London Cage

by Helen Fry

  The special Anglo-American cooperation in interrogation and intelligence gathering continued successfully throughout the war. The various branches of MI19 conducted immensely important work, interrogating prisoners and eavesdropping on their conversations. But it has rarely received its due recognition in books on the Second World War or espionage.

  Later in 1944, trained British and American interrogators accompanied the invasion forces into Europe and worked in forward-field interrogation units. Underpinning all their work was the conviction that psychology was at the heart of successful intelligence operations. It was believed that Nazi youths would yield nothing during interrogation, and by ‘a careful study of the psychology of this new type of prisoner of war, methods were evolved to overcome his resistance and useful information was obtained from even the most resistant of these highly trained members of the enemy forces’.31

  In July 1945, Colonel D. Macmillan, the senior British intelligence officer at the office of the assistant chief of staff, Allied Forces Headquar-ters, concluded: ‘There is very little glamour attached to the work of interrogation.’ That would certainly be the experience of the London Cage interrogators as they entered the most difficult phase of their work and prepared to receive many ardent Nazis, who would sorely test their patience. They were about to face the perpetrators of horrendous crimes in the concentration camps and those responsible for murdering Allied soldiers in cold blood. It would be full-time work to bring them to justice.

  All too often the focus is on the interrogations’ impact on the prisoners, but the work also affected the interrogators. Living in a virtually closed world, their task could lead to mild psychosis.32 How difficult was life in the London Cage? What were the realities that the interrogators faced on a daily basis? And did they cross the line and break the Geneva Convention?

  In his uncensored memoirs, Colonel Scotland wrote: ‘No physical force was used during our interrogations to obtain information, no cold water treatment, no third degrees, nor any other infringements; for not only is it the firm rule of the British Services that no physical force may be used to induce a prisoner to talk, but I have always considered it to be useless as well as unnecessary.’33 What emerges is a very different story.

  4

  CAGE CHARACTERS

  The ‘guests’

  In the course of the war, over 3,000 German prisoners of war – from the air force, navy and army – crossed the threshold of the London Cage. It became the most valuable centre for those prisoners of war who required special attention. It dealt with German prisoners who had special military information, but who were proving uncooperative during interrogation at the other cages. Interrogation was permitted under the Geneva Convention, but a prisoner was only required to give his name, rank and number. The official files and interrogation reports for the London Cage between 1940 and 1943 have never been released. Nor is there a surviving list of prisoners who were held there. Piecing together the details of exactly who the early prisoners were and what information they gave during interrogation has only been possible thanks to Colonel Scotland’s published memoirs and uncensored manuscript, and a few short summary reports in the files of the War Office and Air Intelligence.1

  Prisoners captured during the first year of the war were ideal material for the new interrogators to practise their skills on – as in the case of 200 German paratroopers captured in May 1940 near Rotterdam. They had parachuted into the Low Countries ahead of invading German forces and had attempted to capture strategic airfields in the Netherlands, aided by an assault on the Dutch port of Rotterdam by General von Sponeck’s forces. The unsuccessful enemy action on Rotterdam left thousands of German troops scattered across the sand dunes and in hiding. Over 1,200 were captured and shipped to England via Dover, with 200 being taken to the London Cage for interrogation. The remaining German troops in the Netherlands escaped capture only because of Hermann Göring’s order for the Luftwaffe to pound Rotterdam. Back in London, Colonel Scotland’s interrogators soon established that their new prisoners had no previous military career, but had been trained up quickly by the Nazi regime. Attempting to establish the fighting ability of the German forces was to be a recurring theme in the early days of the London Cage.

  U-boat crews provided Colonel Scotland and his interrogators with details of their training and naval background. German naval personnel let slip technical details about specific battleships, their armour, armaments, construction and engines: the Bismarck, Tirpitz, Gneisenau and Admiral Graf Spee. The crews discussed the movements, tactics and exploits of their own vessels, as well as of the heavy German battleship Scharnhorst. They revealed vital information in the early days of the Battle of the Atlantic.

  Among the earliest prisoners at the London Cage were survivors of the Bismarck, the German battleship sunk by the British 350 miles west of Brest, France, on 26/27 May 1941. Their interrogation reports from the London Cage have not been released, but their bugged conversations from their time at Trent Park survive in the National Archives, in series WO 208 of War Office files. In his memoirs, Scotland spoke of the survivors of the Bismarck, who described her last voyage in considerable detail, including the damage inflicted on her during her fight with the British warships Hood and Prince of Wales. They told how they had been spotted in the water, and how the British destroyer Maori had moved in to pick them up. In total, 110 survivors were pulled from the waves – from an original crew of 2,200. They were taken first to the London Cage for initial interrogation and were then transferred to Trent Park, where their conversations were secretly bugged. One of the youngest Bismarck survivors arrived at the London Cage suffering from severe shock. He was given only light work by the intelligence staff and was befriended by the interrogators, who took a soft approach. He gradually recovered and the interrogators learned that he was one of 500 young men drafted aboard the Bismarck to give them experience at sea. When the battleship had come under fire from the Royal Navy, they were all locked in the hold. It was a terrifying experience, from which most were unable to escape.

  If a question or ambiguity arose over a prisoner’s nationality or status that required more detailed investigation, he was transferred to the London Cage to establish whether he was a member of the German armed forces, a merchant seaman or a civilian. It was important for a man’s identity to be established because he could be a German spy or a traitor – in which case the London Cage liaised with MI5 or Special Branch. In the early days, the London Cage held anti-Nazis who might be at risk from fellow Nazi prisoners in an ordinary POW camp. This cautionary approach proved sensible: in 1944 at Comrie Camp, die-hard Nazis murdered a fellow prisoner. There were serious consequences (as detailed in chapter 8). The London Cage was also a beneficial location for holding prisoners who had special information and who needed to be interrogated by technical experts. In such cases, expert specialists aided Scotland’s interrogators in securing the right information during interrogation.

  The one that got away

  During the Battle of Britain, rooms at the London Cage were filled with Luftwaffe pilots, nicknamed ‘the weekenders’ by the interrogators. These particular German pilots had realised that their reconnaissance missions over England were becoming increasingly dangerous. Flying at the weekends, they expected to have to bail out, and so they packed an overnight bag with pyjamas, a toothbrush and razor. Their interrogations were easy, because they were ready to talk. One German pilot anticipated that he might be shot down and simply landed his plane in a field near Dover, declaring to the interrogators that his aim was to reach America and Hollywood. From men like him, Scotland’s team gained extensive information about the low morale among the German air force and where various Luftwaffe squadrons were based.

  The most renowned Luftwaffe pilot captured in 1940 was the German flying ace Franz von Werra, whose daring escapades were immortalised in the 1957 British film The One That Got Away. The movie claimed that Werra spent a short time at the London Cage, and was possibly ev
en interrogated there. It is a claim repeated online. But there is no evidence that Werra was ever at the London Cage – indeed, it had not yet opened when Werra was interrogated.

  On 5 September 1940, his plane was shot down over Kent during the Battle of Britain. After being held in barracks in Maidstone for a few days, Werra made his first escape attempt. He was transferred to Trent Park, at Cockfosters, and was interrogated by Captain Denys Felkin, the head of Air Intelligence there. Werra was then allegedly transferred to the London Cage, and from there to Grizedale Hall, a prisoner-of-war camp in Cumbria, known as No. 1 camp. Run by Lieutenant Colonel Morton, it had been used for senior German prisoners of war during the First World War. On 7 October 1940, Werra escaped from Grizedale Hall and was recaptured on 12 October 1940. The London Cage was not requisitioned until 15 October 1940, and its first prisoners arrived on 23 October. This makes it highly unlikely that Werra was ever held at the London Cage.

  After his recapture, Werra was sentenced to three weeks in solitary confinement at Camp No. 13 in Swanwick, Derbyshire. In January 1941, he was transferred, together with other German POWs, to a camp in Canada, from where he escaped and eventually made his way back to Germany. Later that year he saw active service on the Russian front and continued his dangerous missions. He died young, at the age of twenty-seven, on 25 October 1941, after crashing into the sea north of Vlissingen, off the Netherlands.

  Rudolf Hess

  The highest-ranking German prisoner ever held by British intelligence was Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess. He flew solo to England on a peace mission, seeking to offer terms to the Duke of Hamilton, who he thought would offer a sympathetic ear. Late at night on 10 May 1941, Hess parachuted out of his plane when it ran out of fuel, landing south of Glasgow. He initially concealed who he was, and was carrying papers identifying him as Alfred Horn, so it took three days to establish his true identity. Whether Hess was ever taken to the London Cage is a subject of speculation. In his memoirs, Colonel Scotland claimed ‘We interrogated Hess.’ What is unclear is whether Scotland meant ‘we’ as in British intelligence or ‘we’ as in his unit in Kensington Palace Gardens. It is known that Hess was interrogated by a number of officials, and analysed by psychiatrists and psychologists. And he was certainly interrogated by the head of Air Intelligence from Trent Park, Captain Felkin. But it is not known where Felkin saw Hess; it was possibly at the Tower of London, where Hess was held for four days after being transferred by train from Scotland.2 He remained a prisoner of MI6 for the duration of the war and stood trial at Nuremberg in 1945–46.

  ***

  The London Cage also debriefed British prisoners, mainly pilots, who had escaped from German POW camps on the Continent. Of particular interest to Military Intelligence were their successful methods of escape and evasion, and details of any military installations that they might have observed while being escorted as prisoners through enemy territory. These men were relatively small in number, however, compared to the main focus of the work of the London Cage. From 1942, British pilots who escaped from POW camps were debriefed at another MI9 site, Wilton Park, Beaconsfield.

  Fighting capacity

  British interrogators had to learn all German ranks, recognise badges and understand military formations and the structure and division of the German armed forces. Such information could reveal a fair amount about a prisoner, even before he was interrogated. In the early days of the war, knowledge of the training methods of the German army was patchy. Interrogating prisoners of war about their training became a priority, to enable British intelligence to understand the German military morale, ability to fight under certain conditions, fighting qualities and the prisoners’ will to resist.

  From those early prisoners at the London Cage it was discovered that the Luftwaffe pilots had not been trained in Germany in matters of security: some carried papers and documents that were found and confiscated during the search of the prisoner and his registration, and these proved a good starting point for interrogation. The identity cards provided a clue as to the prisoner’s unit, and, in contravention of orders given to them in Germany, one in ten German pilots carried their savings bank book, which showed where they had last deposited their pay; this allowed British interrogators to trace where a pilot’s unit was stationed. German officers were often found to be carrying notebooks containing lists of their men and codes for all kinds of aircraft, as well as notes on difficulties within the unit. This information could be leaked during an interrogation without the prisoner realising where such precise information had come from. It gave the impression that the interrogator was omniscient and British espionage highly efficient, so that the prisoner decided it was not worth withholding answers to questions. It was an effective tool to break down resistance with little effort.

  Colonel Scotland claimed in his unpublished memoirs to have left the London Cage for a short time to accompany the commando raid on the German-occupied Norwegian islands of Vågsøy and Måløy on 27 December 1941. Apparently much to his disappointment, the commandos would not allow him to go ashore, and he had to wait on the boat. He subsequently spoke about the bravery of these special forces:

  [They were] by far the bravest of all invaders of Europe during the war, particularly those with the special role of obtaining information about the Germans’ beach defences. These men were based in the most remote spots of the south coast of England, from which they slipped across in small crafts to France and returned with valuable knowledge. Necessarily, they were unpublicised but they did their lonely, dangerous work with cheerfulness and resolution, bearing their occasional losses with fortitude.3

  Codenamed Operation Archery, the aim of the raid was to destroy key German installations and defences, oil tanks and ammunition stores, and take prisoners for interrogation. The dawn raid took the German commander completely by surprise and succeeded in its objectives, with 154 Germans killed and 98 captured. It came at a heavy cost to the Allied Combined Forces, with the loss of fifty-three officers and other ranks, including thirty-one from the RAF.4 For the British, it yielded some particularly useful German prisoners of war, who were passed over to Scotland for interrogation. The first priority was to question the German commander, an affable man who, Scotland found, could easily be befriended. Scotland described how he nicknamed him ‘Buddie’ because of the commander’s willingness to sit down with him with a cigarette and a beer. Apparently, Buddie had been so surprised by the attack that he had surrendered in his pyjamas. He jovially complained to Scotland that it was quite unfair of the British not to have given him the chance to use his guns against their ships.

  Whether Scotland actually accompanied this raid is open to doubt, as is the interrogation of Buddie on the island of Vågsøy. His intelligence officer Randoll Coate did accompany the commandos during Operation Archery, and it is therefore probable that Scotland used some artistic licence by claiming to have been on the raid himself. The interrogation of Buddie that he described probably took place at the London Cage and not on Vågsøy; it is unlikely that Scotland would have shared a beer with a prisoner on the beach. Clearly, some caution should be exercised when reading Scotland’s memoirs: one should not assume that all he recounts is accurate.

  Buddie may have proved an easy prisoner, but some of his men were tough, sullen Nazis who were unimpressed by their capture. Their interrogations took longer and required a bluff tactic by Scotland, who leaked information provided by their commander. This soon convinced them that their interrogator knew everything there was to know. The interrogations revealed that the unit had indeed been completely unprepared for an attack. Importantly, it provided British intelligence with a comprehensive understanding of the German occupying forces in Norway, in particular their strength and locations. Louis Mountbatten, then adviser of Combined Operations, had recommended that a concentrated effort on Norway would divert German troops away from other parts of Europe. He was proved right: after Operation Archery, Hitler diverted over 30,000 troops away from other
European fronts to secure the Norwegian coastline.

  North Africa

  The defeat of General Rommel and his forces in the Second Battle of El Alamein, North Africa, in November 1942 produced the first large-scale influx of Wehrmacht prisoners of war. The Anglo-American capture of Tunisia several months later brought the number of Axis soldiers who needed to be processed, identified and interrogated to over 230,000. It was a logistical challenge for Allied interrogators. Some prisoners were transferred to camps in Britain, others to Canada or America. Among them were a number of high-ranking German officers, including General Wilhelm von Thoma and General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim. Both would soon be held by MI19 at Trent Park, north London. They came with an important cache of documents: 5 tons of material, which a special unit at the War Office sifted for intelligence. In cooperation with the Americans, who had joined the war after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, a special document section was established.5 Later, after the invasion of Germany, it would prove invaluable when hundreds of thousands of documents were impounded by the Allies.