India’s Soft Power

by Patryk Kugiel

  According to the Indian Embassy, in Poland there were 57 Polish students who availed stipends for studies in India between 2005 and 2013. Out of this group, 18 people agreed to fill in a questionnaire to assess their experiences and attitude towards India after completing the programme. This accounts for one-third of all participants of the Indian government program, and is a remarkable sample to draw some conclusions. These were mostly students of Indology studies, and they focused on one of the Indian languages while in India, although other programmes were also pursued (such as classical music, dance, or international relations). This explains why those who utilised the scholarship were already interested in India and assessed their knowledge and understanding of India as high (5 per cent) or very high (61 per cent) before their departure to India. Yet, most of them admitted that studying in India better exposed them to Indian culture and helped them to understand the country to a larger extent (44 per cent). Some students acknowledged the huge complexity of India while saying: “During my studies in Poland, I had learned a lot about customs, religions and culture of India, however in practice, India turned out to be much more complicated.” The majority of students assessed the utility and relevance of acquired experiences and knowledge about India for their future carriers and work as “very high” (39 per cent) or “rather high” (16 per cent). It was, however, often observed that the “quality of education” was poor, and the overall high assessment was a result of many elements (friends, trips, etc.) that constituted their final experience. Importantly, for most of students (39 per cent), studies in India had a positive effect on their attitude towards India; yet for 22 per cent, this experience worsened their feelings towards the country. Some people pointed at the “inescapable” cultural shock, and others at the “unexpected amount of discrimination and hypocrisy” in Indian society. In the words of another person: “India is a fastened learning of life – for a much longer time in Poland I have not gained so much experience as for this short time I spent on the Indian subcontinent.” The scholarship was also helpful in developing long-lasting personal contacts – 61 per cent of students maintain links and relationships with people met during their stay in India after returning to Poland, and 22 per cent have maintained these contacts rarely. The survey confirms, also, that granting scholarship is a long-term investment, which makes scholars brand ambassadors of India. Almost all of them (88 per cent) have stayed engaged in work or activities that deal with India. They, for instance, participate and organise Indian events in Poland, follow the news on India and promote knowledge about the country. As a result, the majority of ICCR scholars have a favourable view on India’s role in international affairs (71 per cent), although some observed that India “performs below its potential” in international relations.

  At the same time, a large group of students (44 per cent) raised the problem of insufficient stipends as a major challenge of the ICCR program. Especially those who studied in major cities, like Delhi or Mumbai, who faced difficulties living on US$ 100–150 per month—and without private savings or help of their families, they could not have had an enjoyable stay. It was also observed that the ICCR does not provide any assistance in finding accommodation, access to health care or bureaucratic work, which tends to have a negative effect on their final impressions. Especially when compared to the scale and quality of support offered by other countries (the US and the EU but also China or Taiwan), the level of support from the ICCR is highly unsatisfactory.

  Despite these concerns, the overall overview of Indian government scholarship program can be evaluated as very high. The case of Polish scholars confirms that this is one of the major tools for building stronger ties and goodwill for India. Apart from the few individual negative experiences, the majority of those who studied in India return as promoters and friends of the country. Despite the poor quality of education and modest level of support, this programme gives the opportunity and incentive for studies in India, that would otherwise not take place. This can be seen as an important tool for Indian foreign policy, but further improvements in the programme can make much larger and more positive impact.

  The Indian diasporais becoming an increasingly important asset of Indian soft power in Poland. This once irrelevant group, a few dozen people before 1989, has expanded considerably to some 4,000 people by 2014. Although this is still a small number compared to global standards, they constitute the eighth largest immigrant group in a largely homogeneous Polish society (Pędziwiatr, et al, 2014). More importantly, this new emerging minority shares positive characteristics with those successful Indians settled in other developed states, such as the US or Australia, rather than Indian migrants to the Middle East or some other Western states (like Italy) attracting mostly semi-skilled or unskilled workers. Research done in 2014 shows people of Indian origin in Poland are relatively better-educated and more prosperous than average in Polish society (ibid). The group consists of the three largest elements: entrepreneurs, professionals working in international companies and students. Along with its growing prosperity, the Indian community has become better-organized and more active in the cultural and economic life of Poland. There were at least six main Indian associations in different cities, serving the needs of the community while also contributing to better Poland-India relations. For instance, the Indo-Polish Cultural Committee (IPCC) has been the main organizer of Indian festivals Holi and Diwali – promoting Indian traditions and culture across Poland; and the Indo-Polish Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IPCCI) is a premiere organisation engaged in promotion of India as an economic partner and facilitating contacts between business people from both countries. As truly brand ambassadors of India, they play a significant role in promoting a positive image of their country in Poland. Serving as guides and partners for Indian diplomats, they become an important element of India’s public and cultural diplomacy. They can be seen as a strong human bond between two states and increasingly positive element in relations, which is also eagerly engaged by Polish diplomats.

  Advancement of Indian interests in relations with Poland is supported by other public and private organisations from India. One remarkable example is the cooperation between the Indian Council of World Affairs and the Polish Institute of International Affairs, which serves as a major Track II diplomacy mechanism, ever since both institutions signed an MoU in 2006. Since then, there have been four rounds of talks on political and economic cooperation, held in Warsaw and Delhi, alternatively, to test new avenues for cooperation. Thanks to close ties to their respective ministries of foreign affairs and involvement of diplomats and experts, this dialogue helped to increase mutual understanding of both countries and informed official relations. One of the tangible effects of this cooperation is the first-ever book on bilateral relations, India-Poland: Vistas for future Partnership in the 21st Century, published in India in 2014.

  There have been a few more mechanisms established in recent years that have fostered stronger economic and educational cooperation between the two states. For instance, in 2010, the University of Warsaw established the Centre of Contemporary India Studies, which offered an MA program on modern India and signed MoUs on cooperation with over a dozen Indian universities and research institutions. It was also instrumental in launching Poland and Central Europe Centres at universities in Kolkata and Manipal, in 2012. Institutional networks and the exchange of researchers and students helped a great deal in developing expertise and disseminating knowledge about modern India among the young generation of Polish scholars. Although the initiative was on the Polish side, and funded by a grant from the European Union, Indian diplomats and official partners in India eagerly assisted the project. One can add here that the Indian government encouraged institutional links between other major Indian and Polish institutions, including the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the Polish National Chamber of Commerce (KIG), academies of sciences, and others. This led to more frequent contacts
between entrepreneurs from Poland and India and exchange of larger business delegations, as for instance, over 100 Indian delegates for the Poznań Trade Fairs in Poland, in June 2014.

  It is hard to state, conclusively, the role of the recent soft power strategy in generating more interest in India and reshaping its image in Poland. This perception has always been rather positive and cordial, partly due to a long tradition of Indology studies in Poland and positive experiences of cooperation during the Second World War (including the story of some 4,000 Polish refugees who found shelter in India) and during the Cold War. Jagiellonian University, in Kraków, was one among the first in this part of Europe to a start special department focused on India studies, set in place way back in the late 19th century, followed by the University of Warsaw, in the 1920s, and more recently, the ones opened in Wrocław and Poznań. These institutions fostered a professional interest in Indian traditions, literature, languages and trained “Indologists” who influenced Polish perceptions of India for decades. The Indian Council of Cultural Relations supported these activities, providing chairs of India studies in Kraków and Warsaw.

  With the end of the Cold War and advent of globalisation, interest in India has somehow diminished, and public perception has been, to a large extent, influenced by images provided by popular media houses, which usually concentrate more on negative news. An old stereotype of “spiritual” and “exotic” India has been complemented by an image of a “poor” and “underdeveloped” country. This is well illustrated by the popular book, issued in 2011, Lalki w ogniu (“Dolls in the fire”), written by Polish journalist Paulina Wilk, who depicts India as a country of poverty, malnourishment of children, and social and gender injustice. Analysis of major Polish newspaper media content during the period from 2012–2013 shows there is little general interest in India, and most existing articles concentrate on curiosities and negative news – from terrorist attacks, to corruption scandals, to violence against minorities and women. For instance, the largest outburst of articles about India in recent years was in the aftermath of the Delhi gang rape, in late 2012. The image of a modern, developing economy and emerging power is somehow lost and does not reach the general public, yet. As a result, Polish awareness of India is still based on old stereotypes and clichés, and largely misses the complexity and richness of the country. On a positive note, however, it can be added, that in last 10 years, there have been more scientific books in Polish presenting a comprehensive overview of India as an emerging power and rising economy (Zajączkowski 2008; Iwanek and Burakowski, 2014).

  Despite these constraints, there is still significant goodwill for India in Poland. Although there are no Polish official surveys evaluating attitude of the Polish populace towards India, existing international polls present Poland as having one of the most positive opinions about India. The global opinion survey, done by BBC World Service, in 2013, shows that the majority of Poles are more positive about India’s influence in the world (17 per cent net positive). This was one of the best results among those of the 25 assessed countries, and only 6 countries rated India higher. In Europe, only Russia had accrued a more positive view (33 per cent net positive), but the Poles saw India as more friendly than the Germans, or the British – nations with more intense contacts and interests. These findings were somewhat confirmed by smaller on-line surveys on perceptions of India, which were conducted by the Polish Institute of International Affairs, in 2014 (Kugiel, 2014). A simple questionnaire was sent to a few thousand people interested in international relations (experts, diplomats, academicians, students, etc.); a total of 338 complete answers were returned. Although it cannot be seen as representative for a whole society, it gives some insight into what Polish elites probably think about India. The outcomes indicate that 50 per cent of respondents evaluate India’s influences on world affairs positively, 44 per cent claimed India has no particular influences and only 6 per cent saw India’s role negatively. Moreover, 72 per cent of respondents regarded their personal attitude toward India as positive (54 per cent) or very positive (18 per cent); only 6 per cent harbours negative feelings; whereas 22 per cent were neutral. Conclusively, 49 per cent of respondents regarded India as an important partner for Poland, and more than half (51 per cent) claimed that the Polish government is not doing enough to build stronger relations with this country. These views of Polish experts may be an encouraging sign for India as it points to the large, probably untapped potential of its soft power in Poland.

  It is not an easy task to measure the impact of Indian soft power in realisation of Indian interests. One can argue, however, that several tools and mechanisms, especially more active public diplomacy, scholarship programmes and use of the Indian diaspora, have had a positive effect on growing cooperation and promotion of the new image of modern India. It can be noted that bilateral trade rose fourfold from 2004, from little more than US$ 400 million to US$ 2 billion in 2014. Polish businessmen have become more frequent visitors to numerous fairs and exhibitions in India, as have investors. According to the Indian government, the Polish FDI in India has exceeded $US 600 million, making Poland the 25th largest foreign investor in the country. India also has become a more popular tourist destination, despite the largely negative image the country has in major Polish media. The number of visitors from Poland to India has risen from 6,000, in 2003, to almost 24,000, in 2013 (Ministry of Tourism, 2003, 2014). There is also a growing intensity of political dialogue and official visits. Indian soft power works through more than 30 Indian restaurants, dozens of Ayurveda spas, several hundred schools of yoga, the memory of Mahatma Gandhi, and rising popularity of Bollywood movies and Indian classical culture. The general success of the Indian economy in last decade has also strengthened interest in India as an emerging market.

  The case of Poland shows that soft power instruments can bear positive results; however, they need further strengthening and more investments. The absence of a cultural centre, limited diplomatic staff, and a modest promotional budget are among the major challenges for a more effective policy. Winding down the scholarship program can risk widening the gap between the two societies. Also, the defensive and reactive style of communication with Polish opinion leaders requires a major turnabout. Today, the information deficit and misunderstanding of India forms major impediments for closer political and economic cooperation. There are still old stereotypes and clichés of mystical and poor India dominant in Polish society, and the media still pays little attention to new developments in this country. This can be altered with the help of soft power. The recent “Make in India”, campaign, launched in Poland in March 2015, offers a good chance to change this and update the image of India in the eyes of the Polish public. India enjoys natural goodwill in Poland, but it will need more activism and resources to uphold this attitude in a fast changing and increasingly competitive global system. Nurturing soft power can lead to more robust trade and tourism as well as open support for India at multilateral forums.

  Conclusion

  Analysis of effectiveness of India’s soft power brings rather mixed results. There are numerous examples where this strategy worked well for India – from upward trends in the flow of tourists and investments to the nuclear deal with the US to drawing support for its multilateral initiatives. As the case of Afghanistan demonstrates, soft power tools can be effective for building not only strong political partnerships but also massive goodwill among the public. At the same time, the example of Poland suggests that modest levels of engagement yield modest results. Raja Mohan (2014) is not completely right when he claims that “[w]hether it is yoga or Bollywood, Indian soft power has steadily grown over the decades precisely because the government had nothing do with it.” The Indian government has a role to play in wielding soft power and has started to better integrate it in foreign policy in recent years.

  Yet, India ranks rather poorly in numerous international indices of soft power and its “nation brand” is not as well regarded as it might initially appear (Hall,
2012: 1109). Moreover this image problem continues despite the country’s rise on the global stage and increasing investments in its soft power capabilities. How is it possible that the home to Mahatma Gandhi, source of rich civilization and increasingly popular mass culture, a country that presents itself as a promoter of the ruled-based international system and peaceful coexistence of nations, does not draw popular support and favourable views abroad? There is no simple explanation of this complex problem and no single reason behind India’s relatively low position in soft power measurement.

  Possibly it is yet too early to assess conclusively the impact of soft power on realisation of the country’s interests as soft power works in the long perspective. Nevertheless, there must be also some important factors that undermine India’s global perception. As argued by Ian Hall (2012: 1109), “Clearly, public diplomacy alone cannot address this poor image which is the result of matters far beyond the control of the ICCR or the MEA.” The rule in economy that apparently applies to politics also says that marketing alone will not be sufficient if the product is not good enough. It appears evident that India’s assets (such as democracy, Bollywood, yoga, and the diaspora) are countered by its considerable liabilities (such as poverty and underdevelopment, social and religious tensions, and the Kashmir conflict). Better understanding of the limitations of its soft power is essential for a more effective approach in the future. Several ideas about impediments to India’s soft power—and on how India can wield its strengths in this domain are given in the next chapter.