Eisenhower in War and Peace

by Jean Edward Smith

  Ike set to work with a small team of dedicated believers—Thomas Handy, Robert Crawford, John Hull, and Albert Wedemeyer—to flesh out plans for the invasion.g According to Eisenhower, “Not many officers were really aware of the existence of the project, nor had they heard any of the great arguments pro and con that went into its making. Many with whom we had to consult were always ready to express doubts of the blackest character.”46

  Eisenhower presented his planning draft to General Marshall on February 28, 1942.47 “The burden of proof was on us,” Ike recalled, and the presentation was lengthy. Marshall quizzed the OPD team relentlessly. At the end he said, “This is it. I approve.”48 Eisenhower was instructed to refine the draft for presentation to the president and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

  The following week the British appeared to draw back from their “Hitler first” commitment. Churchill was badly shaken by the fall of Singapore (“the Gibraltar of the Pacific”), and fretted about the fate of Australia and New Zealand. In a series of cables to Washington, he suggested that the Allied buildup in Europe be postponed.49 That triggered a strategy session with FDR at the White House on March 5. Stimson and Marshall asserted that it was essential to concentrate American efforts in Europe, that Russia needed urgent support, and that the Pacific theater was secondary. Admiral King pressed the case for war in the Pacific. The next day Marshall met with Stimson to review the discussion. Marshall told the secretary that the War Plans Division was drawing up specific plans for an invasion of Europe, and sent Ike to brief him.

  Stimson recorded the meeting in his diary.

  I told Eisenhower that I wanted to reserve my own opinions on the subject and simply to hear his study, and that he was to talk to me not as if I was Secretary of War but as an ordinary citizen seeking enlightenment. We then stood up in front of my big map of the world and he laid out the main problems as he saw them. When he got through, I found that they coincided almost exactly with what I had expressed in the White House conference the day before, although he had not heard through Marshall of what I had said.50

  Ike’s unusual ability to think like his superiors paid dividends. On March 25 he presented the finished proposal to Marshall.51 Codenamed BOLERO, the plan was stripped to its essentials: Great Britain must be kept secure; Russia must be kept fighting; and the Middle East must be defended. “All other operations must be considered in the highly desirable rather than in the mandatory class.”

  Eisenhower argued that the principal target for the Allies’ first offensive should be Germany, “to be attacked through western Europe.” Shipping routes were shortest; an early buildup of forces in Britain would compel Germany to withdraw troops from the Russian front; there were abundant airfields in Britain from which the air force could operate; use of British combat forces would be maximized (“If a large scale attack is made in any other region, a large portion of the British Forces will necessarily be held at home”); and, from the standpoint of an invading force, the highway and railroad networks of western Europe were superior to those found in any other area. After briefly detailing the requisites for a successful cross-Channel attack, he concluded with a dash of rhetorical saber rattling. “The War Plans Division believes that, unless this plan is adopted as the central aim of all our efforts, we must turn our backs upon the Eastern Atlantic and go, full out, as quickly as possible, against Japan.”52

  Marshall and Stimson reviewed Ike’s plan for a cross-Channel attack that morning, and then presented it to FDR at a meeting at the White House. The luncheon meeting, which was also attended by Navy Secretary Frank Knox, Admiral King, General Arnold, and Harry Hopkins, turned into a full-scale review of American military strategy. Roosevelt played devil’s advocate, suggesting, as Churchill might have done, a half dozen alternatives to a cross-Channel attack.53 When Marshall stood his ground, FDR—who evidently was probing for weaknesses in Ike’s plan—gave his approval to the proposal and instructed Marshall to work out the details.

  Time became the driving force. Relying on his knowledge of French geography, Eisenhower and his planners worked quickly to come up with an order-of-battle invasion plan (ROUNDUP). D-Day was set for April 1, 1943. By that time, the United States and Great Britain were to have assembled a force of forty-eight divisions (thirty American, eighteen British and Canadian), 5,800 combat aircraft, and 7,000 landing craft. The initial landing would be made on a six-division front between Calais and Le Havre, north of the Seine. British and American paratroops would drop behind enemy lines and prevent reinforcements from reaching the battlefield. As soon as the beachhead was secured, nine armored divisions would be “rushed in to break German resistance,” and spearhead a drive toward the Belgian port of Antwerp.54

  Eisenhower submitted the plan to General Marshall on April 1. Marshall and Stimson made two minor textual revisions, and carried the plan to the White House that afternoon. Once again the discussion was lengthy. Roosevelt examined the plan paragraph by paragraph. No minutes were kept, but in his diary Stimson said that Marshall “set the course while Hopkins and I held the laboring oar.”55 h When FDR gave his final approval, Stimson noted that it would mark April 1, 1942, as one of the memorable dates in the war.56 Roosevelt agreed that speed was essential. He directed Marshall and Hopkins to fly to London at once and present the plan to Churchill and the British chiefs of staff.

  Marshall, Stimson, Hopkins (and Eisenhower) felt that a milestone had been reached. A cross-Channel attack seemed in the offing. Hopkins cabled Churchill, “Will be seeing you soon so please start the fire [a reference to the frigid temperatures that prevailed inside the prime minister’s country house, Chequers].” FDR told Churchill that he had “reached certain conclusions of such vital importance” that he was sending Marshall and Hopkins to explain them and to seek “your approval thereon. All of it is dependent on the complete cooperation of our two countries.”57

  Marshall and Hopkins arrived in Britain on April 8, 1942. After a week of intensive discussions with Churchill and the British chiefs of staff, Eisenhower’s plan for a 1943 cross-Channel assault was approved. “I have read with earnest attention your masterly document about the future of the war and the great operations proposed,” Churchill cabled FDR on April 12. “I am in entire agreement in principle with all you propose, and so are the Chiefs of Staff.”58

  Roosevelt replied shortly. “Marshall and Hopkins have told me of the unanimity of opinion relative to our proposals, and I greatly appreciate the message you have sent me confirming this. I believe the results of this decision will be very disheartening to Hitler. It may well be the wedge by which we shall accomplish his downfall.”59

  Marshall, who had done most of the heavy lifting in London, shared the general enthusiasm but recognized the pitfalls that lay ahead. “Virtually everyone agrees with us in principle,” he told Army deputy chief of staff Joseph McNarney, “but many if not most hold reservations regarding this or that.”60 Eisenhower took the agreement at face value. “I hope that at long last, after months of struggle by this division, we are all definitely committed to one concept of fighting. If we can agree on major purposes and objectives, our efforts will begin to fall in line and we won’t be thrashing around in the dark.”61

  Marshall’s concern about the future of BOLERO was justified. At the end of April, President Roosevelt abruptly announced that he was increasing the size of American forces in Australia to 100,000 men and 1,000 combat aircraft.62 The War Department was caught off guard. FDR was responding to pressure from the governments of Australia and New Zealand as well as from the U.S. Navy, but neither Marshall nor Stimson had been informed. Marshall instructed Eisenhower to prepare a reclama pointing out that any dilution of the forces earmarked for BOLERO would seriously impede the possibility of landing in Europe.63 Marshall told Roosevelt that he would have to choose between BOLERO and Australia. “If BOLERO is not to be our primary consideration, I would recommend its complete abandonment.” And since the British were a part of the scheme, they “sho
uld be formally notified that the recent London agreement should be canceled.”64

  FDR was sometimes too quick off the mark, and this time he recognized that he had overstepped. As he often did when caught out, he dissembled. “I did not issue any directive to increase our forces in Australia,” he wrote Marshall. Roosevelt said he merely “wanted to know if it were possible to do so. I do not want BOLERO slowed down.”65

  The American buildup in Great Britain was saved for the moment.66 But for Eisenhower it was a rude awakening. “BOLERO is supposed to have the approval of the President and Prime Minister. But the struggle to get everyone behind it, and to keep the highest authority from wrecking it by making additional commitments elsewhere is never ending. The actual fact is that not one man in twenty in the Government realizes what a grisly, dirty, tough business we are in.”67

  While Marshall was in London he took the measure of the American Army’s command structure in Britain and found it wanting. The senior American commander, Major General James E. Chaney (USMA, 1908), an air corps officer who had been sent originally to observe the Battle of Britain, seemed out of touch with the unfolding situation, and his headquarters remained wedded to peacetime routine. Officers wore civilian clothes to work, put in an eight-hour day, and always took weekends off. Little effort was made to coordinate with British military staffs, and the headquarters itself seemed to be operating in a vacuum. Marshall told Eisenhower to fly to London and assess the situation. With BOLERO about to begin, General Marshall wanted the Army’s command structure capable of handling it. “I’m taking off on the 23rd with General Arnold and others for a trip to England,” Ike wrote in his diary on May 21. “My own particular reason for going is an uneasy feeling that either we do not understand our own commanding general and staff in England or they don’t understand us. Our planning for BOLERO is not progressing.”68

  Marshall’s purpose in sending Eisenhower was twofold. He wanted a second opinion about Chaney, but he also wanted to expose Ike to the British. It was widely assumed that when the invasion of Europe was launched, Marshall would command it. He was grooming Eisenhower to be his chief of staff, and Ike’s ability to get on with the British would be important.69 i

  Eisenhower requested that Mark Clark, who was now chief of staff of Army Ground Forces, accompany the mission. “I felt that Clark’s observations regarding the suitability of the United Kingdom as a training and staging ground would prove valuable.”70 Eisenhower and Clark, both of whom had been lieutenant colonels a year before, were newly minted major generals, Ike the senior by three weeks.

  After a much delayed and rerouted flight across the Atlantic, Eisenhower and Clark rolled into Paddington Station on the morning of May 26, 1942. They were met by a smartly uniformed driver from Britain’s Motor Transport Corps (MTC), Kay Summersby. The MTC was a unit of volunteers originally formed by British post-debutantes that had done heroic service driving ambulances in London’s East End during the Blitz. They bought their own uniforms and initially received no pay for their services. The drivers were uniformly bright, attractive, upper-class, and knowledgeable about everything in which visiting dignitaries might be interested. Summersby was no exception. A former model for Worth, the Paris house of haute couture, she was recently separated from her husband, a wealthy London publisher, and linked romantically to a dashing young Army captain, Richard Arnold (USMA, 1932), who, like Summersby, was also still married.

  Kay Summersby as she appeared when Ike met her in 1942. (illustration credit 8.2)

  Eisenhower and Clark remained in Britain for ten days, and Summersby was their driver throughout. The two Americans met repeatedly with the British chiefs of staff, and traveled extensively to examine possible staging areas. Ike and Clark were not pleased with what they saw. In their view Chaney and his staff were decidedly “in a back eddy, from which they could scarcely emerge except through a return to the United States.” That is how Eisenhower expressed it in his memoirs. At the time he said the whole outfit should be relieved and shipped back to the United States “on a slow boat, without destroyer escort,” a likely death sentence given the prevalence of Nazi U-boats at the time.71

  Among the sites Ike and Clark visited was a major training area in Kent and Sussex to witness a field exercise testing a new organizational structure for infantry divisions. The exercise was directed by Lieutenant General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, the British Army commander in southwest England. Montgomery arrived very late for the briefing. “I have been directed to take time from my busy life to brief you gentlemen,” he tartly announced, scarcely endearing himself to Eisenhower or Clark.72

  As Montgomery made his way to the map board and picked up his pointer, Ike lit a cigarette. Montgomery sniffed the air without looking around and briskly asked: “Who’s smoking?”

  “I am,” said Ike.

  “Stop it. I don’t permit smoking in my office.”73

  Eisenhower put out the cigarette, but his anger smoldered. In his diary, Ike said simply, “General Montgomery is a decisive type who appears to be extremely energetic and professionally able.”74 Riding back to London in the car with Clark, he said, “That son of a bitch.” Kay Summersby remembered looking in the rearview mirror and saw that Eisenhower’s “face was flaming red and the veins in his forehead looked like worms. He was furious … really steaming mad.”75

  Ike and Clark appreciated being chauffeured by someone as knowledgeable and attractive as Kay Summersby. On sightseeing excursions they would occasionally stop at an English pub for a pint of ale or a round of gin and tonics. Once they ignored the barriers of rank and invited Kay for lunch at the Connaught, one of London’s most elegant hotels, much to the consternation of neighboring diners. “We were three people,” Kay remembered. “Not two generals and a driver.”76 It was at the Connaught that Ike began calling her Kay instead of Miss Summersby. Kay did not yet call Eisenhower “Ike,” but she was smitten nonetheless. As one biographer has written, “Sitting opposite him for the first time, she remarked on his ‘brilliant blue eyes, sandy hair—but not very much of it—fair and ruddy complexion.’ ” Kay thought Ike had a strong face, not conventionally handsome, but “very American, certainly very appealing. I succumbed immediately to that grin that was to become so famous.”77

  Toward the end of their stay, Ike and Clark were offered the opportunity to tour Windsor Castle, the country residence of the royal family. The King and Queen, they were told, had been informed of their visit and would remain in their apartment to avoid embarrassing their guests. But King George forgot. It was a beautiful spring day, and when Clark and Eisenhower arrived the royal family was taking tea in the garden. The garden was surrounded by a hedge, and when the King heard the voice of the Royal Constable approaching with the two guests he realized his error. “This is terrible,” he told the others. “We must not be seen.” The King and Queen of England, and the two young princesses, Elizabeth and Margaret, got down on all fours and crawled on their hands and knees back to the castle door before Ike and Clark entered the garden.78

  On the evening before their departure, Eisenhower, Clark, and Hap Arnold had dinner at their hotel and compared notes. All agreed that Chaney had to be replaced. The question was with whom. According to Arnold, “We agreed it had to be someone who was fully acquainted with our War Department plans. He must have the confidence of General Marshall and the Secretary of War. We also agreed that he should get to London as soon as possible.”79

  Eisenhower went to bed early, and Clark and Arnold continued talking. As Arnold remembered, “The two of us came to the conclusion that it should be Ike. Clark thought that since I knew Marshall better than he, I should present Eisenhower’s name after the three of us told the Chief of Staff of our conclusion that a change should be made at once.”80

  When the time for departure came, Kay Summersby drove Eisenhower and Clark to Northholt air base, outside London. At the field, Ike gave Summersby a “priceless” box of chocolates for her efforts—a gift that only
visiting Americans could have come by in war-rationed England. “If I’m ever back this way, I hope you’ll drive me again,” he said.

  “I’d like that, sir,” Summersby replied.81

  Eisenhower reported to Marshall on June 3, thoroughly dissatisfied with what he had seen in Britain. If the buildup for the invasion (BOLERO) had any hope of success, there must be an immediate change of command. Marshall told Ike to put it in writing. Eisenhower’s memorandum of June 3, 1942, is a remarkable example of his ability to offer candid advice. “During my visit in England, I gave a great deal of study to the identity of the individual who should now be commanding our Forces in England,” he told Marshall. “I was very hopeful that my conclusions would favor the present incumbent. For a variety of reasons, some of which I intimated to you this morning, I believe that a change should be made.” Ike said his classmate General Joseph McNarney, who was the Army’s deputy chief of staff, was best fitted for the post. McNarney was thoroughly familiar with the planning for BOLERO, enjoyed Marshall’s confidence, and understood the complex British command structure. “I believe that General McNarney has the strength of character, the independence of thought, and the ability to fulfill satisfactorily the requirements of this difficult task.” Eisenhower also recommended that Mark Clark be appointed to command the initial assault force.82

  Two days later, Eisenhower sent a second memo to Marshall recommending that whoever was designated to command American forces in England should be promoted immediately to three-star rank. Regardless of whether Chaney was retained, said Ike, the British did not take major generals seriously. “While, in other circumstances, the question of promotion might appear trivial, it would, in this case, have a definite effect upon orderly progress in getting ready for the attack.” Eisenhower repeated his recommendation that McNarney be named to the post.83