The Nuclear Jihadist

by Douglas Frantz

  The absence of Masud Naraghi, the Iranian nuclear official, from the second round of negotiations in Dubai was first reported in a German documentary film, The Mullahs’ Physicist, by Egmont R. Koch, which was broadcast on German public television on February 22, 2007.

  CHAPTER 20. MORE AND MORE PIECES

  The report that President Clinton shared with Boris Yeltsin was first disclosed by Jim Hoagland, “Briefing Yeltsin on Iran,” Washington Post, May 17, 1995. Warren Christopher’s lobbying of Qian Qichen was from Elaine Sciolino, “Beijing Rebuffs U.S. on Halting Iran Atom Deal,” New York Times, April 18, 1995.

  Hussein Kamel’s flight from Iraq was detailed in a report by the UN Secretary-General, “Note by the Secretary-General,” S/1996/848, October 11, 1996; and a transcript of the UN interview with Kamel, “General Hussein Kamal [sic] UNSCOM/IAEA Briefing,” provided to us by a UN official. Jacques Baute provided a detailed description of the inspection team’s efforts in Iraq, its visit to the “chicken farm,” and his dealings with Iraqi officials in a series of interviews.

  The quotation about the mounting questions concerning Khan’s nuclear activities was from an interview with a former State Department official who asked for anonymity because of the sensitivity of the information. The quotation about Khan being the subject of intense scrutiny was from a former CIA officer who now works undercover for another agency and did not want his identity disclosed. The same former officer helped us understand other reasons why the American intelligence community was reluctant to blow the whistle on Khan.

  The incident in which Khan jumped from his seat to defend himself was dawn from interviews with Feroz Khan, who was present at the meeting.

  CHAPTER 21. A MYSTERIOUS MURDER

  Khan’s visit to Istanbul was described by Tahir under questioning by Western diplomats and by one of the Libyan officials who attended the session in conversation with IAEA officials in Tripoli; the diplomats and IAEA officials shared the information with us on a confidential basis. The Libyan also described Khan’s earlier trips to Tripoli. Some information about Khan’s dealings with Libya is also contained in IAEA reports.

  Information about the hotel Khan built in Timbuktu is available in numerous published articles. The Khan video was played for us by a Western diplomat who had obtained a copy from the Pakistani government. Information about Khan’s travels to various countries trying to sell nuclear technology was described in many published articles, including Edward Harris and Ellen Knickmeyer, “Head of Pakistan’s nuclear ring made repeated visits to uranium-rich Africa,” Associated Press, April 20, 2004.

  The Indian test, and the events leading up to it, is best described by Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb. The Pakistani response, including the debate and Khan’s role, was detailed in Defence Journal, an official publication of the Pakistani military; the article, “When Mountains Move—the Story of Chagai,” was written by Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam. In April 1999, Jang, one of the most respected newspaper groups in Pakistan, published a special edition about the country’s nuclear test and the background for its nuclear program. The elevation of Khan to hero status was described in interviews by Hoodbhoy and a Pakistani journalist who spoke on condition of anonymity because he is not authorized to speak by his newspaper.

  The murder of Kim Sa Nae was drawn from Paul Watson and Mubashir Zaidi, “Death of N. Korean Woman Offers Clues to Pakistani Nuclear Deals,” Los Angeles Times, March 1, 2004

  CHAPTER 22. INSIDE THE NETWORK

  The obstacles to mass production of centrifuges for Libya were outlined in debriefings of Tahir and Urs Tinner by Western diplomats and CIA officials, who relayed the information to us. Some of the material also was referred to in various reports published by the IAEA. Gary Milhollin described Dubai as a black hole in an interview. Urs’s claim to friends that he was going to Dubai to sell beverages was from an interview with Bruno Vanoni, a Swiss journalist.

  Peter Griffin and his son Paul were identified as Khan associates by Tahir, according to the statement released by the Malaysian police. The history of the relationship between the two men was described in testimony by Matthew S. Borman, a deputy assistant secretary of commerce, before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the House Committee on Government Reform, March 9, 2004; and in an article by Owen Bowcott, John Aglionby and Ian Traynor, “Businessman under scrutiny 25 years ago after ordering unusual supplies,” Guardian, March 5, 2004. Griffin described his dinner with Khan in Steve Coll, “The Atomic Emporium: Abdul Qadeer Khan and Iran’s race to build the bomb,” The New Yorker, August 7, 2006.

  Peter Griffin declined requests for interviews through his lawyer, but the lawyer and Griffin have both denied repeatedly that he had any knowing involvement in the shipment of nuclear technology to Libya or Iran. Griffin has blamed Tahir for forging his signature on documents. Neither Griffin nor his son have been charged with any criminal violation.

  Gunes Cire and Selim Alguadis were implicated in the network by Tahir’s statement to the Malaysian police, and equipment from Alguadis was later found in warehouses in Libya. Cire died soon after his involvement was disclosed. In an interview in Istanbul in 2005, Alguadis acknowledged that he knew Khan and said that he once gave him a tour of the city. But he denied knowingly providing nuclear-related technology to Libya or Iran.

  Wisser’s involvement with South Africa’s nuclear program and his dealings with the Khan network were described in great detail in hundreds of pages of affidavits, sales records, and other documents from the case file in Pretoria, South Africa, on the criminal case against Wisser and Geiges. Among those documents are two lengthy statements given by Wisser to law enforcement officials in Germany and South Africa, as well as photographs of the centrifuge piping system manufactured for Libya by Johan Meyer. The records are the primary source of information on Wisser and his colleagues, though interviews were also conducted in Johannesburg with lawyers for him and Meyer. In addition, IAEA officials evaluated the contents of the court records and shared their findings with us.

  Lerch acknowledged in an interview with Swiss authorities that he knew Khan, Wisser, and Tahir, but he denied that he had any role in setting up a uranium enrichment facility for Libya, according to a transcript of the interview provided to us.

  Urs Tinner’s difficulties establishing a centrifuge plant came from CIA and IAEA officials who spoke with Tinner and from the debriefing of Tahir by Western diplomats.

  The Clinton administration’s efforts to stop Pakistan’s nuclear program and the lunch with Nawaz Sharif and Strobe Talbott were described by Einhorn in an interview. Talbott also referred to the lunch in Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington: The Brookings Institution, May 2004).

  Clinton’s comment that Pakistan was “messing with nuclear war” during the Kargil confrontation was from “Pakistan ‘prepared nuclear strike,’” BBC-TV, May 16, 2002, based on an interview with Bruce Riedel, who was on the White House National Security Council during the incident and later wrote a paper about the episode for the Center for Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania.

  The tip to General Pervez Musharraf was recounted in an interview with a former senior Pakistani law enforcement official, who provided extensive details from his written notes and memory about Musharraf’s determination to assert control over Khan. The former official spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear of reprisal. Khan’s boast that he knew the CIA had tried to penetrate his network came from an interview with a former colleague.

  In 2006 a handful of articles suggested that Urs Tinner had been recruited by the CIA. The articles were not conclusive and they did not speculate on when Tinner might have started supplying information to the Americans. Tinner’s recruitment was, we believe, a turning point in the CIA’s knowledge of the Khan network, so we want to explain our methodology in unraveling the mystery, though the names of some of the sources must remain anonymous.

 
We first learned that Tinner, his father, and his brother had begun cooperating with the IAEA from two Western diplomats in Vienna. The diplomats were uncertain how the arrangements were made, but eventually one of them conceded that a mysterious woman had telephoned Olli Heinonen, the IAEA official heading the investigation of the Khan network, and set up the first meeting with the Tinners. Heinonen said in an interview that he did not know the identity of the woman, though he suspected she was from the CIA. Later, a former CIA case officer who worked in Vienna suggested that the meeting had been arranged by the agency. We interviewed two former CIA officials before tracking down a former chief of the CIA station in Vienna, who had later returned to a senior post in Washington and eventually left the agency. He provided many of the details about the recruitment of Tinner by the agent identified as Mad Dog, and he acknowledged dispatching the woman agent to contact Heinonen. The quotation that Tinner “gave us the final ability to know what the network was doing” came from the former station chief. Another former CIA official provided additional details of Mad Dog’s relationship with Tinner. As a result, we were able to confirm that the CIA began receiving direct and detailed reports about Khan’s supplies to Iran in early 2000, earlier than previously disclosed. Some of these findings were corroborated by a British counterproliferation official who also declined to be identified.

  Einhorn confirmed the improved flow of information about Khan’s connection to Libya in an interview, but he knew nothing about the source.

  Tenet’s boast about the CIA penetration of the Khan network came in a speech he made at Georgetown University in Washington on February 5, 2004.

  CHAPTER 23. TIGHTENING THE NOOSE

  The investigation of Khan by Pakistan’s National Accountability Bureau was described by Farah Stockman in “Pakistan Had Case Against Scientist,” Boston Globe, February 13, 2004; and Douglas Frantz, “From Patriot to Proliferator: The myth of a Pakistani scientist as his nation’s savior long protected him,” Los Angeles Times, September 23, 2005. Our account is much fuller and relies heavily on a series of interviews with the Pakistani man who carried out the investigation. The investigator’s recollections were augmented by notes he had taken during his inquiry, which were also shared with us. The investigator now lives in the United States and requested anonymity to protect family members still in Pakistan. We made every attempt to corroborate his information. For instance, the investigator read us a list of Pakistani journalists who received payments from Khan, some of which we were able to corroborate by talking with journalists. General Syed Mohammad Amjad vouched for the reliability of the investigation in an interview, but he declined to discuss any details of the inquiry into Khan. In addition, we reviewed reports filed by Pakistani security officials.

  Musharraf referred to the investigation and his suspicions about Khan in his autobiography, In the Line of Fire (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). He also discussed the difficulty in pursuing Khan in an interview with David Rohde and Amy Waldman, “Pakistani Leader Suspected Moves by Atomic Expert,” New York Times, February 10, 2004.

  Hamid Mir described Khan’s reaction to the investigation in an interview. The name on the shopping bags was provided by a Western diplomat who later saw the bags in Tripoli. Details of the surveillance of Khan came from the investigator, who had access to the intelligence reports as part of his inquiry.

  Events surrounding Khan’s dismissal were described by Musharraf in his memoir and numerous published articles. The quotation about Musharraf fearing a backlash came from an interview with a former Pakistani general who spoke on condition of anonymity. Khan’s complaints were described by several of his former associates; one of his friends told us about Khan’s plan to run for president. John S. Friedman and Eric Nadler, the co-producers of the 2002 documentary Stealing the Fire, graciously provided us with a transcript of their full interview with Khan.

  The network’s purchase of the Spanish lathes came from the court files in South Africa, which include invoices for the machines, as well as from interviews with South African law enforcement officials. Tahir’s conversations with Khan about moving the manufacturing to Malaysia were described by the Western diplomats who debriefed Tahir while he was in prison.

  Einhorn described his conversation with Richard Armitage in an interview. A second former Bush administration official, who requested anonymity, recounted the briefings at the White House. John Wolf was interviewed after he left government.

  The August 2001 meeting of the Pakistani nuclear scientists with Osama bin Laden was described in detail in numerous newspaper articles, including Douglas Frantz, James Risen and David E. Sanger, “Nuclear Experts in Pakistan May Have Links to Al Qaeda,” New York Times, December 9, 2001; Kamran Khan and Molly Moore, “2 Nuclear Experts Briefed bin Laden, Pakistanis Say,” Washington Post, December 12, 2001; Akhtar Jamal, “Pakistani Nuke Scientists to Face Charges for Al Qaeda Contacts,” Eurasianet.org, December 13, 2001; and David Albright and Holly Higgins, “Pakistani Nuclear Scientists: How Much Nuclear Assistance to Al Qaeda?” Institute for Science and International Security, August 30, 2002. George Tenet provided a detailed analysis of the meeting and its ramifications in his autobiography, At the Center of the Storm (New York: HarperCollins, 2007). It was also mentioned in Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

  CHAPTER 24. “WITH US OR AGAINST US”

  Musharraf wrote about his conversation with Secretary of State Colin Powell in his memoir, In the Line of Fire; the exchange was also described in various publications. General Mahmood Ahmed’s confrontation with Armitage was disclosed by Musharraf in an interview with CBS-TV’s 60 Minutes on September 24, 2006; and by Hassan Abbas, “Inside story of Musharraf-Mahmood tussle,” Daily Times of Pakistan, September 26, 2006. Armitage denied making the threat in an interview with NBC-TV on September 22, 2006, and in a PBS documentary, Return of the Taliban; the PBS transcript is available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/interviews/armitage.html.

  The information about the American efforts to secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and the Trojan horse quote is from Frantz, Risen and Sanger, “Nuclear Experts in Pakistan May Have Links to Al Qaeda.”

  Tenet’s arrival in Islamabad on December 1 was described from interviews conducted by us in Pakistan; we also relied on Tenet’s At the Center of the Storm and Suskind’s One Percent Doctrine.

  Khan’s decision to make electronic copies of centrifuge designs and ship centrifuges to Dubai came from IAEA reports and interviews with IAEA officials and Western diplomats in Vienna, all of whom spoke on a confidential basis. In addition, we were given access to confidential reports prepared by the IAEA, which provided a detailed description of the network’s activities based on interviews conducted by the agency with network participants and officials of various governments and intelligence agencies.

  Tahir’s lifestyle was described by two of his former associates in interviews and by Anwar Faruqi, “Accused Smuggler Lived Lavishly,” Associated Press, February 14, 2004. The details of Tahir’s deal with Scomi were drawn from the Malaysian police report. Mad Dog’s move to Kuala Lumpur was described in an interview by the former senior CIA official.

  The South Africa project was described in the court file against Wisser and Geiges. The training of Libyan technicians in Dubai was from an IAEA report and interviews with IAEA officials who had been given a rundown on the network’s operation by Libyan authorities.

  The $2 million Libyan payment was described by a Western diplomat involved in the investigation who copied bank records tracking the money.

  CHAPTER 25. DIPLOMATIC CHESS

  The transcript of Alireza Jafarzadeh’s press conference is available at www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/NCRI/perspex-ncri-topsecretprojects-081402.htm; we also interviewed him. The outlines of Iran’s clandestine nuclear program were reported by Frantz, “Iran Closes In on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb.” The response
to the disclosure by the IAEA was described in interviews with three IAEA officials who were involved.

  Changes at the IAEA after the discovery of Saddam’s secret nuclear program were described in interviews by Hans Blix, Pierre Goldschmidt, Laura Rockwood, and other IAEA officials. We also had access to minutes from IAEA board meetings and other internal records.

  ElBaradei’s quotation about how he sees his job was from Tom Hundley, “UN nuclear chief, agency win Nobel Peace Prize,” Chicago Tribune, October 8, 2005. The details of his meeting with senior officials and the letter to the Iranian representative were from interviews with other IAEA officials and agency records.

  The fact that the United States and Britain had not provided information about Khan’s network to the IAEA came from interviews with six IAEA officials and Western diplomats in Vienna, all of whom had knowledge of the agency’s inner workings and its relationship with the two countries. The fact that the Americans and British were aware of Khan’s network became obvious with the release of the so-called Butler report, officially The Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, on July 14, 2004.

  Contacts between IAEA officials and their Iranian counterparts were laid out in an internal chronology provided to us and through interviews with IAEA and Iranian officials who were involved. Additional analysis of the Iranian enrichment program came from a twenty-page internal assessment by a senior IAEA expert, which was provided to us.