Not a Good Day to Die

by Sean Naylor

  Blaber and the other AFO personnel assumed that until he officially “transitioned” command of TF 11 forces in the Shahikot to Hyder, he remained in charge. But as the day wore on, the Delta operators in the safe house didn’t realize that from the tent the SEALs had erected in the courtyard, Hyder was communicating directly back to the Blue TOC at Bagram. Command and control of what had been the most successful part of Operation Anaconda was now starting to fray.

  In the TOC a small crowd of SEALs, AFO operators, and TF Dagger troops began scrutinizing maps looking for the best places to put observation posts that night. Among the men scanning the maps and overhead photos was the Mako 30 leader, a skinny senior chief petty officer with reddish blond hair and beard nicknamed “Slab.” Blaber had worked closely with Slab on missions in Bosnia and considered him one of the most proficient operators he’d ever known. The Delta officer took Slab aside. “I’m really uncomfortable with you guys going right in,” he told the NCO. “I want to make sure you get all the advantages that the other guys had.” “I totally agree,” Slab replied. “But I do what I’m told, and we’re being told to go in tonight.” Blaber didn’t understand the urgency. The prospect of a couple of nights without as many AFO/TF Blue recon teams in the valley didn’t overly worry him, because TF K-Bar was planning on inserting over twenty recon teams around the Shahikot. Trebon’s phone in Bagram rang again. Blaber was calling. Were the SEALs to go in that night? he asked. They were, Trebon replied. The Air Force general, who had never commanded a ground combat operation before, was now making tactical reconnaissance decisions. “Back here it looks like you need guys up on the mountains. Those other guys need to be replaced…. You’ve got to pull them out.” This time, Trebon spoke as if to leave Blaber in no doubt. He was to put both SEAL teams straight into the fight that night. That was an order.

  2.

  WHILE the SEALs began planning their infiltrations, the rest of the safe house’s residents were consumed with trying to get Zia’s Afghan force back into the fight. Task Force Hammer’s retreat had left the CIA and Special Forces men involved—both in Bagram and Gardez—by turns angry and despondent. Blaber was determined to fix that. He had gathered them around him the previous night when they got back to the safe house and told them they had accomplished their mission by sealing the western avenue of escape from the Shahikot and forcing the enemy fighters to expose themselves by firing at the Hammer column. This in turn had allowed the AFO teams to identify the enemy positions and call in air strikes on them. He had told them to get some rest and then get ready to go back out. A plan was in the works to send TF Hammer back down the same route with the aim of resealing the western approaches to the valley.

  That plan evolved throughout March 3. In its final form it involved Task Force Hammer, which now included a third A-team, ODA 394, bringing a smaller Afghan force under Zia back toward the Shahikot. But this time, instead of moving south past Carwazi, Gwad Kala, and the Whale and then east through the Fishhook, they would move north and seize the Guppy. In essence, the plan was a variation of what Harriman’s mission had been: to establish a blocking position and observation post near the Guppy. The plan was dubbed “Operation Payback.”

  Mulholland flew in to the safe house to talk to the SF guys, instantly earning their respect. “He was the only guy to ever come talk to our guys,” McHale said. Sad and somber over Harriman’s death, the Dagger commander was the first to tell McHale that Casenhiser and Wadsworth were going to be okay. He listened to his troops’ assessment of the situation and was briefed on Operation Payback. He also told them the folks at Bagram were not “talking bad” about them. “That was important and good to hear,” McHale said. Meanwhile, Brigadier General Mike Jones, the military liaison to the CIA also serving as one of Hagenbeck’s deputies, and Rich, the CIA Kabul station chief, each visited Spider and his men. The lack of close air support for Hammer on D-Day had left Spider as angry as the other leaders in the convoy. “He was pissed because the Agency thought they got left out to dry, too,” Haas said.

  McHale, the ODA 372 leader, decided he had to return to the States to represent the team at Harriman’s funeral. He flew back to Bagram with Mulholland. During a quiet moment in Bagram, the captain spoke with the colonel, obtaining the Dagger commander’s approval to put Harriman in for a Silver Star. McHale also obtained the colonel’s commitment to keep the remainder of his team in the fight. McHale knew anything other than a return to battle would cripple their morale. “My analogy was, you can’t let the guys feel like they lost the last game of the season,” McHale said. His men’s attitude was “We need to see this through to the end now, let’s get back in there,” said one of them. “We don’t run from anybody.”

  But the Americans had to persuade the Afghans to step back into the furnace with them. As it turned out, the AMF fighters were more willing to follow the Americans into combat than they were many of their own leaders. A senior CIA interpreter at the safe house spoke to Haas. “I want to let you know that all the [Afghan] troops are talking about the bravery and the courage of the Americans during the battle,” he told the officer. “They don’t trust their leadership, because they all freaked out, but the Americans were calm and cool and came and picked them up when their vehicles left them. They’re all talking about it around the campfire, that they will follow the Americans anywhere they want them to go.” The SF troops built on this goodwill by holding a ceremony for the AMF fighters that day in Gardez, both to hand out individual medals and to commemorate the Afghan fighters who had been killed. The awards, which the Special Forces guys had designed and ordered ahead of the operation, included the Afghanistan Order of the Wounded Lion (the equivalent of the U.S. Purple Heart, for those wounded or killed in combat), the Afghanistan Commendation Medal, the Afghanistan Legion of Merit, and the Afghanistan Meritorious Service Medal. When the ceremony was over, the SF troops had a message for the militiamen: “We’re going back in, tonight.”

  WITH Trebon and Kernan insisting that Mako 21 and Mako 30 go into the Shahikot that night, the only issues remaining to be settled were how the teams would be infiltrated and where they should establish their observation posts. Hyder asked the AFO guys for their recommendations. The AFO planning cell in Gardez received no guidance from the Blue TOC in Bagram, so Glenn P. put together folders on possible reconnaissance targets. By 3 p.m. Blaber and the other TF 11 personnel in Gardez had decided Mako 21’s six operators would fly to LZ 15 at the north end of the valley—the same LZ into which Butler’s troops had air assaulted at midnight—and from there move east to link up with and resupply Juliet. After receiving a situation update from Juliet, they were to move farther east to establish an observation post overlooking the Upper Shahikot Valley. The plan for Mako 30 was more ambitious. Unlike Mako 21 and 22, which were assault teams that specialized in direct action, Mako 30 was a SEAL Team 6 reconnaissance outfit. Its leader, Slab, was the most experienced SEAL sent from Bagram, and his team, with six SEALs and one Air Force combat controller, was the larger of the two. Blaber wanted to get Slab’s team onto the most dominant piece of terrain in the valley: the peak of Takur Ghar. Anyone on top of the 10,469-foot mountain would enjoy a commanding view of the entire valley, as well as the Upper Shahikot Valley to the east. That was where the AFO commander had intended Juliet to establish their observation post, until the snowfall had forced them to remain in their position to the north. Along with the other U.S. commanders in Anaconda, including Hagenbeck, Blaber was keen to get an observation post on the mountain. But he didn’t feel a need to do it that night. He didn’t want to break his “no helicopter” rule, and there was no way to infiltrate the team overland in time to get them to the top of the mountain before dawn. But the decision was out of his hands. Trebon, Kernan and Hyder had decided Mako 30 was going in tonight, and if that were the case, they were going to have to fly in. (Despite repeated requests, Trebon, Kernan, and Hyder were not made available for interview for this book by U.S. Special Operations Command.)<
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  An examination of maps and overhead imagery in Gardez revealed what looked like a suitable LZ on a spur about 1,300 meters east of Takur Ghar’s peak. The operators in Gardez called it “LZ 1” (ignoring the fact that the Rakkasans had already named another patch of the Shahikot “LZ 1”). There had been no enemy activity reported at the spot. Mako 30 was to be ready on the rough airstrip by the safe house at 10:30 p.m., with insertion planned for 11:30 p.m. The SEALs knew it was important to give themselves plenty of time to scale the mountain and set up their observation post before first light. They thought the climb would take about four hours.

  Glenn P. gave the SEALs a detailed briefing on what to expect in the Shahikot. For Mako 30 he could refer to extensive, detailed overhead photographs of Takur Ghar, which he had ordered when it looked like Juliet would end up on top of the mountain. His briefing should have been a red flag to the Navy men. The intel NCO told Mako 30 and Vic Hyder that there was a high likelihood that the enemy already occupied the top of Takur Ghar. He based this conclusion on several factors: human intelligence reports had indicated the enemy was there; an overhead photo appeared to show a man-made trench or fighting position on the peak with what appeared to be a DShK; and the enemy had already demonstrated a determination to occupy the other high ground around the valley, such as the DShK position Goody’s team had discovered on the Finger and the numerous mortar and DShK positions on the Whale. There was no reason to suppose the enemy’s approach to Takur Ghar—the valley’s most desirable terrain—would be any different.

  In and of itself, this information should not necessarily have dissuaded Mako 30 from launching on their mission. By landing at the base of Takur Ghar at night and climbing up the mountain, Slab’s team could ensure that any contact they made with the enemy would be in the form of a “meeting engagement”—an unexpected meeting between two opposing forces—and not an ambush. In a meeting engagement, the SEALs’ night-vision goggles, superior marksmanship and the air power they could call upon would likely enable them to break contact and get away.

  But already the SEALs were thinking of avoiding the tiring slog up the mountain that a landing at LZ 1 would entail. During the afternoon Slab proposed a couple of alternatives to Blaber, one of which was to land halfway up the mountain. Blaber tried to steer Slab back to the original logic of landing at the offset LZ, and believed he had dissuaded the SEAL from doing anything other than that. Then at 10 p.m. Hyder approached Blaber in the busy AFO TOC and asked the Army officer what he thought of having Mako 30 land on top of Takur Ghar instead of at LZ 1. Any Ranger or Special Forces soldier would have been able to tell Hyder that he was proposing a huge tactical blunder. It is a reconnaissance axiom that a recce team should never infiltrate by helicopter directly onto its observation post, because doing so essentially signals the team’s location to the enemy. But this apparently had not occurred to Hyder. Blaber told him he didn’t think the 160th pilots flying the mission would go for it. But Hyder said that he lived next to the pilots at Bagram, and he thought he’d be able to persuade them. Shortly thereafter, both SEAL teams moved to the airstrip.

  IN Bagram, Hagenbeck greeted TF 11’s decision to put a recce team on top of Takur Ghar enthusiastically. Because TF 11 worked directly for Central Command, Hagenbeck had no authority to task any of its operators, including AFO, to do anything, and he was not part of the discussions that led to Trebon ordering Blaber to transition command and control of the recce missions in the valley to TF Blue. But the Mountain commander had made his desire for more information about the southeast corner of the valley clear to Jimmy and Blaber, the two TF 11 operators with whom he worked most closely. The Halfpipe battle had revealed the area south of Takur Ghar to contain perhaps the heaviest concentration of Al Qaida forces in the Shahikot, while the deep gorge—now dubbed “Ginger Pass”—that ran along Takur Ghar’s southern edge was likely a major supply route. That evening Jimmy passed the plan to get Mako 30 into position on top of Takur Ghar to Hagenbeck. “Hey sir, we think we can put guys right there,” the bearded special operator told the general. “Jimmy, if you can do that, you’re the man,” Hagenbeck replied. Outside, two 160th—or Task Force Brown, as the 160th was known in TF 11—MH-47E helicopters, call signs Razor 03 and Razor 04, lifted off at 10:20 p.m. bound for Gardez where a dozen men waited by a dirt airstrip, shivering in the night air that retained an Afghan winter bite.

  3.

  THE two Chinooks touched down in Gardez at 11:23 p.m., picked up the SEALs and flew off again. But six minutes later, as they approached the Shahikot, word came that the infil for each team would now be delayed fifteen minutes in order to allow an AC-130U gunship to get into position. The 160th pilots wanted the gunship crew to use their high-tech optical systems to search the landing zones and, in the case of Razor 03 and Mako 30, the top of Takur Ghar for signs of enemy activity. This was not unusual. To an alarming degree, special operators had become psychologically dependent on the presence of aircraft like the AC-130 “clearing” their landing zones and objectives. “The special ops community has gotten so that we can’t go in now unless a UAV is looking at it or an AC-130 is looking at it,” an operator in Afghanistan said. The Task Force Brown pilots considered the AC-130U, call sign Nail 21, essential to the mission. At 11:41 p.m., with the Chinooks finally inbound to their respective LZs, Nail 21 reported that it could not get “eyes on” Mako 30’s LZ because of an ongoing B-52 strike. The senior Chinook pilot, a chief warrant officer 4 called Al, Slab, and the Mako 21 leader decided to return to Gardez. The air strike would not have stopped the Chinooks from flying to their LZs. Only the AC-130 was affected, because of its wide turning radius. However, so firm was the pilots’ conviction that AC-130 coverage was a sine qua non, that despite Mako 21 and Mako 30 being only six and nine minutes out respectively from LZs at which no enemy activity had been spotted, they aborted the mission.

  Their plan was to sit on the ground at Gardez for a few minutes and then fly back to the valley as soon as the B-52 strike was over. By then Nail 21 would have left the area and they would have to work with a new AC-130U, Nail 22. Once they had landed at Gardez, however, Razor 03, which was due to fly Slab’s team to the foot of Takur Ghar, developed an engine problem. Al, the flight lead (the pilot in charge of getting both helicopters to their destinations), called Bagram to request a replacement helicopter. The 160th always flew in pairs in Afghanistan, so the TF Brown TOC’s solution was to dispatch a pair of MH-47Es from Bagram to replace the two on the ground at Gardez. The two helicopters duly arrived. Razor 04 was low on fuel by this point, so the air mission commander (a 160th captain) and the pilots from Razor 03 and Razor 04 got into the new aircraft (the Razor call signs transferred with the pilots), with the incoming pilots taking their places in the helicopters that had been sitting on the ground in Gardez. (The new pilots included a maintenance pilot for Al’s original aircraft. After checking it out he flew it back to Bagram alongside the original Razor 04.) The crew chiefs in the back all remained on the helicopters on which they’d flown to Gardez. But the repeated delays were eating into the precious hours of darkness. As Razor 03 and Razor 04 were about to launch, the pilots were told they would have to wait a little longer while a 101st helicopter mission went into the valley. This final delay slammed Mako 30’s window of opportunity shut. The pilots told Slab the earliest they could land him at LZ 1 was 2:30 a.m., too late to allow the team to climb to the mountaintop in darkness.

  Mako 30 and its chain of command faced a choice. They had two good options: They could abort, and delay the mission until the next night; or they could fly to LZ 1, go to ground in a hide site until it got dark the next evening, and then move up to the mountaintop. Slab’s recommendation was to “bump” the mission twenty-four hours. But the lack of clear guidance about who was in charge of the recce missions being launched from Gardez now began to reap disastrous results. In theory Blaber was still in charge, because no firm time had been set for turning the mission over to Hyder and Task Forc
e Blue. But from the moment they arrived at Gardez that morning, Hyder and the two SEAL teams had behaved as if the transition of authority had already occurred. This critical moment in Operation Anaconda was to be no exception. Just 1,000 meters away at the safe house, helping coordinate the preparations for Operation Payback (not scheduled to launch until 2:20 a.m.), was Pete Blaber, a man whose entire career had prepared him to make the sort of decision Hyder now faced, a decision upon which would hang the fates not just of Hyder’s men, but of others as well. Blaber had spent weeks immersing himself in the tactical situation that confronted recce teams in the Shahikot. He was also still—officially—the officer commanding the reconnaissance effort in the valley. But Hyder chose to ignore him and instead seek guidance from the Blue TOC, which was almost 100 miles away and staffed with Navy personnel who had never been anywhere near the Shahikot. He used Razor 03 to relay his message on the TF Blue satellite frequency, which he knew Blaber would not be monitoring. “The earliest infil time possible is now 2215Z to 2230Z [2:45 a.m. local to 3 a.m. local],” the Blue TOC was told. “Mako 30 requests to bump twenty-four hours. What would you like to tell the team?” The message back to Razor 03, Hyder and Slab from the Blue TOC was clear and unequivocal: “We really need you to get in there tonight.” (Task Force Blue officers tried to pin this decision on an enlisted man who had been manning the radio at the time, but the call sign used, according to the TF 11 Joint Operations Center log, was that of the TF Blue operations officer.)