No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah
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The responsibility for making critical decisions concerning Fallujah bounced back and forth between the military and the civilians. After the mutilation of the four contractors in Fallujah in April 2004, the White House and high officials reacted emotionally by ordering a full attack on the city. Gen Abizaid was key in making that decision, with Bremer in support. When Iraqi officials reacted with equal emotion against it, Bremer recommended to the White House a cease-fire rather than risk the resignation of Iraqi officials. The Marine option was to finish the battle rather than risk turning Fallujah into an enemy sanctuary. Abizaid concurred with Bremer, not with the Marines. With both field commanders (Bremer and Abizaid) in agreement, the Marine option was closed out and was not presented to President Bush.
As the unilateral cease-fire dragged on, the stream of advice flowing into the White House from multiple sources—Abizaid, Bremer, Sanchez, Blackwill, Blair, and others—resulted in countermands and caused confusion down the ranks. In late April, with Abizaid and Bremer unwilling to seize the city, the Marines turned it over to the Fallujah Brigade. That political decision should have involved the civilian diplomats, but the military chain of command excluded them.
In war, authority and responsibility should reside in the same organization. Iraq required one unified civilian-military staff reporting to a single commander who would be held responsible for all key decisions.
Our military lacked clarity of mission. Some American divisions were pursuing offensive operations, while others were trying to invigorate municipal services and select Iraqi leaders. In July 2003 CentCom announced it was fighting an insurgency. Yet a year was wasted during which American forces could have trained and selected Iraqi military leaders. The dissolution of the Iraqi Army and the failure to develop quickly a replacement security force were the principal shortfalls attendant to the liberation of Iraq.
For these lapses, the generals were as responsible as the civilians. The CPA had the authority to develop the security force—and CentCom had firmly supported the creation of the CPA. When Bremer dissolved the Iraqi military, the Central Command did not object. While having the authority to create a new army, the hastily assembled CPA staff lacked the expertise to do so. The CPA, though, did have diplomats whose negotiating skills were essential to developing a new Iraqi government. The separate military and civilian staffs needed to be pulled together.
The high command, both civilian and military, interfered too much in Fallujah and knew too little. Twice Abizaid overruled his own field commanders, by first ordering them to attack and then ordering them to stop a week later. The televideo was used too often as a substitute for written staff work, while those with critical information, like the division commander Mattis, were not included in those conferences—despite the new technologies. The solipsism that too frequently infects high commands has no place on a battlefield.
Left alone, Conway and Mattis would have continued the attack in April. Had they attacked fully, the outcome in Fallujah would have resembled that in Ramadi: Americans in control of the highways and insurgents in control of the marketplaces, with Toolan and Suleiman working together. Such an outcome, while inconclusive, would have been preferable to Zarqawi developing a bomb factory and exporting mass murderers, thus provoking a second assault in November with increased casualties for all parties.
Whether Fallujah could have been coaxed down a path that avoided a tough fight, either in April or in November, is problematical. In the summer of 2003 the 3rd Infantry Division emphasized economic growth and political inclusion. The money that was available for such goals, however, was a pittance. In the fall of 2003 and the winter of 2004, the 82nd Airborne Division was more prone than the 3rd ID had been to mount military operations. As firefights increased, antagonism spread among the city’s youth, adding to the number of insurgents. American foot patrols became more dangerous, while the volume of fire from Bradleys and Humvees created more resentment and more recruits.
Both approaches—infusing money and staging raids—were entirely American. Indigenous leaders were missing. In Fallujah the Americans were on their own.
An insurgency cannot be won by an occupying force alone. Unlike the Germans of 1945, many Sunni leaders in 2004 had not surrendered psychologically. Janabi, Ghazi, Suleiman, and others all sat at the table with the Americans. Some of them were actually the enemy. But as foreigners, the Americans could not determine which sheikhs and imams believed in the new Iraq and had the power to lead, and which did not. Sorting out who was committed to the new Iraq was the duty of the Iraqi officials who stayed in Baghdad. They ignored Fallujah until the April 2004 battle began; then they rushed to save insurgents like Janabi, who were implacably determined to destroy the new Iraq.
The American high command imprudently commenced the April assault against Fallujah without consulting with Iraqi officials or international allies. The Iraqi officials responded by publicly denouncing the United States—a self-defeating indulgence that encouraged the insurgents. These feckless officials were stampeded by Al Jazeera, whose swift employment of digital images opened a new chapter in the book on information warfare and propaganda. Al Jazeera’s repeated assertion of horrendous civilian casualties, buttressed by selected pictures, evoked sympathy and anger in Iraq and worldwide. British generals complained to Prime Minister Blair about American “heavy-handed tactics,” and President Bush was concerned about what seemed to be a startling number of casualties.
Every battle now has a global audience. The April 2004 siege of Fallujah was lost on the playing fields of digital technology. As LtGen Conway put it, “Al Jazeera kicked our butts.”
The sympathy of the Arab press toward the insurgents, no matter how murderous, reflected the widespread resentment in the Islamic world of America and the West. Equally disturbing were the incitements by the Sunni clerics, who in April whipped up an emotional jihad that sent many youths to their deaths with no political objective. The clerics gained power by urging the easily led to rush into the streets, shoot, and die.
Through the Sunni clerics, the insurgents hijacked Islam, wrapping themselves in the religious banner of attacking the infidel occupier. As long as American soldiers, who believed they were the liberators, had to search houses and seize heads of households, resentment against them as occupiers grew. The sooner the Iraqi forces stood on their own, the better for all concerned. But Iraqi officials maintained a hands-off policy toward the Sunni clerics, even those who preached sedition.
The Fallujah Brigade, formed in May 2004, was an effort to coax the foot soldiers of the insurgency away from the hard-core leaders. The hope was that by restoring authority of former Baathists and generals, the residents of Fallujah would see that they had a stake in the new Iraq. The effort failed because in the year since the fall of Saddam a new set of insurgent leaders had come to taste power. None were willing to obey the old generals anymore.
The insurgents considered the Marine withdrawal from Fallujah to be proof of their victory. The American-nuanced strategies of offering money for development and mounting raids to nab insurgent leaders were based on a misdiagnosis of the metastasizing rebellion. Suleiman was the last, best hope for Fallujah, and the insurgents tortured him to death. The only way to remove Zarqawi, Hadid, and Janabi from Fallujah would be to use the gun.
In twenty-first-century conflicts the infantry still has the most dangerous job. Marines in Fallujah attacked room by room, as they had done in Hue City, Vietnam, thirty-six years earlier. But the Pentagon had not equipped the infantry to the extent that their missions demanded. The U.S. military has more combat aircraft and pilots than infantry squads. The infantry squad deserves to be funded as a weapon system every bit as precious as an aircraft and its pilots.
Making war is the act of killing until the opposition accepts terms of surrender rather than suffer more destruction. The ferocity of the November assault on Fallujah shook the leaders in other Sunni cities. Fearing their own city would be next, the elders in Ramadi
promised that they would at long last assert control. Their resolve, however, quickly dissipated, and by the spring of 2005 they were once again standing on the sidelines while the Americans did the fighting.
Two years after the fall of Baghdad, Gen Abizaid said that “building the Iraqi security forces is a phenomenal success.” Yet American soldiers were still fighting on the front lines.
The most effective weapon wielded by the insurgents was intimidation. The families of every policeman and soldier were potential hostages. The Sunni cities provided the haven for the insurgents because by and large the Sunnis resented and feared Shiite majority control. The insurgents, though, lacked a political vision to sustain popular support. Eventually they will be ground down by the Baghdad government’s huge advantage in resources and by the promise of a progressive future.
The Western press covered incidents of misconduct more fully than the multiple instances of bravery such as that of Sgt Norwood. The stupid, criminal acts at Abu Ghraib prison cast a shadow over the decency of hundreds of thousands of other soldiers. The shooting of a wounded insurgent inside a mosque in November emerged as the most televised event in the battle for Fallujah because, like the Abu Ghraib story, it smacked of misconduct. Yet the Western press paid scant attention to the subsequent investigation that cleared the Marine or to the courage of a Jesse Grapes or a Timothy Connors.
The Western press strived for neutrality, torn between disapproval of the invasion of Iraq and recognition that a democratic Iraq bolstered the security of the West. In World War II the Western press—believing in its cause—had extolled the Greatest Generation of Americans. The warriors who fought in Iraq would not be called the Greatest Generation, because America was divided about the cause for which they were dying. The focus of the press was upon their individual deaths as tragedies.
This was an incomplete portrayal. The fierce fighting at Fallujah attested to the stalwart nature of the American soldier. In The Iliad a warrior in the front ranks turned to his companion and said, “Let us win glory for ourselves, or yield it to others.” For Greek warriors, there was no true glory if they were not remembered afterward in poem or in song. There will be no true glory for our soldiers in Iraq until they are recognized not as victims, but as aggressive warriors. Stories of their bravery deserved to be recorded and read by the next generation. Unsung, the noblest deed will die.
WHERE ARE THEY NOW?
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Prime Minister Allawi—Lost his post as prime minister in the 2005 elections but remained the leader of an important secular political party.
Ambassador Bremer—Returned to civilian life as a successful businessman.
Cpl Connors—Resigned from the Marine Corps and went to college. He presented the parents of LCpl Desiato with a poem and a memento from the squad.
LtGen Conway—Was promoted to the post of J-3 operations officer in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
LtCol Drinkwine—Took his battalion to Afghanistan, then returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
LCpl Gomez—Recovered from his wounds in the fight at the Jolan graveyard and is serving at Camp Pendleton.
Lt Grapes—Resigned his commission, after the fight in the house from hell, with plans to become a lay missionary for the Catholic Church.
Sheikh Ghazi—Is living in Syria; offered to meet with Americans to discuss future cooperation.
Hadid—Zarqawi reported the “martyrdom” of his psychotic lieutenant in Fallujah, but no body was identified. His description matched that of the bearded leader Cpl Connors killed in the fight to recover LCpl Desiato’s body.
Hassani—After lobbying successfully for the April cease-fire in Fallujah, he quit the Sunni Islamic Party when it refused to participate in elections. As a prominent Sunni moderate, he was elected Speaker of the National Assembly.
SgtMaj Howell—Returned to Iraq in mid-2005 as a senior adviser, on his third tour.
Mufti Jamal—Disappeared in July; was replaced as mufti in Fallujah by a cousin of Janabi who is careful and correct in his dealings with the Americans.
Janabi—Gave a press interview in January 2005, wearing a suicide vest and swearing he would never be taken alive. Is rumored to be operating in Ramadi. A $50,000 reward was posted for his apprehension or elimination.
Col Latif—Is working part-time with old friend MajGen Shawany, the director of Iraqi intelligence.
MajGen Mattis—Was promoted to lieutenant general; directs the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in Quantico, Virginia.
LtCol McCoy—Was promoted to colonel and wrote a book on leadership in combat, entitled The Art of Command.
Ra’ad Hussein—The former mayor of Fallujah was released from prison in April 2004, swearing his enemies had set him up. Went to work for LtCol Wesley in April 2005.
LtCol Suleiman—The commander of the Iraqi battalion in Fallujah is buried in his hometown of Haditha. The Marines painted his portrait on a concrete barrier at the eastern entrance to Fallujah, inscribed with the Arabic words Hero of Iraq. Seven months after his torture and death, six bodies were found outside Fallujah. Suleiman’s tribe had taken revenge.
Col Toolan—Assumed the post of director of the Command and Staff School in Quantico, Virginia.
LtCol Wesley—After serving with the 3rd Infantry Division in Fallujah in the summer of 2003, he returned to Iraq in 2005 as a battalion commander.
Zarqawi—Is the object of an intense manhunt.
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In early fall, as the 1st Marine Division prepared to attack Fallujah for the second time, a new pickup truck pulled out from the division’s home base at Camp Pendleton and headed across the desert toward Illinois. Lance Corporal Aaron Gordon was on his way to visit Toby Gray’s mother, as he had promised when Gray’s body was carried down from the tower at the railroad station in Fallujah during the fight in April.
Somewhere along Interstate 10 he passed MajGen Mattis, who had a longer list than Gordon’s. It took Mattis weeks to drive across country, visiting the families of the fallen.
Resolute men deserve resolute leaders.
ORDER OF BATTLE FOR OPERATION PHANTOM FURY
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REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM 1
Btry M, 4th Bn, 14th Mar (Firing Btry)
Co B (-) (REIN), 2d CEB, 2d MARDIV
Co A (-), MP, 4th FSSG
Co D (REIN), AAV, 2d AA Bn, 2d MARDIV
Co C (REIN), 2d Tank Bn, 2d MARDIV
AT (TOW) Platoon (-), 23rd Marines, 4th MARDIV
Det, 940, Co B, 9th PSYOP Bn
4th Civil Affairs Team, 4th Civil Affairs Group
Platoon from 1st Force Reconnaissance Company
Shock Trauma Platoon (-)(REIN), 1st Force Service Support Group
Explosive Ordnance Detachment, 1st FSSG
Co B (-), 1st Bn/4th Marines (REIN)
3 Bn/1st Marines
H&S Co (REIN)
Det 2d Intel Bn
Det Comm Co, HQ Bn, 2d MARDIV
Det, HQ Btry, 11th Marines
Co I, K, L, Wpns Co
Truck Platoon (Prov), 2d Bn, 14th Marines
1st Platoon, Co C, 4th Combat Engineer Bn
Co D, 1st Specialized Special Forces Bn (Iraqi)
3 Bn/5th Marines
H&S Co (REIN)
Det 2d Intel Bn
Det Comm Co, HQ Bn, 2d MARDIV
Det, HQ Btry, 11th Marines
Co I, K, L, Wpns Co
3rd Platoon (-), Truck Co, HQ Bn, 4th MARDIV
2nd Platoon, Co A, 2nd Combat Engineer Bn, 2d MARDIV
Co B, 1st Specialized Special Forces Bn (Iraqi)
TF 2nd Bn, 7th Cavalry (ARMY)
A & B Co, 2-7 CAV (Infantry)
C Co, 3-8 CAV (Armored)
Task Force LAR
HQ Co (-) (REIN), 3d LAR Bn
Co C, 3rd LAR
Co B, 1st Bn (REIN)/23rd Marines
36th Commando Bn (-) (Iraqi)
Other Iraqi Units w/RCT 1
ICTF (Iraqi Cou
nterterrorism Force)
lst Bn 1st Brigade Iraqi Intervention Force
4th Bn 1st Brigade Iraqi Intervention Force
REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM 7
Co C (-), 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion
Co B (-), MP, 4th FSSG
2nd Force Reconnaissance Co (-)
44th Engineer Bn, 2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Army)
Co C (REIN), 2nd AA Bn
1st Bn (REIN)/8th Marines
H&S Co (REIN)
Det, 2nd Intel Bn, II MEF (HET)
Det Comm Co, HQ Bn, 2nd MARDIV
Det HQ Battery, 11th Marines
Co A,B,C
Weapons Co
1st Platoon, Truck Co, HQ Bn, 2nd MARDIV
1st Platoon, Co C, 2nd Combat Engineer Bn, 2nd MARDIV
2nd Bn, 1st Brigade, Iraqi Intervention Force
Emergency Response Unit (Iraqi–Ministry of Interior)
Battalion Landing Team (1/3) (from 31st MEU)
1st Bn/3rd Marines (REIN)
H&S Co, Co A,B,C, Weapons Co
2nd Platoon, Co C, 3rd AAV Bn
Combat Engineer Co (-), Combat Assault Bn, 3rd Marine Division
C Battery, 1st Bn/12th Marines
Co A (-), 1st LAR
Co C (-) (REIN), 2nd AAV Bn
Co A (-) (REIN), 2nd Tank Bn
Co C (-), 2nd Combat Engineer Bn
5th Bn, 3rd Brigade, Iraqi Intervention Force
TF 2-2 In (-) (ARMY)
6th Bn, 3rd Brigade, Iraqi Intervention Force
2nd Brigade (-) (REIN), 1st Cavalry Division “Black Jack Brigade” (ARMY)
TF 1-5 Infantry (Stryker)
TF 1-5 Cavalry
759th Composite MP Bn (ARMY)
2nd Recon Bn
Co A (REIN), 2nd LAR, 2nd MARDIV
NOTES
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The Iliad . . . trans. Richard Lattimore, University of Chicago Press, 1961, (book 12, 11. 322–28).