London Cage
Page 12
To get a prisoner to agree to an injection, a ruse was employed: it was said that the POW unit did not know his blood group, and in the event of casualties during the Blitz, the prisoner might need a blood transfusion. The ruse worked; but instead of having a blood sample taken from him, the prisoner was injected with Evipan. First, a number of experiments on prisoners had to take place to assess the value of this in intelligence terms: would a prisoner really tell the truth under the influence of Evipan and hypnosis? After injection, a patient actually fell asleep for a few minutes and was then in a state of drowsiness for three-quarters of an hour. Godfrey was told that during this forty-five-minute period, ‘the hypnotic condition can be established and maintained’.3
On 12 December 1939, Vice Admiral Godfrey authorised experiments to determine the applicable dose of Evipan. Appropriate prisoners had to be found for the experiment. It was decided to select those who were known to have secret information; the extent to which they divulged those secrets during interrogation under the influence would be a measure of the effectiveness of the ‘truth drug’. Under the guise of requiring a blood sample, a small dose of Evipan was administered, enough to make the prisoner slightly drowsy. After two or three days of unexplained drowsiness, the prisoner would probably ask to see a doctor, at which point ‘it would be reasonable practice for him [the doctor] to give a dose of Evipan’.4 The patient would be none the wiser, would still feel sleepy, and Naval Intelligence could observe the effects over a longer period of time. The particular value of using truth drugs and hypnosis lay in the fact that the intelligence services could use anyone to carry out an interrogation if they spoke fluent German. They had to sign the Official Secrets Act, of course, but they may not have known that the patient was under the influence of drugs and hypnosis.
A doctor who was ‘prepared to adopt the technique and had no professional scruples about carrying it out’ would administer the drugs to prisoners.5 He would be trained in administering Evipan and in subsequent hypnotic treatment. But the military raised questions about the use of truth drugs, focusing on whether it was morally acceptable, whether it would infringe the Geneva Convention, and on the repercussions if the patient became aware of the process. A key issue was whether any information that could possibly be extracted justified such a drastic method. The disagreement among military advisers was not actually on moral grounds, but was concerned with the potential of scandal. The head of Section XIV of Naval Intelligence Division (whose signature is illegible) said: ‘If I were in the Cabinet I would not agree to such a method, as, if by bad luck it leaked out, there would be such widespread popular agitation about it that it would become a first-class political scandal.’6 The advisory doctors agreed unanimously that ‘evil effects might take place in perhaps one in 100,000 cases’.7 This led Godfrey to conclude:
The method is justified provided the doctors are satisfied that the technique is one that can easily be carried out, and which will have no permanent effect on the patient’s health; the information which it is desired to elicit is of vital importance, and the preliminary experiments show that the patient is likely to respond favourably to the interrogation. If these two conditions are fulfilled, the objections on moral and legalistic grounds should not be accepted.8
Experimental use of insulin and the hallucinogen LSD on German prisoners of war was known to have been carried out in the Far East.9 The Americans also used drugs on German prisoners. One American agent encouraged an MI5 officer to use Benzedrine sulphate (a truth drug), which was known to induce sleepiness and was used as an alternative to Evipan. An official report by a principal medical officer in 1950 concluded: ‘Truth drugs were discontinued in the army after a very short period in the recent war as found to be unreliable.’10 With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to add that truth drugs nevertheless continued to be the focus of research and use by the British, American and Russian intelligence services.11
Use of drugs by the military
The use of drugs was not confined to Naval Intelligence or the British Secret Service. Their possible use by the military and by air force pilots remained high on the agenda of the War Cabinet and other intelligence chiefs in 1940.12 At the end of July 1940, Winston Churchill asked the Ministry of Defence for a report on their use by the military. Attention turned to the drug Benzedrine, which reduced the desire for sleep and any feeling of tiredness, a possible asset for troops in combat. Benzedrine sulphate was first used in 1935 to treat narcolepsy; it was later utilised for conditions such as post-encephalitic Parkinsonism. A dose of 5 milligrams could ward off drowsiness or sleep for four or five hours. The Royal Air Force was cautioned against using the drug on fighter pilots, but it could prove ideal for special commando and naval operations which put great strain on the body and necessitated greater short-term endurance than usual.13
The Medical Research Council examined the medical findings of research into Benzedrine, Pervitin and Leonidine, drawing on medical papers published in Germany in the 1920s, and advised the War Cabinet and the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee that different people might require a higher dose to achieve the desired mental alertness; there were no after-effects or withdrawal symptoms of abnormal exhaustion or depression, although repeated use of such drugs reduced their effectiveness. The council recommended their use by the army in emergency circumstances only, and with certain precautions. Any such drug ‘should only be given under the supervision of a Medical Officer. Where individual judgement is required in the course of a person’s duties, it should only be taken if their reactions to the drug have been previously tested.’14 It concluded that more research was needed to determine whether the effects of these drugs differed in different temperatures (i.e. tropical or temperate climates), and what the optimum dose was. Further controlled trials on personnel were required to observe the effects and after-effects.
In a report dated 27 September 1940, the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee issued a memo for the meeting of the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff Committee that advised:
There was a net gain from using Benzedrine drugs to stimulate mental alertness and resistance to fatigue. The Flying Personnel Research Committee was already carrying out experiments on this type of drug for stimulating air crews. The Army Medical Service was also carrying out its own research trials.15
The report was signed by Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Services Liaison Department of the Foreign Office; Vice Admiral John Godfrey, head of Naval Intelligence; Major-General Frederick Beaumont-Nesbitt, director of Military Intelligence; and Air Commodore A.R. Boyle of Royal Air Force Intelligence. The consensus was that, provided the drugs were administered under the strictest medical supervision, they ‘might have considerable military value’.
At a further meeting on 2 December 1940, General Sir William MacArthur, director general of Army Medical Services, outlined trials and research into the effectiveness of Benzedrine: ‘The results of the test so far carried out were inconclusive and further tests are necessary before a definite recommendation on the use of the drug can be made. Any further experimental work should be of a practical kind, using opportunities created by incidents of war.’16 The report was marked in bold red lettering: ‘To be kept under lock and key.’ General MacArthur advised the committee that ‘I should be totally opposed to wholesale drugging of the troops, and I feel the idea of putting men under the influence of a drug to do their duty repellent.’17
Around this time, the adoption of a variety of drugs for military use was becoming commonplace. The SOE gave its agents a cyanide pill to use in the event of capture, the resulting swift death ensuring that they gave nothing away during intense interrogation and torture. From 1942, SOE’s special section at the military experimental establishment at Porton Down in Wiltshire worked on Operation Saccharine – research to procure drugs for use by agents.18 In the declassified files relating to this operation, a number of tablets are listed as being suitable for a variety
of purposes:
•A tablets – to aid travel sickness;
•B tablets – Benzedrine, to provide extra energy;
•Mecodrin – an amphetamine, for energy in an emergency;
•E capsules – fast-acting anaesthetic;
•K tablets – could knock out foreign agents, if slipped into their drinks;
•L tablets – suicide pills.
That same year, SOE dispatched truth drugs for use in the field. A memo of 10 April 1942, marked ‘SECRET’, enclosed ‘doctored’ aspirin tablets, together with the same number of plain aspirin. The effectiveness of the doctored tablets had been confirmed by experiments on animals. Known as ‘A tablets’, they looked just like innocent aspirin. A tablet would take effect thirty to forty-five minutes later and would cause death within three to four hours.
SOE also favoured the use of insulin, which, if injected in certain quantities, could cause collapse and unconsciousness within an hour. A single injection rarely had any serious effects, but if followed with a second, ‘success would be ensured’.19
The military and intelligence services were careful to disguise their use of these particular drugs. In a file marked ‘Narcotic Drugs’ (i.e. drugs which have a sedative effect), a memo was at pains to emphasise that if they were mentioned in any telegram, the drugs should be described as ‘being supplied to our agents for medicinal purposes’; ‘telegrams dealing with this subject need to be very carefully worded’, it advised.20 Contained in one dispatch to SOE in the Far East in April 1942 was a small phial marked ‘7 tablets A, plus six boxes of insulin, totalling 400 units’.
‘K tablets’ induced sleep that could last for several hours. They took effect thirty to sixty minutes after swallowing. Small test tubes were provided to dissolve the tablets in water, because they could not be introduced in small quantities into drinks or food to produce instant effects – ‘Such things can only be done in spy and detective fiction,’ wrote one unnamed SOE officer. Guidelines were issued in a booklet entitled Instructions for the Use of Tablets K.21 One tablet was a sufficient dose for a person of slightly less than average bodyweight. Two could be used to produce quicker results, but a dose of three tablets was verging on the dangerous. It was underlined that these tablets were poisonous and any attempt to exceed the recommended dose could have fatal consequences.
Issuing tablets to agents in action behind enemy lines was one thing, but administering experimental mind-transforming truth drugs on unsuspecting prisoners without their consent was quite another, and crossed the boundaries of the Geneva Convention.
The Nazis and truth drugs
The German army and air force were known to be using Benzedrine to increase mental alertness and resistance to fatigue, followed by sedatives like Sedormid to combat the Benzedrine-induced wakefulness. Also in the Second World War, Pervitin was known as the German army’s ‘wonder drug’, as it enhanced performance and gave soldiers incredible stamina and endurance (for example, marching for 90 kilometres without a rest).
The Nazis were known to have been developing clandestine drugs and brainwashing substances as early as the 1930s. During the war, a number of truth drug experiments were carried out in Ukraine and at Dachau and Auschwitz concentration camps. The drugs were being developed because German interrogators had been unable to break Allied prisoners during interrogation. Definitive proof that the regime was testing the truth drug mescaline came from a decoded message deciphered at Bletchley Park on 24 July 1942. The cipher was marked ‘Most Secret’ and read:
Experiments to date of injecting parachutists with scopolamine were successful. Therefore, experiments with mescaline are to be undertaken, since these injections produce and enhance effect through intoxication. The above is a request from SS Fuhrer in Ukraine for mind-altering drugs from SS medical headquarters (Berlin).22
The mind-altering properties of scopolamine were first discovered in America in 1916 by obstetrician Dr Robert E. House, again in relation to pregnant women. The findings were widely available and were drawn upon by the Nazis. Mescaline, a hallucinogen made from the Peyote cactus, was supposed to induce talkativeness (though ultimately it was found to be unreliable). Experiments continued in Block 5 at Dachau, aimed at ‘eliminating the will of the person examined’.23 The project was supervised by Wolfram Sievers, director of the Institute for Military Scientific Research and a member of Heinrich Himmler’s personal staff. Sievers was to stand trial at Nuremberg for his crimes, and would be hanged on 2 June 1948, in Landsberg prison, Bavaria.
Horrific medical experimentation at Auschwitz is well documented. It was carried out there under the authority of the SS doctor Bruno Weber, a German physician and bacteriologist. He experimented with barbiturates and morphine for the purposes of mind control, as well as with psychotropic drugs during interrogation. He managed to avoid prosecution as a war criminal and died a free man.
The Nazis were not alone in these types of experiments. In the 1930s, the Soviets had built a covert laboratory in Moscow, where doctors and scientists ‘developed new poisons to eliminate enemies of the state’.24 Its location and function were so secret that even senior KGB officers were not privy to its whereabouts. Soviet botanists began ‘cross-breeding hallucinogenic and poisonous plant species to create hybrids, producing new drugs with effects on the human body and mind as yet unknown’.25
Use of drugs by American intelligence
On 31 October 1942, US intelligence was alerted by the US National Research Council to the Germans and Russians experimenting with truth drugs. A committee was formed to verify the facts and check the effectiveness of truth drugs in interrogation. It came under the auspices of the OSS, and was headed by the main scientist there, Stanley P. Lovell. A chemist from Boston, Lovell invented an entire arsenal for his boss and head of OSS, William ‘Bill’ Donovan, that could have come straight from the lab of James Bond’s ‘Q’. Items included detonating household objects, exploding cookie dough and silenced pistols for assassinations. He even produced cocktails of lethal chemicals to use on the Führer, but any imagined assassination attempt on Hitler failed.
In May 1943, American intelligence was carrying out research into scopolamine, considered one of the most deadly drugs from the Colombian borrachero tree. The OSS decided to test this ‘truth drug’ on a group of people who knew the most classified secrets of all – the scientists on the Manhattan Project. The results were limited, because it made most of the scientists violently sick.
Working alongside Lovell were Harry Anslinger (head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics), Winfred Overholser (director of St Elizabeth’s Hospital, Washington, DC), and CIA operative George Hunter White. Experiments showed that mescaline and scopolamine were not suitable truth drugs. The side effects of hallucinations, blurred vision and headaches were found to be a distraction during interrogation. They knew this because they first subjected their own team to experimentation, including with different types of marijuana. George Hunter White was one of the first to try out new drugs, on one occasion, when testing the effects of smoking marijuana, knocking himself unconscious. Subsequently, the OSS carried out tests on unwitting members of the public by inserting marijuana into cigarettes and resealing the packets. White once commented: ‘the [marijuana] cigarette experiments indicated that we had a mechanism which offered promise in the relaxing of prisoners’.26 Already in 1946, the OSS had concluded that nothing was more effective on a prisoner than alcohol.
White had attended Camp X, the top-secret spy school in Canada, and had met Ian Fleming, an officer from British Naval Intelligence. He also accompanied Bill Donovan during interrogations of German prisoners of war. White was an interesting character, later becoming the CIA’s main federal narcotics agent, involved in the 1950s and 1960s in the highly classified Project MKUltra. Warfare and espionage had entered the shady, dangerous and unpredictable world of mind control.
Experimental psychology and mind control
In addition to truth drugs, MI6 was alrea
dy testing out new experimental psychological methods on its prisoners. As commanding officer at the London Cage, Colonel Scotland liaised with a number of psychiatrists and psychologists, some of whose work was controversial and unorthodox. Among the list of items impounded by Special Branch during the second raid on Scotland’s flat in 1955 was a letter dated 5 December 1944 and addressed to Scotland from William Brown, director of Oxford University’s Institute of Experimental Psychology.27 (All attempts to trace the letter or any archives of William Brown have failed.) Brown founded the institute in 1936 on the academic foundations of experimental psychology, which had begun in a clandestine laboratory in Oxford in the nineteenth century with the controversial psychologist William McDougall. Brown had been McDougall’s first student. A parallel department existed at Cambridge University, where Kenneth Craik devised a number of instruments and pioneered research into the sensory system. Much of his work had practical military application and was taken up by the military in the Second World War.
Colonel Scotland’s correspondence with Brown raises questions about what Scotland hoped to gain from the connection. It points to his attempt to use experimental, even unorthodox, psychological methods on his prisoners. But further than that, the trail goes cold, and it is not known if the two men ever met. However, it would not be the first or only time that MI6 looked to psychologists and psychiatrists for help with prisoners. The eminent (but controversial) British psychiatrist William Sargant (1907–88), along with psychiatrists Lieutenant Colonel Henry Victor Dicks and Brigadier John Rawlings Rees, carried out work for MI5, MI6 and various other branches of Military Intelligence, including MI9 and Colonel Scotland’s unit at the London Cage under the auspices of MI19.28