Summa Risus: Collected Non-Fiction

by R. A. Lafferty

  She announced him King in his eighth year, and fulfilled the legend in this manner:

  She had called to him, seeing him on horseback, and he had cantered to her in a glen. He often dove from the saddle into her arms. He was still a small boy; and she was, too early, a woman.

  She told him to come out of the saddle onto her shoulders, and she carried him on her shoulders into camp, announcing that she carried him as King. She had timed it for the afternoon of a great assembly, that he should so come riding the red mare. It was a very Gothic thing to do, but it had Gothic precedent. An early betrothal rite among the Goths had required a girl to carry her man on her shoulders to prove that she was of an age and strength to marry.

  The act was accepted absolutely by all the children except one, and the adults remembered it when the time did come to choose a king. Sarus, however, did not accept Alaric completely. Older than Alaric, he had his own ideas about the ultimate kingship. Later, when he became the Empire Goth, he believed that there must not be a Gothic king.

  Sarus would several times plant himself as an obstruction in the path of Alaric, and remained unafraid of him. Hafras, writing a few years later, even seems to imply that Alaric was afraid of Sarus. The best of opinion, however, is that Alaric was afraid of no one; that neither of them ever knew fear. The opposition of Sarus and Alaric would become very intricate, and the friendship strained. There would be the accusation of treason; but the question would remain, who was the traitor and who the betrayed? Both boys were to suffer divided allegiance between the Gothic and the Roman in them, but it was Sarus who became entirely Roman when he matured.

  There was a strong religious element in the life of the children. The Arian children, like the Catholic, were very close to the Eucharist. This religious element in the life of the Goths and the Romans was more important than it seems, and was the thing that turned many of the Goths into Romans. The Empire had already become a complete Theocracy. It was as totally so as the ancient Jewish state, or as Islam in the years of its explosive activity. It is impossible to get the feel of the period without understanding this. The Empire was Christocentric; though for some, particularly the Arians, Christ was not quite so vividly at the center as for others.

  Here it becomes necessary to chronicle briefly the affair between the Goths and the Romans in the early years. The fortunes of the Visigoths, for the first twelve years of the life of Alaric of Balthi (a.d. 376-388), abstracted as simply as possible from the sources, are as follows:

  On their entering the Empire the majority of the Goths did not at once settle peacefully on the land of Lower Moesia. Probably neither side expected it to be carried through peacefully. Both the Goths and the Romans defaulted on the terms of their agreement.

  The Romans had made the harsh provision, or so it is reported down to us, that the Goths should give up their arms to the Romans on their entry into the Empire, and that the children of the Goths should be taken from them and distributed through the provinces of Asia. The children were to be indoctrinated as Romans, and were to serve both as ambassadors and as hostages of their own people.

  The Goths, of course, did not give up their arms. The defence of the border by them was the main part of the agreement for their entry. Neither did they assign all their arms to Roman custody or inspection. For one thing, the Goths were better armorers than the Romans, and a good part of the northern trade had been in arms supplied by the Goths to the Romans. This mysterious requirement—that the Goths give up their arms—may be a historical misunderstanding of a payment to be made by the Goths in kind-in arms, in the quality of which they exceeded the Romans.

  Probably several thousand children of the Goths, but not the fifty or sixty thousand who would have been all the children, were separated from their families for Romanization in groups and centers. It is plain that the Romans intended these to be the children of the noble families, and it is just as plain that the Goths deceived them in this. At least one thousand were taken, for at least one thousand were later murdered by the order of the Master General Julius. It is possible that this taking of the children for a special education was considered as an honor—so considered more by the Romans than the Goths. Provision, apparently, was made for others to be taken at a certain age and for certain periods. Many wives and citizens were also taken as hostages.

  The Romans defaulted in their promised treatment of the Gothic settlers. Profiteering at the expense of the Goths was promoted by Lupicinus and Maximus, military officers of Thrace. Instead of assisting in the transition of the Goths, they robbed them and starved them. Supplies brought by the Goths themselves and contributed by their brothers from across the Danube were seized at the inspection points and confiscated or sold at auction for personal profit. Fines were assessed, and Gothic persons were held for money ransom.

  At this time Alavivus and Fritigern, called judges, were the leaders of the Visigoths. Fritigern is sometimes spoken of as a kinsman of Alaric, but their relationship, if any, is not known. This Fritigern was an adherent of the Balthi family or party and worked in accord with the Balthi men. The best of belief, however, is that Fritigern was a commoner and not of the Balthi line. He was a man of stubborn ability and much military talent.

  Alavivus soon drops out of the picture, and Fritigern becomes the sole effective leader. He did not at once resist with arms, and he forbade the Goths more than local resistance. But he did set up a series of intrigues and was able to reach into the Imperial forces. From the beginning the Goths were able to make contacts where most needed, and they never made a move of any sort before their intelligence system had given an analysis. But it was Fritigern, when he believed that the Goths had absorbed enough abuse, who moved quickly to put a term to the affair.

  The first blood of the Gothic revolt was shed at Marcianapolis. Fritigern defeated a Roman force under Lupicinus, and with surprising ease. Fritigern had information that Lupicinus, for all his ability at extortion and deception, was an incompetent general, and that the Roman troops, of adequate quality, would be badly arranged and badly handled. He knew also that Lupicinus was hated by his own men, and that the resistance would be only a token one. Yet the Romans would have been defeated even if well-generaled and determined. The Goths, in this one action, established the supremacy of heavy horse troops over even good infantry, and that supremacy would endure into the time of gunpowder and to the very close of the sixteenth century. Reading history backwards, it looks as though the events of the next several generations could have been predicted from that one action alone.

  At a little later date, Fritigern won his second victory without himself being present or his own men being involved. This concerned a move of certain basic Gothic troops of previous introduction into the Empire as mercenaries. There were anti-Gothic demonstrations, of official or quasi-official instigation, by the populace of Adrianople. These Gothic troops of the Empire, under the leadership of Colias and Suerid, swung against the people of the City and crushed the demonstrations and riots. Then they came out of the City and joined the forces of Fritigern. This partly settled the question of where the loyalty of the Roman- Gothic forces would lie. It would seem that much could have been predicted by this act also.

  A bloody stalemate was then fought between the Romans and Goths at Salices. This was almost a reversal of the action of Marcianapolis. Here the Goths encountered Roman soldiers perfectly commanded, the toughest foot soldiers in the world. The Goths could not ride them down or run over them as they had at Marcianapolis; and the old Roman contention was almost proved—that an absolutely disciplined infantry can stand against any horse assault whatsoever. It was not conclusive, however; the Goths had attacked with insufficient forces, and the battle was fought to a bitter draw. Both sides withdrew in good order to prepare for the final event. The Emperor Valens collected a sizeable army and moved from Constantinople against the Goths near Adrianople. And Fritigern assembled his total force for the total battle.

  On August 9 of the ye
ar 378 the Goths, under Fritigern, defeated the Romans near Adrianople and killed the Emperor Valens. This should not be told in such a bald fashion, but there exists no detailed account of the battle. It was surely heavy horse against superb infantry once more, and it was the battle that decided the type of warfare of Europe for more than a thousand years following. The Roman legion in its classical form was made obsolete on that day.

  This was one of the most nearly total defeats ever suffered by Roman forces. Its effect on the Roman world was so disorganizing that a gap of several years appears in the chronicles of the Eastern Empire. And the Goths at that time were not keeping chronicles.

  The Romans were in total frustration, and in their frustration they now committed a mad-dog act that could have ruined them forever. The Gothic children, and the many Gothic wives and citizens, who had been distributed among the provinces of the East as hostages by order of the Emperor Valens, were now slaughtered in a horrible massacre. The numbers were not great, but something over one thousand. They were executed in a dozen cities by order of Julius, Master General of the Roman troops. The move could have torn the entire Empire apart.

  The Roman Empire of the East had had its central army destroyed, and no force had yet been brought from the Western Empire. The Goths were in control of the countryside, and the people of the cities had no defence against slaughter by the Goths. It still is not understood why the Goths forbore.

  There were only two things that the Romans could now do. They could mass all the forces of both the Eastern and Western Empires and fight a war that might have lasted a generation and might have finished the Empire forever. They could make the great effort to eradicate and destroy the sudden Gothic power that was now in the middle of them.

  Or they could practice the seemingly impossible policy of containment. The policy of containment was decided on, or at least it worked itself to the fore. The Romans could still find the ability to deal with the most difficult situation in the manner that events would prove to be the successful way. And now the perfect instrument for the policy of containment appeared—one Theodosius.

  The Emperor Gratian of the West, nephew of Valens the dead Emperor of the East, acting on unknown but sound advice, brought Theodosius from an exile in Spain, and proclaimed him Emperor of the East. Theodosius had been a general and the son of a general. His father had fallen out of favor and been executed but—a sign of the improving of the times which no longer carried death to the descendants—Theodosius had been allowed an honorable exile instead of destruction. It points up either the urgency of the situation or the good sense of the Western Emperor Gratian, that he should call on the son of the man his father had killed a half dozen years before and place complete trust in him. And it is a sign of the hold that the idea of Empire had over the Romans of the day that Theodosius should have been willing to forget past treatment of his family and accept the high office coupled with the nearly impossible task.

  Recalled from his Spanish farm to begin his second career, Theodosius was now thirty-three years old and was possibly the most competent man in the Empire.

  The historian Gibbon states it simply: “The general or rather the final capitulations of the Goths may be dated four years, one month, and twenty-five days, after the defeat and death of the Emperor Valens.”

  What happened in the four years, one month, and twenty-five days was a miracle of containment, the perfect use of negotiations and the force of arms available, infinite patience, and the triumph of the still-powerful idea of Empire; and the inculcating in the Goths of that idea. The new Emperor Theodosius fought few battles with the Goths, and won none; but his policy somehow succeeded. He established himself in Thessalonica, the capital of Macedonia, and gave orders for the re-establishment and strengthening of the garrisons of Constantinople and Adrianople. He built up and negotiated and avoided conflict. On the death of the Gothic leader Fritigern—and there has never been a hint that it was other than a natural death—the more stubborn elements of the Goths subsided.

  Then came the coup. Athanaric took over the leadership of the Goths; and he listened to the proposals of the Emperor Theodosius. He came as guest to that Emperor in Constantinople, and was given a royal welcome. But two weeks later he was dead. Here, at least, there have been certain hints that the death may not have been a natural one.

  However it was done, it was done neatly.

  It may have been at that early date that the family of the Balthi moved to the fore in the Gothic esteem. One of the five families of the Goths, the Abrasi, was discredited by Athanaric. The Amali, the first of the families, had remained outside the Empire and had become affiliated with the Huns. The Skeirasi had an impediment in their reputed cruelty and greed, and would not be accepted by the commoners. And the Ansti had remained steadfastly pagan.

  It would be the Balthi who would next be called upon to raise up a great leader; but first the Goths must doze for a dozen years.

  Theodosius, the Emperor, however, did not doze. Athanaric had not been popular, and the intrigues and negotiations of Theodosius began to pay off. The independent secondary leaders of the Goths, first one and then half a dozen of them, came in and made separate treaties with the Emperor. They felt themselves leaderless. As they were now Romans as well as Goths, Theodosius was their Emperor also. They found good faith in the new Emperor; as had not always been the case with the Emperor Valens, and seldom with his deputies. It was late in the year 382 that peace and symbiosis were achieved.

  The whole Gothic army, in one form or another, was now enlisted under the Roman standards. The Goths now thought of themselves as Romans, particularly the younger ones. There was not then a strong feeling of nationality among the Goths, only of family among their elite. When Stairnon and Alaric, manipulated by Athaulf from beyond the frontier, brought about a Gothic national feeling a few years later, it was not so much a revival as a creation. And against this would be the strong feeling of the Goths for the Empire—as the motherland of all Christians and as the essence of what was called The World.

  The uneasy but workable Gothic-Roman peace was built up for the following several years. The Emperor Theodosius made one very wise move for the Romanization of the Goths, although it was only a revision of a very foolish move that the Emperor Valens had made for the same purpose. We come onto the new device immediately, and the effect it had on Alaric of Balthi and others.

  Meanwhile, the Goths achieved stability and thrived on their lands in Moesia. They were probably the best farmers in the Empire when the peaceful spirit was on them.

  3. Of the School for Generals

  One of the projects for the containment of the Goths which was now set up by the Emperor Theodosius had to do with Gothic youth. This, in a way, was a continuation of an ill-fated project of the Emperor Valens. But, whereas Valens had taken thousands of youths—and those not picked, though he had intended that they should be—Theodosius took only dozens, and those most carefully selected.

  Nor were they only Goths. There were Vandal children and youths; Celts and Burgundians and Lombards; Sarmatians, Armenians, Suabians, and “White Huns.” There were Saracens and Idumeans; Africans and Mauretanians and Tarraconese-Spanish, and others. These were the children of the leading families of the new races and the imperfectly assimilated races, taken partly for hostages, but mostly to form them into a mold sympathetic to the Empire. It was realized by the Emperor Theodosius that from these few dozen young men would come the rulers of the world; they would no longer come from the old Roman lines. If these boys could be formed in Christianity, prudence, courage, and foresight, then the Empire would go well.

  For all the different nations represented by the youth in the school, however, it was the Goths who came to the fore—as they now came to exceed in all military matters in the Empire. The Goths were few in numbers—a fifth of a million beings among the seventy-five million of the Empire; but even these figures give no idea of the discrepancy. The great soldiers of the Empire came only
from the elite of the Goths—that strange nobility of great families. And this elite numbered, in all, less than one thousand persons.

  From this group the names have come down to us, through fifteen and a half centuries of poorly-kept records, of more than a hundred Gothic men who were master generals, generals, or soldiers of great note. This is more than one male out of every five of their group. In that one generation they comprised more than half of the soldiers of the Empire whose names have survived to us.

  All, of course, did not attend the School for Generals; but at least one-third of the great Gothic name soldiers did attend.

  The Emperor was a good man who was subject to serious failings—physical, mental, and moral. The nature of his physical failing has not been accounted to us, and the hints are too meager to establish even a surmise. He was a man of extraordinary strength and vigor, but there would be days and weeks when he was physically prostrated and could not act at all. He was a man of acute mind and rapid accurate judgment. Nine times out of ten he would arrive at a correct decision instantly, implement it, and dispose of the most difficult affair unerringly. But the tenth time he would arrive at no decision at all—not ever. Hesitation, on the rare occasions that he was subject to it, turned him into a pathetic failure. The man whom he selected as his first assistant in all matters, the Pannonian Vandal Stilicho, was to have a touch of the same failings.

  Theodosius was capable of furious anger and of ordering horrifying massacres. He was also capable of the most sincere penance and restitution. He was never able to restore his victims to life, but he did pray for their souls and care for their survivors. He did public penance by the order of the Archbishop Ambrose of Milan, and thereafter that prelate increased his already strong hold over the Emperor.