Delphi Complete Works of Procopius

by Procopius of Caesarea

  Now Vittigis and the Goths with him, hearing that Belisarius at the beginning of spring would come against them and Ravenna, were plunged into great fear, and they began to take counsel regarding the situation which confronted them; and realizing as they did that they alone were not a match for their enemy in battle, they decided, after long deliberation, to invite the assistance of some other barbarians. In carrying out this purpose, however, they avoided the Germans, having already had experience of their crafty and untrustworthy character, being well content if they too should not come against the Goths with Belisarius, but should stand aside for both. But they sent envoys to Vaces, the ruler of the Lombards, offering great sums of money and inviting him to an offensive and defensive alliance. But these envoys, upon learning that Vaces was a friend and ally of the emperor, returned unsuccessful. It was natural, therefore, that Vittigis should be at a loss in these circumstances, and he was constantly calling together many of the elders. And from them he made many inquiries as to how he should form his plans and act in order that he might achieve the greatest success. Accordingly many opinions were expressed by those who gathered for the council, some of them in no way adapted to the situation, and some too which contained suggestions worthy of some consideration. And among these suggestions this idea also was advanced, that the emperor of the Romans had plainly never been able to make war upon the barbarians in the West before the time when the treaty had been made with the Persians. For it was only then that the Van dais and Moors had been destroyed, and the Goths had suffered their present misfortunes. Consequently, if someone should once more rouse the hostility of the king of the Medes against the Emperor Justinian, the Romans thereafter would never be able, when once that nation had been stirred up to war against them, to carry on another war against any people in the world. This suggestion pleased both Vittigis himself and the other Goths.

  It was decided, therefore, that envoys should be sent to Chosroes, the king of the Medes, but that they should not be Goths, in order that the real character of the embassy might not be at once obvious and the negotiations be made useless, but Romans, who were to make him hostile to the Emperor Justinian. Accordingly they bribed two priests of Liguria with great sums of money to undertake this service. One of these men, who seemed to be the more worthy, undertook the embassy, assuming the appearance and the title of bishop, which did not belong to him at all, while the other followed as his attendant. Vittigis also entrusted to them a letter written to Chosroes and sent them off. And Chosroes, influenced by this very letter, committed acts of an outrageous character against the Romans in time of peace, as has been told by me in the preceding narrative. Now when the Emperor Justinian heard that Chosroes and the Persians were planning to this end, he decided to bring the war in the West to an end as quickly as possible, and to recall Belisarius in order that he might take the field against the Persians. So he immediately dismissed the envoys of Vittigis (for they happened to be still in Byzantium), promising that men would be sent by him to Ravenna who would draw up the treaty with the Goths in such form that the interests of both sides would be furthered. But Belisarius did not release these envoys to the enemy until they, in turn, had released the embassy of Athanasius and Peter. And when these men arrived at Byzantium, the emperor counted them worthy of the greatest gifts of honour, appointing Athanasius prefect of the pretorians in Italy, and giving Peter the office of “magister” as it is called. And the winter drew to a close, and the fourth year ended in this war, the history of which Procopius has written. [529 A.D.]

  XXIII

  Now Belisarius wished first to capture Auximus and Fisula, and after that to march against Vittigis and Ravenna, with no one of the enemy any longer able to oppose his advance or to harass his rear.

  He accordingly sent Cyprian and Justinus with their men and some of the Isaurians to Fisula, together with five hundred foot-soldiers from the detachment commanded by Demetrius; and they made camp about the fortress and commenced a siege of the barbarian garrison. And Martinus and John with their troops and another army, commanded by John whom they called the Glutton, he sent to the country along the Po River. These officers he commanded to take care that Uraias with his forces should not advance from Milan against his own army; and if they were not able to repel the enemy’s attack, they were secretly to follow behind them and assail their rear. So they took possession of Dorthon, an unwalled city which lay on the river, and having established their camp remained there, while Belisarius himself went to the city of Auximus with eleven thousand men. Now this is the first of the cities in Picenum, being the metropolis, as the Romans are accustomed to call it.

  And it is about eighty-four stades distant from the shore of the Ionian Gulf, and from the city of Ravenna a journey of three days and eighty stades. And it is situated upon a very high hill, having no approach at all upon the level ground, and for this reason it is entirely inaccessible for an enemy. In that city Vittigis had assembled all the most notable troops among the Goths and had established them there as a garrison, conjecturing that the Romans, unless they should first capture this city, would never dare to march against Ravenna.

  Now when the Roman army arrived at Auximus, Belisarius commanded them all to encamp in a circle about the base of the hill. So they took their places by companies, and were setting up their huts at different points in the line; and the Goths, observing that the enemy were rather far apart from one another, and were not able easily to bring assistance to each other, since they were in a great plain, suddenly advanced upon them in the late afternoon, on the side to the east of the city, where Belisarius happened to be still engaged in making camp with his spearmen and guards. And the Romans took up their arms and began to defend themselves against their assailants as well as the circumstances permitted, and by their valour they forced them back with the greatest ease and routed them; and in following up their flight they reached the middle of the hill. There the barbarians turned upon them, and, confident in the strength of their position, made a stand against their pursuers; and since they were shooting from above, they slew many of them, until night coming on put a stop to the fighting. Thus the two armies separated and bivouacked that night. Now it happened that on the day before this encounter some of the Goths had been sent out to the country close by at early dawn in order to gather provisions. These foraging parties, having learned nothing of the presence of the enemy, returned at night, and suddenly spying the fires of the Romans, they became greatly amazed and frightened. And many of them, who plucked up courage to take the risk and escaped detection by their enemy, entered Auximus. But as many as were overcome by terror and hid themselves for the time in any convenient clumps of trees with the intention of proceeding to Ravenna, all these not long afterward fell into hostile hands and were destroyed. And Belisarius, seeing that Auximus was exceedingly strong and securely placed, and that it was altogether impossible for him to make an attack upon the fortifications, was of the opinion that he could never take the place by storm, but he hoped by a close siege to reduce the enemy to want by cutting off their food supplies and thus to bring them into his power by the passage of time.

  Now not far from the fortifications there was a place where the ground was covered with an abundant growth of grass, and this gave rise every day to an encounter between the Romans and the Goths. For every time the Romans saw their opponents cutting this grass for the sake of their horses, they would ascend the hill with a great rush, and, upon reaching the enemy, they would engage with them, and by making a display of valorous deeds, try to prevent them altogether from carrying off the grass; and they always slew many of the Goths in this place. Then the Goths, finding themselves no match for their enemy in valour, devised the following plan. They removed the wheels along with the axles from their waggons and held them in readiness; then, when they had commenced to cut the grass, as soon as they saw that the Romans, as they ascended, were at the middle of the hill, they released the wheels to rush down upon them from above. But by some c
hance it so happened that these wheels went all the way to the level ground without touching a single man. And since they had failed in this attempt, the barbarians on that occasion took to flight and got inside the fortifications, but after that they adopted the following plan. After filling the ravines which are close to the fortifications with ambuscades of the men of note among them, a few soldiers would shew themselves near the grass to the enemy, and when the fighting had come to close quarters, those in concealment would leap out from their ambuscades, and, being greatly superior to their opponents in number, and striking terror into them because they had not previously seen their assailants, they used to kill great numbers of them and always turned the rest to flight. And although those of the Romans who had kept their position in the camps did see the enemy rising from the ambuscades, and tried, with much shouting, to call their companions back, still they failed utterly to do so, since those fighting could not in the least hear their call, because, in the first place, they were separated from them by a great expanse of hillside, and, in the second place, the barbarians purposely always made a din to drown the voices by beating their weapons together.

  And when Belisarius was in perplexity because of this situation, Procopius, who wrote this history, came before him and said: “The men, General, who blew the trumpets in the Roman army in ancient times knew two different strains, one of which seemed unmistakably to urge the soldiers on and impel them to battle, while the other used to call the men who were fighting back to the camp, whenever this seemed to the general to be for the best. And by such means the generals could always give the appropriate commands to the soldiers, and they on their part were able to execute the commands thus communicated to them. For during actual combat the human voice is in no way adapted to give any clear instructions, since it obviously has to contend with the clash of arms on every side, and fear paralyzes the senses of those fighting. But since at the present time such skill has become obsolete through ignorance and it is impossible to express both commands by one trumpet, do you adopt the following course hereafter. With the cavalry trumpets urge on the soldiers to continue fighting with the enemy, but with those of the infantry call the men back to the retreat. For it is impossible for them to fail to recognize the sound of either one, for in the one case the sound comes forth from leather and very thin wood, and in the other from rather thick brass.” So spoke Procopius.

  And Belisarius was pleased by the suggestion, and calling together the whole army he spoke as follows:

  “I consider that enthusiasm is beneficial and thoroughly praiseworthy, but only so long as it continues to be of a moderate sort and consequently brings no harm upon those under its spell. For every good thing, when in excess, is wont to change for the worse. Do you, therefore, from this time forth, not allow your enthusiasm for battle to cause you to fail of success; for to flee from one who is inflicting loss upon you is, as you surely know, no disgrace. But he who without looking about him goes into trouble which is before his eyes and, should it so happen, escapes from it, still stands convicted of folly; but the man truly noble is he who plays the part of a brave man in dangers that cannot be avoided. Now the barbarians, since they are unable to fight a decisive battle with us in the open, are trying to destroy us by laying snares. But for us it is more blameworthy to face the danger than to escape from their ambush. For nothing is more shameful than to fall in with the plans of the enemy. It will rest with me, accordingly, to see to it that you do not come unawares upon the ambuscades of the enemy. And it will be your duty, as soon as I give the signal, to retire with all speed. And this signal, soldiers, will be given by the trumpet of the infantry.” So spoke Belisarius. And the soldiers, seeing the enemy near the grass, made a charge against them and killed a few of their number in the first onset. And one of the Moors saw among these fallen Goths one in particular whose person was adorned with gold, and laying hold of the hair of his head, he began to drag the corpse after him in order to strip it. But some Goth hurled a javelin at him, and with such a lucky aim that the weapon passed through both his legs, piercing the muscles which are behind the shins, with the result that his two legs were pinned together by means of the javelin. But nevertheless the Moor kept holding the hair of the corpse and dragging it along. At this point the barbarians roused their men from ambush, and Belisarius, seeing from the camp what was being done, commanded the foot-soldiers to whom this duty was assigned to sound the trumpets quickly. And the Romans, hearing it, began immediately to withdraw gradually, taking up and carrying the Moor, javelin and all. And the Goths dared follow them no further, but returned unsuccessful

  XXIV

  As time went on and the barbarians saw that their supply of food was coming to be exceedingly scant, they purposed to report their situation to Vittigis. And since no one of them dared set out on this mission (for they thought that they would never elude their besiegers), they devised the following plan. They first put in readiness the men whom they were intending to send to Vittigis, and then waited for a moonless night; when this came they put a letter into their hands, when it was well on in the night, and thereupon all raised a mighty shout at many parts of the circuit-wall. One would have supposed that they had been thrown into confusion owing to a violent attack of the enemy and an unexpected capture of the city. And the Romans, utterly unable to understand what was taking place, by the will of Belisarius remained quietly in the camps, suspecting that some stratagem would be carried out from the city and that an army from Ravenna bringing assistance to the enemy had come against them. And moved as they were by these fears, they thought it better for them to remain quietly in a secure position and thus save themselves than to go on a moonless night into a danger which could, in a way, be foreseen. By such means, therefore, the barbarians concealed their plan from the enemy and despatched the men on the way to Ravenna. And they, without being seen by a single one of the enemy, came before Vittigis on the third day and displayed the letter. And the writing was as follows: “When you appointed us, O King, for the garrison of Auximus, you said that you had placed in our keeping the keys of Ravenna itself and of your kingdom. And for this very reason you enjoined upon us to be on guard with every fibre of our being, that we should not by any act of ours betray the power of the Goths to the enemy, and you declared that, if we craved your assistance, you would be at hand with the whole army even before any messenger could announce your coming. Now as for us, we have, up to the present time, though fighting both with famine and with Belisarius, proved ourselves faithful guardians of your kingdom, but you have seen fit to aid us in no way whatsoever. You must consider, therefore, whether the Romans may not one day capture Auximus and take up the keys which you yourself are disregarding as they lie here, and thereby be excluded in future from none of your possessions.” Such was the purport of the letter.

  When it was brought to Vittigis and he saw it, he did at the moment send the men away with the promise that he would bring assistance to Auximus with the whole army of the Goths; but later, after long consideration, he continued to remain inactive. For, on the one hand, he suspected that the troops of John would follow up his rear and thus make him exposed to attack on two sides, and, on the other, he thought that Belisarius had with him a numerous force of able fighting men; consequently he fell into a sort of helpless fear. But chief among the many causes of his concern was the famine, which disturbed him greatly, since he had no source from which to provide supplies for his army. For the Romans, on the one hand, being as they were masters of the sea and holding the fortress in Ancon, brought all their supplies from Sicily and Calabria and stored them in that place, and, at the proper time, easily got them from there. The Goths, on the other hand, if they marched into the land of Picenum, would have no means of securing provisions; this he fully realized, and so he found himself completely at a loss. So the men who had lately been sent to Vittigis from Auximus brought back his promise to the city without being detected by their enemy, and thus fortified the barbarians there with empt
y hopes. And Belisarius, upon hearing this from the deserters, ordered that a still stricter guard should be kept in order that no such thing might happen again. Such was the course of these events.

  Meanwhile the troops of Cyprian and Justinus who were besieging Fisula were quite unable to make an assault upon the fortifications or even to get very close to them; for this fortress was difficult of access on every side. But the barbarians made frequent sallies against them, wishing rather to reach a decision by battle with the Romans than to be hard pressed by lack of provisions; and the engagements at first, indeed, proved indecisive, but after a time the Romans, now having the advantage, shut the enemy up within their wall and continued to guard them securely, so that no one could leave the city. So the barbarians, seeing that their provisions were failing, and finding themselves helpless in their present situation, sent to Vittigis without the knowledge of their enemy, begging him to bring them assistance with all speed, on the ground that they would not hold out very much longer. And Vittigis commanded Uraias to go to Ticinum with the army then in Liguria; for, after that, he declared, he too would come to the aid of the besieged himself with the whole Gothic army. And Uraïas, acting accordingly, set in motion the whole army he had with him and went to Ticinum. And crossing the river Po, they came to the vicinity of the Roman camp. There they too made camp and established themselves over against their enemy, at a distance of about sixty stades from them. And neither side began an attack. For the Romans, on the one hand, deemed it sufficient if they should block the way for their enemy, so that they could not advance upon the besieging army, and the barbarians, on the other, were reluctant to fight a decisive battle with their enemy in that place, reasoning that, if they should fail in this engagement, they would ruin the whole cause of the Goths. For, in that case, they would no longer be able to unite with the troops of Vittigis and with him to give assistance to the besieged. So both sides, reasoning thus, continued to remain quiet.