Not a Good Day to Die

by Sean Naylor

  20.The Pakistanis intercepted…bin Laden was at Tora Bora. “U.S. Concludes Bin Laden Escaped at Tora Bora Fight,” by Barton Gellman and Thomas E. Ricks, The Washington Post, April 17, 2002, p. A1.

  21.Deputy Defense Secretary…allowing them to flee. Wolfowitz’s June 26, 2002, testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, op.cit.

  22.But among…conventional forces. Edwards; Task Force Dagger source; another U.S. special operations source; Gellman and Ricks, The Washington Post, op. cit.; A senior officer involved in Pentagon planning said bin Laden “probably escaped” from Tora Bora.

  23.Rosengard was more…all people in Afghanistan.” Rosengard.

  24.But to planners…do the mission,” Edwards said. Edwards.

  Chapter 5

  1.In the cold, muddy…on the plate.” Fletcher; Rosengard; other Task Force Dagger sources.

  2.The disappointing performance…a new approach. Task Force Dagger officer…. accepted bribes…safe passage. Wolfowitz’s June 26, 2002, testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, op.cit. “Bribery is an Olympic sport throughout Afghanistan,” commented a Dagger officer.

  3.By mid-December…Campbell, Kentucky: Fletcher; another Dagger source.

  4.The Bear…best against them.The Bear Went Over the Mountain—Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, by Lester W. Grau (London: Frank Cass, 1998) Afghan Guerrilla Warfare—In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters, by Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau (St. Paul, MI: MBI Publishing Company, 2001) (originally published as The Other Side of the Mountain by the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command); Fletcher; other special operations sources.

  5.While most…brilliant,” Rosengard said. Rosengard; other special operations sources …working as an information operations specialist… Some Army officers are trained in two fields: their primary branch (infantry, armor, aviation, etc.) and their functional area (operational support, information operations, institutional support). In Sweeney’s case, his branch was SF, but in his LIWA job he was working in his functional area.

  Chapter 6

  This chapter is based entirely on interviews with special operations sources familiar with events in Gardez.

  1.Texas 14…ODA 594. Each A-team in Afghanistan had two names. One was its three-digit team number, which tells someone familiar with the numbering system a lot about the team. The first digit refers to the team’s parent group, the second digit to the team’s company and battalion—there are three battalions in a group, and three companies in a battalion; for the purposes of the team numbering system, A Company, 1st Battalion, is 1, A Company, 2nd Battalion is 4, and so on—and the third digit to the team’s number within that company. Thus ODA 594 was the fourth team in C Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group. The other name given to the team was its call sign or code name. This only lasted as long as the mission. In Afghanistan, many of the teams were given the prefix “Tiger.” But when the eleventh team went in, Dagger decided to change the prefix to “Texas,” to avoid anyone confusing a team called “Tiger 11” with “Tiger 1” in a broken radio transmission.

  2.“He was not interested…of moxy.” Rosengard.

  3.The town into…in the 1990s. Larry Goodson, a professor at the Army War College and one of the United States’ foremost experts on the Afghanistan; McHale.

  4.Like many…was combat. Sources familiar with operations in the Gardez safe house. The description of the safe house is informed by photographs I have seen of it.

  Chapter 7

  1.The bulky…moonlit landscape. Source is someone present in Bagram the night that Blaber arrived.

  2.The first American troops…October 21. “Special Forces OD Alpha-555,” by Lance M. Bacon, Soldier of Fortune, September 2003.

  3.Bullets had pockmarked…beside the runway. My personal observations, February through April, 2002.

  4.In fact, many…dangerous enemies. Task Force 11, JSOC, and other special operations sources; Pitfalls of Technology: A Case Study of the Battle on Takur Ghar Mountain, Afghanistan, by Col. Andrew N. Milani. An experienced special operations aviation officer, Milani conducted Joint Special Operations Command’s investigation into the Takur Ghar episode, which occurred March 4 during Anaconda. His extensive report is classified. However, while attending the Army War College, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in the 2002–2003 academic year, Milani drew heavily on his report to write his strategy research project (essentially a short thesis that all AWC students must write). He kept this paper unclassified by giving pseudonyms to the various Task Force 11 components. He referred to Task Force Blue, for instance, as Task Force SEAL, and AFO as Task Force RECCE. He also referred to Task Force 11 members only by their positions, ranks, and initials. During my research, I cross-referenced the Milani paper with interviews with CJTF Mountain staff and members of the special operations community.

  5.Established…a few dozen…Delta Force, by Col. Charlie A. Beckwith (ret.) and Donald Knox (New York: Avon Books, 2000).

  6.…almost 1,000…for the CIA. Special operations sources.

  7.The first Delta squadron…Task Force Blue. Special operations sources; Pitfalls of Technology.

  8.Formed in 1980…from the ground up.Brave Men, Dark Waters—The Untold Story of the Navy SEALs, by Orr Kelly (New York: Pocket Books, 1993) pp. 208–236; retired Army special operator.

  9.It took a few years…Delta’s. Retired Army special operator.

  10.Some of the bitterness…coming apart.” Navy officer who has worked extensively with both Army and Navy special operations forces.

  11.Joint Special Operations Command…outright animosity. Retired JSOC staff officer.

  12.Many strong…each organization. Special operations sources.

  13.Nevertheless, JSOC…Army special ops source. Special operations sources.

  14.But Dailey…for success. Senior Army officer.

  15.Dailey applied…Gregory Trebon. TF Sword source; other sources in the special operations community.

  16.Curiously…Air Force or joint staffs. Trebon’s Air Force résumé; sources in the special operations community…. over 7,000 flight hours in fifty-five different military and civilian air frames. Asked how Tebon amassed flight hours in so many different aircraft, Major Cynthia Teramae, his spokeswoman for his next command, Special Operations Command—Pacific, said, “It is common for a pilot who commands many different units to conduct familiarization flights in the different types of aircraft assigned to each unit in which he commands.”

  17.His specialty…Dailey’s boss. Retired officer who served on the JSOC staff in the 1990s; a TF Sword officer; other special operations sources; senior Army officer.

  18.A barrel-chested man…warn visitors about. I have shaken hands with Gary Harrell on numerous occasions, and on at least one was warned by one of his staff officers beforehand to beware the general’s grip. Mark Bowden made the same point in Killing Pablo (New York: Penguin Books, 2002, p. 149).

  19.He had spent all…between 1998 and 2000. Harrell’s Army résumé.

  20.Harrell was no stranger…Aidid in Somalia.Killing Pablo, ps. 149, 150, 152, 153; Black Hawk Down, by Mark Bowden (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999) passim.

  21.Despite his…“door-kickers”…Edwards.

  22.Since July 2000…“fusion cell.” Harrell.

  23.…that would take…back to Franks. Edwards.

  24.The CENTCOM commander…could match. Gray; Harrell; other CJTF Mountain, special operations, and intelligence sources; Edwards; I walked past the detention facility several times a day during my stint at Bagram.

  25.Nested inside Bowie…enemy territory. Special operations sources. Pitfalls of Technology.

  26.AFO was not…familiar with AFO. Special operations sources.

  27.Although AFO was small…in the 1990s. A source who served on the JSOC staff in the 1990s; other sources in the special operations community.

  28.Prior to taking…Bagram with TF Bowie. Special operations sources.

  29.In briefings…posi
tively shone. CJTF Mountain sources; special operations sources; my own observations watching Dagger, Bowie, and TF 11 personnel in briefings at Bagram in the days leading up to Anaconda.

  30.But beneath…deploying into Afghanistan. JSOC officer; other sources in the special operations community; Edwards; retired officer who served on JSOC staff in the 1990s; senior Army officer.

  31.Edwards, the deputy…operational control.” Edwards.

  32.Some in TF 11…Afghanistan experience.” Special operations sources…. rising to command B Squadron. Because of the Rangers’ status as the Army’s most elite airborne infantry, officers command Ranger battalions only after successfully commanding another infantry battalion. Thomas was the first to follow a Delta squadron command with a Ranger battalion command. For Thomas, the opportunity to command and mold young infantrymen proved irresistible.

  33.TF Red had been…a waste.” Special operations sources.

  34.This was the situation…Another former Ranger, Special operations sources; CJTF Mountain sources; Special operations timeline—this ninety-nine-page document, a detailed account of many special operations activities related to Operation Anaconda compiled by some of the participants, was mailed anonymously to me. Henceforth it will be referred to as “special ops timeline.”

  35.Jimmy was in…movie-star good looks. I met Jimmy very briefly in Bagram before Anaconda.

  36.A 10thMountain…Serpico. CJTF Mountain staff officer.

  37.Indeed in some…Jimmy that guy. Special operations sources; CJTF Mountain sources.

  Chapter 8

  1.For a week…point in the war. Source familiar with the meetings in the Ariana; special ops time line.

  2.Since mid-December…that region. Edwards; Rich’s biographical background is from Ghost Wars, by Steve Coll (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004).

  3.Now, a month…highest priority. Special ops timeline.

  4.“In no conversation…really did.” Edwards.

  5.After receiving…assembling in Gardez. Thomas; Southworth.

  Chapter 9

  1.By January 20…U.S. allies. Task Force Dagger source.

  2.By now…in the works. Fletcher; another Task Force Dagger source.

  3.After studying…wants to do.” Rosengard.

  4.Despite the evidence…all these Afghans.” Rosengard; Fletcher.

  5.The second reason…understood it. Rosengard.

  Chapter 10

  1.At his Kuwait…varied wildly. Mikolashek; Edwards.

  2.For a long time…around the valley. Source in the special operations community.

  3.To Mikolashek…enemy in the Shahikot. Mikolashek, Task Force Dagger sources; another source in the special operations community.

  4.Based on intelligence…(IMU). Mikolashek.

  5.The IMU fighters…run with it. Mikolashek. “…the main effort…” Army doctrine defines “main effort” as “the activity, unit, or area that commanders determine constitutes the most important task at that time. Commanders weight the main effort with resources and priorities and shift it as circumstances and intent demand.” (Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations).

  6.…by early February…about that time.” Mikolashek.

  7.However, CENTCOM…blocking positions.” Mikolashek; Edwards; Task Force Dagger source. Mikolashek’s comments, echoed by several other knowledgeable sources, throw a harsh light on the following statement by Wolfowitz to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 26, 2002: “So when in Anaconda we relied more heavily on American and coalition forces, it wasn’t because we had, quote, ‘learned a lesson,’ but because we had more capability available.”

  8.If the CIA…yet again. Mikolashek.

  9.CENTCOM finally…Edwards said. Edwards; Nocks.

  Chapter 11

  1.It was a cold…dream posting. Wiercinski; my personal observations from Kandahar.

  2.The Army had…twenty-five infantry brigades, Monica Manganaro, media relations officer, U.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia. In addition to the twenty-five infantry brigades, the active Army also has twenty infantry “training” brigades, which are not combat formations.

  3.The 101stAirborne…the world’s militaries. The official 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Web site: www.campbell.army.mil/dhistory.htm.

  4.Such was the case…falling umbrella.” The official Web site of the 3rd Brigade, particularly the history pages at www.campbell.army.mil/3bde/3rdbde_history.htm and www.campbell.army.mil/3bde/187th_history.htm.

  5.The legacy of valor…was unrelenting. Wiercinski.

  6.In early November…ranges at Jacobabad. Sarat; Wiercinski.

  7.As the Rakkasans…operations,” Mikolashek said. Mikolashek; Edwards.

  8.…Forces Command… Forces Command is in charge of all the Army’s conventional war fighting units in the continental United States.

  9.In the 101st, these slices…military intelligence elements. Cody.

  10.With all its components…5,000 soldiers… Wiercinski.

  11.But Franks didn’t want…I can’t get there.” Cody; Edwards; Keane; Mikolashek; Wiercinski; Burns.

  12.CFLCC and CENTCOM…missing artillery. Mikolashek.

  13.…Mikolashek was telling…“full-spectrum operations,” Wiercinski.

  14.When TF Rakkasan deployed…Al Qaida prisoners. Cody; Marye; Wiercinski.

  15.The force package allotted…nowhere with Rumsfeld. Cody; Edwards; Mikolashek; White; Wiercinski; senior officer involved in Pentagon planning; another Pentagon official.

  16.The chartered flights…the Sinai. I was on this flight.

  17.Situated several…bargained for. Larsen; Wiercinski; my personal observations from the six weeks I spent with the Rakkasans in Kandahar in January and February of 2002.

  18.As the Rakkasans adjusted…to go to work. Cody; Edwards; Marye; Wiercinski; a general officer familiar with Franks’s relations with the senior Army leadership.

  Chapter 12

  1.The addition…handle on its own. Mikolashek; special operations sources.

  2.He had already…spell Bagram.” Hagenbeck; Mikolashek; Edwards; Wiercinski; Larsen; Gray.

  3.Jim Larsen, in Bagram…disappeared inside. Larsen; Fletcher.

  4.The Rakkasan officer…conducting in Uzbekistan. Larsen; Gray.

  5.Larsen and LaCamera…and it showed. Larsen; Nocks; my own observations driving from Bagram to Kabul and back. The next morning. The date of the meeting at the Kabul safe house is the subject of some confusion. Some documents state that it happened on February 8, others that it occurred February 9. The memories of the attendees’ are similarly nonconclusive. Weighing the evidence, it seems more likely to me that it occurred February 8.

  6.The Toyotas pulled up…get ourselves into.” Larsen; Nocks; Harrell; Bishop; Haas; other sources familiar with the meeting in the Kabul safe house and with the safe house’s design; special ops timeline…. Glenn…Mark… In cases in which I have been unable to determine last names, or in which it is clear that the individuals involved may be operating undercover at the time of this book’s publication, I have only used first names, sometimes with last initials.

  Chapter 13

  1.In the late…the puddle.) Larsen; Wiercinski; Rosengard; another attendee at the meeting.

  2.Listening to Rosengard…trust and support. Wiercinski; Larsen; another attendee at the meeting.

  3.The Rakkasan officers…battalion to Afghanistan.” Larsen.

  4.Wiercinski, Gibler, and Yates…of the infantry force. Wiercinski; Larsen.

  5.Meanwhile, Bishop…Anaconda. Larsen; Nocks; Bishop.

  Chapter 14

  Except where noted below, this chapter is based entirely on interviews with U.S. personnel familiar with events in Gardez during the prelude to Operation Anaconda.

  1.Only when the CIA…only as “Spider.” Special ops time line.

  2.“They went with…paramilitary guys.” Haas.

  Chapter 15

  1.Blaber’s decision…lay beyond it. Special ops time line;
sources in the Gardez safe house; other TF Dagger source.

  2.For signals intelligence…ambushes now. “SIGINT Marines Help Fight War on Terrorism in Afghanistan,” Intelligence Community Newsletter, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Department, February 2003; TF 11 source; Briley; another source in the CJTF Mountain TOC in Bagram; special ops time line; Gardez safe house sources; another TF Dagger source; Blaber briefing—this refers to a set of briefing slides I obtained that were used by Blaber to brief the story of Anaconda to many different audiences in Pentagon and around the U.S. military; I also spoke to several people who had attended one or more of these briefings for elaboration on the points made in the slides.

  3.Around this time…himself was in the Shahikot. Special ops source; source in the Gardez safe house; “Ali Mohamed: The Defendant Who Did Not Go to Trial,” by Judy Aita, U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, May 16, 2003, accessed on the Internet at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/security/a1051502.htm; “The Infiltrator: Ali Mohamed Served in the U.S. Army—and bin Laden’s Circle,” by Peter Waldman, The Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2001.

  4.Another document…report stated. I obtained a copy of this debrief.

  5.During this period…those missions. Special ops time line; Blaber briefing; sources in the Gardez safe house.

  6.But when he…AFO’s approach. Special ops time line; a source familiar with the VTC.

  7.In fairness…element in Gardez. TF 11 source in Masirah; special ops time line; source in the Gardez safe house; senior Army officer.

  8.As it was…went native. TF 11 source.

  9.But to Chris…to us,” Haas said. Haas.

  10.Part of the reason…American in Gardez. Special ops time line; Gardez safe house source; Blaber briefing.

  Chapter 16

  1.The dark…to war again. Hagenbeck; Edwards; Gray; Wille; Mikolashek. Details on MC-130 Combat Talon landings at Bagram were provided by Major Perry Panos, a Combat Talon pilot with the 919th Special Operations Wing who made over ten landings at the air base.

  2.The 10thMountain Division had…(Light Infantry).The Army of Excellence—the Development of the 1980s Army, by John L. Romjue, publ. by Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, pp. 15–16. The 10th Mountain Division Web site, http://www.drum.army.mil/history/divisionhistory.htm.