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black market prompted repeated congressional hearings, queries, and con-
demnations. 30
Family Planning/Coercive Abortion
Controversies in US population
planning assistance continued with regard to China’s population programs.
Abortion, and the degree to which coercive abortions and sterilizations occur
in China’s family planning programs, remained a prominent issue in these
debates. 31
Religious Freedom
US government reports including the Department
of State’s Annual Reports on International Religious Freedom and the report
issued on May 1, 2000, by the US Commission on International Religious
Freedom criticized Chinese government policies on religious practices. They
provided a focal point for congressional hearings and statements. Although
some foreign commentators noted recent moderation and even encourage-
ment by Chinese officials regarding freer religious practices, the strong US
criticism of China’s record on religious freedom continued. 32
Internet and Media Restrictions
The growth of Internet, cell phone
use, and text messaging led to new Chinese regulations begun in 2005 that
prompted some congressional hearings and other actions. A key issue was
the extent to which US Internet firms collaborated with Chinese authorities
in helping the latter control Internet use in China. 33
Issues in Security Relations
US-China security and military relations never fully recovered after they
were suspended following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. The EP-3
incident resulted in a temporary halt regarding most military contacts.
China’s Military Expansion
Some officials in the George W. Bush
administration, backed by officials in Congress, the media, and others, fo-
cused on China’s military buildup with regard to a Taiwan contingency con-
cerning US military intervention and involvement. They pressed for stronger
US measures to deal with this situation, which in turn reinforced US-China
military competition and complicated bilateral military relations. 34
WMD Proliferation
The Bush administration, backed by many in the
Congress, also took a tougher position against China’s WMD proliferation. 35
One key security issue for the United States was China’s record of weapons
sales, technology transfers, and nuclear energy assistance, particularly to Iran and Pakistan.
Espionage
Beginning in the late 1990s, US media sources reported
about ongoing investigations of cases of alleged Chinese espionage against
the United States dating back to the 1980s. The most serious case involved
China’s alleged acquisition of significant information about the W-88, an
advanced miniaturized US nuclear warhead, as a result of alleged security
breaches at the Los Alamos nuclear science laboratory between 1984 and
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Chapter 6
1988. Another serious instance, first reported in late April 1999 by the New York Times, involved allegations that a Taiwan-born Chinese-American scientist, Wen Ho Lee, had downloaded critical nuclear weapons codes, called
legacy codes, from a classified computer system at Los Alamos to an unclas-
sified computer system accessible by anyone with the proper password. As
noted in chapter 5, alleged Chinese espionage featured prominently in the
1999 Cox Committee report that was sharply critical of the US administra-
tion’s counterespionage activities against China. 36
Subsequently, US media focused attention on a complicated case involv-
ing an alleged Chinese double agent whose sexual relationship with senior
FBI counterintelligence officers seemed to undermine the integrity of US
government efforts to curb Chinese espionage. Suspicions of Chinese espio-
nage were voiced in Congress when the State Department decided to pur-
chase computers for use in classified communications from a Chinese com-
pany. The controversy caused the department to halt the purchase. 37 Developments later in the decade featured arrests and convictions of individuals
illegally funneling advanced US technologies to China at the behest of Chi-
nese government clandestine agents.
Economic Issues
Trade Deficit
Issues involving trade with China factored heavily into
US policy debates. The US trade deficit with China surged from a $17.8
billion deficit in 1989 to around $100 billion in 2000. It more than doubled in the five following years and was $256 billion in 2008. 38
Intellectual Property Rights
China’s lack of protection for intellectual
property rights (IPR) was long an issue in US-China relations and became
more important in the 109th (2005–6) and 110th (2007–8) Congresses. Ac-
cording to calculations from US industry sources in 2006, IPR piracy cost US
firms $2.5 billion in lost sales a year, and the IPR piracy rate in China for US
products remained estimated at 90 percent. Backed by Congress, US admin-
istration officials repeatedly pressed Chinese officials to better implement
IPR regulations. 39
Currency Valuation
In recent years until 2005, the PRC pegged its
currency, the renminbi (RMB), to the US dollar at a rate of about 8.3 RMB to
the dollar—a valuation that many critics in Congress and elsewhere in the
United States concluded kept the PRC’s currency undervalued, making PRC
exports artificially cheap and making it harder for US producers to compete.
On July 1, 2005, the PRC changed this valuation method. The resulting slow
appreciation in the RMB from this action was not sufficient to assuage US
congressional concerns. 40
Chinese Purchase of US Government Securities
A related concern
was Chinese purchases of US Treasury bills and other US government secur-
Pragmatism amid Differences during the G. W. Bush Administration
133
ities as a means of recycling China’s massive trade surplus with the United
States while maintaining the relatively low value of Chinese currency rela-
tive to the US dollar. The Chinese investments seemed very important to the
stability of the US economy. Some congressional and other US critics
warned of US overdependence on this type of investment by China. 41
Bid for Unocal
The bid of a Chinese state-controlled oil company to
acquire the US oil firm Unocal in 2005 set off an uproar in Congress and the
US media. The congressional debate over the alleged dangers of the transac-
tion to US energy security was so intense that the Chinese firm withdrew the
bid after two months. 42
China’s International Rise
A set of issues emerged in the 109th and 110th Congresses, focusing on the
critical implications of China’s economic growth and increasing international
engagement and influence for US economic, security, and political interests
in various parts of the world. To feed its growing needs for resources, capital, and technology, Chinese officials, businesses, and others successfully sought
trade agreements; oil and gas contracts; scientific and technological coopera-
tion; and multilateral security, political, and economic arrangements with
countries around its periphery and throughout the world. China’s growing
international economic engagement was backed by China’s increasing mili-
tary power and went hand in hand with expanding Chinese political influ-
ence. China notably used unconditional economic exchanges and assistance
to woo governments and leaders seen as rogues or outliers by the United
States and other developed countries. Chinese practices undercut Western
pressures on these officials and governments to improve governance in ac-
cord with Western norms. China’s increased influence also extended to many
key allies and associates of the United States and to regions like Latin Ameri-
ca, where the United States exerted predominant influence. 43
Sovereignty Issues: Taiwan and Tibet
Taiwan
Taiwan remained the most sensitive and complex issue in US-
China relations. Beijing engaged in a military buildup focused on a Taiwan
contingency involving the United States.
In 2001 the George W. Bush administration offered the largest package of
US arms to Taiwan in ten years and allowed President Chen Shui-bian to tour
more freely and to meet with congressional representatives during stopovers
in the United States. President Bush publicly pledged to come to Taiwan’s
aid with US military power if Taiwan were attacked by mainland China. The
steps were welcomed in Congress, but they deepened Beijing’s judgment that
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Chapter 6
the United States would remain at odds with China over the Taiwan issue for
the foreseeable future. 44
Beginning in 2003, as the Taiwan government of President Chen Shui-
bian advanced pro-independence proposals that the Bush administration saw
as destabilizing, the US president and his aides took steps to curb those
potentially destabilizing actions. In general, these steps elicited only minor
objections from the normally pro-Taiwan Congress. 45 Beginning in 2008, the calming of cross-strait tensions that resulted from Taiwan President Ma
Ying-jeou’s policies of reassurance toward China was welcomed in the ad-
ministration and the Congress.
Tibet
The Dalai Lama long had some strong supporters in the US
Congress and among other US opinion leaders, and these continued to put
pressure on the White House to protect Tibetan culture and accord Tibet
greater status in US law despite Beijing’s strong objections. 46 The Tibet issue flared again in US-China relations in 2007. Congress awarded the Congressional Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama in a public ceremony. President Bush
met the Dalai Lama during his visit to Washington, and Bush took part in the
congressional award ceremony. China protested strongly. 47 Congressional leaders spoke out firmly against the Chinese crackdown on dissent and violence in Tibet in 2008.
China and the 110th Congress
The strong victory of the Democratic Party in the November 7, 2006, con-
gressional elections underlined a broad desire of the American electorate for
change in the policies and priorities of the G. W. Bush administration. In the
House of Representatives, the Democratic Party moved from a deficit posi-
tion of thirty seats against the Republican majority to an advantage of thirty
seats over the Republicans, and in the Senate it erased the Republican Party’s
ten-seat advantage, gaining a one-seat majority.
The implications of the Democratic victory seemed serious for US policy
in the Asia-Pacific and particularly for US policy toward China, the focus of
greatest controversy in the US Congress regarding Asia-Pacific countries.
The Democratic majority of the 110th Congress, led by opinionated and
often confrontational leaders Representative Nancy Pelosi and Senator Harry
Reid, pressed for change in a partisan atmosphere charged by preparations
for the US presidential election of 2008. The Democratic majority was fore-
cast to pursue strong trade and economic measures that, if successful, would
seriously disrupt US economic relations with China and the free trade em-
phasis of the Bush administration. Mainstream commentator Thomas Fried-
man predicted a civil war in American politics over the massive US trade
deficit and related economic issues with China. Democrats pushing more
Pragmatism amid Differences during the G. W. Bush Administration
135
activist approaches regarding human rights and environmental initiatives
added to anticipated serious complications in US relations with China. 48
In contrast to such dire warnings, however, factors of power, priorities,
politics, and personalities diluted the push for substantial change in US poli-
cy in Asia and toward China in particular. These factors resulted in a more
balanced assessment of what the Democratic-led Congress could actually
accomplish in changing US policies and practices in Asia. On the one hand,
there were frequent episodes of congressional proposals, postures, and ma-
neuvers regarding US policies and practices involving China. On the other
hand, the impact of these congressional actions seemed not to change the
course of US relations with China in major ways. Overall the experience
supported the view that the equilibrium that emerged in relations between the
US and Chinese governments would not be substantially challenged by the
continuing US domestic debate over priorities in policy toward China. 49
Power
The US Constitution gave the executive the leading role in
foreign affairs. In the face of a determined president like George W. Bush,
the Democratic-led Congress appeared to have only a few levers to force
change in areas that impacted on US relations with Asia and especially
China. Congress controlled government spending—the “power of the purse.”
This control could be used to block, redirect, or tailor administration requests for US government spending and US foreign assistance. The relevance of
this issue to China was low, especially as official US aid was not allowed to
go to China. Congressional opposition could hold up and possibly halt ad-
ministration personnel appointments or policy initiatives needing congres-
sional approval. In its last years, the Bush administration did not appear to
anticipate major or controversial personnel changes regarding China, and
broader Asia policy or substantial policy initiatives requiring congressional
action.
Priorities
Newly empowered Democratic leaders in the House and
Senate voiced varied priorities, and China policy was not high on the list.
They tended to focus initially on such domestic issues as raising the mini-
mum wage, controlling government spending deficits, strengthening job se-
curity for US workers, preserving Social Security, and providing limited tax
relief for middle-class taxpayers. Finding ways to change the adverse course
of the US-led war in Iraq dominated the foreign policy agenda.
Against this background, lower priority attention to China-related issues
focused on finding ways to deal more effectively with the massive US trade
deficit and perceived unfair Chinese trade and economic policies. Some
Democratic leaders and members favored strong emphasis on human rights,
&
nbsp; labor conditions, and environmental concerns in governing US policy to
China and other concerned Asian countries, but others did not.
Politics
The bruising fight among House Democrats leading to the
selection of Representative Steny Hoyer as House majority leader over the
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Chapter 6
wishes of Speaker-designate Nancy Pelosi was a reminder that the Demo-
crats in the House of Representatives would not follow their leaders in lock-
step as Republicans had done in recent years. Even if Speaker Pelosi wanted
to push House Democrats to follow her past leanings to be tough in relations
with China regarding human rights and trade, the makeup of the Democratic
caucus and likely committee leadership strongly suggested less-than-uniform
support. Conservative Democratic members increased as a result of the 2006
election and were reluctant to press too hard on human rights, environment,
and other issues when important US business and security interests were at
stake. Many Democratic members supported free trade and resisted what
they saw as protectionist measures of Democratic colleagues against China.
They were backed by polling data of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs,
which showed that Americans were fairly comfortable with the economic
rise of China. 50
Personalities
Given loose Democratic leadership control, individual
members in key committee assignments mattered in the Democratic-led Con-
gress and its approach to China issues. Because they differed among them-
selves on key issues, they were likely to have difficulty coming up with
united positions in pressing for meaningful change in Bush administration
policies regarding China. 51 On the one hand, the public positions of House leader Pelosi and Senate leader Reid were tough on trade and related economic and human rights issues regarding China. Representative Sander Le-
vin and some other members of the House Ways and Means Committee and
other economic policy committees also favored a tougher US stance on trade
issues with China. However, they were offset by committee moderates
headed by the Ways and Means Committee’s leading Democrat, Charles
Rangel. In the Senate, the leading Democrat on the Finance Committee, Max