London Cage

by Helen Fry

  The second glider crashed near Egersund. Fourteen surviving prisoners were picked up by German patrols under the command of Colonel Probst. All were shot by members of the German 355 Infantry Regiment.15 Both Probst and Behrens would face interrogation at the London Cage after the war. Behrens was absolved by a British military court in Hamburg of any part in the deaths of the fourteen commandos of Operation Freshman, and remained a prisoner at Camp 11 at Bridgend in South Wales until his repatriation to Germany in 1947.

  Falkenhorst in the cage

  Colonel Scotland wanted to understand why Falkenhorst had added the clause to the Commando Order. He waited three days for him to cooperate with a statement, which Falkenhorst duly completed. In it, the German outlined why he had been chosen by Hitler as commander in Norway and how he had had no authority over another key known war criminal, Josef Terboven, the senior political commissar for occupied Norwegian territories and head of the secret police there. Terboven had feared capture by the Norwegians for his part in atrocities and had committed suicide. Although Terboven had no command over German military forces in Norway (because they came under Falkenhorst), that did not mean he had not been ruthless: he had planned the concentration camps in Norway and had his own personal force of around 6,000 men, including 800 secret police. Terboven was known to have been responsible for the murder of at least five British prisoners of war in captivity in Norway.

  Colonel Scotland sought to understand why Falkenhorst had allowed certain events to unfold in Norway without making any attempt to forestall them.16 Why, for example, had he allowed Terboven to send British prisoners of war to their deaths in Norway or in concentration camps in Germany? As the most senior commander of forces in Norway, it was his duty to ensure that all captured prisoners were held under military law and treated according to the Geneva Convention. During a number of interrogations, Scotland made the consequences of Falkenhorst’s actions very plain. He explained to Falkenhorst that he would certainly be charged with the deaths of the commandos in the Glomfjord raid.

  According to Scotland, Falkenhorst had a ready supply of answers, claiming that in allowing the prisoners to be taken to Germany, he was not actually responsible for their deaths: he was only obeying Hitler’s Commando Order. Scotland was one step ahead and retorted that in distributing the Commando Order throughout Norway, Falkenhorst had not kept it secret, but had made it a public document; and that by adding the clause, he was implicated in the deaths of the men of Operation Freshman. Scotland laid out the plain facts – that the men had been in uniform and only carrying weapons with which to defend themselves. He put it to Falkenhorst that these men fell within the boundaries of the Geneva Convention as prisoners of war, and as such, Falkenhorst should have arranged their transfer to a prisoner-of-war camp, not a concentration camp.17

  Falkenhorst defended himself by saying he had no organised POW camps in Norway at that time. The only camps were under the control of Terboven, and he would not allow the men to be taken to Terboven’s camps. Scotland did not accept this feeble explanation and countered that Terboven had prisoners in the Akershus. Falkenhorst replied that he had nowhere else to put prisoners of war.

  Scotland’s patience wore thin as he outlined Falkenhorst’s crimes:

  Crime Number one – You as the commander of all the troops in Norway were bound by the Geneva Convention to provide accommodation for any prisoners of war but you failed to do so. When Hitler’s Order reached you in October, you decided to have these men removed from the Akershus to Germany. They were removed in irons – another offence against the Geneva Convention.18

  Falkenhorst seems to have been no match for this experienced interrogator. Scotland mentions in his memoirs how the German’s hands began to tremble and he became very uncomfortable. He continued his denials and became so agitated that Scotland ordered the guards to take him back to his cell.19

  Allowing a short time for Falkenhorst to recover his composure, Scotland recalled him for another round of interrogation. Again, the central focus was on holding Falkenhorst to account for the deaths of the British men who should have been treated as prisoners of war. There was no relaxation in the intensity of the interrogation, as Scotland challenged Falkenhorst that he must have known the British men were going to a concentration camp.

  He confronted him with military procedure:

  I suggest that you received a receipt from Terboven for them [the prisoners], and that they were guarded on the journey to Germany by security force men who had the right of entry into a concentration camp in Germany. You can’t take prisoners from one camp to another without getting a receipt for them, and your own troops would never have entered a concentration camp.20

  Falkenhorst flatly denied being given any receipt for the British prisoners or having knowledge of a military escort. He denied all knowledge of any injured commandos. Scotland related how he kept ahead of the game, for he knew that the prisoners had been handled by Terboven, and that Terboven and Falkenhorst were in close contact. He ventured that Terboven had gloated over the captured commandos and had spoken to Falkenhorst about their capture and death.21 Scotland insisted on knowing the truth. At this point, Falkenhorst explained that he had contacted Wilhelm Keitel and Keitel had simply replied: ‘You have the orders.’22 (Wilhelm Keitel was the officer in command of the whole Wehrmacht, based in Berlin and found guilty of war crimes at the Nuremberg trials. He would be hanged in Nuremberg prison on 16 October 1946.)

  Scotland challenged Falkenhorst that Colonel Probst had admitted to him during interrogation that Falkenhorst had given the orders to shoot the men. Concluding the interrogation, Scotland stated that the brutal deaths of the men from Operation Freshman were the responsibility of Falkenhorst, and reiterated that he would hang for the crimes. Falkenhorst was sent back to his cell.

  The interrogations paid off, because finally, in a statement signed in the cage on 5 July 1946, Falkenhorst admitted distributing the Commando Order to the commanders of the army, navy and air force in Norway, and adding the sentence that prisoners were not to survive for longer than twenty-four hours. He told Scotland: ‘I cannot remember the last wording of this extract but I put in the last sentence.’23 It was one of several signed statements that Falkenhorst made at the London Cage between 21 June 1946 and 6 July 1946, all witnessed by Colonel Scotland.

  The case of diver Bob Evans

  Nikolaus von Falkenhorst knew about another war crime that had taken place in Norway in autumn 1942. Between Operation Musketoon and Operation Freshman, the Royal Navy Special Service Unit landed a group of men in Norway on 28 October 1942. Their aim was to sink the prized German battleship Tirpitz, the heaviest battleship then built in Europe, which had been deployed in Norway to disrupt Allied convoys bound for the Soviet Union. Practice for the mission had been thorough enough and involved employing special ‘two-man torpedoes’. The team had learned how to cut its way through submarine nets and attach explosives to the hull of a ship. Having failed in their mission, they were within 100 metres of the border over into neutral Sweden when they were stopped by a German officer. One of the team, Bill Tebb, fired his revolver at the German, but missed. The Germans opened fire with their Luger pistols. Tebb succeeded in killing them, but his colleague, Bob Evans, was badly wounded in the stomach. Thinking him dead, the British men pressed on and escaped over the border. The gunfire had aroused other German guards who transferred the wounded Evans to hospital. Once he had recovered, he was taken to Gestapo headquarters for interrogation. There he suffered brutal treatment and was ‘exhibited’ for all to see: local Norwegians and Germans were encouraged to come in and see the frogman with his diving gear laid out on a table. After the Gestapo had had enough of ‘the show’, they transferred Evans to Grini, where he was murdered alongside five of the commandos captured after the failed raid on Vemork.

  Colonel Scotland knew that Falkenhorst had visited Evans at Gestapo headquarters in Oslo.24 Facing Scotland in the London Cage, Falkenhorst was interrog
ated over his failure to treat Evans as a prisoner of war. In his defence, Falkenhorst argued that the Commando Order forbade him from treating Evans as a prisoner. Scotland challenged him on which section of the Commando Order made that stipulation. Falkenhorst could provide no answer as he floundered and admitted that it had been useless to intervene once Terboven had a prisoner. Under the terms of Hitler’s Commando Order, Terboven could do whatever he liked. Scotland pointed out that Falkenhorst could have sent some of his own men to Grini or Gestapo headquarters to release Evans, but chose not to. Scotland told him:

  You are a despicable swine. You talked to Evans for fifteen minutes at the Gestapo headquarters, knowing that he was going to be murdered shortly by your friend Terboven. You made no attempt to rescue him. You enjoyed the situation.25

  Falkenhorst said he had felt sorry for Evans. But Scotland dismissed his attempts at remorse and told him that he was ‘a regular swine of a man’.26

  Falkenhorst was sent back to his room to write down his statement on all the charges against him. He signed a number of consecutive statements between 21 June 1946 and 6 July 1946 that outlined his command of Norway.27 As he awaited trial, he was transferred to Camp 11 at Bridgend in Wales, where he was ostracised by the other German officers. He became so depressed that after a fortnight, in the middle of July 1946, he was moved back to the London Cage, and from there was transferred to Brunswick for the war crimes trials. These were also attended by Scotland, who verified that the statements had been signed by Falkenhorst.

  Nikolaus von Falkenhorst was found guilty of ordering troops under his command to execute the Commando Order. The court sentenced him to death, but this was later commuted to life imprisonment. In 1953, Falkenhorst was released from Werl prison on health grounds; he died in 1968.

  14

  BEFRIENDING THE FIELD MARSHAL

  Of all the revelations emerging from the London Cage, possibly one of the most extraordinary was the unexpected friendship that developed between Colonel Scotland and Field Marshal Albert Kesselring.

  It was September 1946 when the military authorities sent news that Kesselring was due to arrive at the London Cage from Nuremberg, where he had been appearing as a witness in the trial of the top Nazi leadership. After nine months, the court proceedings were over and the world had been presented with evidence of the worst atrocities in human history. The verdict on the twenty-one defendants deemed responsible for the most heinous war crimes had yet to be pronounced (for that, the world would have to wait until 1 October). No decision had yet been made whether Kesselring himself would face charges of war crimes alongside General Eberhard von Mackensen. Kesselring and Mackensen had both commanded forces in Italy and would spend time in the London Cage answering questions about the killing of more than 300 Italians and partisans in caves outside Rome in March 1944, in an incident known as the Ardeatine caves massacre.

  Kesselring had commanded the Luftwaffe forces during Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of Russia in June 1941. Then he had served as ‘commander-in-chief south’ in the Mediterranean operations, including the siege of Malta, the North African campaign (1941–43) and the Italian campaign (1943–45). It was his military service in Italy – and his possible part in war crimes – that was the reason for his transfer to the London Cage in autumn 1946.

  Kesselring was one of the most popular German generals, remembered today by the only surviving veteran of the London Cage as ‘always smiling and cheerful’. Even before Kesselring’s arrival, Scotland had decided that he would be treated differently from other prisoners. He called Sergeant Prion to his office and instructed him to prepare a room in comfortable quarters at 6 Kensington Palace Gardens. Kesselring was not going to be treated as a prisoner facing a criminal charge, but would be accorded the privilege of walking in the gardens, free from the normal supervision of the guards. He was not to be subjected to regular observation, sleep deprivation, bright lights, minimal food rations or solitary confinement – although he did have his own room.

  When Kesselring was brought to the cage, Scotland was waiting at the threshold to welcome him. There would be no unmarked vans for this escort, or arriving quietly at night. Scotland looked Kesselring straight in the eye and said ‘Guten Tag, Herr Feldmarschall’ (‘Good day, Field Marshal’).1

  Writing later about the moment he first met Kesselring, Scotland recalled ‘a tall, well-built man with a strong face, a keen and direct look and an air of authority.’2 Kesselring made a good impression on Scotland and the other staff at the cage. In the luggage that accompanied him from Nuremberg prison were several heavy coats and smart mackintosh raincoats that were now being searched by the guards. Scotland asked Sergeant Prion to take a table up to Kesselring’s room, so that he could put his extra coats on it. Kesselring remarked: ‘It would be better if some hooks were nailed in the door. Then I could hang them up.’ It was against cage rules for prisoners to have any sharp items in their room. Scotland glanced at Prion, then back to Kesselring, and said: ‘We can’t allow nails and hooks in a prisoner’s room.’3

  Kesselring laughed in his own inimitable way and replied: ‘I assure you, I have no other use for them!’

  Scotland then accompanied Kesselring to his special quarters on the second floor of No. 6, in a room overlooking the Bayswater Road. He appeared very grateful to be on his own after the stress and hectic atmosphere of the Nuremberg prison. Having his own quarters helped him to remain relaxed and helpful to the cage’s employees.

  By the time Kesselring arrived at the London Cage, many of his staff from Italy had already been interrogated (see page 187). Scotland and the interrogators had formed the opinion that Kesselring was innocent of the Ardeatine caves massacre. They assumed that the Allies would not charge him as a war criminal and that he would soon be a free man. It therefore came as a shock when Scotland received notification from the Judge Advocate General’s Office that Kesselring would stand trial, and it was Scotland’s job to inform him. For the first time in his long history of dealing with German prisoners of war, Scotland felt embarrassed and depressed as he sat opposite Kesselring in his quarters and delivered the news.

  Kesselring stood up, his fists clenched as he raised his voice in anger:

  If the British government expects me to submit to this charge as a guilty criminal they are making a mistake. I shall not defend myself as a man on a criminal charge, but as a Field Marshal of the German army. I shall defend my honour in that rank and nothing else.4

  Scotland rose to his feet, level with Kesselring, and told him firmly:

  I do not believe you are guilty of any crime in Italy. But if you take that attitude before a British Military Court you will be found guilty, and you will be sentenced. Sit down and write your final statement, as you will prepare it for a proper legal defence on a legal charge. You have to answer any charge made against you, but that answer is not as a Field Marshal. I am convinced that the limitation of your authority is your answer. But if you maintain that you were the Supreme Authority in Italy, then you will be condemned.5

  Kesselring was a principled man with his own views on military responsibility. He refused to listen to Colonel Scotland and maintained that he would defend his honour as a field marshal and as supreme officer in Italy overseeing various German units. He stated his intention to shield Mackensen, too, of war crimes. His response not only frustrated Scotland, it strengthened his resolve to help prove him innocent. Kesselring was asked to write down his version of events and what he knew of atrocities in Italy. Scotland spent time with him most days, discussing military matters and going over his statement. He admitted in his memoirs: ‘I used to spend two hours a day going over with him the ground for his statement and, as he produced his material, amending it with him to show what had been his personal duties and responsibilities in Italy at the time of the crimes.’6

  Kesselring wrote his statement in German; the flowery language that was so typical of him was difficult for the translators to render into rea
dable English. Scotland was comfortable enough to advise him that, as a soldier, he should practise using short words and learn to be more precise. The two men enjoyed each other’s company as military men and had an extraordinary mutual respect that did not occur between Scotland and any other prisoner.

  The Ardeatine caves massacre

  The war crimes investigations at the London Cage – including the massacre at Le Paradis, the Wormhoudt massacre and the Emsland case, to name but a few – already amounted to a heavy workload. Added to those now was the Ardeatine caves massacre.7 Although Rome was spared the bombing during the war, the Italians hated the occupying forces and blamed Germany for the loss of its men and territory in North Africa in 1942. The resentment led to reprisals against German troops and attacks on the streets of Rome by groups of partisans. These acts of sabotage and murder incensed the German occupying forces. Across the different headquarters in Italy, Fascist leader Benito Mussolini, German Infantry General Rudolf Toussaint, SS General Karl Wolff and Field Marshal Kesselring were united in agreement that the partisan killing of German troops must cease. During 1944, leaflets and posters warned the population that for every German murdered on the streets of Italy, ten Italians would be killed within twenty-four hours. These reprisals would be carried out by the security police under Herbert Kappler. The authority behind the retaliation order was Luftwaffe General Kurt Mälzer, who had been appointed commander of the city of Rome in 1943. Although Kesselring had subscribed to the order, he had no authority in Rome.