me to come to her office for a private discussion. I hope I was helpful.

  I was invited to meet President George W. Bush on three occasions—a small group discussion after 9/11, a large black-tie dinner at the White House in 2005 and at an awards presentation in 2006. I was told that if I wished to make any suggestions I should e-mail them to Stephen Hadley, who was by then the National Security Advisor. I did send a few e-mails to him, but they were about Iran and not Iraq and were sent long after the Iraq War. In the interest of dispelling conspiracy theorists, or perhaps offering them more grist for their feverish speculation, allow me to offer up some excerpts from those 2006 e-mails:

  We must be conscious of what we say as much as what we do. Sir Harold Nicolson once said that one can never be certain what is in the mind of the oriental but we must leave the oriental no doubt what is in our mind. . . .

  Let us not forget that we have tried a number of times since the Iranian revolution to negotiate with the [Iranian] regime, starting when President Carter addressed Khomeini during the hostage crisis “as a believer to a man of God” and continuing through various phases of apology and other expressions of good will and even praise. The result was always the same—a refusal and a snub. To seek to negotiate now—from a position of weakness in Iraq, uncertainty at home and insult from Iran can only be seen as an expression of weakness and fear on our part. When defeated in battle, it makes good sense to try and get the
best possible terms of surrender. We are not yet at that stage.

  Over the years, a pattern has evolved in the Middle East whereby the people of “friendly” countries hate us because they see us, often correctly, as supporting the tyrants that misrule them, while the people of “hostile” countries, i.e., those ruled by hostile rulers, turn to us as their best hope of liberation from those rulers. I remember being told by a highly placed Iranian that, “There is no country in the world where pro-American feeling is stronger, deeper and more widespread than Iran.” I have ample independent confirmation of this, for example, in the often repeated remark from Iranians that, “You should have tackled your problems in this region in alphabetical order,” i.e., first Iran, then Iraq. . . .

  What we need to do is encourage the people and scare the leadership. To negotiate in present circumstances would do exactly the reverse. A better line would be to show some encouragement and even support for opposition movements and sympathy for the sufferings of the Iranian people under their corrupt and tyrannical masters.

  We might say things like, “We have the greatest respect for their culture. . . . We share their hatred of their tyrannical and predatory rulers who are dishonoring their country, their people and their faith, which their rulers pretend to represent.” The regime has only two policies—tyranny at home and terror abroad, both serving the same purposes. . . .

  Particular importance should be attached to the policies, and perhaps still more the attitudes, of the present rulers of Iran, who seem to be preparing for a final apocalyptic battle between the forces of God [themselves] and of the Devil [the Great Satan—the United States]. They see this as the final struggle of the End of Time and are therefore undeterred by any level of slaughter and destruction even among their own people. “Allah will know his own” is the phrase commonly used, meaning that among the multiple victims God will recognize the Muslims and give them a quick pass to heaven.

  In this context, the deterrent that worked so well during the Cold War, namely M.A.D. (Mutual Assured Destruction), would have no meaning. At the End of Time, there will be general destruction anyway. What will matter is the final destination of the dead—hell for the infidels, and the delights of heaven for the believers. For people with this mindset, M.A.D. is not a constraint; it is an inducement. . . .

  I have been reading with increasing alarm stories in the press about how we are making diplomatic approaches to Iran to help us extricate ourselves from the “mess” in Iraq. What matters most is the immediate message this will convey to both our enemies and our friends in the Middle East—an encouragement to the first, a sign of desperation, even of abandonment and betrayal, to the second.

  In considering any step, there are two questions which we must ask. Will it work? What will be its immediate impact?

  It will obviously take time to formulate an answer to the first question. My conviction is that it will fail but I can see that others think differently. We can agree to disagree. But the answer to the second question is immediate, clear and devastating. It will be seen as a sign of American fear and weakness, as seeking the help of an enemy to betray a friend. Ahmadinejad has made no secret of his attitudes, and the attempt by diplomacy to ingratiate ourselves with him and his faction will be seen as a frantic attempt by us, in retreat and defeat, to solicit Iranian help in withdrawing from Iraq. This will be seen as confirming Ahmadinejad’s boast when he assumed office, “I know how to deal with the Americans.”

  This e-mail correspondence makes it quite clear that my primary concern was Iran’s nuclear program, and not toppling Saddam Hussein.

  The first invasion of Iraq, after its conquest of Kuwait, was unquestionably legitimate and necessary. Iraq had committed a blatant act of military aggression which could not be tolerated. I, along with most, thought that corrective action was necessary. The second invasion of Iraq in 2003 was another matter. This is sometimes ascribed to my influence with Vice President Cheney. But the reverse is true. I did not recommend it. On the contrary, I opposed it. It is, to say the least, annoying to be blamed for something I did not do. Advice, whether given or not, is impossible to prove. The best I can do to prove my point is to note that I am nowhere mentioned in the 530 pages of Cheney’s memoir, In My Time.

  It is often said that an American connection or American support is the kiss of death for a Middle Eastern politician. This may be true if the support is fluctuating, uncertain and applied in accordance with what often seems to be the guiding principle of American foreign policy—we must not get too close to our friends for fear of antagonizing our enemies. But even now, despite the damage caused by the second Iraq war, there are still reserves of goodwill toward the United States. American support could even again become an asset in a domestic political struggle provided that the support is clear and effective—that there are rewards for friendship and penalties for hostility to the United States and not, as often appears to be the case, the other way round.

  To achieve these results it is necessary to project an image of firmness and reliability. Experts in public relations would no doubt be able to devise many ways of doing this. But to project an image of firmness and reliability, there is one essential prerequisite—to be firm and reliable.

  The OIC and EU Foreign Ministers Conference

  In February 2002, at the invitation of the Turkish government, a joint meeting was held in Istanbul of two organizations, the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) and the European Union. Each member nation of the two organizations was invited and was asked to be represented by its minister of foreign affairs. In addition, the Turkish government invited a small number of individuals to come as guests. They invited two from the United States, Edward Said and myself; a curious combination, to say the least. Professor Said pleaded a previous engagement and sent his regrets. I accepted with alacrity, the more so since my invitation included Buntzie Churchill. We were treated royally. In this, as in so many other matters, the Turks were well informed. We were given two rooms in one of the most luxurious hotels in Istanbul, a car and driver, and driving to and from the meetings we were preceded by a police motorcycle escort.

  I was astounded that in order to move us quickly from the hotel to the meeting and to avoid traffic, our car and the escorts raced down the fenced-in trolley corridor. What would have happened if a trolley had come along is a mystery.

  The opening reception was very much Western-style. Turkey at that time was still rigorously secular. Press photographers were darting around trying to take pictures of us and I saw that the Iranian representatives were visibly anxious that they not be photographed with miniskirted waitresses carrying trays of alcoholic drinks.

  They also had some other concerns. To my surprise, the Iranian minister of foreign affairs came up to me and introduced himself. This was very shortly after President Bush had delivered his “Axis of Evil” speech and the Iranians were visibly worried about what he was going to do next. This emerged still more clearly when, to my astonishment, I found myself scheduled to participate in one of the major debates. The stage was occupied by a panel of four speakers—the ministers of foreign affairs of Iran and Egypt, and two professors, an Egyptian and myself. We were each asked to make a brief statement, and then to answer questions from the floor.

  The speeches from the two ministers of foreign affairs were precisely the opposite of what one would expect. The Iranian foreign minister, still under the impact of the “Axis of Evil” speech, was very cautious. He had some criticism of American policy but the strongest word he used was “misguided.” The Egyptian foreign minister, followed by the Egyptian professor, felt free to denounce America in the strongest terms. They started with the atrocities of the first European colonists who landed on the shores of the New World and dispossessed, evicted, and in various ways persecuted the original inhabitants. Later Americans enslaved and ill-treated millions of black Africans. When it was my turn to speak, I took the opportunity to make a response. I pointed out that the ensl
avement of black Africans had begun centuries before Columbus discovered America and continued for a long time after slavery was abolished in America. And most of these slaves went east, not west. This brought some smiles of approval and even a timid round of applause from some of the darker-skinned members of the conference. It is worth noting that slavery was not abolished in Saudi Arabia until 1962, and continues in all but name in some countries in the Middle East to this day.

  In response to a question the Egyptian professor stated that while slavery in America was vicious, slavery in the Arab world was “benign.”

  One amusing interaction occurred when Buntzie went to buy a knockoff Hermès purse in a Grand Bazaar shop recommended by the wife of the Turkish ambassador to one of the EU countries. As a very determined Buntzie had only approximate directions and had to ask for help en route, the two motorcycle policemen and I tagged along to assist—me to translate and the policemen to ensure we didn’t get lost as I have an abominable sense of direction. She found the tiny shop, went in, and told the proprietor what she wanted. He was delighted to help her until the two large, very intimidating motorcycle policemen clothed in black leather and I came in. Our presence filled the shop. The owner paled and signaled to Buntzie that she go up the narrow, rickety stairs at the rear. He stayed downstairs with us while his assistant helped her on the tiny second floor. There was no doubt that he was most eager to have us leave as soon as possible. The mission was accomplished in record time and the purse was, and still is, proudly worn.

  In Oman

  The following year, I was invited to the Emirate of Oman. I went there as a guest of the Ministry of Religious Affairs to give a couple of lectures, one in the Grand Mosque of Muscat and one in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The first was for a public audience; the second was private, at the ministry. The second of these lectures, but not the first, was followed by a lively question and answer session.